Your Honour, that is not the case, that only the governments where accused resides are informed about an arrest, because governments can put pressure on other governments. Governments also can provide information about the whereabouts of the accused. Governments - you also have to have some notice so that if someone then does travel to that country, they can be arrested. They want to know that information. A person doesn't - shows up at an airport if there is a warrant of arrest they need - the government wants to know that. Or a person applying for a visa they need to know if there is a warrant out for that person. So it is the practice in my - in my submission, because I'm responding to a Defence submission that's not footnoted that says that this is unheard of in any - by any Prosecutor, I'm saying that is simply untrue. And it doesn't make sense, practically, given that there is no police power in any international tribunal.
We see that on the next page of this same document. 004, the filing 004. It says that the judge, Thompson, "hereby orders the Registrar of the Special Court to address this warrant of arrest, decision approving the indictment, the approval of the indictment of the accused and a statement of rights of the accused to the national authorities of such states or to the relevant international body, including INTERPOL, as may be indicated by the Prosecutor, in accordance with rule 56."
So the Prosecutor disclosing the sealed indictment against Charles Taylor to governments was completely proper and within his powers and in accordance with the order of Judge Thompson. There is no basis for the Defence submission that this indicates some kind of political misconduct by the Prosecutor or interference by a government.
The Defence goes on to argue, in the beginning of their brief, they discuss the Celibici standard for improper - I'm forgetting the word, for a prosecution that's - where is my mind? Target against an individual improperly. Selective prosecution. Thank you.
And they indicate that, in this case, Blaise Compaoré and Muammar Gaddafi could have been indicted. Of course, a Prosecutor has an obligation to only indict those that they can prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and we welcome the fact that the Defence, from the evidence that's been heard in this case, believes that the involvement of Muammar Gaddafi and Blaise Compaoré has been proven, because as your Honours know, having heard all the evidence, certainly there is evidence that these individuals or the governments that they headed aided the RUF. But that evidence is less than a tenth of the evidence involving Charles Taylor's assistance to the RUF, and the evidence further shows that the great majority of that aid went through Charles Taylor directly. Or directly, for example, through his airport, Roberts International Airport.
The fact is the Celebici standard for selective prosecution concerns - it has to be established that the persons are similarly situated. Well, we submit that in this case, no one is similarly situated to Charles Taylor in regards to the role he played in the war in Sierra Leone. Others may have aided the RUF. We do not contest that. Our evidence shows that. But uniquely Charles Taylor created the RUF on his territory. Charles Taylor armed the RUF. His forces led the RUF into Sierra Leone, in the invasion of Sierra Leone, in March 1991. It was Charles Taylor who direct - who dealt directly and regularly with Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, and other leaders and representatives of the RUF in the early days with Foday Sankoh. The RUF, the evidence shows, overwhelmingly in our view, was a proxy army of Charles Taylor. The RUF didn't fight for Blaise Compaoré. It didn't fight, as far as we know, hopefully not now, for Muammar Gaddafi. But the evidence is overwhelming that Charles Taylor used them, not just in Sierra Leone, he used his proxy RUF army in Liberia to fight against his enemies there; he used them in Guinea, to fight against his enemies and forces in Guinea, to invade that country; he sent them to the Ivory Coast and had them fight for him, Sam Bockarie and others in the Ivory Coast.
Uniquely, the RUF was a proxy army under one person, Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor held no formal title in the RUF, but witnesses have given various references to names he was called and have basically said he was called and he was considered the godfather of the RUF. This lack of a formal title remind me of recent statements by Muammar Gaddafi where he says I can't resign my authority because I don't have any. I don't have any authority to resign. I don't have a title. The absence of a de jure title does not mean a person does not have de facto control and the evidence in this case shows that the person who is uniquely situated, no one is similarly situated, to Charles Taylor, as the godfather of the RUF, who created them, who armed them, who directed them, and who profited from the wars and the crimes that they committed.
One interesting statement by the Defence in paragraph 1087 of the corrected brief, I believe, the Defence states in a sentence in that paragraph that the Defence submits that the RUF was able to arrange the supply of arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso completely independently of Taylor. Well, your Honours, we only have to look at a map to question how the Defence - perhaps they can answer this in their oral arguments - how can the RUF, independently of Charles Taylor, deal and obtain arms from Burkina Faso? There is no border between them. Sierra Leone borders two countries, Guinea and Liberia, and Guinea throughout this time period, particularly of the major arms shipments in 1998, in March 1999 from Burkina Faso, we have evidence, including one person who was along on the trip in March 1999 and persons who were waiting for the shipment when Sam Bockarie came back in late November or early December 1998, the only way to get those large arms shipments to the RUF was through Roberts International Airport, Charles Taylor's main airport in Liberia. And that is exactly what was done.
