The transcripts of the trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia. More…

Good morning, your Honours. Good morning, counsel. And thank you very much. May it please the Court, your Honours, I'd like to begin by discussing some of the Defence arguments regarding the adjudicated fact 15, the law on adjudicated facts and specifically regarding Freetown and the role of the RUF in Freetown, because I believe, I am sure unintentionally, some of the facts of this case were not correctly represented to your Honours. In one of the arguments during the arguments of the Defence yesterday, it was stated that the adjudicated fact 15 said the RUF didn't make a contribution. Actually, the RUF -- what the adjudicated fact 15 states is that - part of it - when RUF reinforcements arrived in Waterloo they were unable or unwilling to make the necessary contribution, and what I understand by "necessary contribution" is to repel ECOMOG, to kick them out of the city, to take Freetown and hold it, but the evidence has always been clear that the RUF contributed to the Freetown operation. Again, I believe Mr Gosnell mistakenly represented to you that the AFRC forces reached Freetown led by SAJ Musa. Your Honours, only if SAJ Musa was a ghost, because it's a finding in this case that SAJ Musa was killed on 24 December 1998 in Benguema. As Mr Gosnell said, he was assassinated. I agree the evidence shows that. The Trial Chamber didn't make that finding, but they found he was at least killed on that day in Benguema. And when he -- once he died, the situation changed immediately, because immediately the AFRC forces led now by Gullit began communicating with the RUF and, the Trial Chamber found, co-ordinating with the RUF and following the orders of Sam Bockarie. So that changed immediately. The forces that went into Freetown were not led by SAJ Musa. They were led by Gullit, acting under the instructions of Sam Bockarie, and the forces that went into Freetown were AFRC and RUF forces that Gullit was commanding. That is an agreed fact in this case. Agreed fact 31 in this case is RUF and AFRC forces inter alia attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999. And what happened when they took Freetown that morning, when the people of Freetown woke up to find RUF/AFRC rebels in their midst? As I mentioned yesterday, from State House they called Robin White at BBC and he asked "Who? Who are the forces that have taken the city?" He said, "We, the combined forces, the RUF and the AFRC." Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found other contributions, one critical contribution that Charles Taylor and his forces -- those acting under his instructions were making to this invasion. The one clear advantage that ECOMOG had was control of the air, and the Alpha Jets of the Nigerian forces were a great concern. The RUF/AFRC forces had no defence against the Alpha Jets. 448 warnings, that was the code. 448 warnings were given from Buedu and from Monrovia to the forces in the city to let them know, "Jets have taken off. You're going to be attacked," and these were critical because -- in making sure that the AFRC/RUF forces were not caught in the open by the Alpha Jets. These warnings made a critical contribution. But, moreover, before Gullit led those forces in the city, it's critical that he knew the RUF was at his back. The situation in Sierra Leone had changed tremendously from the beginning of the attack on Kono, I believe that was 24 December, before 6 January, because large ECOMOG forces were destroyed in Kono and the RUF captured a great amount of matériels and in Makeni. Makeni, it's the evidence in this case, is a two-hour drive to Freetown. Does the fact that ECOMOG forces had now been removed from Makeni have an effect? Yes. Does the fact that Gullit knows the RUF is with him have an effect? Of course it does. Would it make sense for a force of only about a thousand men, Gullit's forces, to go into the city with ECOMOG forces on the peninsula at Jui, near Waterloo, without knowing that they had reinforcements at their back? They had reinforcements at their back, and in fact adjudicated fact 15 says exactly that. RUF reinforcements arrived in Waterloo. So the evidence in this case is overwhelming that the forces that went into the city were acting in co-ordination with the RUF and the RUF made critical contributions to that invasion and to the crimes. I understood -- and forgive me if I didn't understand everything, but I understood Defence counsel to say yesterday that the Rambo Red Goat group committed no crimes; that there were no findings of crimes by the Rambo Red Goat group. That's not true. Remember Rambo Red Goat group, Issa Sesay - we're very grateful for his testimony - told us included RUF