Good morning, your Honours. It's a privilege to address you. Your Honours, during my remarks if at any time I'm not clear, I welcome your interventions, your questions, if I can clarify any issue in your mind. I'm not particularly articulate, and I definitely am nervous about -- because of the importance of the issues that we are addressing today. I'm going to begin by addressing the six questions that your Honours have asked about aiding and abetting, and that come from the Defence appeal of Mr Taylor's conviction for aiding and abetting each of the 11 counts of the indictment. Before I begin and get into the details and jurisprudence, answering those six questions, I think it's useful to step back for a moment and look at the common thread that runs through these issues, these issues of specific direction, purpose, of what the Defence calls the "as such standard." Because if you carefully study the Defence submission, you'll see a common thread in all of these areas and that is, while the Defence and Prosecution agree - and the Defence acknowledges - that the jurisprudence from your Honours in all three cases at this Court and from all of the ad hoc courts, back to Tadic 15 years ago in 1997, imposes a mens rea standard of knowledge for those who aid and abet atrocity crimes. The Defence challenges that. They say that is not the standard that should -- that exists in customary international law during the indictment period and they assert it shouldn't be the standard. What the Defence proposes to you is that the law should be a person is not responsible who knowingly aids and abets a campaign of atrocities where people are being raped, people are being amputated, people are being killed. They're not responsible if they knowingly assisted unless their purpose was those very crimes; unless the objective that they were seeking to achieve, their desire, was the crimes being committed. So under the Defence proposal if a person knowingly aids and abets atrocities knowing people are going to be killed and raped, but they do it for a political advantage, or they do it for a military alliance, or they do it simply for greed, simply to make money, then they're not responsible because their purpose was not the crimes. Their purpose was military advantage, or their purpose was money. So to take an example that I think exemplifies this - our case is a great example, but just to use other facts - if a person was selling ammunition and arms to the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, in 1994 in Rwanda, aware of the killings that they were doing, aware of their campaign to kill all Tutsis in Rwanda, but they were doing it indifferent to the killings simply to make money, or perhaps they were doing it because, "You know, the Hutus are our allies in Congo and so we're providing these arms for military advantage. The fact that Tutsis are being killed doesn't help me, but it helps me that the Hutus are strong," according to the Defence, as they would want the international criminal law to be, they would not be responsible. So we see these grounds of appeal in this case, the trial of the first -- the first Head of State being tried for crimes he committed as Head of State ever, of great, great consequence, and we think the fact that you are dealing now with issues of aiding and abetting and how we hold responsible not just those who perpetrate crimes, but those who promote them, we think that's extremely important because in conflicts around the world unfortunately there are groups that engage in campaigns of terror. We can see in the facts of this case, for example, where the RUF under the facts of this case most of the persons were recruited, even according to Defence witnesses, they were taken from NPFL jails and given a choice of joining the RUF or being killed. It was created in terror, and in those circumstances it's not hard, it's not that difficult, to find a Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay to go and lead these groups in carrying out great atrocities against civilians. But those behind them we feel are just as important that we hold responsible. Those are the promoters of the war, the lords of war, that sell arms to groups engaged in these conflicts; those who fund groups by buying resources, whether they're buying cocaine from the Shining Path in Peru, or whether they are buying gold or diamonds from a group engaged in raping women as a modus operandi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those who knowingly provide assistance that they know will facilitate these crimes should be held responsible, and that's the difference between us and the Defence. In their view, as long as their purpose is not the crimes, it's political advantage, it's military advantage, or in the case of Charles Taylor the diamonds of Sierra Leone, then it's okay. They're not responsible for aiding and abetting. They had a different purpose. We think that would be a great step backward in international law. Your Honours have asked about the actus reus of aiding and abetting and whether the Trial Chamber correctly applied the standard under customary international law. In paragraph 424 of the Judgement, the Trial Chamber articulates a standard that's recognised in international law and that is that the aider and abettor has provided practical assistance, encouragement or moral support that assists the perpetration of a crime, of a specific crime, and, secondly, the Trial Chamber has to find that this assistance had a substantial effect on this crime. So that is the actus reus of aiding and abetting. Now, the Defence argument at times in their submissions, one of their headings is "The actus reus of aiding and abetting is nothing less than purpose." Now, purpose is clearly, reading the Defence submissions, a mental element. It's part of the mens rea. All of -- everyone understands the difference between actus reus and mens rea, but unless you tell me not to I will address then whether purpose is part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, or whether there's any mental element for the actus reus of aiding and abetting, which requires me really to talk about the mens rea; what the actual mens rea of aiding and abetting is. Your Honours, there is no requirement of purpose in the jurisprudence and the law, and one consequence of the Defence proposal I'd like