The transcripts of the trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia. More…

  • Mr Sesay, when we broke off yesterday, we were discussing the reasons why Superman's group proceeded to attack Port Loko with a view to proceed to Lungi. You were explaining how at that time Sam Bockarie - sorry, Gullit had already taken over Freetown. And you said Sam Bockarie was doing this, as it were, to get a name. I just want you to explain exactly what you meant and why it was important for Sam Bockarie to then attack Port Loko with a view to proceeding to Lungi after Gullit took over Freetown. You remember the evidence I'm talking about?

  • Yes, I recall.

  • Can you just assist us by explaining again why it was important for Sam Bockarie to take over Lungi with a view to proceeding to - to proceed to - sorry, attack Port Loko with a view to proceed to Lungi, when Gullit took over Freetown.

  • Well, it was because Gullit and others had attacked Freetown, they were purely AFRC, that was the reason why Sam Bockarie also said that the RUF should go to Lungi if we were able to capture Port Loko.

  • Yes, but why? Why? Why was it necessary for you also to show your faces near the capital? Why was it necessary for the RUF to show your faces there?

  • Well, my Lord, the RUF too was fighting for the capital. So if the AFRC had captured Freetown and the RUF captured Lungi, then at the end of the day, the RUF too will not be too far from the important areas in the country because Lungi also is an important area in the country.

  • Yesterday, in answering that question you said Sam Bockarie did this to get names. Can you explain what you meant by that phrase?

  • Well, what I meant was that Sam Bockarie did that because the AFRC, that is Gullit and others, had attacked Freetown, so they were purely going to make the name that they had captured the capital city. That was the reason why Sam Bockarie also said the RUF should capture Lungi, but we were unable to capture Port Loko, so it was not possible.

  • Mr Sesay --

  • Just so I understand that, Mr Chekera, so the only reason the RUF wanted to capture Lungi was because Gullit had captured Freetown? Is that right?

  • What sort of a military reason is that?

  • Well, my Lord, Lungi also is an important area in the country.

  • Why was it important to the RUF?

  • Well, if we had got Lungi, then that would have been important to the RUF because that is one of the important areas in the country.

  • Why would it have been important to the RUF?

  • Because that is where we have the international airport, the only airport in the country. That is where it is located.

  • And what would the RUF have done with the airport?

  • Well, my Lord, the RUF also was fighting for political power, so if we had got the airport, it meant that we had got one important area in the country.

  • Mr Sesay, yesterday when we were looking at that map which you marked for us, MFI-45, you indicated that in your opinion, the Guinean troops at Port Loko would necessarily travel southwards through Gberi Junction, through Gberi Bridge, down to Masiaka and then on to Freetown. That's what you said yesterday, isn't it, if they were to go and reinforce their colleagues in Freetown?

  • But I'm just wondering, don't you think that it would be nearer for them to travel from Port Loko through Lungi where their colleagues were? First of all, let me ask this: Where was the headquarters of ECOMOG at that time? Was it not at Lungi?

  • The ECOMOG headquarters during this time was in Freetown.

  • Yes, but Freetown had been taken over or attacked by AFRC. Was not their - wasn't there a strong contingent of ECOMOG at Lungi at this time?

  • They were there, my Lord.

  • And don't you think it would make better sense, it would be easier, for the Guineans to join their colleagues at Lungi through Port Loko?

  • Yes, if we attacked Port Loko, the Guineans will have used two ways to withdraw, either to go through Lungi or to go back to Guinea.

  • So why do you think that they would go through Gberi Bridge and Gberi Junction? Isn't that a longer way to get to Freetown? Isn't it shorter to go through Lungi if you're at Port Loko?

  • Yes, ma'am, if you are in Port Loko, if you want to go to Freetown, the shorter way for troops is through Masiaka, through Gberi Junction to Masiaka but if you went through Lungi you will have to use the ferry and by then the AFRC had captured where the ferry lands in Freetown.

  • So how were you, the RUF, hoping to get to Lungi if the ferry was no longer available, how were you hoping to get there?

  • Well, through Port Loko, my Lord.

  • I know, I know through Port Loko, but once you left Port Loko, how were you, the RUF, hoping to capture Lungi if there was no ferry available? How were you going to do it?

  • Well, the troops were to move from Port Loko to Loko Massama, and from Loko Massama to --

  • Your Honours, the next town that the witness referred to was not clear to the interpreter.

  • Please repeat the route. How would the troops move?

  • From Port Loko they would go through - from Port Loko they would go to Loko Massama. From Loko Massama, there are other two routes to go to Lungi. You might either use Komrabai route, or you come to Rotifunk, or Tintafor, that is in Lungi Masoyilla. Or, if you want, you might take it by Loko Massama to Fori Kalangba, and then you come to Bailor and then you come to Conakry Deux. That is another route also.

  • And you do not reckon that the Guinean forces to have used any of these routes to get to Lungi?

  • Yes, ma'am. That is the reason why I said if we had attacked Port Loko, if we were able to capture Port Loko there were two routes. The Guineans, if they wanted, they would have gone through Loko Massama to Lungi, and then they joined their ECOMOG colleagues there or they would draw back to Guinea through the Kambia route.

  • So in other words it is not true what you said yesterday, that the only route for them to Freetown would have been through Gberi Junction and Gberi Bridge, it's not true, is it?

  • Well, my Lord, I cannot say that is not the truth because during this time, where the ferry was to slam in Freetown, the only routes to the place where the ferry slams had been captured by the AFRC, that is the Kissy Terminal and Old Wharf, I mean Government Wharf, the AFRC were present there in Freetown.

  • Okay. Thank you, Mr Interpreter, the names, the various names that are definitely not on the record, do you think you can spell any of them for us?

  • Yes, your Honours. Loko Massama is L-O-K-O M-A-S-S-A-M-A. The second one is Komrabai. It is K-O-M-R-A-B-A-I. The third one is Rotifunk, R-O-T-I-F-U-N-K. And the next one is Tintafor, T-I-N-T-A-F-O-R. The next is Kalangba, K-A-L-A-N-G-B-A. Another is Bailor, B-A-I-L-O-R. The next is Old Wharf, is O-L-D W-H-A-R-F. The next is Government Wharf, as is "government" then "wharf".

  • Thank you, Mr Interpreter.

  • Can I ask one other point of clarification, Mr Sesay? Did ECOMOG have helicopters at Lungi?

  • Yes, my Lord. They had helicopters. They had Alpha Jets.

  • Could they not have used helicopters to take personnel?

  • Yes, they could have used helicopters to reinforce.

  • Mr Sesay, just as a follow-up to that question. If the helicopters were - if ECOMOG had used the helicopters to - from Lungi to reinforce in Freetown, where would they have landed?

  • Well, they still had areas to land that were still under the Government of Sierra Leone, like Cockerill. They would have landed at Cockerill. They would have landed at Mammy Yoko, Aberdeen. They still had those areas, because the AFRC had not yet reached those areas.

  • And if they had used the sea, the ferry, where would they have landed?

  • Well, with the ferry, they would have either landed at the Government Wharf or the Kissy Terminal, that is where the ferries normally slam.

  • And who was controlling those two places?

  • Now, Mr Sesay, the Guinean contingent that was based at Port Loko, did they ever, during the time that they were at Port Loko, was there a time that they moved towards Freetown at any point?

  • No, they did not go to Freetown. They came to Waterloo to receive their brothers who were at Waterloo, and for them to go back to Port Loko.

  • And which route did they use when they were coming to Freetown? Sorry, to Waterloo?

