The transcripts of the trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia. More…

  • Mr Sesay, yesterday we began looking at a document that, unfortunately, had not been reproduced in full. And consequently, we had to adjourn our examination of it until the copies were obtained. I'd like us now to return to that document, please. It's behind divider 4, in the week 27 additional binder. Do we all have it?

  • Yes.

  • Now, you will recall, Mr Sesay, that this was a document bearing your name and the name of Gibril Massaquoi, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, then Kofi Annan.

    Let us begin again at the beginning of the document so that we can have its contents in context. We see it's from --

  • Excuse me. It's our position that I believe the witness denied any knowledge of the document, so there's no foundation to go through the document with the witness.

  • This is a document bearing the witness's name, which no doubt Mr Koumjian in due course may choose to cross-examine the witness on. It seems to me the witness has ever right to have an opportunity of dealing with the document before he's cross-examined on it in due course.

  • Yes, please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

  • Now, you see that it's from the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, defence headquarters, Makeni, dated the 6th of April 2001. In April 2001, Mr Sesay, where were you based?

  • Where was Gibril Massaquoi?

  • Gibril was in Monrovia.

  • Where was the RUF defence headquarters?

  • No, sorry, Gibril was in Makeni in April 2001.

  • And where was the RUF defence headquarters in 2001?

  • Now, we see that the heading is "Detailed information about the RUF and her position on the ongoing peace process":

    "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone deems it necessary to inform you and the United Nations Security Council through you about her activities from 1991 when she launched her insurgence and on to the current peace process because of the intensification of President Kabbah and his government's propaganda machinery to destroy the RUF.

    Below are the contents the RUF is informing you about her activities and position:

    (a) Cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

    (b) Atrocities during the conflict.

    (c) Failure of various Peace Accords on Sierra Leone.

    (d) Position of the RUF on the current peace process and her political stance.

    (a) Cause of the Conflict in Sierra Leone:

    The Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone believes that she has been sidelined for too long and that international community seems to only listen to President Kabbah's own version which have definitely not yielded any fruitful peace for the people of Sierra Leone. And, therefore, it is now time to listen to the RUF too so as to achieve durable peace, not one that is dictated by the recycled and corrupt politicians of Tejan Kabbah's government."

    Can I pause for a moment and ask you this: By April 2001, Mr Sesay, had the RUF established itself as a political party?

  • No. It was after the disarmament.

  • Let's continue.

    "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone was formed by a group of gallant men and women headed by Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh in 1982, in the south and eastern parts of the country, with a full participation of people with all walks of life in the entire country and Sierra Leoneans out of the country.

    The cause of the conflict is known to all Sierra Leoneans, both in and out of the country, except those politicians along with their families who pretend not to know due to their own actions. Leaders of this country created misery on this nation, especially after independence on to the current date. Massive corruption, nepotism, tribalism, mismanagement and misuse of State resources and funds was the order of the day by the one party rule, All People's Congress (APC). The poor become poorer, the rich richer, and education and health was completely zero, and they became privileges instead of rights. People dying without medication on a daily basis, number of drop-outs from school due to unaffordable school fees was also on daily basis. Civil servants not paid at the end of the month. No development throughout the country, especially the rural areas. No freedom of speech and association. The saying of the day was: 'Where you tie a cow feeds itself there' in local language 'Creole' meaning" --

    Maybe you can help me with the next sentence, Mr Sesay, the Krio part.

  • "Where you tie a cow is where it feeds from."

  • "There was total breakdown in governance. Instead of government of the people, it became government of the politicians and families."

    Now, Mr Sesay, that description of the way life was in Sierra Leone, is it one with which you agree?

  • Yes, that's how life was in Sierra Leone. Things were difficult, because I experienced that myself, personally. My father worked at the Ministry of Works. It took them three to four months without being paid any salary.

  • That's why I didn't further my education.

  • "Today, the same recycled politicians, moving from one party to another for self-interest, are now telling you that the war is about diamonds, which is totally untrue, trying to misconstrue our agenda."

    Mr Sesay, was the war about diamonds and mineral resources in Sierra Leone?

  • No.

  • "Although diamonds are part of our endowed natural resources which have been mismanaged since 1930 when it was discovered, virtually it has not produced development in this country. Even roads leading to the sites are unmotorable. The politicians are only interested in getting the gemstones for their own use and not the State and her people.

    The RUF only took Kono in December 1998. From 1930 on to date, what have the diamond done for this nation? Same for gold, bauxite, rutile, fishes, iron ore, crude oil, et cetera, et cetera.

    President Kabbah and his cohorts are propagating that the war is a diamond war because he signed contracts with the British to exploit our minerals, which we will not agree to. The people of Sierra Leone this time should be involved in their mining and knowing where the resources go, not only cabinet or parliamentarians of the proportional representative system who are not voted for by the people to these positions.

    The resources of Sierra Leone belong to Sierra Leoneans, which RUF is part of. We cannot cry down politicians for mismanagement of our resources and turn around to copy them. We have enough arms captured from government forces, some in store and others on assignment. No need to sell diamonds for arms as alleged."

    Now, pausing there again. By 2001, Mr Sesay, what was the position of the RUF, in terms of arms available to them?

  • RUF did not look for arms or ammunition during this time.

  • But did you have arms and ammunition in April 2001?

  • Yes, we had arms and ammunition, many of them, and we had tanks that we captured from the ECOMOG, and many bombs, mortar guns, mortar bombs, we had many of those that we captured in December '98.

  • Now, tell me, was it the case that at this time the RUF found it necessary to trade arms in order to -- to trade diamonds in order to obtain arms and ammunition?

  • No, it was not necessary.

  • "For all these reasons mentioned, students and trade unions demonstrated - demonstrations, failed several times for a change in government and governance but were all foiled by the government. Some were arrested and detained and others killed. This made the RUF to take up arms as the last resort in 1999 to wipe off this system throughout the country, as it was now the order of the day.

    The RUF therefore advised that the cause of the conflict is not neglected by United Nations if durable peace is to reign in Sierra Leone.

    Lastly, the continuous propaganda of President Kabbah that RUF is using diamonds to purchase arms from President Taylor is rubbish. Let them prove it by giving you one of the end user certificates or certificates. In fact, he, President Kabbah, is one of the causes of the conflict by stealing State resources, including two others in 1968, wherein Justice Singor Boaku Betts passed a ruling of Tejan Kabbah not to hold public position of trust in Sierra Leone, during the commission of inquiry after stealing a shipload of cocoa. This very man on the BBC Focus on Africa admitted that RUF was right to fight and that when at Central African Republic, Bongay, he was not happy as corruption engulfed the whole nation. Because he wants to entrench himself into political power by hook and crook, he's now bent on destroying RUF. Realistically, the RUF can no longer leave the destiny of this country in the hands of crooked politicians.

    Conclusively, the RUF fought for democracy, justice and human rights when there was one-party dictatorial rule of the All People's Congress, and there is no way we cannot accept being sidelined by the same politicians who are the cause of the conflict."

    I'm going to pause again, Mr Sesay, and I'm going to ask you directly: Why did you, as a young man, decide to take up arms and enter Sierra Leone?

  • Well, during my training at Naama, when Foday Sankoh was addressing us, lecturing us, as you said, yes, the man was saying the truth, that the State was ruled by one party and that the people was suffering, and that was the fact that gave me the cause to be part of the revolution.

  • Now, tell me, Mr Sesay, whilst you were training at Camp Naama, did any of those undergoing the same training as you suggest to you, firstly, that the whole purpose of this enterprise was to control the mineral resources of Sierra Leone?

  • No. Throughout the time that I spent at Naama, nobody ever told me. None of the instructors, including Mr Sankoh, nobody spoke about mining diamonds.

  • Did, for example, anyone say to you that Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor had made a plan, an agreement, in Libya to carry out such a purpose in Sierra Leone?

  • No, no, nobody told me that.

  • Did Foday Sankoh, in Camp Naama, tell you, for example, that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and that the two of them had decided to conspire together?

  • Objection. The questions are leading the witness into answers suggested by counsel.

  • What is your response, Mr Griffiths?

  • Let me just repeat the question: "Did Foday Sankoh, in Camp Naama, tell you, for example" --

  • He's repeating the suggestion. We all can read the transcript.

  • -- "that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and that the two of them had decided to conspire together?"

    What is the allegation being made by the Prosecution in this case? Am I not allowed to put it to the sole most-senior surviving member of the RUF to get his answer on that? Why is Mr Koumjian afraid of any answer that the witness might give to a question like this, which goes to the very heart of the allegation being made by the Prosecution?

  • Please, order. Order.

    Please sit down. We've heard the objection. We've heard the response. Let me consult.

  • [Trial Chamber conferred]

  • We are of the view that this is one of the main Prosecution assertions in their case, alluded to in the indictment, and that it may be put precisely in the manner that Mr Griffiths is putting it to the witness.

  • Mr Sesay, did Foday Sankoh in Camp Naama tell you that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and the two of them had decided to conspire together?

  • I do have another objection. It's a compound question. There's two parts, and they should be separated.

  • I think counsel has the right to put the assertion as he has put it. Please go ahead.

  • Did Foday Sankoh, Mr Sesay, in Camp Naama tell you that he had met with Charles Taylor in Libya and the two of them had decided to conspire together?

  • No, Mr Sankoh never told me that. He never told any of us that at Naama. In fact, what we knew from Mr Sankoh and Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawalli and - they said that the leader of the RUF who was training at Libya was called Mohamed Kabbah, he was the leader of the RUF then.

  • I'm grateful. Let's go back to the document, shall we:

    "The judiciary lost its sense of justice, whereby the criminals reached triumph over the judicial system while the poor became entrapped in abject frustration and punishment. The judiciary's criminally responsible for frustrating so many youths in taken arms in this nation. Up to date, the judiciary continues to be the hallmark, spectra and behemoth of injustice and intolerance. The judiciary have refused itself to be independence.

    The politicians have politicised and institutionalised corruption within their midsts. Backed by the philosophy of 'Wusai den tie cow, dog-eat-dogism.'"

    What does that mean? What does that sentence in Krio mean?

  • Where they tie a cow, that's where it feeds from. That means where you work, you feed from there.

  • "I.e. - 'engulfed in one big fight for survivalism and hence lost its sense of justice'.

    (b) Atrocities During the Conflict.

    The civil war in Sierra Leone have been catalogue with a lot of atrocities especially at a latter date, simply because of the amount of forces involved in the fight. The international community have not investigated the commission of these atrocities fully, either from the people themselves or the fighting forces. They only cast blame on the RUF due to what the so-called Government of Freetown tells them or spoon feeds people to say RUF did this to me.

    The RUF will never deny involvement in committing atrocities in Sierra Leone during the 10 years civil war, but the kind of appalling atrocities committed at a latter time of the conflict cannot be attributed to the RUF, because the RUF is bounded by rules and regulations which cannot allow anybody to commit atrocity against innocent civilians whom the RUF took arms to save from the misery imposed on them by politicians."

    I'm going to pause. Mr Sesay, I'm going to ask you again do you agree with this proposition:

    "The RUF will never deny involvement in committing atrocities in Sierra Leone during the 10 years's civil war."

    Do you agree with that?

  • Yes, I agree with it, that the RUF cannot deny being involved in committing atrocities. Yes, I agree with it. But as you read, that the later part, all the atrocities in Sierra Leone was being blamed on the RUF. That's a lie. Because, for example, in Freetown, the invasion in 1999, January, even like the late Defence Minister of the SLPP who was arrested, and all of us were in detention; there were times when we had arguments with our friends, the AFRC guys, and once one morning Hinga Norman told myself, Alex Brima - Gullit - were arguing, because he told me that he wanted to testify that Superman was --

  • This is important, so I want you to take your time. I don't want to miss a word of this. Do you get me? Now, you were having a discussion with whom? Hinga Norman, the former - what was his position?

  • He was the Defence Minister for the SLPP government during that time.

  • Who else was involved in this discussion?

  • Tamba Alex Brima, alias Gullit.

  • Five-Five was there, Santigie Kanu, Morris Kallon was there and Augustine Gbao. It was in the morning at the detention centre in Freetown, because all of us were in detention.

  • Was this while you were awaiting trial or during the trial?

  • This was during the time that Alex Tamba Brima was to go and testify in the Court. That was when he suggested this to me. And I said, "No, I was not going to accept that." So I informed Kallon and Gbao. So there was there was an argument between us. Chief Norman was the one who mediated. When Tamba Brima, alias Gullit, told me that he wanted to go and tell the Court that it was himself and Superman who carried out the attack on January 6th. And I said, "Oh, why are you going to call out the name of Superman when Superman was not involved in the incident?" And I said, "No, I will not accept this." And I said, "In fact, I'm going to tell my colleagues." Then I told Gbao and Kallon. And Gbao said, "You see, what was their handiwork, now they want to put the blame on the RUF." He said, "Let him not even - don't even encourage him to bring those sorts of discussions to you." And Gbao invited Brima, Tamba Brima, alias Gullit, and asked him, and said, "What did you tell Issa?" When he asked him, he did not want to respond. And I came there, and I explained that Tamba had said he wanted to go and testify in court that he carried out the attack in Freetown, together with Superman. And Gbao said, "Man, you go and say what you did. Forget about the RUF, because Superman was not in Freetown and no RUF joined you in Freetown."

    And Chief Norman came to calm down the situation, to talk to us, together with Tamba. And he said, "This is strange to me." He said, "I was the Defence Minister. Trust me, I myself went with the idea that it was you, the RUF and the AFRC, that carried out the attack in Freetown. So that means what, just telling lies on you guys, and we are taking sins from you. It is only now that I've realised that RUF never took part in the attack on Freetown." So Chief Norman mediated and resolved the issue. And I said, "No." And Chief Norman said, "Brima", that is Gullit, "if you are going to testify, go and testify about what the AFRC did. Don't implicate the RUF in things that they did not do. If you knew that the RUF did not take part in the attack, say that. If they did it, then you can say it. But if you know that no RUF commander did not go to Freetown and they were not part of the attack on Freetown, don't try to bring any problem."

    So Chief Norman advised him and he accepted it. But even the SLPP government and the authorities in that government during the invasion of Freetown, and after that invasion, they had the idea that RUF was part of the attack, but it was later that they came to realise that it was not the RUF, that the RUF took no part in the attack on Freetown.

  • Thank you.

  • If I may seek clarification, Mr Sesay. When you say "during the 10 years of the civil war the RUF will never deny involvement", could you be precise as to what part of these - which 10 years you are referring to here, from which year to which year?

  • Like, my Lord, I'm talking about from 1991 to the end of the conflict. Because even like the man who wrote this letter committed atrocities.

  • And when you say that you do not agree that the RUF was responsible for the latter time of the conflict, what specific time are you referring to as the latter time of the conflict?

  • I'm talking about since the time the RUF joined the AFRC in 1997 to the end of the conflict.

  • You are saying that the RUF does not acknowledge committing atrocities from 1997 to the end of the conflict, is this what you're saying?

  • No, that is not it. I was saying that they were not just to cast blames on the RUF for conflicts committed from 1997 to the end of the war; that it was only the RUF that committed atrocities. That is what I'm saying, ma'am.

  • Mr Sesay, let's clarify that. Do you accept, Mr Sesay, that after the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998, up until the Freetown invasion in January 1999, that first - that a number of atrocities were committed?

  • Yes.

  • Who was responsible for them?

  • The AFRC, some were by the RUF and some were by the CDF. And even the ECOMOG.

  • Because even the ECOMOG committed atrocities because they were dropping bombs, they were killing innocent civilians, they were shelling heavy missile rockets that dropped in civilian villages, towns and killed people.

  • Now, who committed the bulk of the amputations which took place during that period, Mr Sesay?

  • Well, those were committed by the AFRC, because a witness testified against us during our trial and that witness was from an NGO, and they were the ones receiving the amputees from Masingbi, from Kabala, from Makeni in '98, Port Loko, up to the time for the invasion in Freetown. And all that witness's testimony, according to the witness, the areas that they received the amputees, and all the atrocities committed against the amputees, up to the early 1999, the witness testified about all of those, that they were committed by the AFRC.

  • Thank you.

  • But, Mr Sesay, are you saying that if it were not for that witness you would not know who committed the atrocities?

  • My Lord, I know, because those atrocities committed for example in 1998, there was no RUF present in Koinadugu District from February '98 up to August. It was only the AFRC who were there. And those same AFRC moved down to Bombali District, up to the time they attacked Karina, and they went down to Port Loko District and down to Freetown in early 1999. And during those times, those were the times that the amputations actually took place, because, when we attacked Kono and we went to Masingbi, Magburaka, Makeni in December '98, no amputations took place. And even the civilians in Makeni did not see anyone being amputated in November 1998.

  • Does the name --

  • Mr Griffiths, I thought I heard the witness say Koinadugu District. Which district did you say, Mr Sesay, that the RUF was in in 1998?

  • My Lord, I said from February of '98 - from February to August of '98, RUF were not present in Koinadugu District and from --

  • The record shows Kono when it should be Koinadugu.

  • Mr Sesay, does the name Staff Alhaji mean anything to you?

  • Was he a member of the RUF?

  • No, he was AFRC.

  • How do you come to know the name?

  • Well, I came to know that name when I attacked Kono in December 1998 and it was after the attack that I heard about Staff Alhaji and even Savage, the atrocities that they had committed in those areas in Small Sefadu, Benduma and Tombodu.

  • What atrocities had they committed, Staff Alhaji and Savage?

  • Well, when I came and attacked Kono, they told me that those two men and their followers, they used to put people into houses in Tombodu and they would put fuel on the houses and burn them. They were amputating civilians, they were amputating ECOMOGs in Kono, in Koidu, and they were killing people.

  • Was Savage a member of the RUF?

  • No, Savage was AFRC.

