P-387 is the first one. Your Honour -- okay. You will recall this is a photograph of Charles Taylor holding an automatic weapon in his right-hand and next to him is Benjamin Yeaten on his left and the real Butterfly, Oretha Gweh, on his right. And then perhaps just to shorten things if we can go to P-396, P-395, your Honours are three other photographs of Charles Taylor, I'm not going to show those in a -- camouflage uniforms holding a weapon in each of those photographs. None of those are - clearly none of those are inspecting a honour guard.
Or none of them appear to be during any ceremony. And then P-396 is a picture of Taylor pointing at a map holding his AK-47, much like -- several witnesses talked about Charles Taylor planning military operations including the December attack. Isaac Mongor said Sam Bockarie told him Taylor stood over a map in discussing how the attack would take place. Also TF1-371 said before the attack, invasion of Sierra Leone, Taylor stood over a map and discussed how the invasion of Sierra Leone would take place.
If we could have D-118, please, page 2? One of the most obviously non-credible statements of Charles Taylor was when he testified the 9th of September 2009, page 28481 that people that were under the age of 18 were not trained as military personnel in the NPFL.
Then there was a lot of - he was asked several - a lot of questions about that and he stuck with it. And he was asked about the term "small boys unit" SBU and he admitted that term existed around Gbarnga which just so happens to be the same term the RUF rebels, his surrogate army, used and Charles Taylor said, "SBU, well, they are like boy scouts." That was his explanation for the small boys unit. But the Defence put into evidence several articles by a man named Baffour Ankomah which praised Taylor very much, rather very, very favourable articles to Charles Taylor, a journalist who obviously likes him. And we see here this article it says that Baffour Ankomah spent a month behind the lines with Charles Taylor and his forces in Liberia, going to the bottom of the first column, he said, "Small boy soldiers some as young as nine and ten years old would put a knife to the throat of some elderly Krahn man and tell him, 'Papay, don't worry, it won't hurt you.' In another minute his head would be gone. Some teenage soldiers, both boys and girls, told me in separate interviews that they just wanted to seek revenge for the atrocities committed against their parents, whose dismembered bodies were left to rot in the open by Doe soldiers. One boy who is now 14 told me in a disarmament camp, 'I returned to our village from school in Monrovia'"... and it goes on. "He says, 'I joined President Taylor's army and sought revenge.'"
So many of the other bits of evidence in this trial including the chapter written by Herman Cohen and other reports of NGOs document that clearly child soldiers were rampant in the NPFL.
Then one of the more relevant lies of Charles Taylor was when he claimed to this Court that he had no idea that the RUF trained at Camp Naama but we've had testimony, including from Defence witnesses that the RUF was in Naama, 025 said at least he arrived in August and it already was full, from August 1990 up until March 1991, the RUF army was created at Camp Naama. That's where they were trained. Their trainers included, even according to Defence witnesses, many NPFL officers like One Man One, several others, Isaac Mongor, former NPFL. John Vincent, one of the Defence witnesses said of the original 328 RUF members, RUF vanguards, trained at Naama, 252 of those were Liberians, that's comes out to 77 per cent of the RUF army was a Liberian army. The others, we've heard from both Prosecution and Defence witnesses, many of them were Sierra Leoneans who had been captured by the NPFL. DCT-292 was one of them. He said he was captured by an NPFL operation and he was told they - that it came from the high command. One of the men told him it came from the high command, this order to arrest them, they were threatened with death until Foday Sankoh took him out and brought him and others to Gbarnga, passing through, and he marked on a map, at least five NPFL checkpoints.
Issa Sesay says he was tricked in the Ivory Coast by Sankoh and he's brought first to the NPFL base at Cuttington and then no Naama, and Naama we know from other witnesses and one of the best is the last Defence witness, Sam Kolleh, it was an NPFL base, NPFL was present at the same time, Sam Kolleh said he was captured by the NPFL in Gbarnga, which is Taylor's headquarters, he was - he was in Camp Naama for a month, the NPFL part, and then he was transferred to the RUF so what the evidence shows is what exactly what Zigzag Marzah testified to is correct, what he said is: "NPFL and RUF are not different. When you're in Sierra Leone you're RUF, when you're in Liberia you're NPFL." John Vincent, Defence witness, went from NPFL to RUF, and later he went back to the NPFL or then it was the AFL and the SSS.
He was accepted and welcomed back into the SSS despite the fact that he'd been an RUF rebel according to the laws of Liberia, a mercenary, according to the Mano River Union, Taylor had an obligation to arrest him, instead he was welcomed back into the SSS.
Another bit of the - where Issa Sesay let the cat out of the bag was when he discussed the list of vanguards and identified Momoh Dgiba as one of the vanguards but said Momoh Dgiba left the camp just before the invasion. Well, who is Momoh Dgiba? If you look at the book the presidential papers in about half the pictures of Charles Taylor, you'll see Momoh Dgiba at his side or standing right behind him. He was his aide-de-camp. He replaced his son Chucky as head of the ATU, and yet Charles Taylor wants to tell you that even when he testified in 2009 he had no idea that the RUF had trained in the middle of his territory for at least 7 months with 300-plus men, it's just obviously not credible.
Defence witnesses also contradict Taylor about the NPFL role in the invasion. John Vincent says the NPFL captured Koindu, he said that on 25 March - page 38017 - of 2010. Issa Sesay agreed the NPFL led the invasion and he named NPFL commanders like Sam Tuah, Pa James and Charles Timber as taking part in that event, that invasion, that was the 16th of August, page 46420 to 21 and also the 17th of August, page 46437.