  • They used the Gberi Junction route, through Gberi Bridge to Masiaka.

  • You said the contingent, the Guinean contingent, you said under cross-examination, that was based at Port Loko, was quite a large contingent.

  • Yes, it was a large contingent and they were well armed. They had tanks, they had 40-barrel missiles.

  • Could they possibly transport those tanks to reinforce Freetown via the ferry?

  • Yes, those tanks could have only been transported to Freetown through the ferry because the helicopter cannot take them.

  • And do you know how many helicopters were at Lungi under the ECOMOG?

  • No. I did not know.

  • Now, Superman attempts to attack - rather, attacks Port Loko and he doesn't succeed, he fails to take over Port Loko. What does he do after that?

  • Well, after that, Sam Bockarie instructed him to withdraw; he said he and Rambo should take the route to Masiaka and go to Waterloo.

  • And does he get to Waterloo?

  • Yes. They got to Waterloo where they fought for two weeks against the Guineans, and the Guineans withdrew to Port Loko.

  • The Guineans who they fought at Waterloo, are they the same Guineans who were based at Port Loko?

  • No. This was another contingent that was at Waterloo, but they were all just the same Guineans.

  • And while this is happening, when Superman is engaged with the Guineans at Waterloo, where are you, Mr Sesay?

  • I was in Makeni.

  • And at that time, when this is happening, the battle between the Guineans and Superman at Waterloo, what is happening in Freetown?

  • Well, the AFRC were in Freetown, they were fighting against the ECOMOG, because I later understood that they advanced towards the Congo Cross Bridge. It was from there that the ECOMOG started pushing them.

  • When Sam Bockarie gave Superman instructions to go to Waterloo, did he give him instructions to go any further than Waterloo?

  • No, he did not give further instructions because to capture Waterloo it took them two weeks and, by then, before the RUF could capture Waterloo, the AFRC also had withdrawn. They were now around the Allen Town area. So Sam Bockarie did not give further instruction and the ECOMOG were at Hastings and they were also at Jui.

  • So by the time Superman eventually captures Waterloo, Gullit and company are already withdrawing from Freetown?

  • Yes, because the - it was said over the SLBS and even the BBC.

  • And you, Mr Sesay, did you at any point leave Makeni to come to Waterloo?

  • At what point did you leave Makeni to come to Waterloo?

  • Well, it was when Gullit and others had retreated to Benguema, that was the time Sam Bockarie sent me a message saying that I should go and receive the politicians that had been sprung out of Pademba Road. He said I should bring them to Makeni and send them to Buedu, including Gibril Massaquoi because he said he wanted to talk to Gibril Massaquoi to know about Mr Sankoh, so he said I should ask Gibril and the politicians who had been sprung out of Pademba Road to send them to him. That was the reason why I went to Waterloo.

  • And how many men did you go with from Makeni to Waterloo for that?

  • Your Honour, I believe this was covered in direct examination.

  • What is the point of this line of questioning, Mr Chekera? What is it that arose in cross-examination?

  • I am trying to put into context the events around the Freetown invasion which learned counsel opposite in his cross-examination clearly suggested was a joint attack between the RUF and the AFRC. So I have to probe that detail of their coordination and their operations to see if there, indeed, was a joint criminal enterprise with respect to the Freetown invasion, including the retreat to Freetown - to Waterloo which you will recall, Madam President, learned counsel opposite put to Mr Sesay that he was actually sent to Waterloo to reinforce Gullit.

  • Very well. But do not recap the direct evidence, please.

  • I will attempt not to repeat the evidence, only except to the extent that I have to to put into context the issues I'm trying to extract from the witness. I will proceed with caution.

  • Mr Sesay, you will recall that learned counsel opposite suggested to you that actually you came from Makeni to reinforce Gullit and that you and Gullit at some point planned an attack to retake Freetown. You remember that aspect of - you remember that line of questioning from learned counsel opposite?

  • Yes, I recall.

  • Now, how many men did you bring from Makeni to Waterloo when you were sent by Sam Bockarie to collect the politicians?

  • There were just my bodyguards that I went with.

  • Just give me a rough --

  • Didn't the witness mention the name "Gibril Massaquoi"? That didn't come out in the interpretation.

  • He did mention Gibril Massaquoi as one of the persons he was going to come to take along --

  • I didn't hear that in the interpretation.

  • Maybe just to put it on the record I will ask the question again.

  • Mr Sesay, your instructions were to do what when you were sent from Makeni by Sam Bockarie?

  • I said it was to call Gibril Massaquoi, and Sam Bockarie said I should bring the politicians, Mr Victor Foh and others.

  • And Mr Sesay, my question was: Just give me a number of approximately how many bodyguards you had when you left Makeni to Waterloo?

  • About 12 bodyguards.

  • And how long did you stay in Waterloo?

  • Well, I went to Waterloo because by then the Alpha Jet was flying over. I moved at night from Makeni and I was Waterloo for the whole day, and around 7 p.m. I left to go back to Makeni. So I spent just a whole day there. I did not pass the night there because by then, you don't travel during the day, you only travel at night.

  • And did you meet Gullit when you went to Waterloo for that one night?

  • Yes, during the day, Gullit came to Rambo at Lumpa where I was lodged, so we extended greetings and it was there that he asked me, he said, "Oh, my brother, why didn't you guys reinforce us? Now you left us like that in Freetown and we have been put out of Freetown. You did not reinforce us." So I also told him that, "My brother, I did not have any instruction to reinforce you." So he said I should take the politicians with me, but he said he was not going to allow me to take Pa Momoh with me, that is the former President.

  • And, Mr Sesay, when you went to Waterloo and you met the AFRC who had retreated from Freetown, what was their relationship like with the RUF that were in Waterloo?

  • Well, the relationship was not cordial, because they had differences in mind that the RUF failed to reinforce them in Freetown and it came to a time that they used to open fire at one another and --

  • Your Honours, could the witness be asked to repeat that last bit.

  • Slowly repeat your evidence, please. The interpreter didn't get it. Slowly.

  • My Lord, I said when the AFRC withdrew from Freetown to Waterloo to Benguema, the AFRC and the RUF, the relationship was not somehow cordial, because the AFRC was grumbling that the RUF did not reinforce them in Freetown and there were some times that they used to open fire at one another. That was the reason why Rambo decided to withdraw from Waterloo to Makeni.

  • Which Rambo are we talking about, Mr Sesay?

  • I'm talking about Boston Flomo, the RUF Rambo.

  • Mr Sesay, let's talk about Rambo Red Goat. Mr Sesay, you will recall that learned counsel opposite read you some of your testimony when you were led in evidence-in-chief and you talked about someone called Idrissa Kamara and you said that person was with the Rambo Red Goat Battalion. That was what you said in your evidence-in-chief. And when counsel opposite cross-examined you, he put to you that you had lied that you did not know Idrissa Kamara was Rambo Red Goat. You remember that?

  • Yes, I recall.

  • You've already stated Rambo Red Goat was part of Brigadier Mani's group?

  • And you first met him in detention when he was coming to see Bazzy?

  • When did you first become aware that Rambo Red Goat, the person who was visiting Bazzy Kamara, was Idrissa Kamara?

  • Well, that was the first time that I knew that name Idrissa Kamara. The first time I knew that name Idrissa Kamara was when you were asking me about witnesses, the Prosecution witnesses, whether I knew this person or that person, that was at the detention. That was the time he asked me whether I knew someone by the name of Rambo Red Goat and I said yes, Rambo Red Goat at one time visited Bazzy at the detention. And then he said that is Idrissa Kamara. Then I asked, I said, "Is that his name?" So that was my first time I came across that name Idrissa Kamara to say it was Rambo Red Goat. Because he was asking me about different names, Prosecution witnesses, asking me whether I knew this person or whether I know the other person.