The Defence also, in its arguments regarding the political context of this case, argues that this case serves US interests, and that it's the United States that's out to get Charles Taylor. But my question is: How does this fit in with Charles Taylor's testimony? There is no question that the United States government and others believe Charles Taylor is dangerous. That's not evidence in this case, it's not relevant to whether he's guilty or not. It doesn't prove he's guilty and it certainly does not prove he's not guilty, but why would the United States be against Charles Taylor given all of his evidence of the friendship and relations he had with the American government, including with the intelligence agencies of the American government?
Unless, perhaps, the fact is that he was, in truth, destabilising four countries, committing human rights abuses not only in Liberia, but in Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Guinea. It's very interesting that in the Defence brief, the Defence says at one point that Charles Taylor was very reticent to discuss details about his escape from the United States. You will recall that Taylor testified, and this is in the Defence brief, that it was the CIA that was assisted - assisted him in his escape. Although Taylor's details don't add up, because he told us in July, when he first testified, that he remembered distinctly that Quiwonkpa was killed just two days, I believe he said two or three days, after his escape when he briefly went to New York before travelling on to eventually to Mexico and then to Africa. That's what he said in July. And the Defence brief, in footnote 614 - and I hope I have it from the current version - says that, "Contrary to what the Prosecution alleged, Taylor maintained that he did not escape prison in September 1985 but in November 1985 as he was still in the United States when Quiwonkpa was executed."
Actually that is what he said on direct, but the Defence apparently has forgotten what Mr Taylor said on cross-examination. Between the direct and cross-examinations of course, certain documents that the Prosecution was prepared to use in cross-examination were disclosed to Mr Taylor. So after the disclosures, on the 11th of January 2010, page 33127, Mr Taylor, and it goes on to 128, Mr Taylor was asked:
"Now, Mr Taylor, do you accept that two months from the time of your escape to travel to Africa," excuse me, "do you accept then that you had two months from the time of your escape to travel to Africa to take part in the coup? Do you accept that?"
And Mr Taylor said, "Well, not exactly two months but I had some time. I think the escape occurred, if I recall, in September."
And the coup occurred in November.
So my question is - and perhaps the Defence can answer this - why is Mr Taylor, if he believes the CIA is out to get him and the United States government, reticent to tell the truth to this Court about his escape? Who is he protecting, or is this entire story fabricated?
Now, clearly, the dates of his escape was fabricated by Mr Taylor. He didn't escape in November. And the question arises in my mind, did he do that because Mr Taylor had informed people about the plan, the Quiwonkpa coup? He told us he knew about it and he knew the coup was doomed, he himself wanted to avoid being torn to pieces on the streets as General Quiwonkpa was. Is that the case or is it simply the case that he didn't want to be there at the front line? Because Charles Taylor has told us he never goes to the front line. In fact, the evidence shows even with the invasion of Liberia, he sent forces over the border, Mr Taylor couldn't get the date right until his counsel gave it to him over and over again, but in 1989, in December when he sent his forces over the border he wasn't with them, and did not enter Liberia, he says, and the evidence corroborates this from other witnesses, for four months, until April.
And we also know that when there was what is believed to be, or Mr Taylor characterises as, an attempted assassination, where one of his aids, Mr Jackson, was killed at the Executive Mansion on 30 October 1996 when Taylor was part of the Council of State, he immediately went back to Gbarnga, retreated to Gbarnga, and that was the testimony of his own witness, Yanks Smythe.
The next major area that the Defence addresses in its motion - in its final trial brief is to complain about evidence that was admitted in this case outside of the temporal or geographic scope of the indictment. Your Honours, so basically the Defence is asking the Court now, in 2011, to exclude evidence that came in over the last three years in this trial and I would point out that logically, obviously, this is in one of two situations. Either the Defence objected and that objection was overruled, in which case the Defence is now asking for - during the final arguments or final trial brief, for the Court to reconsider its decisions, or the Defence did not object, and, in fact, that, of course, is the case in the great majority of the evidence because there were very few objections from the Defence about evidence being outside the scope of the indictment.