Charles Taylor tried to say that Foday Sankoh in the early years of the war would only come to Liberia for a few days, he admitted Sankoh had a house there but said he would only come for a few days. But the Defence witness Musa Fayia testified that Sankoh was there for six months, up until Top 40, Sankoh was based at Charles Taylor's headquarters, Gbarnga.
Then my colleague Mr Bangura has already talked about the U-turn the Defence case took. Many of the Defence witnesses were called for most of the year, 2010, saying that the RUF never got ammunition from Liberia, Daniel Tamba didn't carry ammunition, all the ammunition was captured, but then you had 008 saying, exactly what Prosecution witnesses said, that Daniel Tamba, Jungle, Zigzag Marzah, and Sampson, carried ammunition, NPFL ammunition, to the RUF at a time that Charles Taylor claims he had no ammunition to give.
That's also corroborated by John Vincent who testified that when he was asked about Daniel Tamba, Jungle, he said he used to come back and forth from Monrovia with ammunition.
My time is getting short so I'm going to try to shorten things up. I'm going to try to hit two topics quickly. One is about the failure of the Abidjan Peace Accord. The evidence from Defence witnesses, particularly DCT-292 and Musa Fayia, is that Foday Sankoh had no intention of implementing the Abidjan Accord. And this corroborates Prosecution evidence that he was told by Taylor to use the accord to prepare for war, to get ammunition.
But you recall a very interesting event, historical event occurred, that after Foday Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria and I believe it's an agreed fact, the 7th of March, early March 1997, Musa Fayia testified that the external delegation held a press conference, he was there, on 15 March 1997. And they announced a change in leadership. They didn't say who the leader was going to be, they said that was going to be up to the combatants but they said Foday Sankoh was no longer going to be the leader and this news was welcomed by many many quarters, many many people. They were immediately contacted, he said it went over the BBC, it went over the VOA, it was on Focus on Africa that very day, Musa Fayia testified. They received positive responses from the United Nations, special representative, I believe, called him, Mr Dinka from the Government of Sierra Leone, from the Government of the Ivory Coast, he said Amara Essy contacted him. The Government of Nigeria provided a plane and the Government of the Ivory Coast - of Guinea excuse me, arranged the travel so that they could go and meet with the combatants in Kailahun. All of these people, all of these internationals, and he said also NGOs and internationals came forward to support this change of leadership in the interests of peace. But despite the fact that the external delegation was based in Danane, that's where it was born and it's clear why Danane was chosen; it's a small town in Ivory Coast but it had been a base for the NPFL, it's where Musa Cisse lived and where Charles Taylor says he used to recruit for the NPFL, where they had a radio station according to Yanks Smythe, in Danane. So the RUF put its external delegation basically in Danane so it would receive the support and be under the supervision of its real sponsor, Charles Taylor, but when this change of leadership was announced, naively obviously by these external delegates, the one person that didn't call was Charles Taylor, Musa Cisse, no one from Liberia, none of Taylor's people, called with any support. During his examination, some testimony was read to him from Augustine Mallah, Augustine Mallah testified on 12 November that two days after Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, he called the radio operator for Musa Cisse and that Mallah was present in the house of Musa Cisse when they put Sam Bockarie in contact with Foday Sankoh through Musa Cisse's radio, and Mallah heard Foday Sankoh tell Bockarie that he should take all orders from Charles Taylor.
We read that testimony to Musa Fayia on 21 April and then he was asked:
"Sir, now do you understand after hearing this that the reason Liberia didn't try to contact those of you trying to change the leadership of the RUF was because once Foday Sankoh was arrested Charles Taylor was in command of the RUF and he had no - he had no interest in anyone else taking over?"
And if you recall his face, I think a bit of shock went over this man, who you recall from the evidence was tortured for two years by Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay in Buedu, and he said - answered, "yeah, if that statement is true, then that is the reason why we were not contacted by Liberia at all, definitely."
That is what happened. The reason that Charles Taylor didn't try to contact or support in any way the external delegates in the change of leadership was the situation was exactly as he wanted it, Foday Sankoh had told Bockarie: Take all orders from Taylor. Mallah by the way is corroborated by TF1-338 who testified to the same evidence that the -- Bockarie was giving the order to - told to take orders from Taylor. That was 1 September 2008, page 15116.
And then basically, I'm out of time. I would like to give a few moments to my colleague, Ms Hollis, but let me just mention one further document and that is a devastating document in this case and that is P-28, it's the document Abu Keita gave us of an operational order in Lofa County. It clearly was written by the adjutant for Benjamin Yeaten, and on that document appear the signatures of Benjamin Yeaten and just above it, Issa Sesay, there's RUF and AFL commanders listed. The document shows exactly what we say was happening throughout the war, the RUF was a surrogate army for Charles Taylor.
The signature of Benjamin Yeaten, if you look at Yanks Smythe's ID card, D-104(B), it's exactly the same signature. And Issa Sesay, of course, when shown the document denied it and he said, "That's not the way I sign." That's what he said, "That's not the way I sign." But then we put all of his signatures on a page of documents and the signature from P-28 he identified as one that was his signature.
So what that document shows and what the evidence in this case shows, is that from the creation of the RUF at Naama, all the way to the end of the war, when the RUF fought for Taylor invading Guinea and fought for Taylor in Ivory Coast, it was his surrogate army. He controlled it, he directed it, he supplied it he facilitated their crimes and he's responsible for the crimes. Thank you.