The transcripts of the trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia. More…

  • Good morning, Mr Sesay.

  • Yes, good morning, sir.

  • Yesterday when you were testifying you gave this answer at page 46589. Perhaps I could just read it. The question was, from me:

    "Q. And let me make it clear to you I say you're lying

    about that because more than 1,000 diamonds were taken from

    Johnny Paul Koroma. What do you say about that?

    A. God forbid. It was never up to that because even 371,

    when he was testifying against me, he spoke about that

    diamond and he confirmed that the only valuable diamond

    among the diamonds was the 14 carat and the other ones were

    smaller pieces."

    And, Mr Sesay, you had told us yesterday that all that was taken from Johnny Paul Koroma was one plastic, you drew the size of it, the kind of plastic that's flat when empty that you put medicine in and seal at the top, and denied, when I read you a document that said nine plastics with 1,832 I believe diamonds were taken from Johnny Paul.

    Now you cited the testimony of 371 in your trial, so I want to read to you - this is closed session so it should not be put on the screen, but I will read to you from testimony of 371 in your trial. And this is the transcript of 20 July 2006, page 74.

    You said - for the benefit of counsel I am going to start reading from the end of line 7. The witness said, the witness that you cited said in your trial:

    "And Sam Bockarie's security disarmed Johnny Paul Koroma's

    security and Johnny Paul Koroma was asked to deliver the

    diamonds, which he did. And those diamonds, as I mentioned

    earlier, were in small plastics. Nine plastics were handed

    over to Sam Bockarie.

    Q. What happened next?

    A. Sam Bockarie took possession of those diamonds and he

    intimated also that he was going to Monrovia to ensure that

    those products were handed over to Mr Taylor in order to

    enable the RUF to make payment for more arms and

    ammunition, and he did carry out that journey."

    So, Mr Sesay, you misled this Court yesterday, didn't you, when you said that 371 supported your story that only a few diamonds were taken from Johnny Paul Koroma and those were the diamonds you took to Monrovia?

  • Well, that is what I recalled, because the diamonds that we took from Johnny Paul Koroma, it was when I was going to Monrovia with the diamonds, that was when Sam Bockarie put them into the plastic, and the diamonds were not many. And I do recall that 371 said that the only valuable diamond among them was a 14 carat. That was the only valuable one. So there were not nine plastics, not at all.

  • Mr Sesay, 371 never said that the only valuable diamond among the diamonds taken from Johnny Paul Koroma was one 14 carat. He never said that, did he?

  • Well, I said that is what I could recall. But the diamonds that we took from Johnny Paul, there were not nine plastics. The diamonds were in a Ludo cup. And Bockarie did not go to Monrovia. Bockarie sent me.

  • So today, Mr Sesay, you are back to a Ludo cap. Yesterday it was a flat plastic that's flat when empty. You want to switch back today to a Ludo cup?

  • Well, I said it yesterday that that was a slip of tongue. I said the time that I was going to Monrovia was when Bockarie gave me the diamonds in a plastic, but the diamonds that we took from Johnny Paul were in a Ludo cup.

  • Mr Sesay, let's move on and talk about testimony about why Sam Bockarie sent Superman to SAJ Musa.

    Do you recall that yesterday I read your testimony in the RUF, where you said Bockarie had instructed Superman to go to Koinadugu? Do you recall that?

  • Yes, I do recall.

  • And that's the truth, isn't it? Bockarie, Sam Bockarie, sent Superman to Koinadugu?

  • Well, what I recall is that after Superman had carried out the attack, Sam Bockarie called him to report to Buedu and Superman refused to go, and Superman went to Koinadugu.

  • Well, you have changed your testimony from the RUF. We will come back to that in a moment. Let's read what another witness said in this trial, TF1-275, on 22 February 2008, page 4525.

  • Mr Koumjian, we have that page.

  • Thank you.

  • Beginning at line 2, the witness said:

    "A. Yes. After our arrival in Koinadugu, a meeting was

    convened and was headed by Superman and SAJ Musa, and

    during that meeting, Superman complained that Sam Bockarie

    had accused him of not carrying out his duties in

    Koinadugu, and in this particular meeting, we came to

    understand that Superman was on a special mission in

    Koinadugu, in order to kill SAJ Musa. Whilst in this

    meeting, SAJ Musa got annoyed and he moved with his troops

    out of the meeting, and immediately Superman decided to

    move with his own troops, and Koinadugu was completely

    upside down, based on the information that was revealed in

    the meeting."