So in that case, legally, they have waived it, because we are being asked, the Prosecution, to respond to very specific issues, very specific evidence, and they haven't identified what exactly the evidence is that they are seeking to have suppressed now, three years later.
Certainly, evidence was admitted in this case because it was relevant and it was relevant for a whole host of reasons, evidence that was outside of the indictment. One of those the Defence talks about, which is pattern evidence, but the rules do not limit relevant evidence only to pattern evidence. For example, the evidence all about Camp Naama, the creation of the RUF, this evidence clearly shows why Charles Taylor is the godfather of the RUF. It shows why he still had control of the RUF at the time period of the indictment. He was its creator. The evidence also is important about how the NPFL acted and how the RUF was created with NPFL trainers and NPFL territory and in an NPFL training camp, because what we have argued consistently is that the RUF was made in the image of the NPFL. Taylor was the godfather. It even borrowed the terminologies of the NPFL such as both the use of child soldiers and even the term that the NPFL used for child soldiers, small boys' units.
And on that same issue, that also, of course, would be relevant now for credibility because Charles Taylor made the laughable claim to your Honours that no one under 17 was allowed into the NPFL, despite all the evidence including from his own witnesses and his own documents about the notorious use of child soldiers in Liberia.
We put on evidence of killings of certain individuals outside of the geographic scope of the indictment because they were efforts by Charles Taylor, they clearly show his efforts to suppress the evidence of his role and control of the RUF and role in the crimes. So the killings of Sam Bockarie and Jungle, Daniel Tamba, Superman and Johnny Paul are all clearly relevant to Charles Taylor's consciousness of guilt. And other attempts to suppress evidence even in Liberia such as the arrest of Sorious Samura, the killing of Sam Bockarie's girlfriend, that TF1-539 talked about who they feared would reveal Taylor's link to the RUF and the arrest of Hassan Bility after his trips and articles about Sierra Leone and trip to Sierra Leone.
Also, the Defence, I believe, does not concede that Charles Taylor had the intent to create terror in Sierra Leone. So we, the Prosecution, put on evidence, some of it from Liberia, about Charles Taylor's intent. One very probative piece of evidence about that was how Charles Taylor treated TF1-590, the Sierra Leone man who was a refugee in Liberia and came here and talked about his horrendous experiences in Liberia where he watched his friend's head being cut off with a knife, and how he was tortured by Charles Taylor's son and the demon forces. And he talked to you, this man, that he was accused by Charles Taylor, he was brought to Charles Taylor himself, he was brought naked, tie-bayed [phon] after being tortured, to Charles Taylor who accused him of being a Kamajor and threatened to have him killed.
So is it any surprise to anyone that Charles Taylor intended that Sierra Leonean civilians be treated the way the RUF treated them? He treated TF1-590 exactly consistent with what the RUF did, consistent with how Sam Bockarie, for example, treated people during the Kailahun massacre. They might be against us, these civilians, so let's kill them.
Charles Taylor revealed his intent in his treatment of TF1-590.
The Defence also complains about evidence about crimes that are outside of locations named in the indictment, but, recall, first of all, the Defence has not, up to today, conceded or stipulated that there was a widespread and systematic attack on civilians in Sierra Leone which is a chapeau element of many of the charges in this case. Furthermore, and perhaps the Defence can clarify this in their arguments, to date, as far as we know, the Defence is still denying that the RUF was on a campaign of terror, dispute all the evidence of hands being chopped off, heads being put on sticks, children, one child whose hands were chopped off and thrown in the sewer, women being raped and gang-raped, women having to hear their children killed and having to carry the heads of the children in bags. Despite all that, the Defence, as we understand it, does not concede that there was a campaign of terror, and the Defence argues that the RUF was a legitimate revolutionary organisation. They place great reliance on two documents. First, Footpaths to Democracy. It's in evidence and your Honours know it's a propaganda tract and we learned through the evidence that it was put together with the help of Ade Sebo, Charles Taylor's former friend and publicist. And that Charles Taylor congratulated the RUF on its publication and gave them money, 50 million CFA, after the publication of Footpaths to Democracy. The Defence also has placed great reliance on saying, Oh, there could be no campaign of terror because Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor and the Gambians, Koukoie Samba Sanyang, were all trained together in Libya under the guidance of Muammar Gaddafi. This was so important, if you recall, there was a document that the Defence read into evidence which was a speech of about 27 pages by Muammar Gaddafi, even though the Prosecution was willing to stipulate that it come into evidence, it was so important to the Defence that they chose to read it, word for word, into the record.