troops. Rambo Red Goat -- in the Trial Judgement, paragraph 6962, the Trial Chamber found that troops led by Rambo Red Goat reached Freetown and Bockarie's forces got to the outskirts of Freetown. It says that, "During the course of the implementation of the plan, these forces committed crimes charged in the indictment," and then in paragraph 5718 the Trial Chamber said, "Notably, the group led by Rambo Red Goat remained in Freetown after the departure of Gullit and the civilian brigade and constituted the forces predominantly charged with carrying out Bockarie's instructions to make the area fearful." And then in paragraph 5720 the Trial Chamber found, "Part of the matériel from the Burkina Faso shipment was taken by a contingent of fighters led by Rambo Red Goat to reinforce the troops in Freetown and was used in the commission of crimes in Freetown and the Western Area." So the evidence is clear that these RUF forces with Rambo Red Goat were involved in the commission of crimes, and again it's an agreed fact that RUF forces were part of the invasion forces. They were with the Red Lion Battalion, a fearsome group that the Trial Chamber found also committed crimes inside Freetown during the invasion. And part of adjudicated fact 15 is it says, "The RUF forces were unable or unwilling to provide the necessary support." Well, what evidence is there about the willingness of the RUF to support the AFRC, the co-ordination? " One of the Defence's own witnesses, Charles Ngebeh, testified on 12 April. At page 38682 he said, "By then it was ECOMOG that was at Jui. ECOMOG was based at Jui at the time that we entered Hastings. We were trying to fight our way to join our brothers in Freetown, but there was no way. God never gave us the opportunity. We tried, but we were unable. I can't tell you lies. We were trying to join the AFRC in Freetown, but the ECOMOG blocked us at Jui. We attacked them and we did not succeed. Thank you." That's what the Defence witness said. Now, does that -- even an unsuccessful attack at Jui Bridge on the Freetown peninsula, does that have an effect on the battle of Freetown? Is that support? It may not have been -- it wasn't the necessary support to win the battle, but of course if ECOMOG is facing a double attack from inside the city and RUF forces are right at Jui, this is support for the forces inside the city; the attempt to, as Charles Ngebeh said, "Link up with our brothers from the AFRC." Now, on the adjudicated fact issue, in listening to the Defence argument they're basically saying that they were prejudiced because they were surprised they weren't allowed to call evidence that could have rebutted Prosecution evidence from 2008. Because the Trial Chamber took notice of the adjudicated fact in 2009 before the start of the Defence case, they said they couldn't call evidence to rebut it. They've never told you what evidence. They're even -- they're continually vague about what this fact supposedly proved in favour of the Defence and they've never told you what evidence they have that they did not call that could have rebutted that fact. The truth is of course throughout this trial, Prosecution case, Defence case, whether or not the RUF had a role in Freetown was a central issue that the Defence fought tooth and nail, they fought it and they lost it, and now they're complaining and asking you to in effect find adjudicated facts after the trial is over with. What the Defence says is that the jurisprudence provides that a Trial Chamber, once it takes notice of an adjudicated fact, can't consider the evidence that's already on the record. They haven't cited a single case that says so. No case says that. All that they've cited - they said it was an example, but it's the only case they've cited - was the Krajisnic decision of 2003. That was pre-trial where again the judge said that they were only taking notice of facts not in reasonable dispute, as opposed to our case where the facts were clearly in dispute and the Trial Chamber said so. And in Krajisnic they didn't say you couldn't rebut the case, the facts. They said in fact a rebuttable presumption remains open to challenge. They said simply it's challenged by presenting evidence and the evidence in this case was already presented. What is the Defence argument? That we should have called the witnesses back to restate what they had already said? That would make no sense. They were arguing that this is a factor for judicial economy, so the Prosecution is supposed to recall the witnesses? That makes no sense. What all of the jurisprudence says is that the Trial Chamber remains under the obligation and duty to consider all of the evidence at the end of the case in assessing the weight, the context and the validity of an adjudicated fact, and that