  • I'm grateful. Let's go back to the document:

    "...cannot be attributed to the RUF because the RUF is bounded by rules and regulations which cannot allow anybody to commit atrocity against innocent civilians whom the RUF took arms to save from the misery imposed on them by politicians. If you can recall from 1991 until 1996, when the first peace accord was signed on Sierra Leone in the Ivorian capital Abidjan on the 30th of November 1996, you never heard of the kind of appalling atrocities which you are hearing now. This is simply because of the principles RUF operates under. The kind of atrocities you are seeing now started in 1997 when President Kabbah took over the government of this country, coming on to the AFRC rule, ECOMOG intervention and up to pushing ECOMOG from the hinterlands to Freetown.

    Any RUF who is identified by any victim of committing atrocities against him or her will face the full weight of the law. Even those who went against the ideology of the RUF during the armed struggle, steps was taken against them severely. This is why Foday Sankoh himself took time to teach the men on how to deal with civilians, prisoners of war and humanitarian laws."

    During your ideology training at Camp Naama, Mr Sesay, did that training cover the topics listed here?

  • Yes.

  • "Do not forget that a lot of forces have been involved in the fight in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Army, Kamajors, Kapras" - what is Kapras?

  • Well, they were part of the Civil Defence Force. They were on the northern axis in Sierra Leone. They were the Kapras in Tonkolili District, Bombali District and Port Loko District.

  • The Donsos were also part of the CDF but they were the Konos, the Kono group. They had the Donso.

  • What about Gbentis?

  • The Gbentis, those were in the Port Loko District.

  • And were they part of any larger force?

  • Yes, they were part of the CDF force, because they were under the government.

  • "ULIMO forces from Liberia based in Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes, Ghurkhas, Sandline, ECOMOG forces, especially Nigerians and Guineans, all on the part of the government and the RUF.

    For President Kabbah to suggest to the United Nations for the RUF to be tried alone means covering his own atrocities committed during his blind and purported democratic rule in Sierra Leone. We fought for democracy, fair and equal justice and human rights in Sierra Leone. During the arm struggle, if any member of the RUF was identified committing crimes against civilians, charges were levelled against him or her when found guilty and necessary steps were taken against the person. Likewise now. We welcome action taken by international community against any member who will be identified by a victim, not only say RUF. In the same vein, what will happen to Kabbah's forces who committed worse crimes like burning of human beings alive with tyres in Freetown, ECOMOG forces killing hundreds of civilians at the Aberdeen Bridge and threw them into the river in Freetown, claiming they were rebel collaborators, using jet bombers and helicopters gunships in the killing of dozens of civilians behind the rebel line in the north and eastern part of Sierra Leone and destroying houses, raping, looting and innocent killing of civilians by pro-government forces (CDF). This has been attested to by one of the Kamajor chiefs, Francis Goba."

    Do you know Francis Goba, Mr Sesay?

  • I heard the name but I don't know the person facially.

  • Very well:

    "Francis Goba in an interview with Ninja News when he classed Kamajors as worst in committing atrocities more than any fighting force who claimed to be fighting on their behalf, worst atrocities committed by Johnny Paul Koroma's West Side Boys who attacked Freetown on January 6th 1999. This have been attested tested by Mr John Selehemen of Reuters in an interview with Musa Jalloh in charge of the amputees and some of the amputees themselves in Freetown. The people of Freetown can also attest that atrocities committed in Freetown was done by the AFRC (Arm Forces Revolutionary Council) of Johnny Paul Koroma. Even West Side themselves after arresting the 11 British soldiers, confirmed that on the BBC Focus on Africa, and above all, Gibril Massaquoi, who was detained at Pademba Road Prison, tried for treason by the Tejan Kabbah government, was removed from prison on the 6th of January 1999 and was with the West Side Boys and saw all what they did in Freetown after being released from prison, spent weeks with West Side Boys" --

  • Your Honours, the interpreters from the Krio booth are asking that counsel be advised to slow down his pace.

  • "...January 1999 and was with West Side Boys and saw all what they did in Freetown after being released from prison, spent weeks with West Side boys in Freetown before joining the RUF troops in Waterloo. These very West Side Boys are now being trained back as the new army by the government."

    Let's pause again, Mr Sesay. When was Gibril Massaquoi released from Pademba Road - sprung from Pademba Road Prison?

  • It was on the 6th of January 1999.

  • Did he thereafter rejoin the RUF?

  • Yes, after the AFRC withdrew from Freetown, Gibril went and rejoined the RUF in Waterloo where he met Superman and Rambo.

  • Did you, Issa Sesay, speak to Gibril Massaquoi about his experience in Freetown after he was sprung from prison?

  • Yes, when I came to Waterloo, I met him there. That was when Bockarie sent me to come and ask him to go and meet him in Buedu. But when I was ready to go, I asked him to go with me but he hide away from me. He hid away from me. But he told me at that time that they had been sprung from Pademba Road and that on their way retreating the guys were talking about the atrocities that they had committed in Freetown. He said, "Oh, these people, they burnt down Freetown. They killed so many people. They amputated people. So many people in Freetown." And I said, "Is that so?" He said, "Yes", and I said, "Okay."

  • And which people was Gibril Massaquoi telling you had committed these atrocities?

  • The AFRC troops who attacked Freetown.

  • "The Mende tribal Kamajors crossed to the north from the south killing and amputating civilians in the north when they claimed are brothers and sisters of Foday Sankoh ethnic group, like in Mile 91 and Yonni Bana. There are mass graves to prove. Some civilians killed and their parts removed for their Kamajor societal activities and political stance.

    There are dozens of evidence with the RUF to prove the guilt of the government in the bulk of atrocities committed in this country by her forces, some written evidence by victims in person, mass graves, recordings, documents, et cetera, et cetera.

    The RUF welcomes the idea of international community investigating genuinely human rights abuses in this country and not one dictated by President Kabbah's so-called suggestion of Special Court on RUF for his political gains. We fought for equal and fair justice and human rights, and we will love to see that exercise in Sierra Leone.

    (c) Failure of Various Peace Accords on Sierra Leone.

    There are three Peace Accords signed by parties to the conflict for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. For example, the Abidjan Accord of the 30th November 1996, the Conakry Peace Plan of 22nd October 1997 and the Lome Accord of July 7th 1999. The question to be answered by parties to the conflict is that why has peace not returned to Sierra Leone? Generally this can be answered thus; signing international document is one thing and knowing the intentions of those signing it is another issue. Having clear intentions to give peace to the people of Sierra Leone and political motives and entrenchment are the two aims that are seriously disturbing peace moves in Sierra Leone by parties. Until these two issues are seriously addressed, there will always be problems.

    The Abidjan Accord of 30th of November 1996 could not give peace to the people of Sierra Leone due to the insincerity of President Kabbah and his cohorts. In the first place, after signing the Abidjan Accord, he, President Kabbah, summoned a meeting at his State House office where his chief of army staff, Colonel James Max Kanga, chief of defence staff, Brigadier Hassan Conteh, and deputy defence minister, Hinga Norman, including the ULIMO commander, the commander of the Nigerian air wing, the Air Force commander of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, including others, were in attendance and instructed by their commander in chief, who is also the president, to attack the RUF base where the leader Foday Sankoh left for Abidjan on the peace accord (Zogoda)."

  • "Peace process (Zogoda)."

  • "Peace process (Zogoda)."

  • "This attack was successfully carried out in which nearly 150 civilians died and others wounded, and the RUF commander Zino's whereabouts was not known up-to-date. President Kabbah further told them to give the credit to the Kamajors so that he could not be seen as one not fulfilling his obligation under the Abidjan Accord, because, when asked, he will reply that it is the civilians going back home and he has no option of stopping them.

    This was revealed in a voluntary statement by the then-army chief of staff, Colonel James Max Kanga, during the kangaroo court martial in 1998 in Sierra Leone. Colonel James Max Kanga was killed by the government after the court martial, even though he was not part of the other ranks who successfully overthrew him, simply because he leaked the president's secret.

    In another development, President Kabbah connived with the late Head of State of Nigeria, Sani Abacha, to have our leader, Foday Sankoh, detained after the eruption of fighting caused by him as stated in top paragraph. Foday Sankoh went to Nigeria upon the invitation of Sani Abacha, the then ECOWAS chairman, in order to resolve the continued violation of ceasefire, and Kabbah was to go there too. The RUF members sent to represent RUF on the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace were given money by Kabbah and the then UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Sierra Leone by then Mr Bahama Dinka, in order to forge new leadership for the RUF which they attempted and failed. We know that President Kabbah will deny this, but the question for him to answer is - why did he ask his ambassador to Guinea, Mohamed Jabbie, to join Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa and others to cross into RUF territory from Guinea, to convince them to denounce the leader, Foday Sankoh, for Philip Palmer? Why did Kabbah swiftly go on the media on the 23 March 1997 to support Palmer and others as new leaders of the RUF, failing to realise that he signed a peace deal with Foday Sankoh in Abidjan? All of these people were arrested, along with the ambassador and bodyguard called Sergeant Gobeh, all from Guinea.

    Furthermore, creating a militia group against the national army made the situation worst when they started killing one another, which is contrary to the Constitution which led to the May 25th 1997 takeover of government by the junior ranks of the army.

    After the May 25th 1997 coup d'etat and subsequent takeover by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the RUF leadership was contacted for peace where he agreed for the RUF to join the AFRC for peace, while on the detention at the Sheraton Hotel in Nigeria by Kabbah and his colleague Sani Abacha. The AFRC signed a peace agreement whereby they were to stay in power from 22 October 1997 until 20 April 1998. This agreement was signed by international community, especially ECOWAS, as mandated by the United Nations on behalf the of the ousted Government of Kabbah. This time never expired when Kabbah hired Sandline mercenaries to bring in arms to fight along with Nigerians to destroy the agreement and to violate the arms embargo on Sierra Leone by United Nations Security Council, and nothing came out of it. After Tejan Kabbah's return, he made four courts of treason for those they termed as collaborators, including our leader, Foday Sankoh, and it was in these courts that Solomon Berewa, the attorney general, said that they were not signatories to the Conakry peace plan and therefore it was not binding on them. Dozens of civilians were killed in and around Freetown in a cold blood while fighting to reinstate Kabbah, and that was the end of the Conakry peace plan. Twenty-four soldiers were killed, even though they had legitimate reasons for the overthrow, and Kabbah never listened to the international community to stop the killing of these soldiers.

    The Lome Peace Accord was signed after international community, including ECOWAS, supported Tejan Kabbah to have a two-track approach on the crisis in Sierra Leone. It was Mr Francis Okelo, the United Nations Secretary-General's Representative to Sierra Leone, who saw the failure of the two-track approach that decided to forgo the military option for a political settlement which was supported by ECOWAS after the RUF had taken over two-thirds of the provinces and West Side Boys take over two-thirds of Freetown, the capital city. After months of deliberations, the agreement was signed on the 7th of July 1999. This agreement was derailed by Tejan Kabbah for its full implementation. Propaganda against the RUF was the order of the day, just to create corridor for the non-implementation of Lome. To start with, any time our leader, Foday Sankoh, went out of the country, even with his permission, he always created tensions in the country that Foday Sankoh went out to buy arms, given ugly pictures of the leadership to both the local people and the peacekeepers.

    President Kabbah failed to give parastatals and ambassadorial positions to the RUF, including other public offices, as agreed to in Lome. Any time RUF supporters wanted to gather either to welcome their leader back from trips or for meetings, they were stopped by Tejan Kabbah under the guise of state of emergency. But state of emergency never stopped them ganging their Kamajors and SLA troops, including their supporters, to attack the residence of Foday Sankoh on the 8th of May 2000, hence derailing the whole programme. The incident that happened between UNAMSIL and RUF was on the verge of settlement which should not have extended to this stage. We would have made progress if they had not attacked RUF leadership, including the officials in Freetown. The deputy UNAMSIL force commander will attest to this. So the attack on RUF officials and RUF leaders was not because of what happened between UNAMSIL and RUF but a deliberate act to derail the peace process, planned and masterminded by Tejan Kabbah and Johnny Paul Koroma for political gains.

    Deployment of UNAMSIL did not occur in Kono as well because Tejan Kabbah failed to set up the commission for the management of strategic resources, reconstruction and development. No office space was provided. Teams came from Britain and America to assist in setting up the commission, and there was no cooperation from President Kabbah due to his hidden agenda. There was a lot of lapses on the part of government, including even the DDR programme, reference to RUF position paper dated 27 December 1999, which a copy was sent to the United Nations on violations of various articles of Lome by President Kabbah."

    Then we come to sub-heading (d), which is the final section.

    "Position of the RUF on the current peace process and her political stance. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone still believes that the only way out of the crisis in Sierra Leone is genuine peace. The creation of awareness have been made especially to the grass roots by the armed struggle. It is therefore now left with international community to count on the integrity of the parties by putting aside the past and compel parties to do the right thing in the interest of the masses.

    On the part of RUF, we are also concerned about the double role of some self-seeking mediators and conflict settlers in Africa, thus prolonging on the conflict as long as they are enriching themselves. We will partly criticise the international community for failing to fulfill their obligations under the international documents they sign. For instance, failing to give trust fund to the RUF for her political transformation, according to Lome. International community failed to prevail on politicians and leaders of various African countries to govern their countries in the interests of the masses. They sit aside until things go out of hand that lead to civil wars, only at the end for them to start saying war crimes, human rights, et cetera, et cetera. They don't condemn the politicians earlier when in power and abusing human rights.

    The RUF's position is very clear as far as the ongoing peace process is concerned. UNAMSIL is allowed to deploy in our territories, which is the first step. We know we have been blamed in the past for creating obstacles to UNAMSIL deployment. It will not happen this time around. Non-governmental organisations are also welcomed into all of our territories without hindrance, but before disarmament the following have to be addressed:

    The RUF knows very well that by us joining other political parties in asking for interim government, the so-called 'something' government will tend not to accept if not pressurised by international community as our people are suffering. They always say the Constitution don't have room for that. This is unacceptable to us because this same Constitution was abused by them from day one of their rule on to date. For instance, there is no provision that says when a man conduct elections, he will accept appointment in the formation of the ruling party's government. Neither there is a provision for a foreigner to head Sierra Leone's army or police force. There are a host of other abuses of the 1991 Constitution by the so-called government. The RUF is not in position to accept any Constitution of poverty on our people.

    The release of all RUF members detained by President Kabbah as he promised in his August 20th 2000 press communique in Freetown in the presence of two ECOWAS leaders which he has not done up until now.

    Training of Kamajors and so-called Sierra Leone army to stop, as it is contrary to Lome, UNAMSIL is aware and have not stopped these trainings.

    Mercenaries to leave Sierra Leone in the security of the state to be in the hands of UNAMSIL alone and not in conjunction with any armed group in Sierra Leone.

    Disarmament to commence under an interim government as President Kabbah's 10 year of office is over. This will further enhance disarmament and speedy implementation of the peace process, a level and fair political playing field and the international community to be able to investigate human rights abuses and war crimes. This is a challenge to the Tejan Kabbah's lead government since they are claiming that the RUF is unpopular and has committed worse crimes during the conflict and do not have a political agenda. The interim government to be headed by a reputable Sierra Leonean whereby all political parties, including RUFP and civic organisations, will be absolved for true peace and reconciliation.

    Disarmament to be carried out by all parties and UNAMSIL to take over State security, even up to six months after elections.

    The removal of our disarmed brothers from Port Loko DDR camp to Pademba Road central prison. Some have been released and now with us while others remain languishing in the Pademba prison.

    Creating obstacles for the RUF to get party house in Freetown by President Kabbah's several times is also our most concern, threaten to burn houses of anyone leased to RUF.

    Treating the RUF as a separate entity and not part of their last government e.g. a big commotion arose for the withdrawal of our vehicles at the quay when they arrived last year."

    Pause there. Mr Sesay, "the arrival of our vehicles at the quay", what's that about?

  • Yes, because Mr Sankoh had a friend of his, whom he went to Gibril in South Africa. He planned to send vehicles for the use of the party; after we would have disarmed, those are the vehicles we would have used for the use of the party.

  • And with what had those vehicles been purchased in South Africa?

  • Well, he met a friend called Nkrumah. That was the name of the man. So according to Mr Sankoh, when he returned from South Africa, he said this man said he will support him to get all necessary items for the party's transformation. So he was ready to investment with Mr Sankoh, and he said after the elections Mr Sankoh would pay him back; that he wanted to invest in agriculture to cultivate big farms of corns, because he wanted went to Magburaka and Makeni and he spoke about those farms. So that was the man who was supposed to support that agricultural programme.

  • Mr Interpreter, you said big farms of what?

  • Corn, C-O-R-N, your Honour.

  • "If these issues are not addressed, disarmament on our side will be definitely derailed and there will be a political stalemate. The RUF joins other organisations and countries in the world in support of your excellently serving another term as UN Secretary-General using our African brother and your efforts in resolving our crisis."

    And we see that Gibril Massaquoi's name appears, and you will recall that over the page your name appears. And we see that this document was to be sent to a number of individuals, apart from the UN Secretary-General, those people being named.

    Go back to page 9, please. Mr Sesay, the propositions which the writer of this document sets out on this page, was there any discussion within the RUF about these issues? Party offices, difficulty in getting the vehicles off the quay and so on, had there been such a discussion within the RUF?

  • Yes, those discussions went on. I was aware of them. Because even the party office in Freetown, President Kabbah used to dodge the discussions to give us the office, except when pressure was piled on him, then the office space was allocated. And even the building was an empty house; I was the one who gave money to Mike Lamin to renovate the house, to repair it, and to buy office equipment. And even the office in Bo, they used to dodge us. And after disarmament they gave us a two-room apartment, and in Kenema President Kabbah refused giving office to us. So I was the one who provided money to take the office in Kenema and Makeni.

  • Yes, we can put that document away now, please.

    When we adjourned yesterday, Mr Sesay, we'd been - we'd embarked on looking at some evidence heard by these Judges from a witness, TFI-571. And I was inviting your comment on some of the testimony given by that witness. I'd like to continue with that process now, please.