    And then the witness was asked a few lines down:

    "Q. Mr Witness, from your position at the signal unit in

    Koinadugu, can you describe generally what you heard in

    terms of the flow of communications that was occurring

    between commanders in Sierra Leone, if any?

    A. Yes. While I was in Koinadugu, Sam Bockarie used to

    communicate with Superman, and Superman, in return, with

    Sam Bockarie, and onward to Gullit at Rosos. Brigadier

    Mani also had access to communication from Kurubonla.

    General Bropleh was also in Koinadugu, and these were the

    three main sources of communication in Koinadugu at that

    particular time."

    Mr Sesay, Sam Bockarie sent Superman to the north and he told him to try to kill SAJ Musa; isn't that true?

  • I said I don't recall that. What I do recall is that after the attack on Kono, Sam Bockarie said Superman should report in Buedu, and he refused and he went to Koinadugu.

  • Well, Mr Sesay, once again let me give you an opportunity to explain the contradiction between your testimony here and in the RUF trial. If we could have the transcript in the RUF trial, 16 May 2007, page 17.

  • Your Honour, this is a closed session transcript.

  • Thank you. I will read it aloud. I am reading from lines 10 and 11, I believe. Yes. Excuse me, 10 through 13. You were asked:

    "Q. Did Sam Bockarie tell you what he had instructed

    Superman to go to Koinadugu for?

    A. He said he told Superman to go and open his own base,

    his own jungle, in Koinadugu."

    So, Mr Sesay, in your own trial you testified, and you testified more than once, that Superman went to Koinadugu on the orders of Sam Bockarie. Why have you changed your testimony in the trial of Charles Taylor?

  • But, my Lord, I cannot recall everything that I said in my own trial. What I can recall is what I will say. And what I do recall is that after the failed Fitti-Fatta mission, Sam Bockarie sent a message for Superman to report, and Superman refused to go to Buedu. He said he would not go to Buedu, and so he went to Koinadugu, and from then he did not take instructions from Bockarie.

  • Mr Witness, you see your answer is interesting because honest witnesses don't worry about trying to recall what they said before. They recall the events. You can't testify consistently because you're not telling the truth, either in your trial or here; isn't that true?

  • No. These are events that happened, and that is what I'm saying. And what I am saying I believe it's the truth, because from August of '98, Superman did not take orders from Bockarie up to December.

  • Mr Sesay, it was in the interests of the RUF for SAJ Musa to die in 1998; isn't that true?

  • Well, it was not in the interests of the RUF because, as far as I know, from February of '98, SAJ Musa operated separately, on his own.

  • And that, you're saying, hurt the RUF; isn't it true? You were unable - you had a large group of SLAs, many of them trained soldiers, that were not coordinating well with the RUF; isn't that correct?

  • Yes. SAJ Musa's group did not coordinate with the RUF from February up to his death, from February '98 to December. There was no cooperation from them.

  • And the problem with SAJ Musa, because he refused to take instructions from Sam Bockarie, he refused to take instructions from a rebel; isn't that true?

  • Well, yes. He did not take instructions from Bockarie, nor from Johnny Paul, because from February he did not take instructions from Johnny Paul, nor from Bockarie.

  • Because all of the SLAs that you had in Kailahun District, in Kono District, they were taking instructions from Sam Bockarie; isn't that correct?

  • Yes. The SLAs who were in Kono from May '98, they took instructions from Bockarie.

  • The problem with SAJ Musa, the man that tried to arrest you, who was only stopped by Johnny Paul Koroma, he was the problem with causing the lack of coordination between the RUF and the SLAs; isn't that right?

  • Please repeat the question, sir.

  • The one person who was causing the problem between the coordination between the RUF and the SLAs was SAJ Musa; isn't that right?

  • Well, SAJ Musa and Brigadier Mani did not operate with the RUF from February to December of '98, together with their followers.

  • You worked together with Mani in Makeni for many months, correct, later?

  • That's why I said from February to December, I did not operate with Mani. We met in Makeni and we worked in late December, January, February to March, and the infight happened, and I left him at Makeni, and from there I did not work with him up to the end of the war.

  • The only person who refused to cooperate at all with Sam Bockarie and the RUF was SAJ Musa; isn't that true?

  • Yes. It was SAJ Musa and his officers, including Brigadier Mani himself, because when he came to Makeni, I never saw him send a message to Bockarie. Only the two of us used to speak to each other. I used to go to him at his house, but he never reported to Bockarie, but he was not under my command.

  • And he used to report to Foday Sankoh, we saw that in some radio messages; isn't that true?

  • Well, when Foday Sankoh went to Lome, he used to send messages to him, and he too responded, but when Foday Sankoh told him to go to Kailahun and to Lome, he refused.