jurisprudence includes the same Trial Chamber in Krajisnic. Two years later in the midst of the trial they took notice of other adjudicated facts, and they said in paragraph 17, "Admission of adjudicated facts from previous proceedings does not affect the Chamber's function of assessing the relevance and weight in light of the totality of the evidence in the trial." And yesterday I read to you from Tolimir and I won't repeat that, but basically it says the same thing. The Trial Chamber has the obligation to assess the adjudicated fact in relation to the totality of the evidence. There even is an Appeal Chamber decision on that in Karemera from 29 May 2009, and in paragraph 21 of that appeal decision the ICTR Appeals Chamber stressed that, "... adjudicated facts that are judicially noticed by way of Rule 94(b) remain to be assessed by the Trial Chamber to determine what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from them when considered together with all the evidence brought at trial. Rule 94(b) mechanism does not allow a Chamber to simply defer to the assessment of evidence by another Chamber on the ground that this mechanism was fashioned to favour consistency." So the law is absolutely clear. It would be a gross violation of the Trial Chamber's duties to ignore evidence on the record that the parties did not have an opportunity to argue because the Defence made a motion for an adjudicated fact midway. The Trial Chamber in fact in this case assessed the totality of the evidence taking into account the adjudicated fact. And I should mention, by the way, that this position was consistently taken by this Defence during the trial. When they made the motion for adjudicated facts from the AFRC case in paragraph 10 they said, "The Prosecution would not be disadvantaged." They said, "The Prosecution may have already led evidence to challenge the rebuttable presumption and that would be established if the Chamber judicially notes these facts." So they're saying the Chamber clearly can consider the Prosecution evidence. In their reply to the motion in paragraph 7 they said, "The Prosecution concede that a certain volume of evidence has already been led to the issues contained in the proposed adjudicated facts. This evidence could be used to challenge any rebuttable presumption created." So the Defence told the Judges when they successfully obtained, one, this adjudicated fact motion, "Don't worry, because of course we understand you can consider the Prosecution evidence already on the record," and now they're saying you can't. Even after the decision was issued in this case they came back a couple months later and asked for adjudicated facts from the RUF case, and the Defence took exactly the same position. After the decision in our case, the AFRC facts were found. In paragraph 12 of their motion of 16 March 2010, the Defence said the Prosecution would not be disadvantaged. The Prosecution may already have led evidence to challenge the rebuttable presumption, and then in their reply on that motion in paragraph 16 the Defence said, "They assume the Chamber has not yet made a final determination on the accuracy, credibility or reliability of the Prosecution evidence. A presumption for the accuracy of adjudicated facts in comparison with contrary Prosecution evidence is only one more factor for the Trial Chamber to consider when weighing all the evidence at the conclusion of the case. A rebuttable presumption can obviously rebutted -- be rebutted at the end of the proceedings by the Trial Chamber considering all of the available evidence." That was the position of the Defence in March of 2010 after this decision was rendered, so for the Defence now to be coming to the Court and saying, "... we were surprised that the Trial Chamber considered the Prosecution evidence that's contrary to the adjudicated fact," well, they weren't surprised. They said themselves consistently that that's what the Trial Chamber could do. What the facts are is that the -- in fact the Trial Chamber did consider all of the evidence and they reached the conclusion, in fact the only reasonable conclusion - from that evidence and the Defence is not happy with it. So now they're changing what they say the law should be and regarding the rules for adjudicated facts. I'd now like to go back to some of the issues on aiding and abetting. I understood the Defence to talk about causation, and I -- perhaps again I misunderstood. I understood Mr Gosnell to say that causation is required for a substantial contribution. In fact, your Honours in your decision on the CDF appeal have specifically said that causation is not a requirement for aiding and abetting. That's also consistent with other Appeal Chamber decisions: The Simic Judgement, paragraph 