Yes, and we are talking -- we just replicated the chart that the Defence gave us. This -- and it would be -- it will be tab 9 in that bundle, your Honours. Tab 9. And if we could just very, very briefly go over these alleged examples of uncorroborated hearsay, starting with number 1 alleged message from Base 1 to troops retreating from Kono. Is this really hearsay? It is uncorroborated. Is this really hearsay? And as we go throughout the entire bunch of examples, we would suggest that you also have to ask yourself was this -- even under the old jurisprudence, was this a sole or decisive factor in any conviction? But first of all, as to the first one, is it hearsay? The finding in contention is that the radio station of Benjamin Yeaten in Monrovia intercepted an AFRC/RUF communication and then sent out a radio message concerning the withdrawal from Kono. So is that hearsay? And secondly, it's based on the direct involvement of TF1-516, who was monitoring the communications. As to the second one, the alleged order to attack Kono, under "Operations in Kono (Early 1998)", this evidence is corroborated, and we refer your Honours to the Judgement, paragraph 2855, and our Response, paragraphs 527 to 531 of our Rule 112 Response. The next one, the "Alleged Order to Attack Kono (Second Order)". This was corroborated, and we refer your Honours to the Trial Judgement at paragraphs 2855, 2840 to 2841. The next one, the "Alleged Order to Hold Kono." This was corroborated, and we refer your Honours to the Trial Judgement at paragraph 2857 and to our Response at paragraphs 533 to 536. In relation to " The Freetown Invasion," the planning -- "The Plan," which is at page 3, this evidence was corroborated, and we refer your Honours to paragraphs 3100 to 3104 of the Judgement and also to paragraphs 5513 and 5514 of the Judgement and to our Response at paragraphs 89 to 92. As to the examples relating to the instruction to make the operation fearful and to use all means, we refer you to our Response at paragraph 269 and at paragraphs 247 to 256 and 260 to 262, and we suggest that indeed this is corroborated by TF1-371 in relation to the meaning of these two terms. But at this point we also want to talk a little bit about, you know, that even jurisdictions that say, "You can't admit hearsay," have exceptions to hearsay. Do any of these statements fall into any exceptions to the hearsay rule? And especially when we look at this instruction from Charles Taylor to make the operation fearful, to use all means, we suggest there are exceptions. There used to be one that was generically called a res gestae exception. This was an inherent part of the plan - this was an inherent part of the implementation of the plan - and we suggest that would be an exception to the hearsay rule. Now, in today's iterations of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, we suggest this would most commonly be found under an exception under then existing mental condition, because that relates to intent, motive, plan. We also suggest that it would be admissible because this was against Charles Taylor's interest. If you look at it in context, this was an instruction of a criminal nature and this was against his interest, and so we suggest that would be an exception as well. We suggest that it would also be an exception for Sam Bockarie, because by passing this on this, of course, was part of the res gestae of the plan and the implementation, but it was also against his interest because by passing it on he was adopting it, accepting it and passing it on. And also when we look at this type of thing, if one person gives another person an instruction that is going to involve an act that is inherently criminal, or in the circumstances is criminal, how can you say you cannot talk about that instruction, that only the one who gave the instruction could come forward to testify about it? So we suggest that it would be admissible. And the same thing is true -- well, also I should point out that there was an argument yesterday that, "Well, you know, the originator of the statement was unable to confront ...", or, "The Defence was unable to confront the originator of the statement." Well, in fact the originator of the statement was Charles Taylor. Now, he could not be forced to testify, but he did testify, and he testified for months, and in fact he did address this on 27 October 2009 at pages 30419 to 30420 of the record. When we look at this issue of "by all means," we suggest that the same analysis would apply in terms of, "Are there exceptions to the hearsay rule? Even in those jurisdictions that have a rule excluding hearsay, are there exceptions?", and we suggest that, yes, indeed there are. We also suggest that there can be no argument that, "Well, the originator, we didn't have a chance to confront the originator." The originator was Charles Taylor and, once again, he testified about this when he chose to testify. Now, if we move on to the "Allegation that the Accused Directed the Freetown Invasion," prisoners from Buedu, TF1-516 corroborates Dauda Fornie and you can look at our Response at paragraphs 216 to 217.