  • Your Honour, I do have an objection to exactly what counsel stated he plans to do; invite comment by the witness on another witness's testimony. There's nothing that allows a witness, and that's what Mr Sesay is, to comment on other witness's testimony. He can state facts, he can give his opinion about what happened, he can say whether something is true or not, but he can't comment and give his opinion about it.

  • Mr Griffiths, what is your response?

  • I really don't see either the logic or the sense in what Mr Koumjian is saying. Given that, for example, he, Mr Koumjian, has on several occasions invited witnesses to comment on whether another witness is a liar or has told lies or not. What's the difference? What's good for the goose is good for the gander - sit down, I haven't finished. I haven't finished.

  • Could we have some decorum in the Court, please. I cannot have two counsel standing at the same time and neither can I have counsel shouting at each other. Please, try and maintain decorum in this Court.

    Mr Griffith, I've asked you to give your response and you were in the course of doing that.

  • I'm grateful.

    The point we make is very simple. It is perfectly acceptable for a witness to be reminded of the evidence of another and for the witness to comment on that evidence. And I underline, Mr Koumjian himself has embarked on such an exercise on several occasions. So I submit, quite bluntly, that it's totally hypocritical of him now to be making this objection. That is my response.

  • I'm going to give a ruling on this objection, Mr Koumjian.

    It is perfectly admissible for a witness sitting in the witness box to have excerpts of past testimony read to the witness where past witnesses have given evidence relating to the participation of this particular witness or relating to events that this witness is able to speak to. There is absolutely nothing irregular about it. So the objection is overruled.

  • I'm grateful.

    I am helpfully reminded by Mr Munyard that I did not request that your Honours mark the last document for identification.

  • Mr Griffiths, we did not hear what you said because your folder was interrupting.

  • Madam President, I am helpfully reminded by Mr Munyard that I did not ask for the last document we looked at to be marked for identification.

  • Do you really require this document, because whilst I did rule that you could put the document to the witness, the witness did say yesterday that he did not know where this document emanated from and that his purported name at the end - he couldn't associate himself with this document. Secondly, you've read virtually the entire document into the record and the witness has commented on excerpts of it. Do you still need to mark this document for identification?

  • Yes, please.

  • Very well. The document will be marked MFI - right, this is the document entitled - well, this is a document addressed apparently, to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it is dated 6th of April 2001, and it appears to emanate from the RUF Defence Headquarters, Makeni, and is apparently written by one Gibril Massaquoi, Secretary of and Spokesman of the RUF. So that document will be marked MFI-10.

  • Now, you recall that the aspect of this testimony that I invited your attention to yesterday was regarding the transfer of two parcels of diamonds, firstly, 43 diamonds, then 18, by - to Foya by Jungle and then on to Monrovia, do you remember that? Do you remember me asking you about that yesterday, Mr Sesay?

  • Yes, I remember.

  • Now, thereafter, this Court was told this by the witness, he was asked, "Did Jungle" --

  • Excuse me. May I have a citation?

  • 9384. I'm picking it up at line 25.

  • This is after the second trip, witness told these judges, that was made to Monrovia with diamonds:

    "Q. Did Jungle return after he left Tongo Fields on that

    occasion?

    A. Well, Jungle came but he did not meet us in Tongo. By

    the time he came back, my assignment had changed."

    And then he went on. He said this --

  • Sorry. Could I just get the date? I don't have the date in front of me.

  • Sorry. It's 8 May 2008 and I'm now going to page 9393.

  • And the witness now goes on to deal with a meeting that took place between Waterworks and Buedu. This is page 9392, bottom line. Now, Mr Sesay, where is Waterworks?

  • You mean in Buedu? Waterworks is between Buedu and a village called Benduma, about a mile - not a complete mile but about a mile from Buedu Town.

  • Is it on the Foya road?

  • Yes, it is that road that leads to the borderline in Dawa and when you cross you take the road to Foya.

  • Okay. Now, the witness says this:

    "Q. Why was this meeting held at this particular place?"

    Page 9393, line 4:

    "A. Well, at that time there was serious fighting between

    us and ECOMOG and we were afraid of the air raids so we

    decided to look out for a thick forest where we could hold

    the meeting, so that was why we were there.

    Q. Who called this meeting?

    A. Mr Bockarie.

    Q. Are you able to say when this meeting took place?

    A. This meeting took place after the intervention, that

    was in 1998.

    Q. How long after the intervention?

    A. Well, if my memory serves me well, because when we

    left February we went to Daru, March - it was April, May,

    around June or even before the death of Abacha, we held

    that meeting before Abacha died."

    He then goes on to describe Abacha being the Nigerian President. And then he continues when asked what was the purpose of the meeting, line 25:

    "A. Well, Mr Bockarie called this meeting and it had so

    many reasons for which we held the meeting."

    And then he goes on to describe, page 9394, line 6, that there were about 600 people at this meeting. Now, let me pause. Do you recall a meeting at that kind of time, Mr Sesay, between Waterworks and Buedu in a forest, attended by some 600 individuals?

  • Well, no, this is a lie. It's a lie. Because Bockarie posted me to Pendembu in late April 1998. And all the meetings that Bockarie held about the front lines in Pendembu - about the front lines, it was in Pendembu that we held the meeting about the front lines in, you know, Baiima, Mobai, Kuiva, they would come together with their staff to Pendembu. It was in Pendembu that we held the meetings. Even to create the brigade around May 1998, it was in Kailahun District that we held the meeting. But Bockarie came from Buedu and we held the meeting in Pendembu. So no meeting took place at Waterworks to my knowledge. No meeting took place there from February right up to December of 1998.

  • I need to make you aware, Mr Sesay, the witness is claiming that this meeting took place in a thick forest between Buedu and Waterworks and some 600 people were present. Do you know of such a meeting?

  • No, no. Such a meeting never took place there.

  • Another aspect of this. Now you will recall that the witness told these judges that this meeting took place in April, May or June of 1998. Now, this is how the witness continued, page 9394:

    "Q. What happened at the meeting?

    A. Well, at that time Mr Bockarie was just from Monrovia

    in the first place."

  • In April, May or June of 1998 did Bockarie go to Monrovia?

  • No, Bockarie did not go to Monrovia.

  • And I should ask you this, Mr Sesay, just so that we're clear. Do you recall any meeting called by Bockarie, attended by some 600 individuals?

  • No. Never did a meeting take place in Kailahun District under Sam Bockarie when 600 people attended who were RUF fighters, no, commanders, no.

  • And he continues:

    "A. Well, at that time Mr Bockarie was just from Monrovia

    in the first place and he told us about his new promotion

    that he had. And, secondly, he told us about the command

    structure between us and the AFRC. And at that time,

    Johnny Paul himself was present in the meeting."

    Pause. Do you recall such a meeting where Johnny Paul was present?

  • No. Such a meeting did not take place.

  • "He also told us of the role of Jungle and he explained that to Johnny Paul and his men. He told us about the Fitti-Fatta operation that was supposed to take place in Kono and he told us about his travel to Burkina Faso together with General Ibrahim."

    Now, when was it that Bockarie went to Burkina Faso?

  • That was late November 1998.

  • In or about April, May or June of 1998 did Bockarie go to Burkina Faso with Ibrahim Bah?

  • Not at all.

  • Help me, when was the Fitti-Fatta mission?

  • The Fitti-Fatta mission was in late July to early August 1998.

  • Prior to the Fitti-Fatta mission, did Bockarie go to Burkina Faso?

  • "He told us about his travel to Burkina Faso together with General Ibrahim and that General Ibrahim was supposed to move with him. He discussed so many other things but I think those were the major things that we discussed. He also told us about the diamonds that Issa took along with him that he said got missing. That was in Monrovia."

    Do you recall such a discussion at a meeting involving 600 individuals?

  • No. No such meeting took place. In fact, even the Fitti-Fatta that this person is claiming about, that Fitti-Fatta mission, at the time Sam Bockarie invited Superman, it was only Sam Bockarie, Mike Lamin and Superman who had a meeting. And even that was held in Sam Bockarie's room. That was where they discussed about the plan to attack Kono during the Fitti-Fatta mission. Because even for me, Sam Bockarie called me, because by then I was in Pendembu, and this person who was speaking here was in Baiima at this time. And after the meeting that Superman held with Sam Bockarie, he and Mike Lamin - Sam Bockarie gave his jeep, his Land Cruiser, to Mike Lamin. Superman and his bodyguards in Mike Lamin's vehicle. They travelled to Pendembu where they met me and from there Mike Lamin stayed with me in Pendembu and Superman said he was going to visit the front lines in Baiima, Mobai and Kuiva.

  • Please slow down as you are narrating your testimony. Slow down, please, for everybody's sake. Continue.

  • So Superman left. Mike Lamin stayed with me in Pendembu. Superman said he was going to visit the front lines. He went to Baiima, he met the battalion commander and his men. He left there, he went to Mobai and from there he went to Kuiva.

  • Which part of slow down did you not understand, Mr Sesay? Do you understand when I say slow down and address the judges? Your testimony is not to counsel. It is to us. So you face us and slow down and give your testimony. Slowly, please.

  • What were you saying, Mr Sesay?

  • Yes, I've heard that, my Lord.

  • Yes. Where did I stop?

  • Let me remind you. You were saying this: And after that meeting that Superman held with Sam Bockarie, he and Mike Lamin - Sam Bockarie gave his Land Cruiser to Mike Lamin. Go on from there.

  • I said Sam Bockarie gave his Land Cruiser to Superman. Mike Lamin used his own vehicle, he also had a Land Cruiser. And both of them drove, they came to Pendembu where they met me and then Mike Lamin stayed in Pendembu with me and Superman told me that he was going to visit the front lines. From Pendembu Superman went to Baiima, and from Baiima he went to Mobai. From Mobai he went to Kuiva, he went to Baiwala and then he came back to Pendembu and went to Buedu.

    So to say that there was any battalion commander, be it Baiima, Mobai, or Kuiva, who attended the meeting at the time Superman came to Buedu and they held it before the attack on Kono or the Fitti-Fatta mission, that is a black lie. Because even the witness that the Prosecution brought against me during my trials who was Superman's operator, who was part of the people who came with Superman from Kono to Buedu, that witness testified before Trial Chamber I that Superman, Mike Lamin and Sam Bockarie were the people who held the meeting in Sam Bockarie's room and they planned the attack on Kono.

    So there was no other commander, including me, who left from outside Buedu and attended that meeting. The meeting - in the meeting were only Superman, Mike Lamin and Bockarie.

  • Now, the witness went on, Having been asked this question:

    "Q. What did he say about his new promotion?"

    Answer, page 9395:

    "A. Well, he left us in Sierra Leone and went to Monrovia

    and we were - we used to call him Colonel Bockarie and then

    he came with two promotions and those were high promotions.

    He was called general now, he and Issa Sesay, and he said

    it was President Taylor, Pa Taylor, who gave them that

    promotion."

    In April, May or June of 1998, Mr Sesay, were you promoted to the rank of general by Pa Taylor?

  • No. Throughout 1998, up to December, I was a colonel, and that was what everybody knew within the RUF. Mr Taylor did not promote me.

  • Did Mr Taylor promote Sam Bockarie to the rank of general in April, May, June of 1998?

  • No, not at all. It was Johnny Paul Koroma who promoted Sam Bockarie to brigadier in March of '98, and that was the rank that Sam Bockarie used up to December 1998.

  • So help us: This evidence of Bockarie being promoted in Monrovia, is it true or false?

  • It's a big lie because everybody in Kailahun within the RUF knew that Sam Bockarie was promoted to the rank of brigadier by Johnny Paul in 1998.

  • Now, the witness was further asked this: He was asked about what Bockarie said about the command structure between us and the AFRC, and he said this:

    "A. Well, he made it clear to all the AFRC men who were

    present that AFRC was no longer in power and that where we

    had now come, it was called the jungle, and that everybody

    was supposed to be under the RUF command and that the RUF -

    anywhere the RUF was serving as a commander, the AFRC

    should serve as a deputy."

    Do you recall anything like that, Mr Sesay?

  • Well, those things did not happen during any meeting.

  • And then he said this, having been asked:

    "Q. Was that something that was accepted at the meeting?

    A. Yes, everyone accepted, up to the leader, the leader

    for the AFRC. All of them accepted, all of us, and those

    of us who was there besides SAJ Musa."

    Now, do you recall such a meeting taking place between Waterworks and Buedu where SAJ Musa was present?

  • No. SAJ Musa never went to Kailahun throughout '98. SAJ Musa did not even go to Kono, let alone Kailahun.

  • But he goes on:

    "Q. Was SAJ Musa at that meeting?

    A. No, no, no. He was not there, but after the meeting

    they made it possible to send it as a message to all the

    front lines."

    Then this question:

    "Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about the role of Jungle at

    the meeting?

    A. Well, he put it clear to Pa Paul, Pa Johnny Paul, that

    that was the man whom the leader had introduced to us to be

    Pa Ghankay's own representative in the RUF territory. So

    he was the person that always linked us to Pa Taylor, and

    he wanted them to know that for them to recognise him."

    What about that, Mr Sesay?

  • It's a lie. That type of meeting did not take place. It's a big lie. Since the time Johnny Paul went to Buedu, when we arrived in Buedu from Kono, he did not attend any meetings between March and August in Buedu. He did not attend any meetings wherein he addressed people, nor did he and Sam Bockarie attend any meetings where they addressed people.

  • Okay. Then this, page 9396, line 5. This question was asked:

    "Q. What was said about the Fitti-Fatta mission?

    A. Well, he said" - that's Bockarie - "he would want us to

    go and clear the mining area" - that is Kono - "and that

    the Pa" - Mr Taylor that is - "had told him that nothing

    goes for nothing and that he had no machine to make arms,

    that they were materials. He also brought them from some

    other areas, so he said - he said we should go and capture

    the mining area so we would be able to get money from there

    and get the materials."

    And then he goes on to confirm that the Pa who was said that to him was Mr Taylor. Do you recall anything like that ever being said by Sam Bockarie, Mr Sesay?

  • No. Sam Bockarie never said so, and even the meetings he attended in Pendembu to create the brigades, he never said that, because for me this type of meeting that he's talking about here, no such meeting ever took place in 1998 between Waterworks and Buedu. This is a lie.

  • Now, just help us, Mr Sesay. Having been a senior commander in the RUF, you should be able to assist us with this. When the RUF were discussing the planning of an operation such as the Fitti-Fatta mission, who would be present at such a meeting?

  • Well, because what I am testifying about here is the reality that happened. Before the Fitti-Fatta attack, it was only Superman who carried out the attack. Mike Lamin, who was advisor to Bockarie, and Bockarie, they were the ones who discussed these things in Sam Bockarie's bedroom. No other commander took place in that discussion. And for me, it was after the meeting that they came to me, they met me in Pendembu, and that was the time Mike Lamin informed me about the things that they discussed in that meeting. And even for me, at the time I was going to attack Kono, the meeting we held at Waterworks, it was only myself, the commanders and Sam Bockarie's adjutants and the late SYB Rogers. We did not invite any other commander, who is a junior commander, on the front line to attend the meeting. You, the commander, who was going to undertake the operation will be at the meeting with Sam Bockarie, including his advisor, Mike Lamin. And if it was necessary, it will include the war council chairman. Because to plan such a meeting, you did not need to involve all commanders, junior commanders, because we wouldn't want the information to leak out. Because, when you are planning an attack, you will have to keep it a confidential business until the day of the attack, or two or three days before the attack because, if the information went out, the junior fighters would go around saying it and they would spread out the information saying that, "Oh, we are going to attack so and so place", and we did not want that kind of thing. We did not like that. So in planning an attack, that is not something you will have to assemble everybody to discuss; no, we never used to do things like that.

  • Question, line 19, page 9396:

    "Q. Another thing that you said was discussed at the meeting was Sam Bockarie's travel to Burkina Faso with General Ibrahim.

    Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about that?

    A. He said that Mr Taylor told him that he would link in

    with Blaise Compaore, the President of Burkina Faso, and it

    was Mr Ibrahim who was going to travel with him, he was to

    move with him to Burkina Faso."

    Now, who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso, Mr Sesay?

  • Well, at the first time I knew that Sam Bockarie went to Burkina Faso was late November 1998, because Sam Bockarie went at first to Monrovia in September and he returned; he went again in October and returned; and, after his return, he invited me from Pendembu, when I went. He said he had met with President Taylor on two different occasions about the revisitation of the Abidjan Accord and he said that President Taylor said that he was going to contact the OAU chairman, who was President Blaise at that time. So his travel to Burkina Faso, according to Bockarie, President Taylor had spoken to Blaise about Sam Bockarie's travel. That was when he, Eddie --

  • Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slow down in that area and repeat it slowly.

  • Mr Sesay, I'd like you to take it up from this part, please: "So his travel according to Burkina Faso, according to Bockarie, President Taylor had spoken to Blaise about Sam Bockarie's travel." Go on from there.

  • Yes. I said when Bockarie returned after his second visit in October, and before he left in November, he told me that I and Mike Lamin should come and stay in Buedu until his return. He said because President Taylor had told him that he was going to contact President Blaise Compaore about his - about the revisitation of the Abidjan Peace Accord. So Sam Bockarie told me that --

  • Mr Griffiths, your question was: Who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso?

  • I'm coming back to it.

  • Who arranged for Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso, Mr Sesay?

  • It was President Taylor.

  • And why was Sam Bockarie going to Burkina Faso?

  • Sam Bockarie said he had discussed with President Taylor about the revisitation of the Abidjan Peace Accord. So that was why Mr Taylor said he was going to contact the ECOWAS leaders - other ECOWAS leaders, because they were the guarantors for the accord, for them to revisit the Abidjan Accord.

  • Thank you. Now, the witness was also asked this: About what you, Issa Sesay, had done. And the question was this?

    "Q. Another topic that was discussed by Sam Bockarie at

    the meeting was something that Issa Sesay had done, is that

    right?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What did Sam Bockarie say about Issa Sesay at the

    meeting?

    A. Well, he told us. He said sorry to everybody for what

    happened. And he asked for forgiveness from Mr Sesay for

    what he did when he took the diamonds with him to Monrovia

    and he said on his way they had gone missing. Those were

    the things that he told us.