85; Blaskic at paragraph 48; Mrksic -- excuse me, Furundzija, paragraph -- I'm not sure about that one. Let me just stop there. Further, your Honours, the evidence -- but what I would say before I move on is - and I'll come back to this - causation is not required, but the findings in this case clearly show a causative link. In fact, the findings in this case of the Trial Chamber, well supported by the evidence, show that if not for Charles Taylor's assistance, thousands of people wouldn't have been killed, they wouldn't have been amputated, they wouldn't have been taken as sex slaves, they wouldn't have been conscripted as children into the forces of the RUF and the AFRC, for the reasons that the Trial Chamber very logically and completely describes in its Judgement, because if the operational strategy of the RUF was to commit those crimes they were, as the Trial Chamber found, reliant on Charles Taylor's support, and without his support these operations maintaining the territory where these crimes occurred would not have happened. Some other factors about substantial contribution and acts of assistance for aiding and abetting. It's not required of course that the acts of assistance occur at the time and place of the crime. That's Celebici, 352. It's not a defence in aiding and abetting to say, "I was just doing my routine duties. This was just part of my job," that's Blagojevic Appeals Judgement, paragraph 189, and it certainly is not relevant whether or not the assistance itself that's given is not criminal or is neutral on its face. In Zigiranyirazo - forgive my pronunciation - paragraph 423, in that case the Trial Chamber found that giving food to a group at a roadblock, sending them lunch, amounted to substantial contribution, because the accused knew that these people at the roadblock were engaged in killing Tutsis and the food that was given to sustain their presence at the roadblock was leading to the deaths of more people. Furthermore, in the Zyklon B case, which counsel mistakenly called that Flick, but that's the case involving the poisoned gas that killed four million people plus in Auschwitz and the different camps that the Nazi Germans held, that gas, contrary to what counsel said, is not only useful to kill human beings. It actually was that they were manufacturing that gas and selling it for a long time to kill vermin. That was what the gas was normally used for. And in fact it could have had a very benevolent use in these concentration camps, because it could have been used to make them more sanitary by killing vermin, but the accused in those cases, in the Zyklon B case, were convicted, in fact were given the death penalty, for their aiding and abetting, not because they wanted these four million people killed, but because they knew -- although the gas could be used to kill vermin, they knew that it was being used to kill human beings. That's what the Court found. And based on that knowledge, even if they didn't want the people killed, even if their motive was only to profit or to remain in the good graces of the Nazi politicians, they were responsible for knowingly assisting crimes; in this case the killing of over four million people. And, further, there's jurisprudence that the contribution does not have to be direct. That's Blaskic, paragraph -- Appeals Judgement paragraph 48. In the Furundzija Trial Judgement, paragraph 232, it says that it's not necessary that it be direct and it's not required the contribution have a tangible or a causal effect, and in the Oric Judgement which somehow didn't make it into my notes, in the Appeal Judgement -- in the Trial Judgement in Oric they also stressed the fact that the contribution need not be direct. The Defence in their arguments, as I listened to them yesterday, continues to say specific direction has a mental element. You know, counsel are much wiser than me and I am sure that they -- I believe they know the law much better than me, but we all know actus reus and mens rea are two very different things and a mental element belongs in mens rea. The Judges, as the Defence has conceded, in all of the cases at the ICTY and ICTR, have said specific direction is part of the actus reus. There's no case that says it's part of the mens rea. And the Tadic Appeal Judgement that came up with this term "specifically directed," I'm sure that Judge Shahabuddeen, Judge Cassese, Judge Mumba and the other two judges whose names I don't recall, understood the difference between mens rea and actus reus. They said it was part of the actus reus and, as I explained yesterday, it was to distinguish a contribution simply to a joint criminal enterprise to a common plan from a contribution to the specific crime. I agree -- we agree wholeheartedly with the Defence submission