to point out is a fundamental principle of international criminal law. It's called -- it's in the Nuremberg principles, it is principle number 4, and it's part of the Statute of this Court, I believe Article 6, that says words to the effect of, "It is not an offence to crimes of international law to say 'I was just following orders. I was doing what my superior told me.'" Well, under the Defence proposal for aiding and abetting, that's a perfect defence. "My purpose was not to see the crimes committed. I was obeying an order. My purpose was to satisfy my superior." So the Defence proposal that purpose be part of aiding and abetting would blow a hole in the international criminal law - you could drive a truck through, or many trucks full of ammunition through - in making it for persons -- a defence possible for aiders and abettors to simply say, "I was following orders. That was my purpose", because what the Defence means by purpose -- and if you read carefully their submission when they talk about specific direction and when they talk about the assistance must be to the crime as such, what they mean is it has to be the ultimate objective, the desire of the person, the aider and abettor, when he provides the assistance, that the crimes happened; that this can't be just something they know is happening, or even a means to achieve what they want to happen. The Defence relies upon two general arguments -- and, by the way, the Defence submissions are excellent and they're very well researched and they're very clever. They're simply wrong about what customary international law is. But the Defence makes two basic arguments in two ways. One is with the ICC Statute, arguing that the ICC Statute provides for purpose. I'm not going to repeat the arguments in our submissions. The ICC never has purported to be codifying customary international law, and very frankly, your Honours know, the whole scheme of modes of participation at the ICC right now is a mess and no one knows exactly what it means. And 25(3)(d), the provision that we talked about that clearly provides a knowingly standard for those that knowingly aid and abet a common plan, well, that's not joint criminal enterprise because you don't have to be a member. Mbarushimana, the case that the Defence cites, says that you don't have to be a member. You don't have to intend any crime under 25(3)(d). So it's not joint criminal enterprise. They say it's not aiding and abetting. So then what is it? If the Defence is saying the ICC Statute codifies customary international law, what mode of liability is 25(3)(d)? What it is is a subset of aiding and abetting for those who are aiding and abetting a joint criminal enterprise, but our point is the ICC Statute never attempts to codify customary international law and it's not helpful in understanding customary international law. The Defence also asked -- did a survey of domestic jurisdictions and said, "Well, going back to 1996, how many States used different standards?" And their conclusion, which we do not differ with, is that there's a great variety of ways that the intent for aiding and abetting is articulated in different domestic standards. The Defence, for example, points out that some jurisdictions have the knowingly standard, and I believe they cite New York, Israel, South Africa and they mention the United Kingdom sometimes applies that. I don't fault them for that, but of course there are other jurisdictions that also use the knowledge standard. France, for example, specifically in its code uses the knowledge standard. In a moment I hope I can find that. The French criminal code, Article 121(7), provides, "The accomplice to a felony or a misdemeanour is the person who knowingly by aiding and abetting facilitates its preparation or commission." Very, very similar language is used - and I'm not going to spend a lot of time reading all of those to you, but we have provided your Honours with these codes and citations - in other countries: Rwanda, Article 98; in Latvia; in Malta; in Ireland; in Belgium; in Senegal; in La Cote d'Ivoire; in the DRC; in Madagascar; in Niger. Now, other countries use words like "intent", as the Defence points out, but the word "intent" has many meanings. In most jurisdictions, even within the jurisdiction it has different meanings. In a common law country, general intent - we provide your Honours with the Black's Law Dictionary - generally means that someone intends the act whether or not they intend the consequences, or even if they do not intend the consequences, the act is intentional. In civil law countries, I think they're a little more sophisticated. They divide intent into three normally: Dolus directus, you desire the result; dolus directus of the second degree, that the accused doesn't desire the result but knows that in the ordinary course of events this result will occur; and dolus eventualis is part of almost all civil law systems. And that says more or less, it is articulated slightly differently in different places, it means that there's -- a possible outcome is the crime occurring and that the accused can foresee this as a possible outcome. So these countries that use the word "intent" that have dolus eventualis and say an aider and abettor must intend to assist, in my view are applying actually a lower standard than this Trial Chamber did. Why? Because this Trial Chamber said you had to prove that the accused did an intentional act, it couldn't be that Charles Taylor thought he was sending school books to the RUF when he was sending ammunition because then it would be unintentional his assistance, and secondly he has to be aware of the substantial likelihood that his acts are going to assist the commission of the crime. So he has to have -- be aware that there's a substantial likelihood these crimes are going to occur and his acts will assist the commission of the crime. That is a higher probability than it's a possible outcome, which is what dolus eventualis provides for. So there's a lot of countries that provide for dolus eventualis for aiding and abetting crimes as a mode of responsibility, including The Ukraine, Mexico, China, Egypt and Germany. In fact I recall in the Stakic Trial Chamber, the famous Judgement where the Presiding Judge was German, Judge William (sic) Schomburg, and it is where he -- the Trial Chamber advocated for a mode