    Q. Who asked for forgiveness?

    A. Well, Sam Bockarie said so. He said Issa said we

    should forgive him. And he said when he went - when he

    went, the Pa himself told him that we should forgive him."

    The Pa being Taylor. Do you recall any such thing being

    said, Mr Sesay?

  • No. No such things took place in any meetings.

  • And then returning to the learned judge's question a moment ago, the witness was asked this question:

    "Q. Did Sam Bockarie say why Charles Taylor was going to

    link him to Burkina Faso, send him to Burkina Faso?

    A. Yes. Because he said he told him about the mission

    that we were to take to free the leader. And it was a

    mission that involved heavy materials, because we were

    supposed to clear the ECOMOG force before we get to

    Freetown. So he said he was going to link him up where we

    would be able to get direct material so that we would bring

    them over and be able to run the mission."

    Did you have such a discussion with Bockarie, Mr Sesay?

  • I did not have such discussion with Bockarie and Bockarie did not tell anybody that throughout 1998. And even before he went to Burkina Faso he did not say that to anybody. And even when he came back before we attacked Kono, we had no plans in mind to attack Freetown.

  • Now, you will have noted that in the course of that answer this individual mentioned a mission to free the leader. So the witness was asked this:

    "Q. What were you referring to?

    A. Well, that was Operation Free the Leader, and that was

    the material he went for, for us to come and run the

    mission to capture Freetown and free the leader."

    I'll pause there before I continue. Do you recall an RUF operation called Operation Free the Leader, Mr Sesay?

  • No, I do not recall any operation that we named Operation Free the Leader. Even the operation that I took to Kono did not have any name. But, you know, sometimes when you carry out a successful operation, fighters will give any kind of name to that operation. But to say we gave it a name that it was Operation Free the Leader or that Sam Bockarie gave it a name, no.

  • Just to complete this, the witness continued by saying that this meeting lasted for some eight hours; line 13, page 9398. So the witness is talking about a meeting in a thick forest involving 600 people in which all of these things were discussed and the meeting lasted for eight hours. Do you recall such a meeting, Mr Sesay?

  • I do not recall any meeting of the such because we did not hold any meeting in 1998 that lasted for eight hours. The only meeting we had at Waterworks in December 1998, before I went to Kono, was about how to go and attack Kono and after that, we all dispersed.

  • Now, I need to take you through some more of this account in order to come to the next matter that I want to deal with, in order to put it in context. This question was asked, line 14, page 9398:

    "Q. Did anyone apart from Sam Bockarie speak at that

    meeting?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Who?

    A. It was Sam Bockarie who spoke more and then later

    Jungle spoke and he buttressed the introduction that Mr Sam

    did, told the former AFRC members and he did say that he

    would try his utmost best to see that things worked out

    well. So he said so. And then later Johnny Paul too spoke

    and some other people also spoke during the meeting."

    Q. Can you remember whether there were high level

    commanders at the meeting?

    A. Yes."

    And he went on to name that Bockarie was there, Johnny Paul was there, Jungle was there, Issa Sesay - that's you - was there, Eddie Kanneh was there, Gullit was there, AB, FOC, and some other commanders. Then he goes on to give details about those commanders. He again goes on:

    "A. Yes, Gullit was there. Gullit was there and Superman

    was there, Morris Kallon was there and Akim Turay was

    there."

    And then he continues at page 9423.

  • Mr Griffiths, perhaps we could continue with that new page after the break, the midmorning break.

  • We'll reconvene at half past eleven.

  • [Break taken at 11.01 a.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 11.30 a.m.]

  • Yes, Mr Koumjian?

  • There is a change of appearance. We are joined by Brenda J Hollis.

  • Can I also register a change of appearance. We have been joined by Ms Logan Hambrick.

  • That is noted. Please continue.

  • Mr Sesay, in April, May, June of 1998, where was Gullit?

  • In May of 1998, Gullit left Kailahun and went to Kono. From Kono he went to Koinadugu.

  • Now, the witness was asked this at page 9423 in relation to that meeting which we have been talking about:

    "Q. What were the topics that were discussed at that

    particular meeting?

    A. Well, firstly, we discussed about trying to free the

    leader, and in that case we were to reattack Kono and go up

    to Freetown and then free our leader and take over power.

    We also discussed the disloyalty of SAJ Musa."

    Now, pause there. I've already asked you, Mr Sesay, whether you had ever heard of an Operation Free the Leader, and you answered in the negative. Do you recall a meeting at which a mission to go up to Freetown was discussed?

  • No.

  • Well, then he goes on. He was asked this:

    "Q. When you say the first target should be Kono, to

    Makeni, up to Freetown. What do you mean by that, the

    first target was to be Kono?"

    Now, let's pause there. When you embarked on that mission to capture Kono in December 1998, Mr Sesay, was it part of the plan that after Makeni was captured, you should go on to Freetown?

  • No. That was not part of the plan, because before I left Buedu, we were not sure of capturing Kono even, so there was no other further plan, apart from the Kono attack.

  • Now, he goes on:

    "Q. What do you mean that the first target was to be

    Kono?"

    A. Well, Kono is a mining area. In that whole country,

    that is the place we know, the high level productivity for

    diamonds, so we believed that if we were able to capture

    there first it would have been good for us. That was the

    reason why Kono. He said 'Kono should serve as the first

    target that we should capture'."

    Now, I'm pausing again to ask you this: Mr Sesay, was the capture of Kono in December 1998 motivated by a desire to commence mining on behalf of the RUF?

  • No. That was not the motive, because when we retreated from Freetown, we went through Kono and to Kailahun, and ECOMOG advanced to Kono and the deployment that they had in Kono was so strong, so we attacked Kono to pursue ECOMOG, it was not with the intent of mining.

  • "Q. Were any particular commanders given the role of

    capturing Kono?

    A. Well, yes.

    Q. Who?

    A. Well, Sam Bockarie told us that this plan was designed

    in Monrovia by Mr Taylor. He said it was designed in

    Monrovia so he only brought it to brief us, that this

    should be the way we should do things so that we will be

    able to succeed in the war."

    Now, the decision to attack Kono, Mr Sesay, was that devised in Monrovia by Charles Taylor?

  • No, not at all. It was at the meeting that we held at Waterworks. It was there that Sam Bockarie planned and discussed the meeting - the attack with us, and he never said that the attack on Kono was an instruction he got from Mr Taylor, no.

  • Page 9425. Line 22 - 21:

    "Q. What commanders were given the role of clearing Makeni?

    A. It was Issa who was the overall for that operation and

    Morris Kallon was his deputy and Superman was third in

    command."

    Is that true?

  • No. That is not true.

  • Who was your deputy in that operation to capture Kono and then on to Makeni?

  • Morris Kallon was the 2IC to me, the deputy, but from Kono to Makeni Superman was not with us, it was in Makeni that we met with Superman. And when we met in Makeni, Superman was senior to Kallon. It was not possible for Superman to be third in command. When we met in Makeni for this short time, after me it was Superman who was second in command.

  • Now, the witness continued in this way:

    "Q. Then you said on to Freetown" - remember, the plan discussed at the meeting, according to this witness, is capture Kono, then Makeni, then on to Freetown:

    "Q. Then you said on to Freetown. Was anyone given the

    role of moving on to Freetown?"

  • Please pause, Mr Koumjian?

  • I'm lost on where we are, have we moved a page, because I don't see it, I'm not exactly sure --

  • "Q. Then you said on to Freetown. Was anyone given the

    role of moving on to Freetown?

    A. Yes. They gave the mission to somebody.

    Q. Who?

    A. Well, Sam Bockarie sent the message to SAJ Musa, even

    before they attacked Kono but he refused. He rejected

    the orders. He said he cannot take orders from him. So

    there was a heated argument over the issue."

    Now, I want you to understand what this witness was telling these judges, Mr Sesay. Did Sam Bockarie send a message to SAJ Musa giving him the role of moving on to Freetown?

  • Not at all.

  • I want us to be clear, Mr Sesay. Because what this person was telling these judges was this; that the decision to attack Kono, Makeni and then on to Freetown was formulated in Monrovia, brought back to Sierra Leone by Sam Bockarie, and that Sam Bockarie gave an order to SAJ Musa to carry out the Freetown leg of the attack. Did any such thing take place?

  • This is a bloody lie. It's a lie. Because the attack on Freetown was an independent attack by the AFRC, planned by SAJ Musa, and Bockarie was not part of it. And before this time, that is, before December, Bockarie and SAJ Musa never communicated. For a long time they never communicated with each other, so this is a lie. And even when I captured Makeni, we did not just capture Makeni and say we should move to Freetown. No, when we captured Makeni, we made an attempt to capture Kabala - when we attacked Kabala, I organised troops and we attacked Bumbuna and we attacked Mile 91. So we did not just go to Makeni, and we took the road straight to Freetown like we had a plan to go to Freetown just after Makeni, no.

  • On this issue of SAJ Musa, this witness's testimony continued in this way. He was asked about this heated argument between Bockarie and SAJ Musa, and he answers in this way, page 9426, line 18:

    "A. After the meeting - but there had been arguments even

    before the meeting, before this mission there had been an

    argument. Just at the time Sam Bockarie sent the message

    to all the stations, right from that time, SAJ Musa was not

    happy about it. He was disgruntled, right up to this

    mission time. And after they had held the meeting. He

    sent the same order to SAJ Musa and he refused even before

    the Kono thing."

    And then he continues, page 9427, line 3:

    "Q. The second issue that you said was discussed at the

    meeting was SAJ Musa.

    A. Yes.

    Q. What was it about SAJ Musa that was discussed at the

    meeting?

    A. Well, Sam Bockarie told us that the complaint had gone

    up to Mr Taylor, that the man's complaint had been lodged

    about his disloyalty towards the mission and he too gave

    his own piece of advice.

    Q. Sam Bockarie told you that a complaint had gone up to

    Mr Taylor? Who is the man that made the complaint?

    A. Sam Bockarie lodged the complaint to Mr Taylor against

    SAJ Musa, regarding his attitude."

    Now, do you recall SAJ - do you recall Sam Bockarie making such a complaint to Mr Taylor about SAJ Musa's refusal to accept this mission, Mr Sesay?

  • No. This is my first time to hear about this issue even, this topic. That never happened. And what I knew, and that was what happened - that was what used to happen from February of 1998 SAJ Musa and Bockarie had no discussion of sending message to each other until December when SAJ Musa died in 1998. They never had any business of operation.

  • And this individual went on to say this in answer to this question:

    "Q. At the meeting was there any other discussion about

    SAJ Musa? Apart from the fact that Sam Bockarie had made a

    complaint to Mr Taylor?

    A. Yes. Mr Bockarie made us to understand that that man

    should not live to tell the story."

    And on the next page he said:

    "A. He" - that being Bockarie - "said we should go all

    out to ensure that that man should not live to tell the

    story. He said" - line 23 - "we should only be able to

    get him when there was a mission, when there was an

    operation going on. He" - that being Bockarie - "even made

    us to understand that that was something he was discussing

    with Gullit; that during any mission that man should not

    live, he should die because he was a traitor, he referred

    to him as a traitor."

    And it goes on, page 9429:

    "A. In the military terms, they said it should be during

    operations, you know, if they will mean arms he should die

    during the battle. He should be shot."

    Now, do you recall Sam Bockarie - let me start again, my fault. Where did SAJ Musa die?

  • SAJ Musa died in Benduma, Waterloo, in December 1998.

  • Well, I was not present. What I heard later was that when they had captured Benduma, SAJ Musa and others captured a lot of weapons and ammunition, including bombs.

  • And the bombs were in the ammunition dump. So they said it was SAJ Musa who said they were to set the ammunition dump alight, so it was after the place was set on fire, it was one of the bombs that - it was one of the fragments that caught him and that was how he died, but I was not present, I only heard it.

  • Do you recall Bockarie discussing with Gullit the killing of SAJ Musa during a military operation?

  • This is my first time to hear this, because before SAJ Musa joined Gullit and others, when they planned the attack on Freetown, because SAJ Musa came from Kurubonla after the infighting between himself and Superman, then he came and joined Gullit's group in Major Eddie Town. That was where they planned the attack on Freetown. Before that time, Bockarie and Gullit were not on speaking terms. But before this time, before they joined him in Major Eddie Town --

  • Your Honours, can the witness repeat this area slowly, kindly.

  • Pause, Mr Sesay. Before that time, Bockarie and Gullit were not on speaking terms. But before this time, before they joined in Major Eddie Town. Pick it up from there, please.

  • Yes. When SAJ Musa arrived in Major Eddie Town, he gave a strong warning to Alfred Brown and King Perry that they were not to go close to the radio set. From that time, in Major Eddie Town, right up to the time SAJ Musa died, Bockarie was not in contact with any - he was neither in contact with SAJ Musa, nor with Gullit before SAJ Musa died, there was no communication between them.

  • Well, the witness was further asked on this topic, though, this question:

    "Q. Did he say who should shoot him?

    A. He" - that being Bockarie - "just told us that he had

    spoken to Gullit and that the two of them had been

    discussing that even before Gullit went to where SAJ Musa

    was, that was what he made us to understand. It was the

    discussion that he had with Gullit. He did not specify who

    should do the shooting, but the decision - the discussion

    had been going on with Gullit."

    And then counsel for the Prosecution returned to the topic at a later stage, page 9450:

    "Q. Just one matter that I wish to return to from your

    evidence this morning. When I was asking you questions

    about the meeting that took place in December 1998, the

    three-hour meeting" --

  • Are you reading from page 9450?

  • Could we please have that page on the overhead.

  • The 9th of May 2008.

  • "Q. Just one matter I wish to return to from your evidence

    this morning, when I was asking you questions about the

    meeting that took place in December 1998, the

    three-hour meeting, and you said one of the issues was the

    SAJ Musa issue, I asked you this: Did Sam Bockarie say how

    SAJ Musa was to die? And you gave this answer:

    Well, in the military terms, they say it should be during

    operations, you know. If they will mean arms, he should

    die during the battle, he should be shot. Can you just

    explain what you meant by that answer."

    Line 22:

    "A. What I meant, when they said somebody should die, he

    should be killed in a battle or in operation. We were not

    fighting with sticks. A commander will not come to tell

    you that you should use a knife or a stick. During battles

    we were using rifles, that's why I said the man should be

    killed with an arm. That was why I said he should be

    killed during the battle. Arms should be used. I don't

    know if that is clear enough."

    Over the page, 9451, line 11:

    "A. That man was a commander and he had a lot of soldiers

    under his command. He cannot be lying in his house while

    there were securities and you would go there and kill him.

    That would not be easy. The only time you would get your

    colleague, that should be when firing was going on, when

    everybody would be concentrating on the enemy. That was

    the easiest time you would kill somebody that you had

    targeted."

    Did Bockarie give an order for the killing of SAJ Musa, Mr Sesay?

  • Bockarie did not give such orders. And even the ones who were with SAJ Musa where SAJ Musa died, they were not taking instructions from Bockarie before SAJ Musa's death. And Gullit left Kailahun in April of 1998, and even the instructions that Bockarie gave to him was to go and join Superman to defend Kono. But on Gullit's arrival in Kono, he did not go by the instructions. He gathered the AFRC group and they joined SAJ Musa. From that time Gullit did not take instructions from Sam Bockarie until that December, after the death of SAJ Musa, when he contacted Bockarie and he told Bockarie that SAJ Musa was dead. And even there, Bockarie did not believe him. But before the death of SAJ Musa there was no communication between Gullit and Sam Bockarie.

    And, honestly, from what Gullit used to tell me, Bockarie would not give orders to Gullit to kill SAJ Musa. Gullit and SAJ Musa grew up together. They were born in the same Wilberforce Barracks and during the NPRC Gullit was a bodyguard to SAJ Musa and - and SAJ Musa was his commander. Even before the overthrow, and even when they had overthrown, when the AFRC took power, it was Gullit who called who told Johnny Paul to call SAJ Musa to come. So Gullit cannot obey those orders. Not at all.

  • Now, the meeting at which this instruction or discussion took place, we are told, going back to page 9429, line 27, that this meeting was at night in December of 1998. Line 17:

    "A. It was a very short meeting, just for three hours,

    because it was at night and we did not even want Johnny

    Paul to know."

    So let's be clear what this individual was telling these judges, Mr Sesay. The meeting to plan the attack on Kono, then on to Makeni, then on to Freetown, took place at night and Sam Bockarie was at pains that Johnny Paul Koroma shouldn't know anything about it. Is that correct?

  • That is not correct, because the meeting about the attack on Kono was in the afternoon. We went and sat by a water well. There is - there is a barri at the water well, we were in that meeting. That is myself, Mike Lamin, Eddie Kanneh, late SYB Rogers, Lawrence Womandia and Rashid Sandy who was the adjutant general at that time. After that afternoon meeting - we spent about one hour 30 minutes in that meeting. The following day we went to Johnny Paul in Kangama and Sam Bockarie briefed Johnny Paul. And the following day, Mike Lamin escorted me, that is Mike Lamin, myself and Bockarie, we went there and Bockarie informed Johnny Paul about the plan that he had made to attack Kono. And the following day Mike Lamin escorted me to the Moa River and I travelled together with Morris Kallon to Kono. So Johnny Paul was fully aware. Myself, Bockarie and Mike Lamin met him and he was informed by Bockarie about the attack on Kono.

  • Thank you very much. Can we go to page 9430, please.

  • Excuse me. My understanding was that the question was when he was informed about the plan to kill Gullit, not the plan to attack Kono. That was the question as I understood it.

  • I don't think it was to kill Gullit. Was it not to kill SAJ Musa?

  • The problem the question is asked and then so much else is said. Now I'm trying to find the last question.

  • The question was:

    "So let's be clear what this individual was telling these judges, Mr Sesay, the meeting to plan the attack on Kono, then on to Makeni, then on to Freetown took place at night and Sam Bockarie was at pains that Johnny Paul Koroma shouldn't know anything about it. Is that correct?"