yesterday that the contribution, the accused's acts of assistance, encouragement or moral support have to contribute to the crime. The Trial Chamber applied that standard in this case. They found that each of the 11 counts were affected. Charles Taylor's contribution was substantial to the commission of each of these 11 counts. And the logic that they used was they talked about the operational strategy of the RUF being to use terror; that the modus operandi of the RUF was to use terror. The Defence continues to talk in their submissions about sporadic crimes. In their submissions - oral submissions - yesterday, they talked about a group that among other lawful activities is committing crimes, but the findings on this case are not about sporadic crimes. The findings are that this was an operational strategy, that the crimes were inextricably linked and it's based upon a wealth of evidence from victims and from perpetrators who testified in this case. We had victims talking about -- Reverend Tamba Tey about witnessing the massacre of I believe it was at least 60 people in a mosque, who then had their heads cut off by SBUs. The bodies were decapitated on the orders of the RUF commander. We had a woman who had to carry -- who had to listen -- she herself was raped repeatedly and had to listen while her children were being killed outside and then carry their heads in a bag to the next village, and we had evidence of massacres by the top RUF commander, Sam Bockarie, in Kailahun, and over and over again. And the Defence told us at the beginning of the Defence case, "We don't understand why the Prosecution called all these victims. We've never disputed atrocities happened," but now they're saying, "Oh, these were just sporadic. We don't have enough evidence before you that this was an operational strategy." We did. We heard it consistently from the victims, "Where the RUF was there was terror." As one of the victims of the enslavement camp, the forced labour camp, Mr Gbonda, testified, "We were slaves." He was forced to carry loads and work for the RUF. Those who were forced to labour for the RUF were slaves. Women were kept in slavery. We had so much testimony about that it doesn't make sense to keep talking about it. So the Trial Chamber -- and to show that this was a policy from the very top, this is what one of the Defence witnesses said. One of the Defence witnesses was read the transcript from a radio broadcast that Sam Bockarie made, the exhibit was P-430B, where Sam Bockarie said, "When I take Freetown, I shall clear every living thing and building. To my God, I'll fight. I'll kill and kill, and the more they tell me to stop the more I'll kill." Ms Hollis read this to Charles Ngebeh and asked him about it, and his response was, "I've heard Sam Bockarie say words even worse than this. Let's go ahead, he was a wicked commander." So this was a policy from the very top, and that was from 12 April 2010, page 38660. And that's why the Judges found in paragraph 6793 of the Judgement, "The crimes were inextricably linked to how the RUF and AFRC achieved their political and military objectives." In 6905 the Chamber found that, "The operational strategy of the two groups was characterised by a campaign of crimes against Sierra Leone civilians, including ...", and it goes through the crimes in this indictment: Murders, rapes, sexual slavery, looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription of child soldiers, amputations, acts of terror. And the evidence in this case is indisputable that Charles Taylor knew about these crimes. He knew that this was going on and this is how the RUF operated. On the very first day of his testimony he said, "There's no one on this planet ...", this is 14 July 2009, "... who hasn't heard of the crimes of the RUF." On 3 August 2009, and this is mentioned in the Trial Judgement at paragraph 6684, Taylor said -- he was asked by his counsel, "And everyone will recall that thereafter those kicked out of Freetown ...", talking about the intervention February 1998, "... embarked on an orgy of violence throughout the country of Sierra Leone, yes?" And Mr Taylor answered, "Yes." And he then was asked, "And you were keeping abreast of that situation from your embattled position in Liberia?", and he answered, "Yes." And then on 8 September his counsel read him a report, I believe it was a letter, or a public letter from the United States Government, in which it said, "Our ambassador in Freetown and State Department officials have visited survivors ...", this is dated May of 2008, "... and heard of stories of entire villages being slaughtered and mutilated by the rebel forces. The RUF calls this 'Operation No Living Thing.' Hundreds of people are being treated in hospitals after rebels