  • Mr Sesay, remember you said Brigadier Mani was working with Superman in Makeni, but they had separate commands. You remember that?

  • Yes. I said they were working before they went and captured Makeni. And even when they captured Makeni, Brigadier Mani and Superman were still working, but they had different commands. Brigadier Mani was commanding the AFRC, whereas Superman was commanding the RUF.

  • And you, when you were in Makeni, who were you commanding?

  • Can you then explain why or how, Mr Sesay, it is that according to the Prosecution's case, you came to command Rambo Red Goat and ordered him and the group of about 60 men to advance to Freetown?

  • No. What Rambo Red Goat said is not the truth. I never became a commander for the Red Goats, or I never gave him instruction, that did not happen. And I did not send anybody to Freetown. I did not send any reinforcement. And even if I had instruction to send reinforcement to Freetown, RUF Rambo, Boston Flomo, would have been the appropriate person for me to send because he was the advance team commander from Kono down to Makeni, so I wouldn't have left out RUF Rambo to send Red Goat Rambo, somebody I was not used to.

  • At this point, Mr Sesay - or, rather, let me rephrase the question.

  • And if the RUF wanted to send reinforcement to Freetown, it would not have been 60 men. The RUF would have sent more men than that, with an RUF commander.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, let's just look at the supply of ammunition for that attack. I'll ask you to comment on a proposition that was made by counsel opposite. You've said in your evidence that the ammunition you used - let's start from the time you were at Buedu. The ammunition you used to move from Buedu to Kono was ammunition that Sam Bockarie came with from Liberia?

  • Yes, I said that was the ammunition that Bockarie bought from Lofa.

  • And that took you as far as Kono?

  • Yes, that was what we used for the attack on Kono.

  • And in Kono you acquired - you captured ammunition?

  • Yes, we captured ammunition and arms.

  • And is that the ammunition that you then used to proceed all the way to Waterloo, when Superman went to attack Port Loko?

  • No. The ammunition that we captured from Kono, we used it to Makeni. And in Makeni also we captured ammunition at the Teko Barracks and that - those were some of the ammunition that Superman used to attack Port Loko. And it was the same ammunition from Teko Barracks that Superman used to fight the Guineans at Waterloo.

  • What about SAJ Musa? Where did he get the ammunition that he was using for his advance from the north to Benguema? And after that, Gullit, all the way to Freetown?

  • Well, I later understood that when SAJ Musa went and joined his men at Major Eddie Town, where he joined Gullit and others, they attacked, from there they attacked Lunsar and they got a huge amount of ammunition and from there they went and attacked Masiaka where they also got some ammunition, and from there they attacked Waterloo and they attacked Benguema. That was where they said they captured the ammo dump at Benguema and those were the arms and ammunition that they used to go to Freetown.

  • Because, Mr Sesay, you will recall learned counsel opposite suggesting to you that you, in legal terms we call it the causal effect - if you had not attacked the ECOMOG in Kono, Gullit would not have attacked Freetown because it was all part of a single chain of events. From the time you captured Kono from the ECOMOG, it was all part of a single chain of events which led up to the invasion on Freetown. Do you agree with that proposition? Or do you understand the proposition or you want me to explain it further?

  • No, I understand.

  • Do you agree with that proposition, that this was all part of a single chain of events: If you had not attacked Freetown - if you had not attacked Kono, Gullit would not have succeeded in Freetown?

  • No. I disagree with that. I disagree with that suggestion, because the AFRC, SAJ Musa's group, they attacked Port Loko and they got a huge amount of ammunition there. By then the RUF had not yet attacked Kono. And they then moved from there, they attacked Masiaka where they got some more ammunition from ECOMOG. And from Lunsar they said they captured so many uniforms from the ECOMOG. And they also went and attacked Benguema and Benguema was a barracks around Waterloo, they captured it from the ECOMOG, and they said all the ammunition that was at the dump, they got everything. So it was from there that they got their ammunition and arms to attack Freetown. So even if the RUF had not attacked Kono, the AFRC had the plans to attack Freetown and they had arms and ammunition from the ECOMOG.

    Because I was not there, but what I understood later was that even when they had captured Benguema, the ammo dump where they got the bombs and other things, the remaining ones that were there, SAJ Musa said they should set it on fire. So people said it was during that process that he lost his life. So they collected all that they needed and the remaining, they burnt it. So that was where they got their ammunition from for them to go and attack Freetown.

  • Now, Mr Sesay --

  • Mr Chekera, Mr Sesay said in a previous answer that they attacked Lunsar and captured ammunition there. Now he's saying they attacked Port Loko and got ammunition there. Is it both Port Loko and Lunsar, or is one a mistake for the other?

  • Mr Sesay, can you please assist the learned Justice?

  • Yes, my Lord. I said they attacked Lunsar where they got ammunition, from there to Masiaka, and then they went to Benguema, BTC, around Waterloo, before they attacked Freetown.

  • So they did not attack Port Loko, is that what you're saying?

  • Yes, my Lord. They did not attack Port Loko. It was Benguema Barracks that they ended up capturing before they finally went to Freetown.

  • Mr Sesay, just to understand that causal link again, can you just briefly, I don't want you to even explain - when you attacked Kono, to your knowledge, where was SAJ Musa's group?

  • At that time, they were around - they were around Masiaka, going down to Waterloo, because it was around 5 December that I heard over the BBC that they captured Lunsar, because by then I was still in Buedu.

  • And where were they coming from? You said they were around Masiaka. Where were they coming from?

  • Well, they had the Gullit group that had been in the Bombali District at a place called Rosos throughout almost 1998. So around September 1998, SAJ Musa moved from Kurubonla and joined Gullit at a place called Major Eddie Town. So it was from there that they held a meeting and made a plan to move to Freetown.

  • And from Colonel Eddie Town to Masiaka, do you know whether during that movement they were engaged in combat?

  • Well, when they moved from there, what I understood later was that it was from there that they moved to go and attack Lunsar.

  • Mr Sesay, just to maybe clarify one little point: Lunsar is in which district?

  • Port Loko District.

  • Now, let's go back to this issue of - okay. Let's look at a different aspect on that invasion, Mr Sesay. At what point, Mr Sesay, did you hear of amputations in Freetown?

  • Well, when they attacked Freetown, I heard over the radio that the SLBS was saying that the attackers in Freetown were amputating people, they were burning down houses.

  • Let me try to refocus because I want us to look at during that time when the AFRC was in Freetown. Let me start by saying for approximately how long was the AFRC in Freetown? Just give me a time frame.

  • The AFRC, by late - by mid-January, by mid-January, they were now pushing them towards the east end of Freetown. That was towards mid-January, they were pushing them towards the east end of Freetown, towards Calaba Town, Allen Town, because what I understood later, they advanced - their advance was very rapid and they captured Freetown. I think the very day they moved into Freetown was the day they captured State House and they continued on to Pademba Road and the following day they continued up to the Congo Cross Bridge and from the Congo Cross Bridge ECOMOG also started pushing them, little by little, and they pushed them up to east end.

  • Let me just - even refocus the question further: Did you hear of amputations when the AFRC advanced and took over Freetown or at the time they were retreating from Freetown? Which of the phases did you hear of amputations?

  • It was at the time they were retreating.

  • Your Honours, the interpreter did not complete the last part of the witness's testimony when counsel interrupted. Something was left behind and he said the Pademba Road Prison was open.