    And the witness has then gone on to explain how Johnny Paul Koroma was in fact informed about it.

  • Indeed. What is irregular about that, Mr Koumjian?

  • Because that's misstating the testimony of the witness from the transcript. The witness in the transcript makes it clear that it's the plan to kill SAJ Musa that Johnny Paul Koroma was not to be informed about. That's what I understood what counsel read.

  • Was this a different meeting than the meeting in which it was discussed to attack Kono? Was it a different meeting?

  • That's my understanding.

  • In any event, the evidence is what the witness says it is.

  • It remains to us to make what we will of it.

  • I'm sure it's my fault, Madam President, and I'm sure I'm the one who is being stupid, but I note that at page 9429 the witness says this:

    "Q. This particular meeting, how long did it go on for?

    A. It was a very short meeting, just for three hours,

    because it was at night and we did not even want Johnny

    Paul to know."

    You go to page 9430, line 18:

    "Q. This meeting, this three hour short meeting, was there

    anything else discussed apart from the plan to attack

    Freetown and the SAJ Musa issue?

    A. Yes."

    So it's one meeting at which a number of different things are discussed. This is a Prosecution witness, so I cannot understand why there is this difficulty in understanding the testimony of their own witness.

  • In any event, please proceed.

  • So let's go to page 9430:

    "Q. This meeting, this three hour short meeting, was there

    anything else discussed apart from the plan to attack

    Freetown and the SAJ Musa issue?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What?

    A. Well, at that time, even the leader who had his

    revolution was there. That should be the first target to

    go to Pademba Road and to free - to release the leader.

    And second we were to go to State House and overthrow the

    President and, if possible, if we met him there, we should

    kill him.

    Q. Just so it is clear, what President is to be

    overthrown and possibly killed?

    A. President Kabbah.

    Q. And what leader was to be released from Pademba Road?

    A. Foday Sankoh.

    Q. The person Jungle who you discussed yesterday, was he

    at this meeting?

    A. Yes, yes. He was part of this 12-man meeting.

    Q. Did Jungle speak at the meeting?

    A. Yes."

    Now, at that meeting in December which you attended, and you've already assisted us, Mr Sesay, as to who was present, was there a discussion at that meeting that in addition to moving on Freetown, that Foday Sankoh was to be released from Pademba Road Prison?

  • We did not have any discussions about Mr Sankoh and we did not have any discussions and any plans about attacking Freetown during that meeting. The only discussion we had was when Bockarie told us - those of us who were there and the other people - and it was about the attack on Kono. Not even Makeni, because we were not that sure whether I was even going to be able to attack Kono. So we did not have any other plan. The target was Kono, and that was the only thing that we discussed during that meeting.

  • But I need your assistance, Mr Sesay, because this individual was giving a very detailed account to these judges and I need your assistance with the detail. Now, was there a discussion about killing President Kabbah at that meeting?

  • No, no. We did not discuss anything pertaining to President Kabbah.

  • Secondly, was Jungle present at that meeting?

  • Jungle was not present at that meeting. Those of us who attended the meeting were seven in number and those were the names I have called. Jungle was not present. Not at all.

  • Where was Jungle at this time in December 1998?

  • Jungle was in Liberia, he was not in Buedu.

  • Well, had he been in Buedu I would have known because it was myself, Mike Lamin --

  • Your Honours, could the witness be asked to repeat that area slowly.

  • Could you just start again, please, from the beginning, Mr Sesay. Thanks.

  • I said it was myself, Mike Lamin and Sam Bockarie who remained in Buedu. Look at Sam Bockarie's house here and my house is across the other side, the other road. And had Jungle been in Buedu I would have known, but Jungle was not there. And even when Sam Bockarie came back, when we had the meeting, up to the time I left, Jungle was still not there.

  • Mr Sesay, you've told us you know Jungle the was not in Buedu. How do you know he was in Liberia?

  • My Lord, Jungle used to go to Liberia because when I met with him in Liberia in April - and I had told you that it was Jungle who used to bring food supply from the Lebanese, from Hijazi and Fayard. So had Jungle been in Buedu, I would have been in the know. But he was not there. He was in Liberia.

  • You're saying that if he's not in Buedu, the only other place he possibly could have been is Liberia? Is that what you're saying?

  • Yes, because in 1998, he used to stay in Liberia when he used to come with Fayard and the other man and they would come and go back. So if he was not in Buedu, he would go to his people in Foya Tinkia where he would spend some time. That was just across the border.

  • Now, the witness continued in this vein:

    "Q. Did Jungle speak at the meeting?

    A. Yes. Later, after the plan had gone on, Sam Bockarie

    spoke to Mr Taylor about the plan, how the mission was to

    carry on, and" - line 16 - "they briefed President Taylor,

    the former President, about the plan, how it was set.

    After that, Jungle too buttressed the same topic to him,

    how the plan had been made, and he in turn thanked them and

    told them to carry on and that he said he should pray that

    the mission should be successful."

    Now, do you recall, following that meeting at Waterworks that you've told us about, that Bockarie called President Taylor to brief him about the plan, how it was set?

  • No. After the meeting, all of us went on board the vehicles, the vehicles that we had used to go there. We all boarded the vehicles back and came back to Buedu. Bockarie did not have any communications with President Taylor, no.

  • Well, I need to press you a little further on this. Can we go back to page 9424, please? And I want to ask you which of the two propositions is right. At page 9424, line 24, this individual told the judges:

    "Well, Sam Bockarie told us that this plan, the plan to capture Kono, Makeni, then Freetown, was designed in Monrovia with Mr Taylor."

    When we go to page 9431, this same individual was saying, line 16: "They briefed President Taylor about the plan, how it was set."

    Now what I want your assistance with is this: Was the plan designed in Monrovia or was the plan designed in Sierra Leone and then Mr Taylor was briefed about it? Which of the two is right?

  • The plan to attack Kono was discussed and decided right in Buedu at the Waterworks and Bockarie gave the mission to me. I was the one now who came ahead and made the plan to attack Koidu Town and to meet with the others whom I met in Kono.

  • Tell me, Mr Sesay, was Charles Taylor involved in any way in creating this plan to attack Kono?

  • As far as I know, no. He had nothing to do with the plan about the attack on Kono. It was RUF who planned to attack Kono.

  • Page 9432, line 5:

    "Q. What did Jungle say at the meeting?

    A. Well, in the first place, Jungle himself told us about

    the material that Mr Bockarie had brought and that we

    should not fear this time round, and that there was no

    force to that could withstand us. That was what he said in

    the meeting and he said he had discussed it with the Pa in

    Monrovia even before they came.

    Q. And did he say what the Pa had said in Monrovia?

    A. Yes. It was just what Sam Bockarie told us. He just

    spoke about the same issue Sam Bockarie had spoken about,

    that the Pa had said our first target should be Kono before

    we should proceed."

    Line 24:

    "Q. Did Jungle say in the meeting what the Pa had said to

    Jungle in Monrovia?

    A. Yes, that is what I explained. They said they were

    the ones who came so he too told us about the materials

    that had been brought for the mission and that the Pa, that

    they had discussed with the Pa how the mission should go

    on. That is Pa Taylor."

    Now, another detail, Mr Sesay, and it's this: In that third trip that Bockarie made to Monrovia and then on to Burkina Faso, did Jungle go with him?

  • No. Jungle was not part of the group with which Bockarie left Buedu; and, on his return, Jungle did not come with him.

  • Thank you. And on this briefing of Charles Taylor after the meeting, page 9434, this question was asked:

    "Q. You gave some evidence earlier when you used the

    phrase 'they briefed President Taylor'."

    Line 25:

    "Q. Who briefed President Taylor?

    A. First it was Sam Bockarie. He held the phone and

    spoke to the Pa. He briefed him about the arrangement we

    had done about the mission and later Jungle himself went on

    the same phone and spoke on the same topic to Charles

    Taylor - President Taylor."

    Page 9435, line 2:

    "Q. Where was this phone?

    A. It was a satellite phone."

    Line 21:

    "A. All of us were in the veranda where the meeting was

    held. I was at the veranda myself. I was part of the

    meeting.

    Q. Are you saying the 12 of you were there when the

    conversation took place?

    A. Yes, because the meeting had not ended yet so all 12 of

    us were still there."

    Now, the meeting to plan the attack on Kono, where did it take place?

  • Waterworks.

  • Is there a veranda at the Waterworks?

  • No. The place where we were seated had a small barri. In fact there were no chairs there. We all sat against the wall, we all sat against the wall, and there was a thatch cover; it was an open place, it had no veranda.

  • Now, do you recall us looking at some photographs of Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu? Do you recall that?

  • Could we have a look, please, and I would like your assistance with this, if you would, at --

  • Mr Griffiths, are you referring to the photographs that we marked for identification?

  • Yes, I am. It's MFI-4A. Found it. Could we have a look at it, please.

  • Mr Sesay, do you recall looking at this, identifying this photograph, as being Sam Bockarie's house in Buedu?

  • Yes.

  • And you help us. What would you refer to as a veranda in this photograph? Do you want to move places to point it out for us?

  • Well, if I speak from here, you might see the - this is the veranda here. This point. Starting from this door up to the other door, towards the wall here, towards the railing, within here. This is what we called the veranda. This is the veranda. This is the veranda

  • So you're indicating that area between the low green-painted wall and the windows and door behind it; is that correct?

  • Yes, yes. That's the veranda.

  • Now, what I want your assistance with, Mr Sesay, is this, because it's very difficult, merely by looking at a photograph, to get an idea of the size of this building. That veranda, would it be big enough to hold a meeting involving 12 people?

  • Well, 12 people can sit here because, if you sit against the low wall here, people can sit on this side, they can sit on the ordinary side here; yes, 12 people can sit there. And even above 12, above 12 people, they can sit here, because they could have chairs against the higher wall there and then people could sit on the lower wall.

  • Thank you for that, Mr Sesay. You can put that photograph away, please.

    So the - this individual is saying, this discussion over the satellite phone, and that all 12 individuals present at the meeting were there when the conversation took place, and over the page to page 9436, line 8:

    "A. He" - that being Bockarie - "told him that" - being

    Mr Taylor - "about the mission that had been discussed in

    Monrovia. He said he had come and put it to the senior

    officers and that was the meeting that was going on and

    that the same plan he had given to him was the same plan

    they had come to discuss.

    Q. Same plan that they had given to who?

    A. Sam Bockarie."

  • Who gave the plan?

  • Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor."

    Line 23:

    "Q. And what did Jungle say?

    A. He repeated the same thing to Mr Taylor because he was

    the representative for him in the RUF, so he explained the

    same thing to him that the plan they had discussed in

    Monrovia, they had come and put it to the senior officers

    and they had assured him that they would go ahead with the

    plan."

    Is there any truth in any of this, Mr Sesay?

  • I said it's a lie. This witness is lying. Because before I went on the attack in Kono, this meeting, which we held at Waterworks, there was nothing like a meeting that we held in Sam Bockarie's veranda about this. The meeting was held at Waterworks. It was after all that Sam Bockarie went and briefed Johnny Paul, and Johnny Paul advised me, before I left to go to Kono; even the brigade commander who came after us, the senior commanders, was the most senior brigade commander in Kailahun. Bockarie did not invite him to attend this meeting, and who would be this witness? Who was this witness to have been invited to attend such a meeting? This is a black lie. This witness is lying. The brigade commander, the deputy brigade commander, and even Morris Kallon who was in Pendembu, Bockarie did not invite him to this meeting. It was after the meeting that Bockarie told me to invite Morris Kallon to join me to go to Kono. So this man - those who were in higher in position, above him, they were not invited to the meeting. How would he have been invited to such a meeting? He was not part of any meeting about the attack on Kono. To my living God, he was not there.

  • Page 9442. 9 May 2008. Question line 3:

    "Q. I want to turn now to a topic involving arms and

    ammunition. Can you tell the Court generally, while you

    were with the RUF, where you got the arms and ammunition

    that you used from?

    A. Well, first in 1991, after we had been trained, the

    Liberians were mainly leading the war. The ammunition was

    coming from Liberia. That was 1991, right up to --

    Line 16:

    "Q. For how long did the arms and ammunition continue to

    come from Liberia?

    A. From 1991 to '92."

    Line 23:

    "Q. When you say the arms and ammunition were coming from

    Liberia, where, if you know, in Liberia were the arms and

    ammunition coming from?

    A. Well, I couldn't tell the part of the country where the

    ammunition was coming from but the NPFL fighters who came

    were the ones who brought the ammunition because at that

    time, I was a junior man in the movement.

    Q. And did the NPFL fighters tell you where they got the

    ammunition from?

    A. No."

    Line 16:

    "Q. Can I ask where the NPFL fighters came from?

    A. It was Liberia.

    Q. And where did the NPFL fighters get their arms and

    ammunition from?

    A. Well, at that time I did not ask them where they got

    their arms and ammunition but only that we got arms and

    ammunition from the NPFL fighters.

    Q. Earlier in your evidence, you did say that you got arms

    and ammunition in 1991 to 1992 from Liberia. Do you

    remember giving that evidence?

    A. Yes.

    Q. How do you know that the arms and ammunition at that

    time came from Liberia?

    A. When we were in here, we were pushed to Liberia and we

    went to Bomi. When Pa Sankoh and Mr Ghankay came and met

    us and they issued materials to us to come and fight in

    Sierra Leone, so by that I know it was Liberia, we were not

    in any other country but in Liberia."

    I want to pause there and ask you this, Mr Sesay: If I understand your evidence, there were two occasions when the RUF, or members of the RUF, were forced to retreat into Liberia, is that correct?

  • Yes.

  • One occasion was when Zogoda fell, is that right?

  • Yes, October '96.

  • And Mike Lamin led the survivors into Liberia and they surrendered to ULIMO, is that correct?

  • Yes, that's correct.

  • When was the other occasion?

  • 1991, that was when the soldiers and the ULIMO pushed the RUF out of Pujehun, so the RUF crossed into Liberia, across the Mano River. Whilst others based in Sierra Leone, like Gibril Massaquoi, Momoh Rogers, and even this person who came here and spoke here, he was part of that group in 1991, they were in Pujehun, in those villages operating from there, while those who had been pushed and went across to Liberia, but that other group, they stayed in Pujehun District from 1991 up to 1994 when Mr Sankoh invited them to come from Pujehun and join him in Zogoda.

  • Now, those who were pushed in 1991, did you have occasion to speak to them after that had occurred?

  • Yes, some of them who went to Liberia, they came to Kailahun, but some decided to go off the RUF, they were no longer part of the RUF, because Rashid brought some of them to Kailahun and they came back and joined the Kailahun group, whilst others were on their own, they no longer joined the RUF.

  • Now, those who had been pushed into Liberia and later returned, did they tell you that they had met with Charles Taylor in Liberia?

  • No. They did not tell me that.

  • Did any of them tell you that after they had been pushed to Bomi Hills they met with Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh and were provided with materials to come back to Sierra Leone and fight?

  • No, they did not tell me that because even the ones who were pushed, Sam Bockarie was among that group when Foday Sankoh took them to Kailahun. And when Sam Bockarie came, it was the house where I was with Morris Kallon in Pendembu, it was the same place that he stayed. He did not tell me that.

  • Those who returned from Bomi Hills, having been pushed there by ULIMO and the government soldiers, did they return with arms and ammunition?

  • No. They did not bring arms. They did not return with arms. They travelled from Bomi Hills to Lofa Bridge and from Lofa Bridge to Kungbahun, Vahun, and they came to Vahun on to Bomaru in Sierra Leone.

  • Question, page 9444 --

  • What was that? They came Lofa Bridge to Vahun and they came to some other place.

  • There was a place, Mr Interpreter, that you said.

  • Yes, my Lord, I said Bomaru. They came from Vahun, they crossed the border into Bomaru, that is in Sierra Leone.

  • And you said - what is this other place you said?

  • That cannot be on the record yet. Can you please spell it for us.

  • K-U-N-G-B-A-H-U-N.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, question - line 6, page 9444: "Q. Did you know whereabouts in Liberia the arms and

    ammunition had actually come from?

    A. No.

    Q. In 1992, did something change in relation to where you

    got your arms and ammunition from?

  • Yes.

    Q. What was the change?

    A. That was the time ULIMO took the border from us, 1992,

    between us and NPFL, when they came from Lofa they

    fortified the border." Line 21:

    "A. That was the time the ULIMO forces came from Lofa and

    they ensured that the entire border was fortified between

    us and the NPFL. They captured right up to Robertsport.

    From that time, the relationship had started cutting off

    between us and the NPFL.

    Q. What effect did that have on the arms and ammunition

    that they - you had?

    A. Well, that affected the movement greatly. The war was

    not progressing because we were not having any other place

    to get ammunition from, so it affected us greatly.

    Q. What was it that affected the getting of the

    ammunitions and the arms?

    A. Well, at that time the enemy had cut off the supply

    line between us and the NPFL, where we used to get our

    ammunition to fight with. That was why the war was not

    progressing, because we could not fight without the

    logistics that so affected us immensely.

    Q. What happened to the movement?

    A. Well, the movement collapsed a little. We were just on

    defensive. Our only offensive was to lay ambush and we

    returned to our same base where we were, so that really

    created a problem for us."

    Line 27:

    "Q. How long did that situation last?

    A. It started in 1992 up to 1993. It stopped there and

    then phase 2 started when we went and met with the leader

    but from 1992 right up to 1996, the border between us and

    NPFL was cut off. We had no relationship with them from

    1992 right to 1996."

    Now, pausing again, question one: Do you agree with what this witness was telling these judges, that from 1991 to 1992, the RUF were getting their arms and ammunition from the NPFL?

  • No. Because this, it was in --

  • Your Honours, can the witness repeat.

  • I said this person was in Pujehun District in '91 to '94 and what happened in late 1991, the ULIMO and the government --

  • What person is the witness referring to? Mr Sesay, which person are you referring to who was in Pujehun?

  • How do you know who the witness is?

  • Well, they asked me about the certain person yesterday, where he was, and from the way I can follow this testimony, I just conclude that it's the person.