  • The SLAs needed the RUF because, in reality, they had nowhere else to turn; isn't that true?

  • Well, they had nowhere to turn, but they fought from Koinadugu right up to Freetown on their own.

  • They had no outside support, correct?

  • But SAJ Musa's wife, who was in Koinadugu, she used to - he used to send his wife to Guinea and they transacted business and they got the ammunition. That's what I heard.

  • The Guineans were one of the biggest opponents of the RUF and the AFRC in Sierra Leone. They are the ones you fought against at Port Loko in the north, in Koinadugu, in fact; isn't that true?

  • Well, from 1991 to 1998, RUF and the Guineans, we did not have problems at the borders, but the Guineans fought along the Sierra Leone soldiers from the very start of the war.

  • And what the SLA soldiers knew is that it wasn't, at that time anyway, an option to go back to the government. They had seen - or to try to run away, because they had seen what had happened to Victor King and his group; isn't that true? Do you know who I mean by Victor King?

  • Yes, I know Victor King, who escaped in a helicopter to Monrovia, and when he was sent back from Monrovia to Freetown.

  • And when he was sent back he was tried and executed by the government, correct?

  • Yes. The government tried them, 24 of them. They were tried but they were not allowed to appeal and they were executed.

  • So these SLA officers were in rather a desperate situation and the only real ally that they could turn to was the RUF; isn't that true?

  • Well, what I understood, it was because of those killings that the SLA planned with SAJ Musa to move from Koinadugu to come down to around Port Loko District to attack Freetown and that's why they attacked Freetown, because they said their colleagues had been killed. That is why they caused those destructions in his Freetown, because when they came to Freetown, they were targeting the police because they say it was the police who arrested them, their colleagues. That is what I understood.

  • SAJ Musa was a proud and stubborn man, don't you agree?

  • Yes. SAJ Musa was a man who believed in himself. He was proud and stubborn.

  • Let's go back to a subject we started yesterday but I did not get a chance to finish it before the time ran out. We had talked about Foday Kallon, uncle of your wife, Elsie, correct?

  • Yes. He was Elsie's uncle.

  • And you said he was sometimes referred to as Pa Foday or Ndevuyama; correct?

  • Yes. He was called Ndevuyama.

  • Now, we had talked about Daru being attacked, you talked about Sam Bockarie having visited there to speak to the soldiers before the attack, and that ECOMOG, in 1998, in about March, took Daru Barracks. At that time many of the SLAs ran away to Liberia from Daru; isn't that correct?

  • Yes.

  • The RUF wanted those soldiers back to increase the strength of your forces; correct?

  • Well, we had strength on our own before we joined the AFRC, because before ECOMOG and Kamajors took the Daru, Sam Bockarie went there and addressed them and said "many of you" - "any one of you who don't want to fight, go to Liberia" and he gave them 72 hours notice --

  • Your Honours, can the witness kindly repeat this part of his answer.

  • Mr Sesay, it is too early in the morning to start running with your testimony. Slow down and repeat your answer for the interpreter, please.

  • Mr Sesay, perhaps I will repeat the question because you are not answering it. The question wasn't about the strength of the RUF before you joined the AFRC. The question was simply this: The RUF wanted those soldiers back who had run away from Daru to Liberia, in order to increase the strength of your informers; correct?

  • Well, yes, in late '98, Sam Bockarie did that.

  • He sent someone to Liberia in an attempt to get these SLAs back to Sierra Leone; correct?

  • Yes. He sent Foday Kallon, because according to my understanding, he said Sam Bockarie knew that the SLA were in Kolahun, Foya and Vahun, so he sent for them to come, that whoever wanted to come, they would come. They had said they wanted to return, so Sam Bockarie sent Foday Kallon for them to return if they wanted to.

  • And you, Mr Interpreter, you need to speak clearly these locations, sometimes we don't hear what you're saying. The witness said Sam Bockarie knew that the SLA were in where?

  • Your Honour, he called Vahun, Kolahun and Foya. Just some of them - he said he heard that some of them wanted to return and he sent Foday Kallon to go and talk to the ones who wanted to return so that they could return.

  • Look, the important thing is to get the locations because we have different locations on the transcript. It's Golahun?

  • Kolahun, Vahun and Foya, my Lord.

  • So, Mr Sesay, these SLAs were in a foreign country, actually in a member state of ECOWAS, and Sam Bockarie received information that these SLAs wanted to return or would be willing to return to Sierra Leone; is that right?

  • Yes.

  • Who in Liberia sent him that information?