  • Thank you, and my apology, Mr Interpreter.

  • Mr Chekera, are you tuned in the same channel that we are on, channel 2?

  • It is my mistake. I am going way too fast.

  • Mr Sesay, entirely my fault. Apparently I'm not waiting for your translations to finish. I will try to slow down a little bit.

    The amputations start when the AFRC are retreating from Freetown, and at that point as you just indicated, the RUF is at Waterloo?

  • Yes, the RUF came to Waterloo around the second week, they fought against the Guineans for about two weeks before they could capture Waterloo.

  • And at this point, does the RUF also start amputations at Waterloo?

  • No. I did not hear about amputations in Waterloo because at the time the RUF fought there for two weeks before they captured Waterloo, there were no civilians in Waterloo at that time because the AFRC passed through Waterloo to go to Freetown, so the civilian population had moved into Freetown before the RUF came and attacked Waterloo.

  • In fact, Mr Sesay, from the time that you advanced from Buedu to the time you ended up in Makeni and some RUF elements proceeding to different parts of the country, almost towards Freetown, were there incidents involving the RUF amputating civilians?

  • No, no. The December advance that the RUF did, no amputation took place. From Kono, down to Magburaka, down to Makeni, up to Lunsar, no amputation took place, not at all, because at this time that we are talking about, Magburaka was overpacked with civilian population, Makeni was overpacked with civilian population. And I never heard about amputation and I did not see anyone who had been amputated. And none of the hospitals received victims that were amputated to say that when Makeni was attacked they were brought to the hospital.

  • Your Honours, could the witness be asked to slow down and repeat from where I stopped.

  • Mr Sesay, you're running again and giving problems to the interpreter. Now, you said none of the hospitals received victims that were amputated, to say that when Makeni was attacked they were brought to the hospital. Now, what did you say after that? Slowly, please.

  • Yes, my Lord. I said during this time, there were so many civilians in Makeni and Magburaka and all the towns that we had passed through, and civilians were not amputated during that attack. And even during my trials, the Prosecution brought amputees but their testimonies - but all the testimonies they gave, they spoke about the places where they were amputated and it was not within December 1998. And it was not during the RUF advance from Kono to Makeni. All the amputees who testified, they did not say it was during that time that they were amputated.

  • Mr Sesay, I just want you to explain because this is very important, I will tell you what the Prosecution's theory is. The Prosecution theory is the attack on Freetown was a joint criminal enterprise involving the RUF, the AFRC, and Charles Taylor, and that that joint criminal enterprise was meant to terrorise the civilian population so that is why I'm asking you whether, as part of that joint criminal enterprise, as alleged, you were carrying amputations from the time you left Kono - sorry, from the time you left Buedu towards Freetown, where we have evidence of amputations? Do you follow the basis for this questioning?

  • Yes, I understand.

  • What do you say to that allegation, that this was all part of an enterprise to terrorise the civilian population involving the RUF, including yourself, Mr Sesay, and Charles Taylor and the AFRC?

  • No. That is not one and the same thing. What the AFRC did in Freetown and the way the RUF conducted themselves from Kono down to Makeni were two different scenarios because the AFRC in Freetown, during January 6 they were amputating people, they were killing policemen, they were killing people whom they said were SLPP supporters, but for those of us in Makeni, we had so many policemen that we met there, about 87 of them, we spoke to them in the barracks, we did not kill the ECOMOGs that we captured, we did not kill the Kamajors that we captured.

  • Mr Sesay, what is wrong with you? Why are you running? We can't hear a word you're saying, perhaps you're talking to yourself. Now, repeat your testimony slowly.

  • Mr Sesay, while you are at it, maybe you can just go slowly, but did you say that we did not kill ECOMOG that we captured but you killed the Kamajors? Because it appears "did kill the Kamajors that were captured". Maybe it's because you're going way too fast, so let's start again with your evidence because it's very important.

  • Yes, my Lord. I said we captured the ECOMOG, we did not kill them. Kamajors surrendered to us with their guns. We did not kill them. We came down to Magburaka, we captured policemen and Makeni also we captured policemen, we did not kill them. I went to the police station, I addressed them. I told them that I don't have rice to be given to you and I said the government that pays the police, they are in Freetown so if you have a route to go to Freetown, you can go. That was how I addressed them in the police barracks and even some of them who were there, like the current police commander at Masingbi, a woman, she made a statement during my Defence case, and amongst the police that we captured during this time she was my investigator in the Special Court case, and if the government, those who were fighting against us, and the policemen who were part of the government, we did not kill them, so it would not have been possible for us to maltreat the civilians and the civilians starting from Kono, down to Makeni, and the surroundings, around this time we did not capture civilians. They stayed in their towns, their villages, up to the end of the war. And no amputations went on in Kono District at this time, not in Tonkolili District, not in Bombali District, coming down to Kambia District and part of Port Loko District. You see, we did not burn any police station, we did not burn any police barracks, they were all intact, we did not destroy government structures, we did not burn down civilians' houses, you see, under - all of these things, we met the paramount chiefs, we did not replace them, we worked with them.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, you just mentioned - I just want to get to one little point, your investigator, was it male or female?

  • He was a man, he was called Dennis Conteh. This was a policeman that we captured during the December attack. The woman that I referred to was also a police but now she is the station commander at Masingbi in Sierra Leone. She was amongst the 87 policemen, police officers in Makeni. And at that time, the AFRC were burning down police barracks in Freetown, they were burning down police stations, killing policemen.

  • Yes, Mr Sesay, the burnings in Freetown, who ordered those burnings in Freetown?

  • Well, the commanders who carried out the attack in Freetown.

  • Because, Mr Sesay, you will recall that it has been suggested that it was Sam Bockarie because he was heard - I cannot - I cannot repeat exactly what he said, but you remember there was evidence that was put to you that Sam Bockarie did order for the city to be burnt down.

  • Yes. They put that evidence to me.

  • And now, was it AFRC commanders who ordered the city to be burnt down or was it Sam Bockarie?

  • No. It was the AFRC commanders. It was the AFRC commanders, the commander that led the troops and his other colleague commanders because they were the ones who attacked Freetown and they were the ones who were in charge of the administration.

  • Now, just one final question on that point - on that issue and then we'll move on. At this point, when the burnings were happening, who was leading the AFRC?

  • Gullit was the commander of the AFRC.

  • And at this point was Gullit taking instructions from Sam Bockarie?

  • Yes. Let's just quickly look at the issue of Sam Bockarie's first visit to - first visit to Monrovia. You will recall, Mr Sesay, that in your evidence you indicated that Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia when - was it Dopoe Menkarzon who came to collect him.

  • Yes, he was the one who collected him at the border.

  • And what year was that again, just to be clear?

  • That was in '98.

  • And you will recall, Mr Sesay, you were referred to evidence from Mr Taylor which suggested to the contrary. You remember learned counsel opposite referred to you - referred you to evidence of Mr Taylor which suggested another date other than the one you were talking about?

  • Now I'm just going to read to you some of the evidence by Taylor on that incident and see whether it agrees with the same incident you were talking about concerning Sam Bockarie's visit, that visit you're talking about. I'm looking at the transcript of 10 September 2009 at page 28610. At line 23, the question was:

    "Q. And he says Sam Bockarie had not yet travelled to

    Monrovia to meet Charles Taylor. When did you first meet

    Sam Bockarie?"

    These were questions that were being put to Mr Taylor, Mr Sesay, just to give you context. And the answer by Charles Taylor was:

    "A. I first met Sam Bockarie in September of 1998."