of participation of co-perpetratorship. But Judge -- the Trial Chamber explains dolus eventualis, and one interesting explanation at paragraph 587 they -- the Trial Chamber wrote, "If the killing is committed with manifest indifference to the value of human life, even conduct of minimal risk can qualify as intentional homicide," and that was when he was discussing dolus eventualis. So, you see, dolus eventualis can provide for a possibility much lower than the standard this Trial Chamber imposed, a substantial likelihood. So what we agree with the Defence on is that in domestic systems there's a whole lot of different ways that aiding and abetting is articulated, and this is exactly the same situation that the Tadic Appeals Chamber faced when they looked at how do different domestic systems deal with crimes by -- in a common plan joint criminal enterprise. And they noted that in some domestic systems people are responsible only those who actually perpetrate the crime, although they are a member of the joint criminal enterprise are responsible. In others all those who intended that crime, even if they didn't perpetrate it, are responsible. And third, in some systems not only those who perpetrate it and intend that crime, but those who enter into a joint criminal enterprise intending one crime but can foresee this crime as a possible result, joint criminal enterprise 3. So they said there's a wide variety in the domestic systems. And they concluded in paragraph 225 by saying, "In the area under discussion, national legislation in case law cannot be relied upon as a source of principle or rules under the doctrine of the general principle of law recognised by the nations of the world. For this reliance to be permissible, it would be necessary to show that most, if not all, countries adopt the same notion of common purpose," but because there was a variety they said they couldn't do that. So what did they do? They looked at two things, case law involving international crimes from the Second World War and they looked at international instruments, and that's what -- well, the same thing was done by the Furundzija Trial Judgement and the Tadic Trial Judgement when they determined that customary international law - back in the case of the ICTY is back before 1991 - provided for a knowingly standard for aiding and abetting. And we've discussed some of those Second World War cases, but I just want to remind you of a couple of them that I think are particularly appropriate and applicable to the facts of this case. One of them was of a man named Flick, and Flick was a businessman and he was charged with promoting, facilitating, aiding and abetting the crimes of the SS, aware of the campaign of crimes that the SS was doing by contributing money. That's what his contribution was. And in that case the Court found that - they specifically found that - Flick, quote, "... did not approve nor condone the atrocities of the SS." So what's clear is he did not have the purpose, as the Defence would put it, that these crimes be committed, and yet they found him guilty because, quote, "One who knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the support of a violation of the law of nations must under settled legal proceedings be deemed, if not a principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes." So simply by providing money knowingly, that was aiding an organisation that Flick knew and the whole world knew was committing a gross campaign of atrocities, he was responsible for violations of international criminal law. Another case that's very noteworthy for many reasons was the Zyklon B case; the trial of Tesch and two others, I believe. That was a case against industrialists who supplied a gas that's normally used to kill rodents to concentration camps in the German occupied territory. This gas is the gas that killed four million people in these concentration camps. Now, the industrialists were found guilty because, quote, "They knew that the gas was to be used for the killing of human beings." There was no attempt by the Judges - the Trial Chamber - to ask whether they intended these people to be killed because that's simply not necessary, but under the Defence proposal if this gas was being provided simply because they wanted to make money, their purpose was to make money. They would have sold the gas to the Germans if they were using it to kill the rats in the camps to benefit the inmates. Okay, they knew that actually the gas was being used to kill the inmates, but that was the fault of the Germans, the Nazis. They themselves were just selling gas knowing it was being used to kill humans. In those circumstances, under the Defence proposed standard, he would be -- they would be not responsible. International criminal law would allow these industrialists to go free, because their purpose was simply to make money. They did not want to kill the human beings themselves. A similar case occurred here in Holland involving crimes that happened in the 1980s, again before our indictment period, and that's the trial of a man named van Anraat who provided a chemical, TDG, that's used in mustard gas and he was providing it to the Iraqi regime. Now, this chemical could also be used to dye textiles, but the Court in The Hague found that van Anraat knew that the gas could be and was being used to manufacture mustard gas and he was aware of Saddam Hussein's campaign of using that gas against Iran and against his own civilian population, the Kurdish population, the famous al-Anfal campaign, and the Court in The Hague, the Court of Appeal, held him responsible. They said in Section 16, "He did not give deliberate support to gross violations of law, but acted ...", quote, "... exclusively in support of large gains." So, again, the Defence proposed standard would be van Anraat should not be held responsible. He was providing a neutral object, gas that could be used to -- or a chemical that could be used to dye fabrics, and his purpose was simply to make money and so he shouldn't be held responsible. We think adopting such a standard is a tremendous -- would be a tremendous step back from the protection of victims around the world, who depend upon international law holding out at least the threat of holding responsible the promoters of wars and atrocities. Now, I'm going to move on to some of your questions -- your question about the specific direction. To answer that question, it's necessary to go back and understand where does specific direction come from? How is it originally used, these terms? And I should just briefly mention that in ICTR they used the words "specifically aimed" and that's simply, you'll see, a matter of translation. Tadic was translated into French, and I'm not going to try my French pronunciation out on you, and the same term in the first ICTR Judgement came out as "specifically aimed." So it's simply a translation. "Specifically directed" and "aimed" mean the same thing. What Tadic was looking at when they used the term "specific direction" was distinguishing between joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting. In paragraph 229, they talk about the difference between the kinds of contribution that a person makes who is guilty of being in the joint criminal enterprise and the contribution that's necessary to prove for aiding and abetting. Now, in a joint criminal enterprise, if you have a group of people with a common plan, the accused who makes a contribution to the enterprise will be held responsible for all of the crimes of that enterprise that were intended, or under JCE3 that were foreseeable. In contrast, the elements of aiding and abetting are more strict. The contribution has to be to the crime, and this is exactly the standard that our Trial Chamber imposed in this case. For aiding and abetting, it is not enough that you contribute to the enterprise. They have to contribute to the crime. Again, this is Tadic Appeal Judgement, paragraph 229. But if I could use a simple perhaps example? Suppose there's a group of people in a town in Bosnia, Prijedor, that form a common plan to ethnically cleanse the territory and that plan includes forcibly deporting women and children and killing men in camps, Accused X makes a contribution -- is a member of that joint criminal enterprise, he shares that intent and he makes a contribution to the plan by organising the forcible deportation of women and children, but makes no contribution to the killing of the men. Under joint criminal enterprise, he's responsible for both the deportation and the killings. He made a contribution to the JCE, a significant -- and remember, of course, JCE requires only a significant contribution. Under aiding and abetting he would be responsible for the deportations, provided it's found he made a substantial, a higher -- a substantial contribution to the deportations, but he could not be held responsible for the killings because his actions did not contribute to the killings. So that's what clearly -- reading the Tadic in context that's what specific direction means, and that's why, as the Defence agrees, all of the cases at the ICTY, ICTR and this Appeals Chamber that have talked about specific direction -- or the Trial Chambers at this Court that have talked about specific direction, have talked about it as part of the actus reus. It does not have, as the Defence wants to imply, wants you to misinterpret, a mental element. And that's why in Blagojevic, paragraph 189, Blagojevic Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber went through it and noted that, "In many of our cases at ICTY, Trial Chambers don't mention specific direction." They say, "Well, despite that, if in an aiding and abetting case there's a finding that the accused made a substantial contribution to the crime, a fortiori he has the -- he has satisfied the specific direction standard because specific direction simply means making a contribution to the specific crime." And the Court -- the Appeals Chamber at ICTY went a little further in Mrksic, citing Blagojevic, saying that really it's not an essential element. The word I would use is it's not a separate essential element. It is implicit in a finding of substantial contribution. And this was reaffirmed as recently as I believe last month in December in the Lukic Appeal Judgement, which again cited to Mrksic that specific direction is not an essential element. So in answer to your Honours' question, which I believe was, "Can a contribution that's not specifically directed be a substantial contribution?", of course it cannot because, if it's not specifically directed, it doesn't contribute to the crime at all. The corollary of that is that if there's a finding, as there is in this case, that Mr Taylor's actions significantly contributed to each of the 11 counts of the indictment, then it is proven that his actions were specifically directed. It's inherent and implicit in the finding that his contribution - his actions - made a specific contribution to each of these 11 counts that his actions were specifically directed to those crimes. Now, the Defence -- I may be going backwards a little bit, but the Defence also talked about -- excuse me, let me go forwards because of time. One other bit of jurisprudence I want to talk about. The Defence cited to two cases from World War II that they feel show that a standard higher than knowledge exists, and one of those I believe is called Resch. Resch was a banker, who made loans to individuals who he knew were using that to fund enterprises that were employing slave labour. If you read the Judgement, the only mens rea that's examined by the Trial Chamber is knowledge. That's the only thing they look at. They never discuss whether or not he intended slave labour, but what they found is they said, quote, that -- I'm paraphrasing, "The making of loans we cannot find is itself a violation of international law." So putting -- what's clear is that was part of the actus reus. They were not discussing his mens rea. And putting it in the terms that we use today for the elements of aiding and abetting, we can see that what the Chamber was finding in Resch was the making of loans to individuals who were funding enterprises that were using slave labour in the view of that Trial Chamber was not a substantial contribution to the crimes. It didn't satisfy the actus reus of aiding and abetting. The second case the Defence relies upon is Hechingen, which took place in a German court, and in the lower court the Trial Chamber, applying the Allied Control Council law number 10, found that -- applied the knowingly standard and found that certain individuals who had organised the deportation of Jews from two small towns in Germany