  • This was late in '98 and there was business transaction between civilians at the borders and it was through that that Sam Bockarie got the information. I don't know who particularly sent the message to Bockarie but that is what I heard, and he sent Foday Kallon.

  • Now, Foday Kallon was a Sierra Leonean, correct?

  • Yes. Foday Kallon was a Sierra Leonean, yes.

  • How was it - and was he successful in recruiting SLAs, soldiers in Liberia to return to Sierra Leone?

  • Yes. Those who were in Vahun and the few who were in Foya, he brought about 20 to 25 of them - no, around 15 to 20 of them. They came through Vahun and they came to Pendembu where they met me and then I informed Sam Bockarie.

  • Actually, he did that two times, isn't that correct, Foday Kallon went to Liberia and came back with SLA soldiers two times?

  • Well, the first time he went he brought some with him but the second time he did not bring anybody. But the second time - because the second time he came alone to Buedu and before he came, Sam Bockarie sent a message to me through radio, he said if Foday Kallon comes to Buedu I should arrest him and put him into the guard room until his return.

  • And the second time did he bring back any soldiers with him?

  • I don't recall that he brought soldiers, because he met me in Buedu.

  • Now, how was it that Sam - that Foday Kallon was able to get soldiers from Vahun and convince them to come back to Sierra Leone, those who had already ran away from Sierra Leone?

  • Well, he went and pursued them and brought them. I did not go.

  • Did he give them the choice of being arrested by the Liberian securities or coming with him?

  • No. I did not hear about Liberian securities arresting them or arresting him.

  • Did he go to Monrovia in order to find some of these SLAs?

  • Well, he was not sent to Monrovia, but I later heard from Sam Bockarie, on his return, that Foday Kallon had gone to Monrovia and that someone saw him at the Sierra Leone embassy.

  • So soldiers that came back - the soldiers that Foday Kallon brought back, what units did they join when they returned?

  • Well, on their - when they came back they met me in Pendembu and then I sent a message to Bockarie and Bockarie responded to me saying that the MP should escort them to the training base for one or two weeks before they are being deployed at the front lines.

  • So they joined after the training, the front lines of the offensive in 1998, late 1998; is that right?

  • Well, Kailahun was not on offensive at this time so after the training they were in Baiima and Mobai. That is where they were. And two of them came and stayed with me in Pendembu because they were my personal friends.

  • Who were those two?

  • Well, one was called Kantus, but I do not recall the name of the other one, but that was Kantus's friend.

  • How do you spell Kantus, is that one name or two?

  • Kantus is a single name.

  • Is that a family name?

  • Well, that was the name that I knew for him, even before the war in the 80s, he used to be my friend in Makeni.

  • And do you want to try to spell the name?

  • I think it is K-A-N-T-U-S, Kantus.

  • Now, you said you received a message from Sam Bockarie to arrest Foday Kallon; is that right?

  • The uncle of your wife, correct?

  • Yes, that is him.

  • Did you place him under arrest?

  • Well, when Sam Bockarie sent the message saying that I should arrest and put him in a guard room, I also invited him and told him, I said, "Sam Bockarie said I should arrest you and put you in the guard room." I said, "What happened?" He said he didn't know, so I told him that Sam Bockarie said --

  • Mr Sesay, did I not ask you to speak normally and slowly so that the interpreter can interpret what you are saying and the transcriber can write what you're saying. Please slow down. Now, start again.

  • I had asked you if you put Foday Kallon under arrest.

  • Yes, sir. I said when Sam Bockarie sent the message to me, I also invited Foday Kallon and I asked him, I told him, I said, "Sam Bockarie said I should arrest you and put you in the guard room." I said, "What have you done?" And Foday Kallon said he did not know. And then I said, "I can cannot put you in the guard room because I have respect for you" I said, "but the only thing that I would want you to do for me, you have to stay in Buedu until Sam Bockarie's return." And then Foday Kallon stayed in Buedu and was not under arrest until Sam Bockarie's return.

  • I want to ask you a couple of questions about what you said. First you said that when you got the message from Bockarie you invited Foday Kallon. Was Foday Kallon in Buedu when you invited him?

  • Foday Kallon came. When he came, he was in Buedu, when I received the message.

  • Did he come right from Liberia to Buedu?

  • Yes. He came from Foya, he came to Dawa and then he came to Buedu.

  • Now, you had received the message before Foday Kallon arrived in Buedu? You had received the message from Sam Bockarie to arrest him?

  • I received the message before he arrived in Buedu. I received a message before he came to Buedu.

  • When was it that you received a message from Sam Bockarie to arrest Foday Kallon?

  • That was in - I think it was in early December.