    Is this round about the time that you recall Sam Bockarie first going to see Mr Taylor, Mr Sesay?

  • Yes.

  • I also refer you, Mr Sesay, on that same issue, to the transcript of 3 August 2009 at page 25805. I'll probably just start at line 1, midway:

    "Q. Now I want us please to consider against that

    background what else was going on."

    Again this is the evidence of Charles Taylor.

    "Now remember in August it had been brought to your

    attention that there was this group of Sierra Leoneans in

    Guinea. Is that right?

    A. That is correct.

    Q. Who wanted to make contact with you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. You told us that you thereafter contacted your

    colleagues on the Committee of Five and as a consequence

    invited Sam Bockarie to Liberia?

    A. That is correct.

    Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. First did Sam Bockarie come

    to Liberia as a result of that invitation?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Who brought him?

    A. I sent one of my generals, Dopoe Menkarzon, to the

    border and got messages and he accepted that invitation."

    Mr Sesay, is this the same incident you were talking about when Sam Bockarie first went to see Charles Taylor?

  • Yes, when I said General Dopoe came and collected him at the borderline.

  • Yes, very well, Mr Sesay. Let's move on to another topic. Let's look at the supply of ammunition to the RUF and specifically, Mr Sesay, I just want to look at your evidence on how the RUF was getting supplies, in light of a suggestion that was made to you by learned counsel opposite when he read to you part of Taylor's evidence where Mr Taylor said - effectively where Mr Taylor said, "If those ammunition were coming from Liberia, then I'm guilty." Do you remember that excerpt being read to you in the context of ammunition that you've said you were getting from Liberia?

  • Yes, I recall.

  • Besides the consignment that you got from Lofa for the Kono attack, you've already indicated that you used to buy ammunition from Liberia through Kennedy?

  • That ammunition, were you buying it from government officials or other parties?

  • It was from ex-ULIMO fighters, those were the ammunition that they had kept during the disarmament in Liberia.

  • And you've also mentioned ammunition that Mike Lamin bought from a general in Lofa in exchange for a generator. Sorry, a general in Bomi in exchange for a generator. Besides that transaction with that Liberian army official, were there any other transactions - besides that transaction and the one in Lofa, were there any other transactions between the RUF and Liberian officials?

  • Yes, because we used to get a few sardine tins from the commander who was in Vahun, the company commander who was in Vahun, but those were not much ammunition. That even happened twice. Apart from that, we did not have any ammunition from any Liberian official.

  • So it is your evidence that the ammunition that you were getting from the Liberian officials were in small quantities?

  • Now, incidentally, Mr Sesay, before I read to you the evidence of Charles Taylor on that and see whether you agree with it, the same evidence that was read to you by learned counsel opposite: The ammunition that you got from Lofa that you used for the attack on Kono, you remember learned counsel opposite suggesting to you that in fact that ammunition came from Burkina Faso? Do you remember that?

  • Yes, I remember.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, you've already indicated to us of your dealings with Burkina Faso concerning ammunition and arms. You've talked of the Magburaka shipment, you've talked of the time that you were supposed to go and see General Diendere with Ibrahim Bah. Do you have anything or did you have anything to hide from - if you had actually gotten the arms that you used to attack Kono, if you had gotten those arms - those ammunitions from Burkina Faso, did you have anything to hide?

  • No, I wouldn't have hidden.

  • Now, let's go back to this ammunition that you said you were getting from Liberian officials and I just want to read to you the evidence that learned counsel put to you concerning what Taylor said about that ammunition. That's the transcript of 28 October 2009, page 30524. I'll start at line 13 which is the line that was read to you by learned counsel to show that Charles Taylor was lying when he said he didn't have arms - sorry, he didn't have ammunition when you were buying ammunition from Liberia:

    "And I'll tell you something, this is a shut and closed case." This is evidence of Mr Taylor, Mr Sesay. "If anyone believes that Liberia had arms and ammunition or Charles Taylor had possession of those arms and ammunition in Liberia between the time he became President up to the time - up to about 2001, when I order material, then really, I'm already guilty in this case."

    That was the part that was read to you, Mr Sesay. Mr Taylor on this page, Mr Sesay, goes on to explain, if you look at line 22:

    "There are no arms and ammunition in the possession of my government. The United Nations had all of them and destroyed every last one. I do not know where I could have pulled these arms out of a magic hat or whatever."

    If you look at the next page, Mr Sesay, this is the part I want you to comment on and see if you do agree with that. At page 30525:

    "I do not deny that small amounts of arms went across the border, but the government did not send them. Whoever bought their arms and things, fine."

    Mr Sesay, you've just indicated that you were dealing with Liberian officials. Do you know whether those dealings, Mr Sesay, were with the blessings of the Liberian government, as in Charles Taylor's blessings or knowledge?

  • No. He did not know about that because when they were doing those transactions, they were doing so in hiding. Even the securities - even the generator that Mike Lamin sold to the commander at Bomi Hills, that was a secret. And even though one or two sardine tins that I bought from --

  • Your Honours, can he repeat the name of the person he bought it from and continue from there.

  • Can you please repeat the name of the person you bought the sardine tins from and continue from there?

  • Captain Tengbeh, my Lord. I said he too was doing it in hiding. He did not even want his colleagues to know about it.

  • Sorry, Madam President, if I could just have a minute. Thank you.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, just a few more questions and you might be on your way back home very soon.

    It was put to you, Mr Sesay, by learned counsel opposite that, as you sit there, Mr Sesay, you are a convicted criminal who committed a number of very, very grave crimes, and as you sit there, Mr Sesay, giving evidence to these judges, you are an unrepentant criminal who is out here to bail another criminal, Mr Taylor. You remember that?

  • Yes, I remember.

  • A number of issues were put to you. I want you, Mr Sesay, to tell the judges what your motivation is for testifying for Mr Taylor in this case.

  • Well, it's because Mr Taylor's case, what I used to hear, Issa's name was appearing a lot in Mr Taylor's case and what happened between Issa and Mr Taylor, my colleague RUF who did not know what Issa did were just telling lies on me.

  • Your Honours, can he kindly slow down and repeat his answer.

  • Mr Sesay, just speak slowly so that the interpreter can interpret what you're saying to us, please. Okay? Now, repeat your testimony slowly.

  • My Lord, I said the reason I came here to give my account of what I know, it was because I used to hear on radio UNAMSIL when my colleague RUF were coming here to say things against me. And even some of them before they came, they used to make send-off parties before they came to The Hague to testify. I was in detention when I used to hear all of that. And they were saying that the way Issa left Mr Sankoh in jail and disarmed the RUF, we too would prosecute him until he dies in jail. I heard my colleagues saying a lot about Issa, things that were not - Issa didn't do. So when Mr Taylor's lawyers told my lawyers that they would need me as a witness, I said: Well, the lies in this case are too much. Let me too go there and give my own account. What the RUF are saying about me is not true. The RUF wanted to destroy me. My colleague RUFs want to destroy me because they are saying that the person who had their future, that is Mr Sankoh, I had betrayed Mr Sankoh, so they were going to make sure that Issa dies in prison. So that was why I came here.

  • But, Mr Sesay, this is not your trial. So whatever you say here has no bearing on the sentence that you are serving. I don't understand that kind of reasoning. How does this clear your name? This is Mr Taylor's trial, not yours.

  • Yes, my Lord. I know that it is not my trial, but it is for people, those who are following up on the Court, for them to know my own part of the story, because a lot of things that they said against me here are not true.