were guilty as accessories for persecutions of those individuals. And the lower court, if I can find it, they applied the knowingly standard in very clear language. The Appeals Court decision is frankly problematic and it's been said that they went out of their way often in these cases to acquit individuals, for the police administrator who organised the deportations, S, they found he wasn't guilty because they said the Trial Chamber had discussed a letter written by Jewish community leaders saying, "We should comply with this order," but they hadn't given it enough weight. So they felt that the fact that the Jewish community leaders, I'm sure figuratively if not literally with a gun to their heads, had said, "We better obey this order," was the failure to further discuss that nullified the conviction. And for the three women involved, the court did not find that the intent for aiding and abetting is something higher than knowledge. They refused to apply the intent for accessories, which under German law - I'm going take a big chance with my pronunciation - is something like Gehilfe for accessories, Gehilfenvorsatz for the intent for accessories. They refused to apply that, because they said, "Well, this Control Council law makes all forms of responsibility equal, as it is in many common law systems, and we are used to, in German law, accessories being considered separate. So we refuse to apply that." And the reason they acquitted these women is because they said, "Oh, they didn't know that persecution was illegal. They weren't aware of the illegality of persecutions," because that wasn't I guess a law at the time in Germany. So that case again does not support the Defence position that there's a higher mens rea standard than knowledge in international customary law. What's very probative, we feel, is the International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Why? This is a group of experts that was elected by the United Nations, and in the Furundzija Judgement they specifically talk about this as an authoritative legal instrument. What it provides, as the Defence concedes, is that one who knowingly assists in these atrocity crimes will be held responsible. The Defence concedes the draft code is a knowingly standard. When was this adopted? July of 1996, just months before the start of this indictment period. So what's clear is at the time of this indictment period, throughout this indictment period, customary international law provided for the knowledge standard for aiders and abettors. Now, I want to move on to your Honours' questions about the "as such standard," as the Defence puts it. Your Honour, we tried hard to come up and discuss the jurisprudence of the "as such standard," but we weren't able to find a single case that uses that language, and my knowledge of the English language, the phrase "assistance to the crimes" and "assistance to the crimes as such" means the same thing. The standard that was applied by this Trial Chamber, which is correct, is the accused has to provide practical assistance, moral support or encouragement that assists the crimes. What does the Defence mean then by "as such"? Perhaps they will explain, but I believe if you read their submission carefully it comes down in the end to the same proposition that I began with. The Defence is holding out that only assistance where the objective, the ultimate desire and objective, of the aider and abettor is that the crime be committed should the aider and abettor be held responsible. It comes down to the same purpose. And that any other type of assistance, even if the accused knows people are going to be killed and raped and held in bondage and child soldiers, they're not responsible as long as that was not the objective of their assistance, because we've already talked about cases that the assistance itself can be neutral on its face; the gas that was used to kill vermin in Zyklon B and many other types of cases where the assistance itself is neutral. Now, why does the Defence argue this? Well, they tried to hold -- frighten you, frankly, with the prospect that, "My God, if we apply the standard ...", that's been part of customary international law they admit since Tadic in 1997, "... then all military assistance is going to be illegal because crimes always happen." And they say, "Well, at the minimum all military assistance, where there are some reports of crimes, are illegal because you're on notice that some crimes have happened," but that, your Honours, does not satisfy the standard that this Trial Chamber imposed; the standard that exists in customary international law. It is not an easy standard to meet. It is met and then some in this case. That standard is first that crimes against international criminal law within the jurisdiction of the Court are being committed and, secondly, the accused has to do acts that facilitate the crimes. Not all military assistance facilitates crimes. It facilitates crimes when the group has an operational strategy to commit crimes, when you know that when they go out and make operations they're going to be killing, they're going to be using terror, when you know that even when they hold territory crimes are being committed, like the RUF, then that military assistance assists crimes, but ordinarily it does not necessarily assist crimes. Professionalising for example a third world army may reduce crimes, and why is that? Because most military leaders recognise that if you want to win a war it depends on winning the hearts and minds, the loyalties, of the civilian population, and committing crimes will only set you back in that goal of that -- your ultimate goal of winning the war. So I've mentioned two of the requirements. The third requirement for aiding and abetting is that the accused -- well, did I mention two? Yes. The third is that the accused knows his assistance is aiding and abetting the crimes. He is aware at least of the substantial likelihood that his assistance will facilitate the commission of those crimes. And then there's a fourth requirement, and that is that the assistance itself amounts to not just an incidental contribution, but a substantial -- not just a significant contribution as in joint criminal enterprise, but a higher standard. It has to be a substantial contribution to that crime. That's what the Trial Chamber found in this case. How