  • So it was during Sam Bockarie's trip to Burkina Faso that you received a message from Sam Bockarie to arrest Foday Kallon?

  • Yes. That was when Sam Bockarie sent the message from Monrovia to me in Buedu.

  • And what you learned is that Sam Bockarie had found out - or had received information that Foday Kallon was seen at Sierra Leone - well, what was the information about Foday Kallon?

  • Well, when Sam Bockarie returned he was very angry and he said the securities whom he went with, like Junior Vandi and one of Bockarie 's bodyguards, they said they saw Foday Kallon at the Sierra Leone embassy. So that was the reason why he sent the message that I should arrest Foday Kallon.

  • Sam Bockarie would have been in Burkina Faso when Foday Kallon allegedly was at the Sierra Leone embassy. Is that correct?

  • Well, the message that I received from Sam Bockarie showed that he was in Monrovia. That was before he travelled.

  • Now, Peter Vandi and the other bodyguards of Sam Bockarie, had no reason to go to the Sierra Leone embassy, did they?

  • You said that Sam Bockarie's securities - excuse me, Junior Vandi and one other saw Foday Kallon at the Sierra Leone embassy. That's what you said, correct?

  • Yes, that was what I said.

  • Junior Vandi and Sam Bockarie's securities had no reason to be at the Sierra Leone embassy, they had every reason to try to hide and not be seen near the Sierra Leone embassy; correct?

  • Well, they used to go there because if they did not know them as RUF members and if they only knew him to be Sierra Leoneans, then - and it was a Sierra Leone embassy.

  • Why were they going to the embassy?

  • Well, I did not know. I did not ask. At the time Sam Bockarie came and said those words I did not ask him, because I wouldn't have asked him questions for the reason - asking for reasons for which Junior Vandi and others went to the embassy. I was not in position to ask him.

  • Do you know of any reason why Junior Vandi or Sam Bockarie's securities would go to the Sierra Leone embassy? Can you think of any?

  • Well, what I would think of is that there were people who were working at the embassy who were Sierra Leoneans and some were Mendes, they were their tribesmen, so I did not actually know the reasons why they went there.

  • So what you're saying is that Sam Bockarie had information that Foday Kallon had gone to the Sierra Leone embassy, just like Junior Vandi and his other bodyguard had gone to the Sierra Leone embassy. Is that right?

  • Well, that was what Sam Bockarie said. He said those were the people who saw him at the embassy.

  • Mr Sesay, Sam Bockarie got that information from Liberian intelligence, isn't that true, about Foday Kallon being seen at the Sierra Leone embassy?

  • No, my Lord, I did not hear that.

  • What was Sam Bockarie's reaction to learning that Junior Vandi, another one of his bodyguards and Foday Kallon were at the Sierra Leone embassy? How did he react to that information?

  • Well, according to Sam Bockarie, when he returned to Buedu, what I understood from him was that when his bodyguards told him about this, he then sent a message that when Foday Kallon arrives in Buedu I should arrest and detain him.

  • And you did that, or you detained him, correct?

  • No. I did not detain him in a cell. I only told him to stay in Buedu until Sam Bockarie's return, because I said I would not want to lock him up. Although Sam Bockarie said I should detain him, but I did not want to lock him up. But the only thing I told him was that he should remain in Buedu until Bockarie's return.

  • What happened when Bockarie returned?

  • Well, when Bockarie returned, we were standing under the mango tree discussing when Foday Kallon came to say hello to Bockarie. And as soon as he came, when he said, "How are you, sir", that was when Bockarie turned to me and said: Didn't I send a message to you that you should detain this man? And this man is now here. I now see him. And they said they saw him at the Sierra Leone embassy. It was Junior Vandi and others who saw they saw him at the embassy, so he is a traitor. Sam Bockarie then brought out his pistol and shot the man.

  • Where did he shoot him?

  • Well, he shot him in his chest; two shots in his chest.

  • And what did he do to Junior Vandi, who was also at the Sierra Leone embassy?

  • Well, he did not do anything to Junior Vandi. Junior Vandi was Mr Sankoh's bodyguard who was with Sam Bockarie. And it was together with one of Sam Bockarie's bodyguards, two of them saw this man. He did not do anything to them because he said they were the ones who gave him the information.

  • He didn't do anything to them because the information came from Liberian intelligence. Isn't that true?

  • No, he did not tell me that. What he told me was that it was Junior and the other guy who went and saw the guy at the embassy.

  • Could we have the transcript briefly for, on the RUF trial, 16 May 2007, page 36. I am going to read from the bottom four lines.