chopped their arms, legs and/or ears with machetes. Thousands more have died before they were able to reach medical help. Many women and children have been raped." And then the Defence counsel asked, "Now, first of all, the date May. At that time, Mr Taylor, were you aware that there was this horrific campaign being waged against the civilian population in Sierra Leone?" Mr Taylor answered, "May of 1998? Yes, there were news reports of that. Yes." So Taylor knew what was going on. In November, 25 November 1999, Taylor testified -- and this is at Judgement paragraph 6803/6804 -- 2009. Taylor said, "In 1997 there were news reports of problems in Sierra Leone, yes." The question was, "Have you heard of atrocities committed by the RUF?", and the answer was, "In 1997 there were news reports of problems in Sierra Leone, yes." So then he was asked, "So did you learn about the atrocities committed by the junta as it fled Freetown?", and he answered, "Yes, there were reports. Yes, we learned of the reports that there were atrocities all over the place, yes." On 18 January 2010, this is the Trial Judgement paragraph 6805, 6884, Mr Taylor was asked, "Would you agree that a horrific campaign was being waged against civilians in Sierra Leone after the intervention?", and he answered, "Oh, yes. Oh, yes." So -- and there's more, but your Honours I won't go on with more. So the evidence is overwhelming: Charles Taylor was well aware of the campaign of atrocities by the rebels, by the RUF and the AFRC in Sierra Leone and he continued throughout the indictment period to supply them with the ammunition, the weaponry that they needed and to encourage them, to give them advice and moral support. As the standard for aiding and abetting goes, that encouraged these crimes in their military operations. The Trial Chamber specifically found that the RUF and the AFRC relied on Taylor's logistical assistance for its operations and in order to hold territory. The Trial Chamber said, paragraph 5842, "On a number of occasions the arms and ammunition supplied or facilitated by Mr Taylor were indispensable for the RUF/AFRC military offensive." At paragraph 5835 the Chamber said about the arms and ammunition, "It was critical in enabling the RUF and AFRC to carry out offences and maintain territories until the end of the indictment period." At 5842 and 6914 they called it, "... critical in enabling the operational strategy of the RUF and the AFRC." Paragraph 6914, "The AFRC/RUF heavily and frequently relied on the matériels supplied and facilitated by Mr Taylor." And in paragraph 6911 the Trial Chamber says that, "The RUF/AFRC, the junta or alliance and Liberian fighters used matériel provided by Mr Taylor in criminal operations throughout the indictment period." Your Honours, there's a -- and there was a great deal of evidence to support those conclusions. One of them that is discussed in the Judgement, paragraph 4939, is Exhibit P-066, which was a letter from Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor through his Chief of Protocol. In that letter Bockarie says -- it begins by describing the RUF's supply shortages, talking about ECOMOG leading attacks against RUF positions in Koidu and Kailahun, and it says, "We do not have rockets, or bombs, which are badly needed to handle the situation. We're merely managing on the small ammunition we have." It says, "We appreciate the assistance we have been receiving and we want you to believe that we have nowhere else to turn to cry for help besides you ...", that's the Chief of Protocol, "... and His Excellency." So the RUF itself said that they relied upon Charles Taylor and had nowhere else to turn. And those familiar with the geography or look -- anyone who looks at a map of Sierra Leone will see that the country has -- borders only two countries. It borders Guinea and Liberia. We know that except for the brief period during the junta when the RUF was in the capital they controlled no ports, they controlled no airfields and during the junta period there was an embargo, so it was difficult for them to get anything into a port and ECOMOG controlled the Lungi Airport. After they were kicked out of Freetown, it was even more difficult. So they had two borders. They had Guinea, which was a member of ECOMOG and an enemy that they were fighting against, and they had Liberia. So the subject of where the RUF got its ammunition was one that was explored in testimony for three years in this case, both Prosecution witnesses and Defence witnesses. The Defence called, for example, DCT-025 to talk about where the RUF got its ammunition. Supposedly he was in charge of the storage of weapons and ammunition. So when the trial -- and Issa Sesay, of course, the number 2 in the RUF, talked about where