did they do it? Well, there's over 500 pages of findings about crimes by the RUF and its allies in this case. I'm not going to be able to talk about all of them, but what is clear from that is that from the beginning of the conflict the Chamber found the RUF was abducting civilians, using children as child soldiers, and what they found is that when they took territory, children were taken and being used and kept as child soldiers employed in their forces, women were taken and turned into sex slaves. When a town was taken the best looking girls went to the top commander, so women and girls were being held in sexual slavery and civilians were being used in forced labour to farm for the RUF, to mine diamonds and other materials for the RUF, to carry the loads of the RUF. So even in situations where hostilities were not active, everywhere where the RUF held territory, crimes were happening, and that is not just the finding -- that's not just a theory. This is what happened in Sierra Leone. This was proven by the witnesses - the 50 or so witnesses - that testified. The Defence said at the beginning they were not challenging the crime base. Why did we call all these victims? And now they are saying, "Oh, the crimes were sporadic." Now they argue to your Honours that these were uncontrollable soldiers and sporadic crimes. Well, we have 500 pages of people talking about how the RUF operated. They operated with terror and it came from the top. The Trial Chamber found that Operation Stop Election was ordered by Foday Sankoh. There's numerous findings about Sam Bockarie, and the Defence's own witnesses talk about what a cruel, wicked and ruthless man he was. The Trial Chamber found he himself personally organised and shot people in the Kailahun Town massacre. 60 to 65 people shot in the middle of the road, and the Defence's star witness, Issa Sesay, says, "Sam Bockarie ordered that the bodies not be buried." Why? To terrorise the civilian population. "Let them rot in the open." And Issa Sesay -- Defence Witness DCT-292 said Sam Bockarie was ruthless and killed innocent civilians, but Issa Sesay, he said, was even more ruthless. So these crimes of the RUF were not sporadic, and the Defence made a very late attempt to say, "Oh, these were uncontrollable soldiers. This was not the policy." It's just not true. The Trial Chamber had more than enough evidence to justify its finding that the RUF was a force engaged using a modus operandi of terror. They were engaged in an operational strategy of terror. As Charles Taylor said the first day of his testimony, "There's no one on this planet who's not aware of the atrocities in Sierra Leone." He knew it and he continued to support them. So when we come to your Honours' question about whether the evidence meets the standard of purpose, I've talked about various standards. Let me talk briefly about purpose. There's a couple of cases in Canada, Hibbert and Briscoe. Canada, as the Defence points out, has the purpose standard, but in these two cases they talk about what it means and it's clear from these cases that it does not mean that the objective of the accused's actions was the commission of the crime. Both quote -- both cases take a quote from a casebook by Hewitt and Manning, both Briscoe and Hibbert, and that casebook quotation is this, "If a man is approached by a friend who tells him he's going to rob a bank and he would like to use his car for the get-away and he will pay him $100, when that person is charged as an aider and abettor can he say, 'My purpose was not to aid the robbery. My purpose was just to make $100?'" The commentator says that that makes no sense. Both the Canadian Supreme Court in both Briscoe and Hibbert calls that result -- states that result would be absurd. If you know what the results of your actions are going to be, the fact that you're doing it for $100, or in the case of Charles Taylor for the diamonds of Sierra Leone, does not make you not responsible for your actions. But even, your Honours, if you adopt the standard, "Did Charles Taylor intend these crimes, the terror campaign of the RUF?", looking at the findings of the Trial Chamber, the evidence in this case, one would have to say he did, because how do you interpret a human being's intent? In cases - domestic cases - all around the world, you look at their actions. And the philosopher John Locke said, "The best interpreter of a man's thoughts are his actions." Well, Charles Taylor told us - and there's many findings of the Trial Chamber's Judgement - he knew about these atrocities. He even had the nerve in the midst of providing assistance in 1998 in July to issue a statement with President Kabbah condemning the atrocities of the rebel forces. At the same time that he was condemning them, at the same time he knew about them, he was continuing to send them more arms and ammunition. He made that statement in July and he shortly after organised the November shipment from Burkina Faso. The Chamber found he kept some for himself and he sent this -- the largest arms shipment of the war to the RUF, and they found that shipment was used on the attacks on Kono and Makeni. Issa Sesay said, "Without that armament from Liberia that came in November, we couldn't have attacked Kono." And the Trial Chamber said, "If not for the attacks on Kono and Makeni these were critical to the attack on Freetown, because the RUF took out ECOMOG in Kono, took out ECOMOG in Makeni, was fighting all the way to Waterloo in support of the AFRC and even was able to get a small group with ammunition into the town." So what was Charles Taylor's reaction to all these reports of atrocities during the Freetown invasion? To send them more. That came through Dauda Fornie. And what was his reaction afterwards? Organise another shipment in March 1999. So those are his actions and you don't need words, but you have words in this case because the Trial Chamber found Charles Taylor told the RUF when they made that operation, "Make it fearful," and it was clear from the witnesses in this case what that meant, especially when you're saying it to the RUF. You are not saying it to a boy scout troop. What it meant was amputations, people being burned alive in their homes, people being killed and heads put on sticks. That's what "Make it fearful" meant. There was a witness who testified on 30 October 2008, and