  • You said, just to read the full paragraph:

    "Well, it was a radio message. I was unable to ask questions. So, upon the arrival of Foday Kallon at Buedu he met I and Mike Lamin sitting at the veranda. He came with about seven soldiers."

    Mr Sesay, today you told us he didn't bring anybody back with him the second time, but when you testified in the RUF trial you said Foday Kallon came back on the second occasion with seven soldiers. Why the difference?

  • Well, I cannot recall everything that I have said before verbatim. I have testified for over a month now, so all that I have said you think I will be able to repeat all of those. I am a human being you know.

  • Mr Sesay, isn't the recollection of seeing your wife's uncle executed - isn't that something pretty vivid in your memory, the events of that day?

  • Yes. That should be - I should be able to think about that, but the man who did it, I never had any control over him.

  • Then going to the next page, you say down at - just before where it says "audio file resumes", the last sentence before that it:

    "Then Foday Kallon came. He stood and saluted Bockarie. Bockarie said, 'You are a betrayer.' He said, 'What did you - why did you go to the Sierra Leone embassy in Monrovia?' Today you are going to die.' The Sierra Leone embassy in Monrovia. Bockarie took his pistol from his side. He shot at Fonti Kanu. He gave him two shots in our presence."

    Judge Itoe asked, "He shot at who?" You corrected yourself and you said:

    "He shot at, sorry, Foday Kallon. Sorry, my Lord. He fired at Foday Kallon with two rounds with his pistol and then Foday Kallon fell. This was how it happened."

    Mr Sesay, it's easy to confuse Fonti Kanu and Foday Kallon because they both were killed upon being brought back to Sierra Leone based on information from Liberian security. Isn't that true?

  • No, sir, because Fonti Kanu was arrested by the RUF at the border and Foday Kallon came and Bockarie sent a message that on his arrival in Buedu I should arrest him. And I did not execute that, the side of the detention. He told me to detain him, but I did not do that, but I told him to stay in Buedu.

  • Why did you confuse Fonti Kanu and Foday Kallon?

  • Well, my Lord, I am a human being, I am liable to making mistakes. I am not a perfect human being to say that whatsoever I do I should be able to say everything hundred per cent correct. I have to accept that sometimes I make mistakes.

  • Was Bakarr with you when you attacked Kono and Makeni?

  • Bakarr, my Lord? The name Bakarr is a common name in Sierra Leone, so which of the Bakarrs are you talking about?

  • The SLA officer brought back by Foday Kallon.

  • Oh, okay, Captain Bakarr. I left him in Buedu and I went to Kono.

  • He was a well-known SLA officer. Isn't that true?

  • Yes, he was at the Daru Barracks throughout the war.

  • And where did he go in 1998 and 1999? What areas was he assigned to?

  • Well, I left him in Pendembu when I went to Kono. And on my return from Makeni, at the time I escaped the attack in Makeni in April, he was in Segbwema and from sometime in 1999 he left and went to Freetown.

  • Mr Sesay, do you know how Foday Kallon was able to go on two successful missions to recruit trained soldiers in Liberia to come back and join the rebel forces in Sierra Leone?

  • Well, I understood that the soldiers wanted to come, but they wanted word of confidence and those were the words of confidence that Foday Kallon took to them. Because, on their return, even Kantus, I used to discuss with him. He said they were in difficulties in Vahun. He said business was difficult.

  • Foday Kallon was never arrested in Liberia, correct?

  • No, because he went there in late '98.

  • Well, perhaps you might learn something about how he was so successful in these missions. Let me read to you testimony from 24 April 2008, page 8504.

  • Please repeat the page number.

  • 8504 from 24 April 2008. And I am going to read from the bottom of the page.

  • The witness testified - he was asked on line 21:

    "Q. What happened after your group was introduced by

    Johnny Paul to President Taylor?

    A. Well, President Taylor said, 'Gentlemen, you are

    welcome to Liberia. This issue which is on the floor now,

    I am happy that you have come and we should solve this

    issue once and for all.' He said, 'I have been giving

    assistance to the movement. I have mobilised most of the

    SLAs who came to Liberia. I mobilised them and sent them

    to reinforce you there.'"

    Then if we go to page 8509, the witness said, at the bottom six or seven lines, thank you, line 24, the witness was asked:

    "Q. You said that President Taylor told the group that he

    provided assistance in the form of food, arms and


    A. Yes, my Lord. That was not hidden. He did not hide

    that from us. He said, 'I have been giving assistance.'

    And even the SLAs who came from Guinea and surrendered, who

    came to Liberia, he said, 'I gave them safe passage. They

    came in and I reorganised them and sent them to Kailahun so

    that they will go and join you to continue the fight.'