Well, perhaps there is one thing we can agree on with the Defence. We would agree that Charles Taylor as likely to use terror against civilians as Muammar Gaddafi. That, we believe, is established. We believe both of them would use terror. Charles Taylor consistently used terror when it was to his benefit to preserve his power or to enrich himself.
The other person that the Defence put on evidence about were the first two witnesses after Taylor were Gambians trained in Libya and they were both members of a group led by Dr Manneh, Koukoie Samba Sanyang, but what did we learn about Dr Manneh? We learned, even from the first of these witnesses, Yanks Smythe, in his own little coup, what he did is he took the wife and children of the President of Gambia, Jawara, hostage and threatened them. So, if that is not an act of terrorism, what is? This is the kind of ideology, the real practice, despite what might be put into the green book or might be put into Footpaths to Democracy, what speaks much louder to all of the foot soldiers is what they see their leaders actually do. So Issa Sesay may say, for example, the RUF was against rape, but we know he raped Johnny Paul Koroma's wife. And Dr Koukoie Samba Sanyang takes children hostage and threatens the lives of children in order to get what he wants.
The very training at Camp Naama about treating civilians well, well, the people who were being trained we heard from many of them, many of them were Defence witnesses, they told us they were there as hostages. They had been - most of them. Issa Sesay says he was tricked and he was forced to stay in Naama because he was told someone tried to escape and he was killed. Someone escaped while they were at Cuttington University in NPFL territory and he was killed. And we heard from Sam Kolleh about how he was captured and forced to go to Camp Naama.
We heard from DCT-292 how he was captured with others, I believe an individual was killed, they were threatened with death and they were basically told you have a choice of dying or going with Foday Sankoh, and so he went with Foday Sankoh. So despite whatever ideology or words might have been mouthed to the recruits at Naama, what undoubtedly influenced their behaviour much more was the reality of how they themselves, originally civilians, were treated. And there is evidence that, in fact, a former NPFL officer, Isaac Mongor, who Defence witnesses Isatu Kallon and John Vincent confirmed was NPFL, although other Defence witnesses tried to deny that, Isaac Mongor taught the recruits the NPFL way. When you go into a village kill a group of civilians, that way the rest of them will obey you.
The next area that the Defence brief addresses, and they address it in length, is the joint criminal enterprise pleading of the indictment and case summary. These, as your Honours know, are issues that have already been decided, the pleading of the joint criminal enterprise. The Defence lost the decision in the trial before your Honours, at the Trial Chamber level, they were allowed to appeal it and they lost the decision in the Appeals Chamber so why now, in the final brief, in the beginning of their brief, does the Defence need to revisit this issue? We submit it's because the evidence is so clear that this joint criminal enterprise took place, because the evidence, factual evidence, that Charles Taylor worked together with the RUF and contributed to a campaign of terror against the civilian population of Sierra Leone is so strong that the Defence wants to try to argue the law, even though it's already been decided. It's old lawyers' saying if the facts are against you, argue the law. The facts of the joint criminal enterprise are overwhelmingly against the Defence so they argue about two decisions that were already decided, they complain that the decision took - was late in coming. They don't take responsibility for the fact that the motion was filed, I believe it was 14th of December, the last day before the judicial recess when right after the recess the first witness was scheduled to testify, as the Defence correctly points out, motions on the form of the indictment should be made at an early point.