Mustapha Mansaray was a double amputee. The last question to him on direct was, "Why did you come to testify? Thank you. Why did you come?' He said, "Why did I come? Because a long time ago a man named Charles Taylor said on the radio that we in Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war. We all heard that." And what he said as he held up his hands, "This is the bitterness that I've tasted." He held up the stumps of his arms, showing that he had no hands. "This is the bitterness that I've tasted. What he said is what came to pass." And, your Honours, the Trial Chamber found specifically, despite Mr Taylor's denials, he did threaten Sierra Leone with the bitterness of war. The Defence's own witnesses corroborated that. What he said was what came to pass. He promised the bitterness of war. He promised a fearful campaign. Those crimes happened because he intended them to happen. So does the -- do the findings of the Trial Chamber satisfy even the standard of purpose? Yes, they do. So, your Honour, I want to move on to the one last point which is the adjudicated facts question in this case, unless there are some questions about aiding and abetting now? Your Honours have asked on adjudicated facts whether or not -- how the Chamber should apply the case law on adjudicated facts when an adjudicated fact is found at the close of the Prosecution case. This was the case with adjudicated fact 15 in this case. Our answer is you should apply the case law as it is, because what the case law makes clear is that a Trial Chamber at all times has an obligation to consider all evidence. An adjudicated fact is rebuttable. At no time does a Trial Chamber, when it makes an adjudicated fact, make a final determination. In this case, the adjudicated fact motion was brought after the close of the Prosecution case, after there were 24,000 pages of transcripts and hundreds of exhibits. It would be obviously a violation of the fair trial rights of parties if the Chamber then made determinations of fact without hearing final arguments - oral arguments - from the parties on those facts, and no such arguments on the truth of specific facts occurred in this case. In the Tolimir Trial Judgement -- excuse me, the decision on adjudicated facts in Tolimir, 17 December 2009, the Trial Chamber said, "Like all rebuttable evidence, judicially noticed facts remain subject to challenge by the non-moving party during the course of the trial. The Trial Chamber retains the obligation to assess the facts' weight, taking into consideration the evidence in the case in its entirety." And that was clearly the understanding of the Defence, because when they made the motion, when they wrote the reply, they said, "Oh, the Prosecution shouldn't be upset, because of course they do have evidence on the record and that can be considered by the Trial Chamber." And, in fact, in the RUF they then brought a motion three months later in the RUF for adjudicated facts in the RUF case. Justice Sebutinde dissented in that. In paragraph 9 of her dissent she says, "In my view, the Prosecution has ample opportunity to challenge or rebut the facts proposed by the Defence in a number of ways; namely, (1) by using Prosecution evidence already on the record." So Justice Sebutinde clearly in March, long before the start of the Defence case had also told the Defence, as they had previously submitted, that of course the Prosecution has the right to bring -- has a right to ask you to consider the evidence which is part of the trial record in this case. Now, on the particular fact at issue in this case, we've pointed out in our brief that the Defence in their appeal made a gross distortion about what that adjudicated fact is. The Defence said that the fact showed in paragraph 85 of their appeal, "Having heard the Prosecution evidence, the majority of the Chamber took judicial notice of the factual conclusion from the AFRC trial that the RUF was not part of the operation in Freetown," but that of course is not anything like any of the adjudicated facts in this case. In effect, what the Defence is asking for in the appeal is for the Appeals Chamber to make a finding of adjudicated facts that was never brought before the Trial Chamber. On the specific fact that is at issue, fact 15, as Justice Doherty indicated in her dissent, this was taken from the AFRC discussion of the context of crimes. And what does it say exactly? I'm not going to read the whole thing, but in the end it says -- it talks about the AFRC retreating from Freetown and it says, "RUF reinforcements arrived in Waterloo." Well, the big issue of course that's in dispute is whether the RUF and the AFRC were co-operating in the attack on Freetown, and the Prosecution in this case frankly proved it far beyond any reasonable doubt in all kinds of ways, and especially with the help of some of the Defence witnesses such as Issa Sesay and Charles Ngebeh that this was a co-ordinated operation. So this adjudicated fact that talks about "RUF reinforcements arrived in Waterloo," well, what are reinforcements for? They are for AFRC. That's clear. It shows co-ordination. Then it goes on to say, "However, the RUF troops were either unwilling or unable to provide the necessary support to the AFRC troops." Well, what does "the necessary support" mean? I mean, it is slightly vague. I don't know how the Defence is interpreting it. I would interpret "necessary support" that what the Trial Chamber meant is to expel ECOMOG from Freetown, to capture and permanently hold Freetown, and of course that's not in dispute. What the evidence shows is the RUF was working with the AFRC. Bockarie was giving them the orders, Gullit was complying with the orders, and right at the back of ECOMOG, the RUF forces were attacking at Waterloo, right on the Freetown peninsula, trying to get into the city. Thank God they weren't able to get into the city. They even tried, according to Issa Sesay, when the AFRC first went in to take the airport. They attacked Port Loko, aiming to take the airport. If they had taken Lungi Airport, ECOMOG would not have been able to reinforce. If they had Port Loko to cut off the road to Guinea, to Conakry, the attack on Freetown may have had a very, very different result. The key is the RUF and AFRC were working together. Now, the Defence relies upon one case for the proposition that they say, "Well, the