  • The person that you are referring to is the person that counsel asked you before you went into the testimony? Very well.

    So the question we haven't had an answer to relates to the - whether you, Mr Sesay, agree that from 1991 to 1992, the RUF were getting their arms and ammunition from the NPFL, and you said no. Then you were about to tell us why you disagree.

  • Yes, my Lord. I said the RUF were on two flanks; the Pujehun District and the Kailahun District. The Pujehun District in late 1991 the ULIMO forces and the government troops pushed the RUF to the border. In fact, the ULIMO, which he said came from Lofa and they fortified the border, between Liberia and Sierra Leone, this is Pujehun District, no, that's not correct. The ULIMO came from there and they came through Pujehun District, they crossed the Mano River Bridge when they defeated the RUF and before they spread into Lofa Bridge and into Lofa County after they crossed the Mano River. So from late 1991 the RUF in Pujehun District were cut off. They were now surviving on captured ammunition from the government troops. Up to 1994, before they joined Mr Sankoh in Zogoda, some of them - while some of them remained in Pujehun.

  • So those who were pushed from Pujehun, what knowledge would they have of those who remained in Kailahun?

  • There was no communication because had they hadn't any radio sets to communicate with the Kailahun group, so they couldn't communicate with Mr Sankoh. This continued until 1993, when they sent Manawai, together with other men, to check in Kailahun and to be able to see Mr Sankoh and explain their situation in Pujehun to him, and, indeed, they came through the Gola Forest to Jojoima, it was in Jojoima that they came and they went to Mr Sankoh. So this group, about seven of them to ten, remained in Kailahun, that was including Augustine Koroma, he was the most senior man among them. They were now in Kailahun until 1994, December 1993, when they went to Mr Sankoh, that Mr Sankoh was to create the Zogoda. So Mr Sankoh was to send them, together with some other armed men, to go to radio set - to go to the Pujehun District. And when they went there, they installed the radio set and they spoke to Mr Sankoh. That was early 1994. When they called for reinforcement from Pujehun, that is Gibril Massaquoi, Monica Pearson, Momoh Rogers, many of them came.

  • Now, second question: Do you agree that ULIMO effectively sealed the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia up to Robertsport from 1992 through to 1996?

  • Yes. ULIMO controlled the entire border from 1992 to 1997, the entire Liberian-Sierra Leone border, from the Mano River Bridge down to Mendekoma, that is the Kailahun District; the entire Liberian border, ULIMO controlled it from 1992 to 1997.

  • And the testimony continues in this way. Line 14, page 9446:

    "Q. And in relation to the getting of arms and

    ammunition, what happened in 1996?

    A. Well, in 1996 we had serious pressure from the

    Kamajors and it was almost at the point of collapsing, the

    movement was almost at the point of collapsing. Well, at

    that time we were able to get connection again with Liberia

    because there was now peace in Liberia and so we had some

    connection with Liberians again.

    Q. And what was the result of the connection you had with

    Liberia, when it comes to the getting of arms and

    ammunition?

    A. That was the time Foday Sankoh came from Abidjan and

    met us in Kailahun. He gave some money to Sam Bockarie,

    some dollars. At that time we had so much pressure. We

    had materials to fight against the Kamajors, so he gave

    some money to that man to try by whatever means for us to

    get logistics to fight with."

    And then he goes on to explain that the money was given to Sam Bockarie.

    "Q. Do you know how much money was given to Sam Bockarie?

    A. No, he did not disclose the total to us. He only said

    the Pa had left some money for us to try and get

    ammunition."

    Now, is it right that in 1996, Sankoh gave some money to Bockarie after Sankoh came from Abidjan to purchase arms and ammunition?

  • Yes, yes, Mr Sankoh gave $7,000 to Sam Bockarie in Buedu in my presence, and Gibril Massaquoi was also there. Peter Vandi too was there and Sam Bockarie; that is in November 1996, yes.

  • Question line 7, page 9447:

    "Q. Do you know whether Sam Bockarie was able to get arms

    and ammunition with that money?

    A. Yes. We started getting some arms and ammunition that

    sustained the movement."

    Line 15:

    "Q. Was there a time when you, yourself, were involved in

    getting arms and ammunition?"

    Line 20:

    "A. Yes.

    Q. How many times were you involved in obtaining arms and

    ammunition for the RUF?

    A. Three times.

    Q. When was the first time?

    A. The first time, it was after the intervention.

    Q. Where were you based at this time?

    A. I was in Baiima then."

    Now, you've indicated, Mr Sesay, that you know who this witness is. Was this witness in Baiima after the intervention?

  • Yes, yes. From February - from March, it was in March that Sam Bockarie deployed him in Baiima, from March he was in Baiima up to October 1999.

  • "Q. How was it that you became involved in obtaining arms

    and ammunition on that occasion?

    A. I had a call from our high command, who was Sam

    Bockarie. He called me at his base in Buedu.

    Q. What did that Sam Bockarie say to you?

    A. He said Pa Taylor was to send some ammunition for the

    RUF, that we were to go and collect it."

    And then he goes on to describe that he had a Land Rover. Did this individual have a Land Rover after the intervention, Mr Sesay, can you recall?

  • Yes. He had a Land Rover. That was what he used in Baiima.

  • "Q. What did you do after the phone call you had with Sam

    Bockarie?

    A. When he called me he told me that ammunition was to be

    brought to Foya and so we should go and collect it."

    Line 24:

    "A. So I joined him and we travelled, we took his two

    jeeps that he had and mine and we moved to Foya.

    Q. Who did you join?

    A. I joined Mosquito. We took his two jeeps that he had,

    and mine, and we moved to Foya.

    Q. So how many jeeps went to Foya?

    A. Three.

    Q. Three vehicles. And who were the people who went to

    Foya?

    A. I went - the two of us went with few of his security

    men and his radio man.

    Q. Do you know the name of the radio man?

    A. Elevation.

    Q. What did you do when you got to Foya?

    A. Well, at that time we went but the helicopter had not

    arrived yet because he told us that the helicopter was to

    bring the materials and we went to the commander, the

    commander was one Commander Joseph."

    Now, there is a lot there that I want to ask you about, Mr Sesay. So what this individual is saying, sometime after the intervention, so after February 1998, he gets a call from Sam Bockarie who tells him that he, Sam Bockarie, has received a call from Pa Taylor, who will be sending ammunition to Foya by helicopter and you are to go there and collect it. Any truth in that?

  • That is not true. That is not true. Because I never heard that a helicopter landed in Foya for the RUF, or brought a RUF person throughout 1998 - for a helicopter to bring a RUF person, that was after the Lome Accord that that started between Mr Taylor and the RUF. But before that time, no, and this - this witness, this person, was - I came to Buedu in late February 1998, and this man was in Daru at that time. Because when we withdrew from Kenema, they were in Daru, so Bockarie and I visited Daru, we visited Daru from Buedu, they were there. Up to the time ECOMOG and the Kamajors captured Daru and they withdrew. That was the time Bockarie said I should take care of Baiima and Manawai was to go and take care of Kuiva and Foday Kamara should take care of Mobai. From that time I was --

  • Your Honours, can the witness repeat this area, kindly, slowly.

  • Before he does repeat this, I understood the question was directed to who will be sending ammunition to Foya by helicopter and you go there to collect it. And he's referring to a RUF person coming by helicopter.

  • Okay, let's clarify this. First of all, in 1998, to your knowledge, was any arms or ammunition transported by helicopter to Foya to be picked up by RUF personnel?

  • No, that never happened in 1998, such a thing never happened. And to say - like even what you said, that Elevation was Sam Bockarie's operator, Elevation never became Sam Bockarie's operator. Elevation was my own operator. And he never crossed the Sierra Leonean border with Sam Bockarie, never.

  • That was at page 9449, line 10, that the radio man that went with them was Elevation. You're saying that never happened?

  • No. Elevation - that never happened. Elevation was my radio operator from 1997 to 2001, up to the end of the disarmament. He was never assigned to Sam Bockarie, and he never moved anywhere where Sam Bockarie went.

  • Do you know of a commander in Foya called Commander Joseph?

  • No, I never knew that person to be a commander in Foya.

  • And the witness's account of these events continues at page 9453 in this way. Line 16, having explained that, after an hour or so, we saw a helicopter coming, it came to Foya, it was flying over Foya:

    "Q. Where did it land?

    A. Foya airfield.

    Q. Can you describe the helicopter, please?

    A. It was a military helicopter.

    Q. What do you mean by military?

    A. It had a green colour.

    Q. How many people were in the helicopter?

    A. Two pilots and I saw up to five people who alighted

    from the helicopter."

    Line 21.

    "A. Mr Bockarie introduced me to a man whom he said was

    Mr Taylor's chief bodyguard. He said his name was Benjamin

    Yeaten and they used to call him Director."

    Line 27:

    "Q. Did you see the person who was the pilot of this

    helicopter?

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. Can you describe what that person looked like?

    A. He was white. They were white people."

    And then he goes on line 11:

    "They were Ukrainians. Bockarie - later I asked

    Mr Bockarie and he said they were Ukrainians."

    Line 17:

    "Q. Did you know where this helicopter had flown from?"

    Line 20:

    "A. Monrovia."

    Over the page, please, 9456:

    "A. After the blacks had alighted we went there and

    off-loaded the material and put them into the vehicle.

    Q. Can you remember what the materials were?"

    Line 9:

    "A. They were AK rounds and there was RPG rockets and

    there were RPG tubes; 40 boxes of AK rounds were there, 10

    boxes of RPG tubes and some arms, AK-47s."

    Mr Sesay, after the intervention, do you recall the RUF receiving that quantity of material flown by helicopter from Monrovia to Foya, 40 boxes of AK rounds, 10 boxes of RPG rockets?

  • This kind of thing never happened, after the intervention. It never happened. It never happened. Because if this kind of thing happened, then there was no need for Sam Bockarie to send Kennedy, Matthew Kennedy Sesay, to go and be based in Voinjama to be buying buried ammunition from the ex-ULIMO fighters, honestly.

  • To be what? To go to Voinjama to do what?

  • To be buying ammunition that ex-ULIMO fighters had buried. Those were the ammunition that Kennedy bought. I said if Sam Bockarie received this kind of ammunition that this person spoke about, then there was no need for Kennedy to be sent to be buying buried ammunition from Voinjama because when they would bring them they would have to wash them, dry them in the sun, before we would ever use them.

  • And then he continues, page 9457, line 12:

    "A. We left Foya, we came to Buedu. The materials were

    put into the store, the ammunition dump.

    Q. Where was the ammunition dump?

    A. It's on the Foya road very close to his house.

    Q. Whose house?

    A. Sam Bockarie's house."

    Now, Mr Sesay, help us: Was there an ammunition dump close to Sam Bockarie's house?

  • No. There was no ammunition dump near Sam Bockarie's house. The only place where Bockarie stored ammunition was at his store room, the place I pointed. That door, the store door that I pointed at. Even the ammunition that Kennedy bought, they were stored there. But if you come from the Foya end and you pass the court barri and pass the place where Lawrence and others were there, there was no ammunition dump in between there and Bockarie's house.

  • Now, you will recall that when I began dealing with this topic of arms and ammunition, I recounted to you that the witness had said that he was involved on three such missions to collect ammunition. At page 9458, 9 May 2008, he was asked this:

    "Q. When was the second occasion?

    A. That was in 1998 still.

    Q. Whenabouts in 1998?

    A. Well, after this mission, because this other one was

    around March to April, it was not too long. It was a short

    time. That was the time ULIMO and the LURD forces invaded

    Lofa."

    So let's pause and put that together, shall we. What this individual was telling these judges was this: Shortly after the ECOMOG intervention, the RUF received 40 boxes of AK rounds, ten boxes of RPG rockets and some AK-47s. Not too long after that, a second trip is made, so let's deal with the second trip. Line 16:

    "Q. How did you become involved on that occasion in

    obtaining the arms and ammunition?

    A. The commander called me again, that is Mosquito at the

    same place, Buedu, and explained the issue to me. That

    that was what the Pa had told him, that those men had

    invaded his men at Lofa County. That's ULIMO and LURD."

    And he then explains that the Pa is Mr Taylor.

    "Q. Now you said that those men had invaded his men at

    Lofa, who were those men who invaded and who were his men?

    A. The LURD forces.

    Q. And who had the LURD forces invaded?

    A. Charles Taylor.

    Q. So what else did Sam Bockarie tell you?

    A. He said we were to put men together to go and help

    to clear the enemy from that place.

    Q. And what did you do when you were told to put men

    together and go and help to clear the enemy?

    A. Well, he gave me my own task that I was to go and

    prepare men in Kono and that Issa - I was told to go and

    prepare manpower for that same mission" - line 17 - "and he

    said that he had told Issa and Morris Kallon to do the same

    preparation in Kono."

    Now, pause. March/April 1998, that's page 9458. Was there discussions about you going to Kono with Morris Kallon at that time in 1998, Mr Sesay?

  • Not at all.

  • And do you recall at or about the time that the attack on Kono was being planned, that simultaneously it was being suggested that men be put together to go and fight LURD in Liberia?

  • In fact, since the time I left Kono in February of '98 I never went back to Kono until December. That was when I went back to Kono and --

  • My question is this: At the time that there was a discussion about attacking Kono, was there at the same time a discussion about sending RUF fighters to Liberia to fight LURD?

  • "Q. What did you do in relation to the manpower?

    A. I brought them to Buedu.

    Q. How many men did you bring to Buedu?"

    Line 28.

    "A. 62 in number."

    And then he goes on:

    "We divided the number into two groups, we divided them and told them that we were to enter at two flanks. While Sam Bockarie and I were to enter by the Foya axis, and the other flank was to enter by Vahun."

    Line 12:

    "Q. And did you and Sam Bockarie enter by the Foya axis?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what did you do?

    A. We attacked Foya Town.

    Q. Who did you attack?

    A. The LURD forces.

    Q. Where did the LURD forces go after you attacked them?

    A. They went to Kolahun. We chased them and we went to

    the same Kolahun.

    Q. Where did you chase them to?

    A. Voinjama.

    Q. What happened after you captured Voinjama?

    A. We had an order from Benjamin Yeaten to chase the men

    right from where they had come from.

    Q. And where had they come from?

    A. They said they'd come from Guinea.

    Q. Did you chase them to Guinea?

    A. Yes. We captured a town that was called Bayalo in

    Guinea. We received orders to burn the entire town and

    that we did.

    Q. Who did you get the order from?

    A. Benjamin Yeaten?

    Q. And what happened after you got to Voinjama?

    A. We spent the night there and in the morning we put our

    men together and we returned to Foya. Then we left the

    Liberians there.

    Q. Where did you go?

    A. Then Sam Bockarie took me to Monrovia."

    Do you know anything about this, Mr Sesay?

  • No. I don't know about any movement that this man undertook to go to Liberia. That did not happen in 1998. I said throughout 1998 to October 1999 this man was based at that place, Baiima.

  • Now, let's be clear what the man was telling these judges. That this took place in March/April 1998, when RUF combatants entered Lofa County at two points, Foya and Vahun, and battle pushed LURD forces all the way to Voinjama upon the orders of Benjamin Yeaten. Mr Sesay, help us. In March/April 1998, what was the position of the RUF in Sierra Leone?

  • Well, Sam Bockarie posted me to Pendembu in late April of '98 and I used to visit Vahun, I used to visit Tengbeh there, and there were over 100,000 displaced persons in the refugee camp in Vahun. There had no attacks in Lofa throughout 1998. And in fact LURD attack was in 1999. That was the time the fighting started going on there when we heard about it over the BBC. It was in '99, not '98. So that man was working directly under me from April to December '98 when I left the Kailahun District. Everything having to do with Baiima, Mobai, Jojoima, every one of them reported to me. They used to report to me and I in return reported to Sam Bockarie. Mike Lamin used to come, he would visit Baiima, he would visit Mobai, he would visit Kuiva.

    So everything pertaining to these various targets and the battalion commanders around that area, shortage of food, shortage of ammunition, medicine, if the combat medic did not have sufficient medicines I was the commander who was based in Pendembu that they used to inform. And what I knew about is that this man was in Baiima starting from March of 1998 up to December when he left the Kailahun District. He did not move to go to anywhere. The only places - the only place he moved to was to come to Pendembu where he attended meetings, or sometimes he left Baiima to go to the village where his family was based. That was between Mobai Junction and Pendembu.

  • Mr Sesay, how far is Baiima from Buedu?

  • My Lord, from Buedu to Kailahun Town is 17 miles, Kailahun Town to Pendembu is 17. That is 34. And Pendembu to Mobai Junction is 10 miles. 44 miles. And Mobai Junction to Baiima is 5 miles. That is 49 miles, my Lord. 49 miles.

  • So from where you were living to where this man was living is about 49 miles?

  • No, ma'am, my Lord. From Buedu to Baiima is 49 miles. From where I was staying, Pendembu to Baiima, is 19 miles - no, 15 miles. Because Mobai is 10 miles, then Baiima 5 miles, 15 miles if you use the main road. But if you use the footpath it's 10 miles. From where I was staying and where he was staying. If you use the car road it's 15 miles. If you use the bush path, the survey road, it's 10 miles.

  • Thank you. Please proceed.

  • Now, do you know of an occasion when Sam Bockarie took this man who we are talking about to Monrovia in 1998?

  • No, Sam Bockarie never took this man with him to Monrovia in 1998.

  • Page 9461, line 25:

    "A. Then Sam Bockarie took me to go to Monrovia."

    9462, line 3:

    "A. I went --

    Q. Who went to Monrovia?

    A. I went and Sam Bockarie went too and one of his

    bodyguards called Magazine.

    Did Sam Bockarie have a bodyguard called Magazine?

  • Yes, Sam Bockarie had a fellow called magazine.

  • "A. Well, we were the ones who went.

    Q. How did you get to Monrovia?" Remember this is '98.

    "A. The same military helicopter with the combat colour

    picked us up from Foya."