But anyway, their complaint about the late decision does not make sense when the decision of both the Trial Chamber and the Appeal Chamber was that the indictment, the long-existing indictment, correctly pled a joint criminal enterprise in which the means used to obtain the objectives was a crime within the statute and jurisdiction of the Court and that is the crime of terrorism. That was the decision both by the Trial Chamber and by the Appeals Chamber, that the indictment pled that, that the Defence had been properly put on notice by the indictment. So it doesn't make sense to say, Oh, we just found out late that we were - that the indictment told us what the means of the joint criminal enterprise were. It was written in the indictment. This is already been decided by both your Honours, the Trial Chamber, and the Appeal chamber, and in this Trial Chamber of course there was a dissent by Justice Lussick. Even Justice Lussick's dissent though stated that he would have ordered the indictment rewritten but he noted that, in fact, the Defence was on notice. The Defence was on notice because the use of a campaign of terror to obtain the objectives of the joint criminal enterprise was clearly laid out. It was laid out in the case summary which was filed, basically, approximately the day that this team took over for the Defence, I think it was the 2nd of August, early August, in paragraph 42, where it discusses a common plan design or purpose to carry out a criminal campaign of terror as charged in the indictment. And the international case law is clear that these terms "common plan," "common design," "common purpose" and "joint criminal enterprise" are interchangeable. The Defence correctly points out that there is some decisions that say it's preferable now to use the term "joint criminal enterprise," but those decisions say it's preferable. There is no other meaning to the terms "common plan," "common design," "common purpose" and "joint criminal enterprise". In the original Tadic decision you'll see that the terms are just used interchangeably.
Also, in the pre-trial brief, paragraph 28 - at paragraph 7, it's stated that the common plan amounted to or involved the commission of crimes. These criminal means involved the campaign of terror waged against the civilian population of Sierra Leone. And also, in the opening statement, in June 2007, as your Honours know, six, seven months before the evidence actually began, the testimony began, the Prosecutor said from its inception, page 31, I'm not sure of the transcript page number, Prosecutor said:
"From its inception the accused and other participants in the common plan used criminal means to achieve and hold political power and physical control of the - over the civilian population of Sierra Leone. These criminal means involved the campaign of terror waged against the population of Sierra Leone."
Those are the arguments at the beginning of the Defence brief, but the Defence brief of course goes on. One of the arguments that's made in depth during the brief, and made early and in depth, is that Charles Taylor was a peacemaker. We know this is the Defence - has been the Defence argument and was the focus of much of his direct examination. Well, of course, the Prosecution in its own evidence had talked about how Charles Taylor was a false peacemaker. How he advised for example, Foday Sankoh, to use the Abidjan Accord to re-arm, about how, when he met with various heads of state and Issa Sesay, after saying one thing publicly in front of the other heads of state, he told Issa Sesay in private, "Don't listen to them. Those are all British-controlled people." How the evidence was put on through many witnesses about how Charles Taylor urged Foday Sankoh - Issa Sesay not to disarm, instructed him not to disarm, was upset when he did disarm. Witnesses like TF1-375, 399, many other witnesses talk about Taylor urging that the RUF use Lome, which of course benefited Charles Taylor, because it left the RUF in control of the diamond regions of Sierra Leone, but that they not disarm.
The Defence talks about the documents that they have that show that Charles Taylor was a peacemaker. Well, there is no question that Charles Taylor tried to portray himself publicly as a peacemaker. Justice Doherty asked a question about the Defence brief, one of those was why, in the Defence brief they say, why did they keep the training at Naama secret? Because Charles Taylor throughout has tried to deny his link to his surrogate army, the RUF. He's tried to portray it as an independent force. He's tried to hide his links by, if necessary, killing people, arresting journalists, whatever was necessary.
And when it comes to Charles Taylor's documents, what is so probative, what is so overwhelming is what is not in there. Because, and we have said this in our final trial brief, we also put it to Charles Taylor during his testimony. Taylor has admitted to meeting Sam Bockarie three occasions, I believe on three trips, in September, October and late November 1998. This time period, as the RUF was building up for the major offensive in December of 1998 including meeting Sam Bockarie on his way to Burkina Faso, that the evidence shows, and the Defence concedes this in some parts of their brief, he came back with war materials from that. That was the war material that allowed the RUF to launch the December offensive. Issa Sesay says that they were out of ammunition until Bockarie came back from Liberia. That's the ammunition he used to attack Kono and thanks to it, he also captured in Kono, allowed him to go on to Makeni all the way down to Waterloo.
So Charles Taylor claims repeatedly that these three meetings -- actually there were more than three because at least in September he met twice, I believe in September and October he says he met him twice, that these were open, that everyone knew about it. But Sam Bockarie was on the United Nations travel ban as a member of the junta, and that had been passed in 1997. There is no exemption from the UN travel ban for Sam Bockarie to travel to see Charles Taylor or to go to Burkina Faso. It doesn't exist. We can't produce it because it doesn't exist and the Defence has not produced it, although they said they had access to UN documents, not only those from Downes-Thomas but there was testimony that they received others from the United Nations, that their investigators received them.