Prosecution shouldn't have been able to argue about the evidence showing that Rambo Red Goat group went into Freetown without asking permission from the Trial Chamber." They rely on a single case that talks about that and that is Krajisnik from 2003, the adjudicated fact decision. There is a big difference between Krajisnik and this. First, it was pre-trial. It was before the start of the trial. There's another decision in 2005 in Krajisnik where they don't make any such order. Let me just go back, I'm sorry. In the 2003 decision they say, "The way the party will challenge a fact is by presenting evidence and requesting the Trial Chamber to consider it." They never say in 2003, "The request has to be before." Obviously, when you are arguing the significance of the fact, you are requesting the Trial Chamber to consider it. Also in Krajisnik, the only thing they talk about in that 2003 decision is judicial economy, and Judge Orie runs a very tight ship in trying to get that case done. What that decision also said is that the Trial Chamber in that case was only taking notice of facts not in reasonable dispute, which is a different standard than was used in the adjudicated fact - AFRC adjudicated fact - decision in our case, where the Trial Chamber specifically said, "The fact that these issues are in dispute is not a reason that we are not going to take judicial notice of them." So the Trial Chamber in Orie -- no, excuse me, in Krajisnik, there were cases where there was an issue of cases issues not in dispute, where before the time was wasted in a court by calling a witness perhaps Judge Orie wanted to say, "Well, I want to hear the relevance of that witness since this is a fact not in reasonable dispute." But in 2005, Krajisnik went on to say -- in paragraph 10 they found more adjudicated facts. I hope I've written it down. Well, I'll paraphrase it because I don't have it. In paragraph 10, they talk about -- I believe it's paragraph 10. They talk about it, and they say again that the Trial Chamber retains the obligation to consider all of the evidence, including the adjudicated fact, but in considering all of the evidence and deciding on what weight, if any, to give to an adjudicated fact and how to place that into context. So our answer to your question about adjudicated facts is the jurisprudence that should be applied is that that exists. A Trial Chamber always retains the obligation to consider all of the evidence in deciding what weight and what context to give to an adjudicated fact and whether or not it's true or not true, because the primary obligation frankly of any Trial Chamber, or an Appeals Chamber, is to get to the truth of what happened. And there's no question on this particular fact that Rambo Red Goat group did go into Freetown with a group of RUF. And the Defence's own witness, Issa Sesay, testified in his direct examination that Rambo Red Goat was leading a group of RUF. That was in the Defence case. And further in the Defence submissions, in their final brief, the Defence acknowledged this, saying in paragraph 1131 of the Defence final brief, "There is evidence that Rambo Red Goat, when he and his group joined the AFRC under Gullit during the retreat, brought with him ammunition." And then the Defence in this case actually got to do two final briefs. In their response to the Prosecution brief, paragraph 150, they said, "The Defence notes that the Prosecution so soon forgets that, according to its witness, the groups that stayed behind in Freetown to carry out Sam Bockarie's orders to burn and destroy were the Rambo Red Goat group and Striker." So the Defence is now saying, "We were prejudiced by a finding that Rambo Red Goat group and a group of RUF went into Freetown." Well, why didn't they object to that when the Prosecution brought it up in its final brief? They didn't object to it. In fact, they themselves argued that Rambo Red Goat group went into Freetown. In all of their submissions on this adjudicated fact, when they have claimed prejudice, what is the prejudice? What is the evidence that they claim that they have that they didn't bring? They don't mention any of it. All they mention is that there were witnesses that said that the AFRC and RUF did not co-operate, but there's no specifics before you of evidence about Rambo Red Goat group. Issa Sesay himself admits that there is evidence that Rambo Red Goat group went into Freetown. Issa Sesay's lies that the Trial Chamber found, three different versions of how he knew the name Idriss Kamara for Rambo Red Goat, show that in fact what the Prosecution witnesses said was true. Idriss Kamara, Rambo Red Goat, was sent by Issa Sesay with a group of RUF. That was just one more way that the RUF contributed to the attack on Freetown. What the Trial Chamber found in this case is -- was proven far beyond a reasonable doubt. The two groups were co-operating. In fact, a piece of evidence that wasn't available in earlier trials was played in this case, P-279, a radio broadcast, and in that broadcast -- it's from Freetown, 6 January. There's a call to Robin White, Focus on Africa, "It's an amazing day in Freetown and we have on our phone a Colonel Sesay, Colonel FAT Sesay, from the AFRC." And they say, "We have just taken the State House." And Robin White asks, "Well, who took it?" He said, "We, the combined forces, the RUF and the AFRC." So, your Honours, there is an interest in harmonising Judgements, but the primary interest is the truth. And what's clear and proven in this case is the RUF and the AFRC were doing a joint operation. Gullit and the AFRC commanders were carrying out Sam Bockarie's orders to commit terror, to burn Freetown, and all of it was part of the Charles Taylor/Sam Bockarie plan to take Freetown. That's the truth and that's what the Appeals Chamber should uphold, in our submission. So thank you, your Honour. I've reached the end of my submissions. Excuse me, the Krajisnik paragraph was 17, where they talk about the obligation of the court. In the March 2005 adjudicated fact decision, they say, "At that time ..." -- this is interesting, because unlike 2003 now they're in the middle of trial. In the 2005 decision, the Trial Chamber in paragraph 17 reminds that, "The Trial Chamber always remains under the obligation to consider the adjudicated fact in light of all of the evidence in the case."