  • So Mr Sesay, you are telling the judges that you are here to tell the truth to set the record straight, that there is a problem with that, Mr Sesay, because the Prosecution says that actually you are here to lie for Mr Taylor who, once he gets out of prison, will talk on your behalf and possibly get you an early release. You remember that suggestion being made by learned counsel opposite, that Mr Taylor, who sits here, who is also in jail and could not save himself from jail is, once he gets free, going to talk on your behalf for you to be set free. What do you say to that suggestion by learned counsel opposite?

  • No. I disagree, because Mr Taylor too has a case to answer. I don't have anything to benefit from Mr Taylor. I'm not hoping for Mr Taylor to talk on my behalf. I am only depending on God, that if God could help me, the sentence that I am serving currently in Rwanda, the ECOWAS leaders and the UN authorities whom I worked with, they know that I accepted the peace of Sierra Leone willingly; so only them and God and the people of Sierra Leone, they are the ones I'm depending on. I'm hoping to. But not Mr Taylor.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, one final question. Your hope is with the people of Sierra Leone, apart from God. You've considered yourself that a number of atrocities were committed during the war for which you are also guilty, individual and collectively as a member of the RUF. What do you say to the people of Sierra Leone who are listening to your evidence right now, concerning all the atrocities that went on in Freetown and other parts of the country?

  • I say sorry to the people of Sierra Leone and I'm appealing to the people of Sierra Leone, especially the victims, who loved their loved ones, those whose arms were amputated, those whose properties were destroyed, I'm appealing to them that what happened during the war was not good for Sierra Leone, but it has happened. I'm just appealing to them. And even those who were bearing RUF lines, they know that most of these crimes, the commanders who were committing them, Issa had no control over them; but today I am bearing the responsibilities of the RUF, so I'm just pleading with the people of Sierra Leone, because they are seeing the perpetrators around, they are seeing them, those who were doing bad things to them, some of those who were protecting and speaking on behalf of the civilians today, I have found myself in the jail. I'm just pleading with them in the name of God for them to forgive me and forget. We are all Sierra Leoneans.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, just one final question: Are you here to set the record straight for Charles Taylor?

  • Well, I am here to give my own true side of the story of what I know. That's why I'm here.

  • That would be all, Madam President, your Honours, thank you. Thank you, Mr Sesay.

  • I think the judges have a few questions to ask of the witness.

  • Mr Sesay, yesterday you told us that you became aware of the Special Court around September 2001 when General Opande told you. Do you remember saying that yesterday?

  • I remember, my Lord.

  • Well, when you heard that, were you surprised to learn of the establishment of a Special Court?

  • Yes, my Lord. I asked General Opande that, General Opande, well, you have said that the government has called on the United Nations to create a court. That is the Special Court. I said so it is the ECOWAS that has appointed me for me to work with you to bring peace to Sierra Leone but now that they are bringing a court, what would be my fate? And he said, young man, you are working with us. Continue the work that you are doing with us for Sierra Leone to realise peace. If the Court arrests you tomorrow, wherever they take you, I am the first commander of UNAMSIL, I would go and explain the role you've played to bring peace to Sierra Leone. I said okay, sir. And indeed, he came during my Defence case, and he explained the role I played towards the peace of Sierra Leone, my Lord. But that did not discourage me to stop disarmament and other things. I furthered the disarmament until the end.

  • All right. Well, you've told us that you were surprised to hear of the establishment of a Special Court. Before you heard that, did you expect that the members of the RUF, who were responsible for atrocities, would not have to answer to anyone?

  • No, my Lord. I was not feeling that way. Given at the time that the RUF was fighting, I heard from Mr Sankoh that he was going to try Isaac Mongor to answer questions to the people of Sierra Leone for the atrocities he's committed, Gibril Massaquoi, and another commander that they called Long Bypass, so I had heard that from Mr Sankoh. So if the government called the United Nations to create a court for the war that the RUF waged in Sierra Leone, I wouldn't be surprised because Mr Sankoh too had planned to try certain commanders of the RUF for the atrocities they committed.

  • All right. Thank you, that's what I wanted to establish and it's then true, just to be quite certain, that even though you had not heard of the Special Court, you knew that the members of the RUF who had committed atrocities were going to have to account for them to somebody? That's correct, isn't it?

  • Yes, my Lord, sir.

  • Thank you, Mr Sesay. I have no further questions.

  • Thank you, my Lord, sir.

  • Mr Sesay, my question or questions arise from some evidence that you gave on 29 July this year for counsel. It arises at page 45002.

    You were giving evidence about the Magburaka shipment and the arms, et cetera, that arrived on that shipment. And you said, when asked - the question asked was: "What came in on that flight into Magburaka?" And you said: "The two BZT weapons and their rounds, the ammunition for them and some seven - about five of them with HMG rounds." You said: "There were no AK rounds, there were no G3 rounds, and you said there was not a single AK rifle."

    Are you saying to the Court that the entire shipment consisted of the two BZT weapons and the rounds, the ammunition and the HMG rounds, or what exactly do you say did come in on that shipment?

  • My Lord, I said the two BZT weapons and their rounds, the HMG rounds, I don't know if there were three or five SAM-7s that are in that flight but the BZT ammunition, there were plenty, and the GMG rounds they were the ones that came.

  • So how big was the aeroplane? Compare it to this room.

  • My Lord, this room is far bigger than it.

  • So compare it. Was it half the size, a quarter of the size, a third, or what?

  • The wideness - the width of the plane was like where the lawyers are sitting, but the length was like from that edge, where the camera is, to the edge of this table here. That is how the length was, and the width was like this.

  • Sorry, which camera are you referring to, the camera on the back wall?

  • Yes, my Lord, the one on the wall. It could start there, the length of the plane could start from the wall to the - this table here - and the width could be like this table where the lawyers are sitting here. That was how the flight was.

  • And was it full of the boxes?

  • No, my Lord. It was not full.

  • What is your estimate, then, of the actual quantity that you have described, the BZTs, the HMG rounds, compare that, for example, to the desk you're sitting at.

  • I don't understand the question, my Lord.

  • All right. A BZT, how big is a BZT?

  • The weapon, the BZT, is like this, and there is the barrel, that is a long barrel.

  • I calculate that the indication you've given with your hands would be approximately 40 centimetres, about two feet, maybe less. What - very well. There was two of those and - sorry, what was the size of the other things that came in?

  • Well, there were boxes of ammunition, the BZT rounds and the HMG rounds. Each box contains two sardine tins in it and, when we off-loaded the plane, they were loaded in two trucks and it was those trucks that were driven to Freetown and parked at Johnny Paul's house.

  • So, as you've already said, the plane was not full. You've indicated two quite small pieces of equipment and two or three small boxes. I've two questions arising from that. First, if it was not full, why did you need a second shipment?

  • Well, my Lord, I think a flight can take what it can carry. That's what I think. Because I did not load the plane, they just met us at the airport, at the airfield, and they told us they were going to come back. So --

  • And again, if it was that small quantity that you've described, why did you need the full of two trucks?

  • Well, my Lord, I said the flight was like from there to here. The ammunition that was in it, we put them in two trucks and we drove those trucks to Freetown with the twin barrel, the BZTs.

  • No, Mr Sesay, the question is if it was such a small quantity, as you've indicated to us with your hands, why did it need two trucks to carry it all?

  • My Lord, ammunition is something heavy. When it is - when one was loaded in one truck, then the chief of Defence, the chief of army Staff, that is SO Williams, said they should load the other one in the other truck and we loaded them and went to Freetown.

  • Those were my only questions.

  • I don't have any questions, apart from admitting some outstanding exhibits. Are there questions arising from the questions asked?