Furthermore, in these meetings with Sam Bockarie, we've asked, where is there any document about these meetings? Aside from the UN travel exemption, where there is a correspondence with President Kabbah or with ECOWAS, with the Committee of Five? Where is there some report to someone that I'm going to meet Sam Bockarie or I met Sam Bockarie? If you meet somebody and you're acting as a mediator it doesn't do much good unless you communicate that position to somebody else. There is not a single letter, not a single communication. There's not even an internal document that the Defence has. Well, they have the next two or three days to produce one, if they have one. They don't. There is not a single document that shows that Charles Taylor met with Sam Bockarie in September, October or November 1998. There is not a photograph. The presidential papers is full of all the activities of Charles Taylor. We have in there for example documented his meeting with Sepp Blatter. We have there documented his meeting with Naomi Campbell in South Africa, but we don't have any mention of his meetings with Sam Bockarie. Why is that? That's because these were meetings planning war. They were clandestine meetings where Charles Taylor was meeting his commander of his proxy army, planning the attacks on Sierra Leone. That's why there is not a single photograph, press release, internal aide-memoire, correspondence to ECOWAS, to the United Nations, to President Kabbah, to anyone, a UN travel exemption, about any of these multiple meetings with Sam Bockarie. Because they were clandestine meetings, and as Prosecution evidence showed, they were about supplying the RUF with the ammunition and the plan to attack Kono and go on to Freetown. That's why the Defence doesn't have a single document about those meetings.
If we could look at some documents that are in evidence, and that would be at the presidential papers, D-141, if we could go to page 298, please. This is a joint communique of a meeting hosted by the chairman of ECOWAS, and the Head of State of Nigeria, attended by President Kabbah and Taylor, on 2 July 1998. Looking at paragraph 3, it says, "The heads of state, they strongly condemned rebel activities in Sierra Leone as well as the horrendous atrocities that had been committed there."
So here there is nothing in here about Charles Taylor should meet with these rebels that were committing these horrendous atrocities, this is in July of 1998.
Now let's look at page 293 of the same presidential papers. This is very interesting because it is a policy statement. As it's coming up, I'll begin reading the heading, "Policy statement by the government of the Republic of Liberia on allegations against Liberia for involvement in the Sierra Leone crisis." And it's dated the 29th of December 1998.
So we know this is in the midst of the rebel offensive just on the eve, a week before, the invasion of Freetown, after the fall of Kono, after the fall of Makeni, Lunsar, and several other locations, Magburaka. If we look at that, and if you go through the entire document, there is nothing in here about Sam - about Charles Taylor meeting with the RUF, Sam Bockarie or any representatives of the RUF. If you go to paragraph 10, page 293, it states, "Actions taken by the Government of Liberia. Maintained an open line of contact and direct dialogue" - page 293, please, sorry, and then if you go to the bottom left, thank you. The Government of Liberia writes that they maintained an open line of contact and direct dialogue with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah aimed at building confidence between Liberia and Sierra Leone. And then the next paragraph - they say they dispatched four high level presidential delegations to Freetown to hold talks with Kabbah and Sierra Leone. The next paragraph 12, hosted Kabbah in Monrovia.
Where is there anything about meeting Sam Bockarie? These are supposed to be the activities of Liberia to solve the crisis in Sierra Leone. And it talks about meeting with the Government of Sierra Leone, but nothing about meeting with the RUF.
So perhaps the Defence can - in their closing arguments - explain why there is not a single document that shows Charles Taylor met in September, October and November of 1998 with Sam Bockarie, because the answer, the only logical conclusion is, it was clandestine meetings to plan war.
Charles Taylor's role - I think I better skip ahead because I'm running out of time.
I'll mention a few things quickly. If we could have D-104B, please, put on the screen - sorry, P-28 put on the screen. Excuse me, sorry, let me stick to the original order, D-7. This is a document the Defence brief, in paragraph 1287, and elsewhere, places great emphasis on and this is the letter from Tiagen Wantee, the ambassador to Guinea, saying that reporting a meeting with Eddie Kanneh at the Liberian embassy there. The Defence brief, paragraph 1287, says, "Sam Bockarie would not have gone to the trouble of sending Eddie Kanneh to the Liberian embassy to try to establish contact with the Liberian government as exhibit D-7 clearly shows."