the RUF got its ammunition. He himself said that at the time before the big offensive in late 1998 they were out of ammunition. They would not have attacked Kono without the matériel that came from Liberia. That was Issa Sesay's testimony. So all of those attacks, and the Trial Chamber finds this specifically in their Judgement, taking Kono, taking Makeni and moving on to Freetown, and the Trial Chamber found, which is very logical, that the attacks on Kono and Makeni were critical. They had a causative link. They were critical to the attack on Freetown. None of that would have happened without the matériel that came from Liberia in late 1998, and that is the Burkina Faso shipment. The Trial Chamber found the RUF was short of matériel, paragraph 5702, at the time of that shipment and it found the shipment to be critical to the December '98 and January '99 offensives, in paragraph 5841. Paragraph 571 -- 5715, the Trial Chamber found, quote, "The Burkina Faso shipment was causally critical to the success" -- I think I need water -- "to the success of the Kono operation and hence the matériel captured there, as Issa Sesay himself acknowledged, without the shipment that Bockarie brought back in November/December 1998, the RUF would not have launched these operations on Kono. And without taking Kono, the RUF would not have had the matériel necessary to attack other areas." In paragraph 5718 they said, "The contribution of the attacks on Kono and Makeni to later attacks on the Freetown axis by the RUF and the RUF and AFRC was critical." And they also went on to talk about this joint attack in February 1999 on Tombo. After the AFRC retreated from Freetown in February 1999, the two forces were based together close to Benguema and the evidence showed and the Trial Chamber found they jointly tried another attack on Freetown this time going through Tombo and the Trial Chamber found that in that attack there was forcible conscription of children and rape of women captured by the RUF and AFRC. So these were causally critical, all of these supplies of logistics by Taylor. And I'm running short of time, but I'd like to try to get to what Mr Gosnell began with in his submission, and that is these crimes against eight people in Payema. Payema is in Kono, and lots -- most of the evidence about those eight killings came from the testimony of a witness who came to this Court by the name of Ibrahim Fofana, and Mr Fofana testified that in February 1998 some soldiers showed up in Payema and they said this is Operation Pay Yourself and they were looting, and a few days later -- and taking things from everyone. A few days later more soldiers came, and then they said this is No Living Thing, and he saw one of his neighbours murdered by a soldier who asked for diamonds and the man didn't have any. And he saw the bodies of two other neighbours who were killed that day. He and his family then fled to Guinea, he said, for a month or month-and-a-half and came back in April of 1998 to Payema and there he was captured, and his family was also captured, three children, his mother and an aunt. And his three children, his mother and his aunt were put into a house and they were burnt to death. They were burnt alive. Mr Fofana, along with four other adult men, were made to carry loads and they carried these loads to another part of Kono, Tombudu, another diamond mining area, where Mr Fofana witnessed 53 people being put into a house and the house set on fire and the people burned to death. And then Mr Fofana and others who were with him, one of them was Mustapha Mansaray, who I mentioned yesterday, were forced to put their hands out and their hands were amputated, and Mr Fofana lost both of his hands. So this is the operational strategy. This is what the Defence calls in their submissions "sporadic crimes of the RUF." And why? Well, we know that when the AFRC/RUF were in retreat, Johnny Paul Koroma, and this is in the Judgement, was desperately calling Charles Taylor for sanctuary in Liberia, and Taylor gave him an instruction and that instruction was, "Hold Kono. Take back Kono." And the RUF, the Chamber found, made two attacks on Kono and the second one was successful to take it back in about February 1998. And why -- why was Mr Fofana, why did all these things happen to him? Well, I can give you my explanation, but I think it's also important to listen to what he said, so I'd like at this time to play a very short bit of an exhibit, P-14. This is not his testimony, but this is part of a Canadian documentary where Mr Fofana appeared. So if that could be played. And you all need to turn to "Courtroom." Please push the "Courtroom" button on your black box. So to see it please push "Courtroom."

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