  • Maybe just to help me understand.

  • Just to help me understand, this BZT you said it's this and it's got something. Is it a gun that's carried by a person or it's mounted on something, or it's already on something?

  • No. When they brought it, it was dismantled, they had to assemble it but it cannot be carried by someone. It could be mounted on a vehicle, for it to be fired or they mount it on the ground, but if you want to move it around, you have to mount it on a vehicle; like the one Johnny Paul gave to Mike Lamin to take to Sam Bockarie, it was in a Land Cruiser van that it was mounted and Mike Lamin took it along to Sam Bockarie.

  • And the round, what sort of rounds are they?

  • Well, the rounds are as big as my - this, my fingernail.

  • And the two trucks, were they - what sort of trucks were they?

  • Four-tyred trucks, Bedford trucks, military trucks.

  • And were both trucks filled to the brim, as it were?

  • No, they were not filled to the edge, because they were four-tyred trucks, they carried the ones they could carry and the others were loaded in the other truck.

  • Thank you, Madam President, that would be all.

  • Right. What I'd like to know firstly from the Defence, do you intend to exhibit all the items marked for identification?

  • Yes, Madam President, if I may. While I'm on my feet, I would just indicate that we are not opposed to the Prosecution exhibiting all their marked documents, with only one caveat that only those aspects, only the excerpts of the documents that were exhibited - that were put into evidence should be exhibited.

  • I understand. Mr Koumjian? What is the Prosecution view?

  • Your Honour, we would seek to admit all of the exhibits that we asked to be marked for identification, all the documents. We would not oppose the admission of the MFIs that the Defence exhibited.

    I would like - yesterday afternoon, Justice Lussick asked a question when counsel was reading some testimony from 371 and this was at page 47272 of yesterday. He said, the question was, "But did 371 ever say that they, the diamonds that were taken from Johnny Paul Koroma were the diamonds that were lost by Issa Sesay?" And I just would point out that the testimony in question was read on 19 August during my cross-examination at page 46675 where 371 in the RUF trial said, "Those diamonds Sam Bockarie took to Monrovia."

    And I would not oppose, again, the admission of the Defence exhibits.

  • Thank you. Then I'm going to start with the list of the Defence documents and I'm going to do down serially down the list of MFIs.

    Now, MFI-1 was a piece of paper upon which the witness wrote a name of a protected witness. That is now marked exhibit - it's admitted as Defence exhibit D-434 and it will be marked confidential.

    MFI-2 was basically a replica - it's a replica of photo exhibit P-68B, as now marked by the witness. That is now admitted as exhibit D-435.

    MFI-3 was the name of a protected witness written down by the witness, that's now exhibit D-436 and will be marked confidential.

  • [Exhibits D-434 to D-436 admitted]

    MFI-4 had five components to it, there were five photographs, that was MFI-4A to E. They are now admitted as exhibits D-437A to E respectively.

  • [Exhibits D-437A to E admitted]

    MFI-5 was a piece of paper on which the witness wrote a name, that is now exhibit D-438 and will be marked confidential.

  • [Exhibit D-438 admitted]

    MFI-6 had three components to it, they were various articles. The first article, MFI-6A out of the Standard Times is now exhibit D-439A. MFI-6B was an article out of the Concord Times, it's now exhibit D-439B. MFI-6C was out of a paper called For di People, it's now marked exhibit D-439C.

  • [Exhibits D-439A to C admitted]

    MFI-7 was again the name of a protected witness written down by Sesay and that is now exhibit D-440 and will be marked confidential.

  • [Exhibit D-440 admitted]

    MFI-8 had five components to it and these were various statements from various persons. MFI-8A was the statement of Alpha Konare and it is composed of a French and English translation, that is now exhibit D-441A. MFI-8B, statement of Oluyemi Adeniji, that is now exhibit D-441B. Statement of Daniel Opande, that was MFI-8C, is now D-441C. Statement of Ali Hassan, formerly MFI-8D, is now exhibit D-441D. And MFI-8E, statement of Alhaji Tejan Kabbah, is now exhibit D-441E.

  • [Exhibits D-441A to E admitted]

    MFI-9 was a photograph of Issa Sesay and others. It is now exhibit D-442.

    MFI-10, just check this one - yes. MFI-10, this is a report to the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, and it's from the interim leader, General Issa Hassan Sesay, or allegedly from, and that is now admitted as exhibit D-443.

    MFI-11 is the name of a protected witness. That is now admitted as exhibit D-444 and will be marked confidential.

  • [Exhibits D-443 and D-444 admitted]

    Now that brings me to a group of Prosecution exhibits starting with MFI-12 which has two components. 12A is the name written confidentially by the witness. That is now admitted as exhibit P-561A and will be marked confidential. MFI-12B is a transcript pertaining to that person, a transcript of closed session testimony out of the RUF case, and the transcript is dated 6 November 2007. Let me just get the pages right. This consists of pages 60, 71, 72, and the back page, that is now exhibit P-561B and will be marked confidential.

  • [Exhibits P-561A and B admitted]

    MFI-13 is a transcript, an open session transcript out of the RUF case, transcript of 29 March 2006, and this consists of pages 12, 13, 15, 16 - sorry. Let me check that. I don't seem to have page 16. Sorry, let me do that again. MFI-13 consisted of only three pages, 12, 13 and 15. That is now admitted as exhibit P-562.

  • I believe we also included the last page for the identification of the witness.

  • I'm afraid I don't think so. The pages that I certainly have don't include the back page. But I don't think that there is an issue as to who the witness was because this is open session testimony anyway. This can always be ascertained later.

    MFI-14 is again a transcript out of the RUF case of 16 May 2008, and this consists of page 101, and the back page. Yes, the back page. That is admitted as exhibit P-563.

    MFI-15 is the transcript out of the RUF case. It's an open session transcript of 11 March 2008, and that consists of pages 94 to 98 - yes, those pages. It's now collectively admitted as exhibit P-564.

    MFI-16 is a transcript out of the RUF case. Again it's open session testimony from 11 April 2008, consisting of pages 50 to 53. And that is now admitted as exhibit P-565.

    MFI-17 is a document entitled, "Cote d'Ivoire departments and cities, statistics and maps on city population" and consists of three pages, that's pages 1 to 3, and that is now admitted as exhibit P-566.

    MFI-18 is a web page out of the Sierra Leone News, and the article relates to the date - or the date is March 1996, and consists of pages 1 - one page actually. I've got one page. Yes, one page, and that is now admitted as exhibit P-567.

    MFI-19 is a document entitled, "African elections database", consisting of two pages, that's page 1 and page 3, and this is now admitted as exhibit P-568.

  • [Exhibits P-562 to P-568 admitted]

    MFI-20 has two components, 20A and B. Now MFI-20 is a video clip of the western peninsula, that's in Sierra Leone, which the Prosecution dubbed or entitled, "The intervention". That is now admitted as exhibit P-569A. This is accompanied by a Google map of the Freetown and the western peninsula of Sierra Leone and that is now admitted as exhibit P-569B.

  • [Exhibits P-569A and B admitted]

    MFI-21 is an article out of the UNOCHA humanitarian situation report of 13 July 1998, and it's entitled, "Sierra Leone, UNOCHA humanitarian situation report," consisting of two pages only, that's pages 1 and 2, and this is now admitted as exhibit P-570.

    MFI-22 is an article out of a book, a book called, "The reversed victory, a story of Nigerian military intervention in Sierra Leone", by Brigadier RA Adeshina. The pages that we were asked to consider, or we marked, were the cover page, the tribute page, the author's page and page 89 only. So those four pages are admitted as exhibit P-571.