By the way, one slight aside, in paragraph 522 of the original brief, now it's 520, it included this rather bizarre statement which apparently has been taken out. The original brief, and it is a substantive change, in paragraph 522, they had said, they said, "Kanneh, having eaten human liver with the President... "
There is no evidence from any witness, Prosecution or Defence, that Eddie Kanneh ate human liver with the President.
Going back to D-7, this is a document the Defence tries desperately to twist the plain meaning of, because what the document does show in fact is that Sam Bockarie was known to Charles Taylor prior to August 12th, 1998, consistent with the Prosecution evidence. And not that he was sending Eddie Kanneh all the way to Conakry to try to make contact with Charles Taylor. That makes no sense. If you go down the list of the names, the last paragraph, thank you, it says:
"Meanwhile Major Kanneh, who remains a strong advocate of the RUF, reiterated his plan of travelling to Liberia, along with six other members of his organisation and would cross into Sierra Leone to join their men after meeting with the leader. And he named Sidiki Janneh, Brigadier Mosquito, both Sierra Leone nationals, including Mr Sherif, assistant director of the SSS."
Well, we submit that it's very likely that Sidiki Janneh is actually Sidiki Kanneh [phon]. If you look at the testimony of Varmuyan Sherif from 9 January, page 817, Varmuyan Sherif said one of his orderlies was Sidiki Kanneh.
So what this - clearly, what this paragraph is saying is that Eddie Kanneh is coming with six people and he's giving references of people who can tell Charles Taylor, people Taylor knows, that can tell Charles Taylor, this guy is all right, he's one of us. And who are those people? Well, it's Varmuyan Sherif, the assistant director of the SSS and his assistant, Sidiki Kanneh and it's Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie clearly is not one of the six people who is travelling; Sam Bockarie is one of the references to Charles Taylor to vouch for Eddie Kanneh. So the only reasonable explanation in the reading of this document, it supports that prior to August of 1998, as Varmuyan Sherif and other witnesses testified, Charles Taylor already had made contact with Sam Bockarie, and the Defence attempt to read it as saying that Sam Bockarie was trying to make contact, makes absolutely no sense. Perhaps the Defence can explain why would you send someone through Guinea, where Isatu Kallon and others had been arrested, to the embassy in Conakry, sn enemy capital, Guinea, when the evidence from the Defence is that the RUF travelled freely to Monrovia when they wanted to. Issa Sesay says in April he went there with diamonds and stayed a week, and when he lost the diamonds, Sam Bockarie sent someone else to investigate. Issa Sesay and others, Sam Vincent said Jungle travelled back and forth from Monrovia, Sesay says to get rice and medicine, Sam Vincent said bringing ammunition. DCT-008 says Jungle used to travel back and forth from Monrovia. We also know that the RUF has contacts in the Ivory Coast with Musa Cisse. They have a radio, they can contact Monrovia by radio, with or without a code, you can speak on the radio. They knew people in Lofa County, they could just cross Lofa County and speak to the NPFL. So what possible sense would it make to send a delegation through Guinea, through Conakry, to try to make contact with Charles Taylor when the RUF, repeatedly we've seen, can drive across the border to the capital of Monrovia. It makes absolutely no sense.
In the minute that I have left could I show P-28 again, please?
One thing the Defence tries to make out, quotes Issa Sesay, if we go down the page, Issa Sesay trying to deny his signature, if you recall on direct, he was shown this by counsel and he said, This is not the way I sign. However, when he was given a little test with the various signatures on a piece of paper he recognised this as his signature. And then he said, Well, maybe it was forged. But he said different than what he said before, that it was not the way he signed. This is his signature. Benjamin Yeaten's signature also appears. Remember, Issa Sesay tried to say the RUF doesn't give written orders. Well, this is not an RUF document. This is a document from Benjamin Yeaten, he's the commander when the RUF is in Lofa. It's an NPFL AFL document and if you look down, we see the signature of Benjamin Yeaten, just keep that in your mind and now if we can show the back of Yanks Smythe's ID card, that's D-104B. What your Honours will see is it's exactly the same signature. This document Issa Sesay and the Defence have tried desperately to deny, because it's so clearly shows what the Prosecution case, through all of its evidence has shown, that from its creation in Naama, up through fighting in Guinea and Lofa County, the RUF was just an extension of Charles Taylor's armies, it was one of his militias, it was his proxy force. He was the true commander. And it was Charles Taylor who directed the campaign of terror against the civilian population of Sierra Leone. Thank you.