Thank you, Madam President, your Honours. I will very briefly address the Defence remarks in relation to question 2(v) about reliance on uncorroborated hearsay and then Mr Koumjian will address the Defence remarks relating to adjudicated fact 15 and the questions on aiding and abetting. Very briefly, your Honours, in regard to the Defence remarks about the findings in relation to Isaac Mongor and TF1-371, of course it will be very helpful when your Honours review paragraphs 6969 and 6970, which are the paragraphs that relate to the mens rea for planning. And you will note, when you review those paragraphs, that the Trial Chamber cited multiple bases, for its ultimate finding that Mr Taylor had the intent or awareness necessary for planning. However, it's also important to note that the only authority, in our submission, to support the Defence position on this question is the line of cases from the European Court of Human Rights which has since been abandoned. And even in those cases, balancing the rights of the accused with the rights of the public and victims to a proper prosecution of crimes, the standard established was a prohibition on reliance on evidence not subjected to cross-examination only where - only where - such evidence was the sole or decisive basis for the conviction. This line of cases sets out that standard, and nothing in those cases says that the standard only applies to cases which are not complex. But perhaps of more assistance to your Honours in relation to the Defence argument that we have to have a different standard here because we're talking about war crimes, it's helpful to recall that the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in the Prlic case on which the Defence relied involved an accused charged with crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws and customs of war. And, with an accused facing those charges, the Appeals Chamber accepted the then existing European Court of Human Rights' law as being guidance that was very valuable to them on the issue of what weight a fact-finder was allowed to give evidence not subjected to cross-examination. And they relied on the standard set out in this line of cases, that you cannot rely on such evidence as the sole or decisive basis for a conviction. Nowhere in the Prlic decision does the Appeals Chamber say, "But you know, we have to have an even lower standard. We have to be able to prohibit that evidence even at a lower level because we are dealing with war crimes." They didn't say that. They accepted the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence as it was set out. They did not say a lower standard must apply. But most importantly, your Honours, that prohibition set out in that line of cases from the European Court of Human Rights is not the rule in this Court, and indeed it is no longer the rule in the European Court of Human Rights. The Trial Chamber did not err in this case in its assessment of the evidence including its assessment of whatever evidence your Honours may determine to be hearsay. Thank you.