    MFI-23 is a photograph of one Sam Bockarie, a two-star general, wearing fatigue uniform. That is now admitted as exhibit P-572.

    MFI-24 is an article, a web page article from bloomberg.com, entitled "OPEC failure foretells decline ten years after the $10 oil (updated)". This consists of two pages, pages 1 and 2. These are now admitted as exhibit P-573.

    MFI-25 is a map of Sierra Leone as marked by the witness Sesay, showing the military positions of various groups as at 15 December 1998. This map is now admitted as exhibit P-574.

    MFI-26 is a Google map of Jui Bridge area, again as marked variously by the witness Sesay. That is now admitted as exhibit P-575.

    MFI-27 is a photograph of one Rambo Red Goat and that is now admitted as exhibit P-576.

    MFI-28 is a map of Sierra Leone and the Western Area as marked by the witness, showing military positions of the various groups as at 5 January 1999. That's on the eve of the Freetown invasion. That's now admitted as exhibit P-577.

    MFI-29 is closed session testimony out of the RUF case of 12 November 2007, consisting of pages 118, 119 and the back page. That is now admitted as exhibit P-578 and will be marked confidential.

    MFI-30 is a document entitled "Revolutionary United Front Party, INT report", dated 2 April 2001. It consists of one page actually and that is now admitted as exhibit P-579.

    MFI-31 is an article entitled "The other war", and it consists of pages ending 661, 668, 669, that's three pages, and that is now admitted as exhibit P-580.

    MFI-32 is a closed session transcript out of the RUF case of 28 July 2005, consisting of pages 80 to 82 and the back page. That is now admitted as exhibit P-581 and will be marked confidential.

    MFI-33 doesn't belong here. It belongs with another witness.

    So MFI-34 is a single sheet of paper upon which the witness wrote or, rather, upon which appear 15 various signatures that were referred to the witness. That piece of paper is admitted as exhibit P-582.

    MFI-35 is a closed session testimony out of the RUF case of 28 July 2005, consisting of pages 47 to 49 and the back page. That is now admitted as exhibit P-583 and will be marked confidential.

    MFI-36 consists of two pages of a document that was formerly exhibit 210 in the RUF case. This document is entitled "RUFP/SL", it's addressed to Daniel I Opande and it's headed "Response" and signed by Issa Sesay, dated 7 December 2000, together with a cover page, with the various ERN numbers. That is now admitted as exhibit P-584.

    MFI-37 is a BBC News web page dated 7 December 2000, and the article is entitled "Hundreds killed in Guinea attack." And this consists of two pages also, and this is now admitted as exhibit P-585.

    MFI-38 is a closed session testimony out of the RUF trial of 6 November 2007, consisting of pages 62 to 64 and the back page. That is now admitted as exhibit P-586 and will be marked confidential.

    MFI-39 is the agreement on - a document entitled "The agreement on ceasefire and cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, also known as Abuja I", and the date on this agreement is 10 November 2000. The document consists of four pages and that is now admitted as exhibit P-587.

    MFI-40 is a very short video clip showing Foday Sankoh and it's taken out of the documentary, "Blood diamonds". That is now admitted as exhibit P-588.

    MFI-41 is a web page out of the address, britains-smallwars.com, and the article is entitled "Gun fight at Rokel Creek, Operation Barras". This article consists of two pages, and that is now admitted as exhibit P-589.

    MFI-42 is a Security Council document, S/2001/857, dated 7 September 2001, and it is the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. It consists of pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and the annex to the report. That is now admitted as exhibit P-590.

  • [Exhibits P-570 to P-590 admitted]

    MFI-43 is a document - we are now back to the Defence exhibits. It's a document entitled "Conditions of detention of Mr Taylor while in prison", it's dated 23 August 2010 and it's a letter addressed to Courtenay Griffiths QC, signed by the Registrar of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, consisting of one page. That is now admitted as D-445.

    MFI-44 was a piece of paper on which the witness Sesay drew various sizes of diamonds and small diamonds and depicting one 14 carat diamond size, of the sizes of diamonds that the RUF confiscated from Johnny Paul Koroma in the witness's opinion. That is now admitted as exhibit D-446.

    And lastly was the map of Sierra Leone upon which the witness marked showing the route that the Guinean ECOMOG at Port Loko would have taken in providing reinforcement in Freetown in January 1999 and the positions that the RUF would have taken at Gberi Bridge to block them. And this is now admitted as exhibit D-447.

  • [Exhibits D-445 to D-447 admitted]

    Now, Mr Sesay, we have come to the end of your testimony and I want to thank you for your patience and your testimony, and we just wish you a safe journey back to Rwanda.

    I think we will take an early break - sorry, it's five minutes to the break now.

  • Sorry, Madam President, I might - I have a small issue to raise concerning the detention conditions of Mr Sesay and Mr Taylor. Just to put the Court into the picture, Mr Taylor and Mr Sesay have been living in the same detention unit but under completely isolated circumstances. I understand that over the weekend, there is a joint sports activity that is going to happen at the detention centre which will involve detainees in the ICTY detention centre where Mr Sesay is, and the ICC detention centre where Mr Taylor is will be meeting together. With that in mind, we were asking for your permission for the restrictive measures isolating Mr Taylor from Mr Sesay to be lifted so that they can interact with other detainees.

  • Mr Koumjian or Ms Hollis, I'm really blind as to whatever is going on. I don't know. Can you shed some light, please?

  • Well, I'm as blind as you are. This is the first I've heard of it. We would object to any contact between the two of them that was not in the presence of someone from the Registry.

  • Ms Hollis, yes, please.

  • I was just waiting in case you had an additional question for me.

  • The judges have noted the contents of the document that we just admitted as exhibit D-445, and this was a letter from the Registrar addressed to Mr Griffiths QC in which the - in paragraph 2, the Registrar points out that certain conditions of segregation were imposed on Mr Taylor. Now, to us, this is really a matter that's out of the hands of the Trial Chamber. This is a matter for the Registrar and the detention authorities to determine. We didn't - it's not the chamber that set up the segregation order, and therefore, at best, I would refer or advise you to refer this issue to the Registry.

  • Thank you for the indication.

  • As far as the Chamber is concerned, Mr Sesay has given his testimony and finished his testimony, but we cannot make any orders beyond that.

  • Yes. So the witness may be escorted out, and we will resume after the break at 11.30, and continue with the testimony of 008; isn't that so?

  • Yes, Madam President.

  • Then we will take a break now and reconvene at 11.30.

  • [Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 11.32 a.m.]

  • Yes, Ms Hollis?

  • I rise simply to note a change of appearance. Mr Koumjian is no longer at the Prosecution table.

  • Good morning, Madam President. Good morning, your Honours. Good morning, counsel opposite. Likewise, there is a change of appearance for the Defence. Silas Chekera and Logan Hambrick are no longer with us.

  • Thank you. That is noted, too.

  • Thank you, Madam President. May I proceed?

  • Let me just remind the witness. Good morning, Mr Witness.

  • Good morning, your Honour.

  • I just wish to remind you of two things. Firstly, the oath that you took at the beginning - the declaration that you made at the beginning to tell the truth, that is still binding on you today as you are continuing with your evidence.

    Secondly, you are testifying with a pseudonym, with a request that you do not wish your identity to be revealed publicly. And so I remind you again in your testimony to avoid any information that is likely to reveal your identity.

    So those are the two things I would like to remind you of. Do you understand?

  • Yes, sir, thank you.

  • Okay. Mr Anyah, please continue,

  • Thank you, Madam President.