    Q. Did he say where these SLAs would go to join you?

    A. Yes, my Lord. He said they were to pass through. He

    said he had sent them to General Mosquito so that they also

    - they will also join the troops that were coming to


    Now, Mr Sesay, this witness's testimony was also put to Mr Taylor on 30 September 2009, page 30027, the last four lines. Well, perhaps to make things in context, I will begin reading from some of what was put to Mr Taylor. So beginning on line 16, Defence counsel read from the answers of this witness, where the witness said:

    "Yes. He said to make sure that the SLPP government headed by Tejan Kabbah should be - to make sure it was overthrown, that it should be out of power. And I can also recall he said, in fact, the visit that we paid, that there was small pressure - some pressure - because in that area Mosquito Spray's squad was there and that he had even ordered General Mosquito to move and come to the Voinjama area to repel that squad that had come from Guinea, because we were in Liberia, in Monrovia, when Mosquito Spray's squad attacked that area."

    Then the Defence counsel asked Mr Taylor:

    "Q. Pause. Now, we have already dealt with you sending -

    reorganising, rearming and sending this group of former

    SLAs back to Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor, I'm not going to task

    on you, but you see an added detail here, don't you?

    A. Uh-huh.

    Q. Now, in August 1999, whilst this Okra Hills delegation

    was in Monrovia, was there not an incursion in that same

    month from Guinea?

    A. Yes, that's in Voinjama?

    Q. Mmm.

    A. Voinjama.

    Q. So that part - and was that by Mosquito Spray?

    A. No.

    Q. Who was it by?

    A. I don't know the - I am not sure they gave me a name.

    Mosquito Spray in '98 in Foya, so the Foya axis, when they

    first come in. But 1999 they don't give a name. We begin

    later on to hear about LURD, but they don't give a name.

    So they are two different years."

    Mr Sesay, Mosquito Spray was in August 1999; isn't that true?

  • Well, that was what we heard in Lofa. We heard on the border.

  • So you heard about that while Johnny Paul Koroma was in Monrovia, correct?

  • Yes. At that time, because Johnny Paul - Johnny Paul went in August, and it was around September that we heard about fighting on the Lofa border with Guinea, around the Voinjama area.

  • Well, if you're unsure of the month, it might help to look at P-389.

    Mr Sesay, we see in this document, it's a news - from the University of Pennsylvania African Studies Centre, a weekly round up, and looking at line that begins, "West Africa, IRIN-WA, weekly round up 32," covering the period 7-13 August 1999, the first sentence of the text reads:

    "Armed men this week seized five localities in northwest Liberia, kidnapped aid workers, commandeered UNHCR vehicles and battled with government soldiers reinforced by extra troops rushed to the area, according to various sources."

    And then just going down to the seventh paragraph, or six paragraphs down, it explains:

    "A rebel spokesman, who gave his name as Mosquito Spray, confirmed to the BBC on Friday that dissidents were holding some 100 persons - around 50 aid workers and their families - whom they intercepted as they were trying to cross over into Guinea. Mosquito Spray said they were being held in protective custody."

    So does this remind you, Mr Sesay, that Mosquito Spray was in August of 1999?

  • Well, I don't recall, because I went to accompany Johnny Paul in Foya and we went to Monrovia by helicopter in August, and I think that the news that I got was around September. I wouldn't know now the exact month.

  • It was, as this document shows, in August 1999, corroborating the testimony of the witness I read, and contradicting President Charles Taylor when he testified that Mosquito Spray was in 1998. Even you say it was in 1999, correct?

  • That is when I heard the news, yes.

  • Thank you. I have finished with that document. If we could now put on the screen the testimony from March 11 of this year, page 37129.

  • While that is being found, we have noted that at page 30, line 12, the date given, it reads, "contradicting President Charles Taylor that Mosquito Spray was - Mosquito Spray was in 1998," not '88.

  • Could counsel please repeat the page reference?

  • What I have is 11 March 2010, page 37129. I am going to read just lines 13 through 15.

  • Mr Sesay, in March, Defence witness for Charles Taylor was asked:

    "Q. Sir, did the RUF intend at all times to get - after

    the intervention, to get back to Freetown?

    A. Yes."

    Then if we look at the testimony of the same witness, the next day, 12 March 2010, page 37204, at line 16, the witness was asked:

    "Q. The ultimate objective was, to really control the

    country, you had to control Freetown. Is that what you are


    A. Yes."

    Mr Sesay, you would agree with that, wouldn't you, that at all times the target of the war was Freetown?