    Line 15:

    "Q. When you landed at this field in Monrovia city, where

    did you go from there?

    A. A vehicle came and received us and we drove together

    with Benjamin Yeaten and we went to Benjamin Yeaten's place

    White Flower.

    Q. Where did you meet Benjamin Yeaten?

    A. Well, this helicopter that came, all of us travelled

    in it.

    Q. Where did you meet Benjamin Yeaten?

    A. Foya.

    Q. Had he come in the helicopter?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What did you went do when you went to his place at

    White Flower?"

    Page 9463:

    "A. That was where we lodged, because he had taken us

    there. We spent some days in Monrovia, like three days.

    I was at Mr Benjamin's place and in the morning the two of

    them would go out to meet with the President. They will

    say they were going to meet with the President. That being

    Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie.

    Q. Did you yourself ever go to meet with Taylor on that

    occasion?

    A. No."

    Question page 9464 - no, to get the context we need to go higher up:

    "Q. Did you speak to Sam Bockarie after he had met with

    Charles Taylor?

    A. Yes. He told me that they had come from the

    President's and that was the mansion ground.

    Q. Did he tell you what had taken place in his meeting

    with Charles Taylor?

    A. The Pa said we should wait, that he had promised to

    give us morale booster and some ammunition for us to go

    back with.

    Q. And did you wait?

    A. Yes, we waited.

    Q. What happened after you waited?

    A. The day that we were to move was when I saw some

    ammunition and Sam Bockarie told me that the Pa had given

    him $10,000.

    Q. Where did you see this ammunition?

    A. It was at the Pa's house where Benjamin Yeaten was, at

    the back of the house Pa Taylor's house, White Flower.

    Q. And what was this ammunition that you saw there?

    A. They gave us AK rounds and some RPG rockets. And then

    he went on to say that he saw the $10,000 and how the

    helicopter took them to Foya and that on return, he,

    Bockarie, invited the commanders Issa, Morris Kallon and

    the other officers, and he explained to them about the few

    materials that we had gone with and the $10,000 that the Pa

    had given us."

    And then he goes on:

    "Q. What happened to the $10,000?

    A. We decided that, well, let the money be used to buy

    drugs for the wounded soldiers so that they would be

    treated."

    Now, that's page 9468, lines 4 and 5. Do you recall any of this, Mr Sesay?

  • No. These events did not take place.

  • Well, you see this individual is saying you were there, involved in this discussion with Sam Bockarie, after Bockarie had returned from Monrovia bearing $10,000. So you were supposed to be there. Did this happen, Mr Sesay?

  • I said it's a lie, he's lying, this kind of thing did not happen. It did not happen.

  • Page 9469, line 12:

    "Q. Was there a third occasion when you yourself were

    involved in obtaining arms and ammunition for the RUF?

    A. Yes.

    Q. When?"

    Line 16:

    "A. That was 2000, after the May incident that occurred in

    Freetown."

    So remember, in May 2000, Mr Sesay, did you travel to Monrovia?

  • Yes, late May, I travelled to Monrovia.

  • "Q. And just so that we get the context, when was this

    one, the third occasion?

    A. That was 2000, after the May incident that occurred in

    Freetown. There was some problem between RUF and the

    Government of Sierra Leone. Our men and the UN had some

    clash in the northern province and a lot of the UN

    personnel were captured. That was the problem that went

    right up to Freetown. Even the civilians and the soldiers,

    the government demonstrated against the RUF who were in

    Freetown because that was their own zone. So that was the

    problem.

    Q. And where were you based in May of 2000?

    A. I was in Bo Town".

    Now, we know who we're talking about, Mr Sesay, so help us. In May of 2000 was this individual based in Bo?

  • Yes, he was in Bo. He was not in Kailahun at this time. He was in Bo.

  • Line 7:

    "A. We were there to monitor the peace, it was because of

    the peace that I went there. I was working with CNC, that

    is, ceasefire monitoring committee or commission."

    Was he?

  • No. He was not a CMC member. He only went to Bo where Mr Sankoh was trying to have an office established, but the CMC members who were in Bo, he was not part of them.

  • Page 9471, please, line 18:

    "Q. And you said at that time you were in Bo Town and you

    became involved in a third mission to obtain arms and

    ammunition for the RUF. How did you become involved in

    that third mission?

    A. Well, the time that incident took place in Freetown,

    most of our men, our RUF members, were captured, and even

    those of us who were in Bo, the same thing happened to us.

    They tried to ransack wing and then they captured some

    people but I escaped and I went to Kenema. When I went to

    Kenema the same thing started there. I also escaped and

    I went to Tongo."

    Do you recall any of this?

  • Well, I knew that after the incident in Freetown, this fellow, and the other RUF members who were in Kenema and Bo, they left Kenema and Bo and they went to Kailahun and Tongo.

  • "Q. And you escaped and you ended up, you said you went to

    Tongo, what happened in Tongo?

    A. Well, when I got there I sent a message to Mr Sesay,

    General Sesay, that I had arrived there and then he ordered

    me not to stay there but that I should go to Kailahun."

    Did you give him such an order?

  • No. He withdrew from Kenema to Kailahun. He did not send any message to me from Tongo. He went back to Kailahun and to Baiima here - where he was before.

  • "Q. What happened when you went to Kailahun?

    A. Well, when I went to Kailahun, at that time I realised

    that the Indians were captured and that was the same place

    where I went to. And then he said to me that they were

    going to change the command. That was the first brigade

    commander who was there, that I was supposed to replace

    him. And then at that time he gave me a new promotion and

    a new assignment to serve as brigade commander."

    True?

  • Yes. I replaced the brigade commander but that was in late 2000, when I said he should be the brigade commander, that was around November 2000.

  • I'm not sure I understand that last answer. "Yes, I replaced the brigade commander but that was in late 2000, when I said he should be the brigade commander, that was around November 2000." So what kind of an answer is that?

  • Did you appoint this witness to become brigade commander?

  • Yes. That was what I said. I said it was in November 2000, that was when I appointed him as brigade commander.

  • Not that Issa Sesay replaced the brigade commander but that he replaced the person who was brigade commander. That's what he means, yes.

  • "Q. Well, the commander who was there" - line 24 - "who

    was there, Denis Lansana was the person that I replaced."

    Is that true?

  • "Q. And what were your duties when you replaced

    Denis Lansana?

    A. My first duty after taking up the command was that

    I should put pressure on the commanders to free these men,

    that is the UN peacekeepers who had been arrested, who had

    been taken hostage by the men. After I had taken over the

    UN, the other Indians in the UN also came to receive their

    brothers in Kailahun but that resulted to a serious

    disaster that led to destruction of places in Pendembu and

    other areas. So I went there and I tried to put things

    under control but my men incurred serious casualties and

    I lost the lives of most of my men in that mission.

    Q. How were the lives of most of your men lost in that

    mission?

    A. Well, we did not expect that kind of battle to confront

    us and they took us unawares, it was very early in the

    morning that they attacked, they raided us in the air and

    then they bombarded us on the ground, and I was living

    around that same area in Pendembu, so both soldiers and

    civilians lost their lives on that ground and more than

    50 houses were burnt down."

    Do you recognise such an incident?

  • Yes, that incident took place but he was not the brigade commander at that time. That was when the Indians who were in Kailahun decided to bulldoze their way to withdraw from Kailahun Town. So they attacked Pendembu, so it was not up to 50 RUF combatants who died. They were the ones who the Indians met in the hospital who were the wounded soldiers that the Indians killed and they burned down 50 houses in Pendembu Town and then proceeded to Daru.

  • Was this witness the brigade commander at the time of that incident?

  • No, no. It was after that time that I appointed him as brigade commander.

  • And then he continues:

    "Q. After that had taken place, did you receive a fresh

    assignment?

    A. Yes. That was my assignment but I went on one

    operation and I was still brigade commander.

    Q. What was the operation that you went on?

    A. Well, that was the last invasion that Damate Konneh,

    the same LURD that we're talking about, that

    commander that brought them, that is Sekou Damate Konneh's

    own troops, they came and based in Voinjama."

    And he goes on to explain that they were LURD forces. Line 23:

    "Q. Your mission was to do what?

    A. Well, I received the similar instruction from the

    commander, Mr Sesay, that I should put men together to go

    and join Benjamin Yeaten at Kolahun."

    Did you give this witness such an instruction, Mr Sesay?

  • No. I did not give him such an instruction and at the time he took over, when I appointed him as commander in Kailahun he did not take any men across into Liberia to go and fight there.

  • He goes on to say that they went to Foya and then to Kolahun, this is page 9475, line 15:

    "A. When we got to Kolahun we were there for two to three

    days and we were waiting for ammunition.

    Q. Did more ammunition arrive?

    A. Yes."

    And then he goes on to say that thereafter they moved on to Voinjama. And he goes on to say at page 9477 that:

    "A. We captured Voinjama" - line 3 - "and the LURD forces

    withdrew to Guinea. And that they then chased them to the

    border. And that this was communicated to Benjamin Yeaten

    and that their radio operator was someone called Mortiga."

    Do you know of a radio operator called Mortiga?

  • Yes, I know Mortiga.

  • Do you recall an occasion in the year 2000 when Mortiga accompanied this witness on a mission into Liberia?

  • Whose radio operator was Mortiga?

  • At first, Mortiga was Mr Sankoh's radio operator, and later, starting from '97 up to 2000, he was an operator who was normally assigned to targets in the Kailahun District.

  • What is Mortiga 's real name?

  • Well, I don't know his real name.

  • And then the witness says that after this mission, line 17, page 9478:

    "A. Mr Yeaten took me to Monrovia.

    Q. Why did Benjamin Yeaten take you back to Monrovia?

    A. Well, he was so happy with the mission, and he said we

    should go for me to see - meet the President, Mr Taylor."

    And then he describes travelling by helicopter to Monrovia.

    Then page 9479:

    "A. We went to White Flower with Benjamin Yeaten.

    Q. Was there anybody else in Monrovia that you met after

    you arrived?

    A. Well, no. We did not meet some other person, but

    somebody met us there.

    Q. Who was the person that met you there?

    A. General Sesay, Issa Sesay."

    Now, do you recall an occasion, Mr Sesay, when this witness that we are talking about met you in Monrovia?

  • No. This witness never met me in Monrovia, nor did I ever meet him in Monrovia. Since the time I became interim leader, this witness did not go to Monrovia. He remained in Kailahun up to the disarmament time.

  • "Q. And whereabouts in Monrovia did General Issa Sesay

    meet you?"

    Page 9481:

    "Q. The person you met, who met you in Monrovia, you said

    was Issa Sesay, whereabouts did he meet you?

    A. Well, we met at Benjamin Yeaten's place. This is at

    the back of the President's house."

    Mr Sesay, have you ever been to Benjamin Yeaten's house?

  • Yes.

  • I went to his house in - it was in October 2000. October 2000, I went to his house. That was the time I went with the delegation, when I went to drop the delegation. That was the first time I went to his house.

  • Had you - did you go to his house thereafter?

  • No. After that time, I never went to his house any more.

  • When in October 2000 you went to Benjamin Yeaten's house, did you meet this witness there?

  • No. This witness was not in Liberia, at the time I was taking the delegation along, this witness was in Kailahun. By then I met him in Pendembu, he was based in Pendembu. Before October, he was not the brigade commander at that time. It was in November 2000 that I appointed him as the brigade commander.

  • Mr Griffiths, if this is an appropriate time, we will take our luncheon break and reconvene at 2.30.

  • [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]

  • Good afternoon. Mr Griffiths, please continue.

  • Madam President, can I indicate for the record that Mr Munyard is no longer with us.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, this individual gave further details of this trip to Monrovia during which he met you. He said this:

    "A. The first plan after the mission" - that was the

    mission that he went on in Foya up to Voinjama - "was that

    after accomplishing the mission, I should come and see the

    Pa, and that was the reason why we moved me to that place,

    but after the arrival of Issa, I did not see that happen

    again. After Issa's arrival, I did not see Mr Taylor."

    And then he goes on:

    "A. Issa Sesay and Benjamin Yeaten would go to the

    mansion."

    And further:

    "A. I was at Benjamin Yeaten's place" - this is 9497, line

    24 - "when they told me that they were going to meet Mr

    Taylor at the mansion. So they moved together with

    Benjamin Yeaten, Issa Sesay, Benjamin Yeaten, so I did not

    follow them any longer. They moved again and went to the

    mansion. When we arrived in Monrovia on the first day,

    Issa was not there but he came on the second day."

    And then he said that on the fourth day they returned. This is page 9498, line 13:

    "A. We flew back, Issa Sesay and I. We came back to Foya

    because that is where we left the troops.

    Q. When you left to return to Foya, how did you travel?

    A. That morning, I saw war materials, logistics, and they

    were put into the vehicle, and that same field where we

    used to land was the same field where we took the

    logistics."

    And then he indicates that these were taken from the dump at the back of the President's house, Benjamin Yeaten's place, and then these were the logistics, page 9499:

    "A. I saw AK rounds, a good number of it, RPG rockets,

    that too a good quantity. I saw AK machine guns, new ones,

    they were also in good quantity, and I saw RPG tubes, and

    they too were in good quantity and they were new ones, and

    I saw grenades and other materials that I cannot recall

    now.

    Q. When you were there and you saw this material at the

    back of the President's house" - bottom of the page - "who

    else if anyone was present apart from you?

    A. Issa was present, Benjamin Yeaten and the security

    officers were present. And I saw Zigzag Marzah. He was

    there too. The time the materials was loaded I saw Zigzag

    Marzah and other ATU soldiers." Line 18: "Zigzag Marzah

    was one of the President's securities."

    Now - and then he goes on to say, page 9503, line 9:

    "Q. What happened to that material that you saw there?"

    Bottom of the page, line 26.

    "A. I said when they had loaded the materials into those

    two vehicles, one van and a jeep, when they'd loaded the

    materials, they brought another jeep where we - we went

    into that vehicle and went to the field."

    Over the page, 9504:

    "Q. Who went to the field with the vehicle?" Line 4.

    A. Issa Sesay."

    And then the bottom of the page:

    "A. After we arrived, the materials were taken out and

    transferred into the helicopter but I was really concerned

    why this quantity of materials, when there was disarmament

    on in Sierra Leone, they were talking about peace and again

    they'd sent this quantum of materials."

    And then it goes on. Line 17:

    "A. Issa Sesay entered into the helicopter." Line 21:

    "We landed in Foya." Line 23: "We met vehicles that had

    come from Kailahun and we loaded all the material into the

    vehicles. We waited until the evening and we travelled,

    and they waited until the evening because we were afraid

    because at that time UNAMSIL had deployed and we were

    travelling with materials. We were afraid that they will

    see us. That is why we waited until night."

    And then he goes on to say that the material was moved with you accompanying it to Buedu, to Kailahun, to Pendembu.

    Now, I have gone into some detail in relation to that, Mr Sesay, because this individual is implicating you deeply in carrying a quantity of war materials in a helicopter from Monrovia to Foya and then by road from Foya to Kailahun at a time when you say you were disarming. Is this true?

  • No, this is not true. This is not true. The time that I went to Monrovia in October 2000, when I went to accompany the delegation that was to go to Abuja, like Jamba Goba, the two of us travelled together, that woman, from Kono to Monrovia. Then I waited in Monrovia while they returned. I travelled together with them from Monrovia back to Kono. I did not travel with this man to Monrovia and I did not meet him in Monrovia, and I did not break any single rounds, no, no ammunition to Sierra Leone. In October 2000 there was no UNAMSIL in Kailahun, the Indian troops that were deployed there had withdrawn and had come to attack Pendembu and had come to Daru. So I can say from September, October, November to December there was no UNAMSIL in Kailahun at this time, so this was just a made up story.

  • Mr Griffiths, the witness mentioned a name of someone that was to go to Abuja, what was that name again.

  • Madam Jamba Goba, the two of us travelled. I travelled then from Kono to Monrovia and we travelled again from --

  • The name, I just want the name. Do we have that name on the record?

  • I think we did, it is the sister of Jande.

  • Is that the person whom you said was the sister of Jande, Foday Sankoh's wife who was executed, is that right?

  • That name was mentioned a couple of days ago, but just to be on the safe side, just spell the name for us please.

  • It is J-E-M-B-A. Then Goba is the same as Jande's.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, I have to explain to you what this individual claimed this material that you brought back from Monrovia was meant for. Page 9507, line 2:

    "Q. And the reason why the materials were brought, he" -

    that being you - "said Mr Taylor had given those materials

    and the weapons and that we were to attack Guinea from two

    flanks. From the Sierra Leone end, he said those were the

    materials and even the money that he had told me about was

    for that mission. Because he went on to say that you

    brought $50,000 with you from Monrovia, that which

    President Taylor had given to you."

    Now, is that true?

  • No. That's a lie. President Taylor never gave me $50,000. It never happened. It is a big lie and this man - the two of us, I never met him in Monrovia and the two of us never travelled from Monrovia to Sierra Leone. He is telling lies.

  • Now, he went on to say that this mission to Guinea did, in fact, take place in 2001. Did you order any RUF men to carry out a mission at Mr Taylor's behest in Guinea in 2001, Mr Sesay?

  • No. No, no. I did not order anybody on Mr Taylor's behalf to attack Guinea, no.

  • And did you at some stage accuse this witness of having sabotaged Mr Taylor's plans?

  • No. I never accused that person, that he sabotaged Mr Taylor's plan. Because the two of us were never any mission on behalf of Mr Taylor, no.

  • Yes. Now, I want to ask you some details about one or two individuals before we go on to look at more transcripts.

    Did you know someone called King Perry, Mr Sesay?

  • Who was he?

  • He was a radio operator.

  • Well, first he was in Kailahun because they were the ones that came together with Rashid Mansaray to Kailahun and he was in Kailahun with Mr Sankoh, Kailahun Town in '93 and we retreated to Koindu, but he did not go to Koindu, he was in Giema with Sam Bockarie and others as a radio operator. So he remained in Giema with Sylvester Miller from December '93 to June '94. When I came to Giema he was the one I met there as station commander in Giema. So he was working with me --

  • From where?

  • From June when I met him there as station commander he worked with me from June '94 to early '95 when Mr Sankoh requested for them - himself and some other operators would went to Zogoda in '95. So from '95, Mr Sankoh posted him to the Kangari Hills, so he was there and worked with George and he came and --

  • Who?

  • With one CO, George, he was the battalion commander in the Kangari Hills.

  • How do you spell that name?

  • I think it is G-O-R-G-E, George, it's George.

  • And for how long did he stay in the Kangari Hills?

  • He was at the Kangari Hills from '95 to May '97. He was the station commander there for Isaac Mongor from January '96 to May '97.

  • Now, after the coup in May '97, what happened to King Perry?

  • Well, when Isaac left with the RUF troops from the Kangari Hills to Matotoka, then Magburaka, Makeni, King Perry was in Makeni as the station commander for the radio that was there throughout the AFRC period up to the intervention. During the intervention, February '98, he withdrew to Kono and he operated with Superman as station commander from February '98 to July of '98 when Sam Bockarie sent him and Alfred Brown to go to the Koinadugu flank.

  • Now, as Sam Bockarie sent him to the Koinadugu flank, who was in charge of that flank when Bockarie sent him there?

  • SAJ Musa was in charge of that area, together with Gullit, because at that time Gullit was in Rosos and SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani and General Bropleh were in Kurubonla. Bockarie decided to send them there, together with Alfred Brown and others, because Bockarie did not know anything that was happening in that axes, so he sent those operators so they would be able to send messages to him so that he would know how the men were operating there. That was the purpose for him to send them there, so he was there. From Kurubonla he joined Gullit and others, up to the time that SAJ Musa join them in Major Eddie Town and all of them, together with SAJ Musa, came to Freetown, they came to Waterloo. SAJ Musa died and he - Gullit and others continued to Freetown. So in February they withdrew from Freetown and he came. I saw him in Waterloo, I saw him there. And he came to Makeni. He was operating with Superman in Lunsar during the infight, the infighting. From that time he was in Makeni up until disarmament.

  • Thank you very much. Now, another person I want you to assist me with is Monica Pearson. When did you first encounter Monica Pearson?

  • It was at the Naama training base.

  • How did she come to be at the Naama training base?

  • Her sister brought them there, herself, her brothers, and some other people. That is Fatou Brown, Mr Sankoh's wife there.

  • So Fatou Brown brought her to Camp Naama?

  • Monica Pearson, Fatou Gbembo and Monica's junior brother, that is, Theophilus Pearson, Musa Gbembo, Gabriel Decker and Anthony Decker, that was the woman that brought all of them together, that is the same group, Fatou Brown.

  • And at Camp Naama, how close were you to Monica Pearson?

  • Well, when Monica Pearson came, because they were the ones who were cooking for Mr Sankoh, said the two of us had a relationship. She was my girlfriend at Camp Naama.

  • Now, following the invasion of Sierra Leone, between 1992 to '94, where was Monica Pearson based?

  • Monica came to Kailahun because she was with the Koindu group with late CO Kargbo, together with Isaac Mongor and others. So around May '91 she joined Mr Sankoh and they went to Pujehun. So from that time of - from '91 to '94 I was in Pujehun. They were the ones who joined Mr Sankoh from Pujehun.

  • And what was she doing in Pujehun?

  • She was a WACs commander. They were there with the other people.

  • From 1994 to 1996 where was she?

  • Well, '94, Mr Sankoh sent her to the training base in Juikoya, around Zogoda --

  • How do you spell that first name?

  • No, I don't know how to spell it.

  • I wonder, Mr Interpreter, if you can assist us?

  • Yes, your Honours, it's J-U-I-K-O-Y-A.

  • Yes, and you were saying they were there with the other people - you were saying?

  • I said Mr Sankoh sent her to the training base at Juikoya that was very close to Camp Zogoda. She was there.

  • Mr Griffiths, the witness said something like she was a WACs commander which appears as a works commander, could you please ascertain what the witness meant.

  • She was a WACs commander, what is that?

  • Those - that is the women's commander in the Pujehun District during '91 to 1994 before they joined up with Mr Sankoh in Zogoda.

  • WACs, is that WACs, as in W-A-C-S?

  • Yes, you're right.

  • Now you say she was sent as training commander somewhere near Zogoda; is that right?

  • Yes, Juikoya. She was the training commandant there.

  • And for how long did she hold that post?

  • She was there up until '95 when Mr Sankoh transferred her to open another base in Matru Jong after the capture of Sierra Rutile.

  • And how long did she stay there?

  • Well, she was in Matru Jong where she established that training base. She was there as training commandant until around July/August 1996 because of the Kamajor attacks on the RUF position in Rutile to Matru Jong. That is why they withdrew to Camp Zogoda.

  • And what happened to her after she went to Camp Zogoda?

  • When she came to Camp Zogoda she was there up until October when the Kamajors and the SLA attacked Zogoda. She was among the group that Mike Lamin headed and they went to Pujehun and crossed over the border to the ULIMO zone and they surrendered. So from October '96 she was in Liberia to around November '97 when she returned to Freetown, when she came back to Sierra Leone through Kailahun and Kenema and she joined Mike Lamin. She was at Mike Lamin's house at Hill Station November '97. So she was in Freetown up until the intervention and they retreated with Mike Lamin through the peninsula to Tombo and they crossed to Fogbo and to Masiaka and she was with Mike Lamin when they went to Makeni. And from Makeni they went to Kono. All of them went to Kono. From Kono - February '98 she was in Kono up until March. Then Sam Bockarie sent a radio message for her to report to Kailahun. So when she reported in Kailahun, Sam Bockarie appointed her as deputy training commandant at the training base in Bunumbu under the command of Jah Glory because Jah Glory was the training commandant there.

  • Jah Glory, how do you spell that?

  • J-A-H G-O-L-R-Y.

  • And how long was she there for?

  • She was there as deputy training commandant Jah Glory until around April an unknown person shot Jah Glory and he was taken to Buedu and he died, so Bockarie appointed her as training commandant. So from that time she was in Bunumbu up to February --

  • February of which year?

  • Up to January/February of 1999 when Sam Bockarie instructed her and the other instructors to transfer the training base from Bunumbu to Yengema to Kono. So from January/February of '99 to the disarmament she was in Kono. After the disarmament she transferred to Magburaka.

  • Do you know someone called Alimamy Bobson Sesay?

  • Who is that person?

  • He was one of the honourable, one of the 17 members that overthrew the SLPP. He was the bodyguard to that person. That is Papa Bangura, Bomb Blast.

  • Have you met Alimamy Bobson Sesay?

  • Yes. During the retreat I saw him in Kono. I met with him in Kono during the retreat because during the retreat I was together with Bomb Blast and he was with Bomb Blast from Makeni to Kono. From that time I did not meet with him, but during the retreat from Freetown to Kono I met with him.

  • Who is Samuel Kargbo?

  • Samuel Kargbo was one of the honourables for the AFRC.

  • Yes, I met with him during the AFRC time in Freetown. And during the retreat I was at Four Mile, that is Songo, coming to Waterloo. When the troops retreated from Freetown, he and the others were in Kono, to oversee the mining in Kono. So when they came from Kono they met me at Fogbo - sorry Four Mile. So all of us drove to where the group crossed the river from Tombo. So all of us retreated to Masiaka and from Masiaka I saw him again in Makeni when I came from Bo and we met in Johnny Paul's village. I met him there. Then we were the ones - we met again in Kono during that meeting with Johnny Paul. Then all of us travelled again from Kono. They met me in Gandorhun. We travelled from Gandorhun to Kailahun, Buedu, because he was in Kailahun with Akim. From there later he was posted to Pendembu as brigade commander by Bockarie. So the two of us were there from May to December. I left him in Pendembu in December '98.

  • December of which year?

  • I said '98. He was in Pendembu. And I left him there. He remained in Pendembu until after the signing of the Lome Accord and he joined Johnny Paul to go to Monrovia. From there they came back to Freetown.

  • To your knowledge, Mr Sesay, when was the first time Samuel Kargbo went to Monrovia?

  • Well, the first time Kargbo went to Monrovia, that was between August until September of 1999. That was the first time he went to Monrovia with Johnny Paul Koroma and Jumu Jalloh, because I recall I was the one who drove them, I took them to Foya where they were collected - picked up by the helicopter. That was the first time he went to Monrovia.

  • Now you said he went to Monrovia with Johnny Paul Koroma and another. Give us the name of that another, please?

  • Can you help us with the spelling of the first name?

  • I think it is J-U-M-U.

  • Thank you. That's helpful. Now another individual I want to ask you about. Does the name Albert Hindowa Saidu mean anything to you?

  • Yes, very well. I know him.

  • Who is he?

  • Well, that was Albert Saidu, commonly called Eyeball.

  • Commonly called what?

  • That his nickname, Eyeball. Eyeball.

  • And when did this person join the RUF?

  • In Kailahun District.

  • And thereafter what - did he achieve any rank within the RUF?

  • Yes. He became a lieutenant before we joined the AFRC and during the AFRC he was a lieutenant. He was operating around Kenema, Tongo Field, Kailahun, up to the time they retreated back into Kailahun. And before - he was in the Peyima Jungle before. They were the ones who retreated from Peyima to Giema in October '96 and before the AFRC he was staying in Giema up to the for the AFRC coup in '97. He was in Giema before the AFRC coup. And after the AFRC coup he was in Kenema, Tongo and later he withdrew to Kailahun. So from March - in March he was in Daru, so February, March - and part of March, he was in Daru. That was in '98. And from March to December up to part of 1999 he was in Baiima in the Kailahun District.

  • Did he remain in the RUF until disarmament?

  • Yes. Some part of '99 he was at Jormu Kafebu and I recall at the time I came Mr Sankoh said I should go and inform them about a disarmament in 2000.

  • What was that name, he was at - what's the location?

  • Jormu Kafebu, something like that.

  • Mr Interpreter, I wonder if you can assist us.

  • Yes, your Honours. It's J-O-R-M-U K-A-F-E-B-U.

  • Go on. You were saying, Mr Sesay?

  • Yes, I said he was - around '99 he was in Jormu Kafebu as adjutant to the commander who was there and that was Harris Momoh. And in March of 2000 when Foday Sankoh said I should go to Segbwema to organise the men and all the surrounding - all the fighters in the surrounding of Segbwema for them to assemble at Segbwema for the disarmament. I met Eyeball, he was at Jormu Kafebu with Harris Momoh and all of them came to Segbwema at the disarmament time and after the disarmament in Segbwema he stayed in Segbwema until the end of the war.

  • I want your assistance with another individual now, please. Who is Idriss Kamara?

  • Idriss Kamara. Idriss Kamara was AFRC.

  • What can you tell us about him?

  • Well, Idriss Kamara was part of the AFRC group that was with Brigadier Mani at the Koinadugu flank. They were there with Brigadier Mani and they moved with Brigadier Mani in December '98 to Makeni. But he was operating with Brigadier Mani and Colonel T. That was what I knew about him.

  • Have you ever heard of a Red Goat battalion, Mr Sesay?

  • Those were the AFRC who were in the Koinadugu District. This Idriss Kamara we are talking about, that was their group.

  • And this Red Goat Battalion, was it involved in the Freetown invasion at all?

  • No. They were not part of the Freetown attack because, at the time Gullit and others attack Freetown, this group was based in Makeni.

  • Did you know someone called Alice Pyne?

  • That was the wife of CO Nya, who joined the RUF in Kailahun District and was a radio operator.

  • Who joined the RUF in the Kailahun district, just to be clear?

  • And CO Nya, when did he join the RUF?

  • In Kailahun. Those were the ones that Anthony Mekunagbe brought with him, so he stayed.

  • So what nationality was CO Nya?

  • And what about his wife, Alice Pyne, what nationality was she?

  • A Sierra Leonean.

  • Now, for the assistance of the stenographer, Nya is N-Y-A-H. It is on the record already. It is on the record.

  • N-Y-A-H.

  • I don't think Mia Farrow is Nya, as the transcript currently shows.

  • So help us: What can you tell us about Alice Pyne?

  • Well, Alice Pyne was one of those trained in Pendembu as radio operator in 1992. So she was with Nya as her partner to the time the RUF was pushed from Kailahun. So she was with Nya in a village called Taidu in late 1993, together with Mohamed Tarawalli.

  • What's the name of the village?

  • How do you spell that?

  • Go on. You were saying she was there in late 1993 together with Mohamed Tarawalli. What else were you telling us?

  • Yes, yes. So around February of 1994, they moved Nya, his wife, all of them moved with Mohamed Tarawalli from Taidu and came to Giema, and from Giema they moved to go and establish the Northern Jungle in Kangari Hills through the Peyima Jungle. So since that time Nya - Alice was with Nya at the Kangari Hills, and she was at the Kangari Hills with Nya up until 1997.

  • In May '97, when the RUF joined the AFRC in Makeni she was part of that group. They used to come to Freetown, she and Nya, and then return to Makeni. And they were in Freetown up until the time for the intervention. They retreated through Tombo to Makeni and to Kono. And then she was with Nya in Kono from February up until August, and they moved to the Koinadugu District together with Superman, up to December of '98, they came to Makeni, and from Makeni they went and based in Lunsar, and they were there after renewed fighting, they were in Lunsar sometimes and in Makeni. And in '99, they were in Lunsar. In 2000, she came to Makeni. So during the May 8 incident, Alice was in Makeni, whilst Nya was arrested in Freetown. So Alice left Makeni in 2000. She was in Makeni in 2000, up to 2001, the disarmament time.

  • Thank you very much. Another individual now please. Do you know a Rashid Foday?

  • Yes, I know him.

  • He was a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh.

  • From 199' - I can say 1992, from 1992 up until 2000, when Mr Sankoh left him in Monrovia.

  • When did he go to Monrovia?

  • And why did he go to Monrovia?

  • Well, he was with Mr Sankoh in Freetown, and Mr Sankoh sent him to stay in the guesthouse in Monrovia. He was there, together with Memunatu Deen as the caretaker of the guesthouse.

  • And for how long did he stay in that capacity?

  • Well, he was there because the guesthouse was there for us. He was there until around December of 2000 to January of 2000, when they said the guesthouse - we were not supposed to use the guesthouse any longer because by then peace had almost started reigning back in Sierra Leone.

  • Mr Sesay, I need your help here. You said he was there up until around December of 2000 to January of 2000.

  • Yes. We stopped using the guesthouse around January to February of 2001. We stopped using it.

  • So help me, just so that we're clear for the purpose of the transcript: Which month did he go to be the caretaker at the guesthouse, and which month and year?

  • Well, he went there around - Mr Sankoh sent him there around - around January of 2000.

  • And he remained there until when?

  • Until around January 2001. The guesthouse was closed to us. They asked us to stop using it. So I had to provide money for them to rent another place for the meantime, and after some time they could return back to Sierra Leone.

  • And in the course of that answer you said, "They asked us to stop using it." Who is the "they"?

  • The Liberian government.

  • And you say that you had to rent somewhere else; is that right?

  • Yes. Because I gave money to him, Rashid, because he had three children with him, together with his wife. I said, okay, they should go and rent a place, he and Memuna, until they were able to organise themselves and return to Sierra Leone.

  • Thank you. Now, there is somebody else I want your assistance with. Do you know someone called Jabati Jaward?

  • Yes, very well.

  • Well, Jabati Jaward was born in the village close to Pendembu called Mandekiema, and he joined the RUF and trained at the vocational secondary school in Pendembu in '91.

  • He was born in a village close to somewhere, close to where?

  • I said the village was called Mandekiema, five miles away from Pendembu.

  • How do you spell that name, Mande --

  • And you were saying he trained where?

  • He was trained at the vocational secondary school in Pendembu.

  • He was trained as a fighter.

  • And thereafter, what postings did he have?

  • Well, he was just a fighter within the RUF up to the time the RUF was pushed in '93, and then he was with me at Pomodu in '94, because he and my bodyguards were brothers. So he was with my bodyguards, '94 at Pomodu. And when I came to Giema later, he stayed in Pomodu with Peter Vandi. So when the government troops retreated from Kailahun in April '95 and he came to Buedu and he now based in Buedu with Peter Vandi.

  • Pause there. And did he have any particular role when he was with Peter Vandi?

  • Yes. He was adjutant to Peter Vandi.

  • And what happened to him thereafter?

  • So when Peter Vandi moved to Giema, he left him in Buedu, so he was with Peter Vandi's family in Buedu up until 1995, '96 - up to the time of the coup. So in 1998, he became Sam Bockarie's S4. That was when Sam Bockarie retreated to Kailahun.

  • As S4, what were his responsibilities?

  • He was responsible for the storage of food stuff. He was in charge of the food store in Buedu. Food, fuel, used clothing, he was in charge of the store.

  • And for how long did he remain in that position?

  • From February/March of '98 up until December of 1999, when he joined Sam Bockarie and they went to Liberia.

  • Do you know someone called Matthew Sesay?

  • Where did you first meet him?

  • We first met at Camp Naama in 1990.

  • How was he popularly known?

  • From 1991 to 1992 what was his responsibility within the RUF?

  • He was a bodyguard to Mr Sankoh up until'93.

  • And, as far as you're aware, how far back did he go with Mr Sankoh? For how long had he known Mr Sankoh?

  • Well, I do not understand the question.

  • Do you know when CO Kennedy and Foday Sankoh first met?

  • Well, CO Kennedy was one of the people who were recruited around the Harbel, Kakata areas. Mr Sankoh brought them to Naama.

  • Did he know Sankoh from before then?

  • Well, I can't tell.

  • From 1995 until 1996 did CO Kennedy have any particular responsibility?

  • What was that?

  • He was the area commander at the Peyima Jungle.

  • And where was Sam Bockarie at that time?

  • Sam Bockarie too was in the Peyima Jungle but he was working under Kennedy as one of the battalion commanders.

  • In December of 1996 was CO Kennedy given any particular assignment?