  • Yes, because even before the AFRC overthrow, in 1995 the RUF came right up to around Waterloo. So Freetown was the seat of government, and RUF was fighting for that, for political power.

  • And Mr Sesay, before you headed out on the Kono attack, you knew, didn't you, that SAJ Musa was heading for Freetown, that that was his goal?

  • Well, at that time I did not know that. I only heard that they attacked Lunsar because it was on the BBC, but I did not know their plan at that time, because they did not explain their plans to the RUF.

  • Mr Sesay, before the offensive began in December 1998, were you aware that ECOMOG, and particularly the Nigerians, were tired of the war?

  • I did not know that ECOMOG were tired with the war because every day they used their gunships and the Alpha Jets. Almost on a daily basis they were attacking in Kailahun, they were shelling, using heavy missiles.

  • Were you aware, Mr Sesay, that after the death of Abacha when Nigerian elections were scheduled, all of the presidential candidates promised to withdraw from Sierra Leone?

  • I did not know about that.

  • Were you aware that Nigeria was under severe financial pressure at this time in late 1998 because of the fall of world oil prices?

  • I did not know that, because during that time ECOMOG was still carrying out the attacks that they started from '98.

  • Well, let's look at something that refers to that. Can we look behind tab 24, please. Now, this document is from a news service It says: "OPEC failure foretells decline ten years after $10 oil." Looking at the second page, we see it's last updated December 1st 2008, but there is just a couple of sentences here that I am interested in reading.

    If we go - the article is dated December 1, and if we go down to the first full paragraph, this is in the second paragraph after the photo, so the fourth paragraph down, the last sentence before the title, "Demand suffers".

    That's the wrong document, I believe. It should be behind tab 24.

    The first page in the fourth paragraph, the paragraph begins, "They haven't done enough." Thank you, it is on the screen. But I am just going to read the last sentence because most of this article is dealing with 2008, but the last sentence in that paragraph says:

    "In December 1998," December 1998, "crude tumbled 61 per cent from its peak to as low as $10.35 when OPEC failed to eliminate a supply glut."

    Then if we go down three more paragraphs, I am talking about the events of 2008, it says:

    "Oil fell as much as $99.02 a barrel from its July record, making the four months slump steeper than crude's drop from its 1996 peak to the low set in December 1998."

    Thank you, I am finished with the document.

    So, Mr Sesay, do you see that there was a severe slump in oil prices in 1998 where prices went down 61 per cent? Did you know that?

  • My Lord, these documents, I never had access to them. I did not hear about them in 1998.

  • And you weren't aware of the financial situation of Nigeria and its dependence on oil revenue in 1998, were you?

  • I did not know anything about the financial activities of the Nigerian government. I did not know.

  • And you were not - and you and Sam Bockarie were not following the Nigerian presidential elections and the promises of the various candidates, were you?

  • I did not follow that up.

  • But, Mr Sesay, based on your knowledge of Charles Taylor, who at the time the of Liberia, he was a person who would have been well aware of regional affairs and affairs particularly in the largest country in the region, Nigeria, and he was sophisticated in economic matters, he was an economist. Isn't that all true?

  • My Lord, I don't know. I think it should be read, that question to Mr Taylor.

  • Well, when you talked to President Taylor, he knew more about what was going on in the region than you did, don't you agree?

  • Well, when I spoke to Mr Taylor for the first time in late May of 2000, we did not discuss that. I did not ask him to tell me what was happening in the region, no. During '98, I did not speak with President Taylor in '99, we did not speak.

  • Mr Sesay, a major offensive in Sierra Leone in December 1998 was perfectly timed because of the financial pressure and the political pressure on Nigeria to get out of Sierra Leone, were you aware of that?

  • No, my Lord, I did not know anything about what was happening in Nigeria.

  • Someone more sophisticated about international and economic events would have been aware of that; correct?

  • Yes. People should have known, apart from me, who was in the Kailahun District. Because we hadn't access to the internet, except when we listened to the BBC once in a while; but I was not following up the activities of what was going on in Nigeria.

  • Well, you got access to the internet - let's come back to that later.

    Mr Sesay, in December 1998, when you set out on this offensive and attacked Koidu, what was the objective of the attack of the offensive?

  • The objective was to capture Kono at then initial stage when we made the plan in Buedu. That was the instruction that Bockarie gave to me because we too were not very sure that Koidu could fall to the RUF, so the target was to attack Koidu, Kono.

  • Your Honour, before I forget, could the document behind tab 24, and I believe we need just the first two pages, be marked for identification, the second page we need just to understand the date of the article.

  • This is an article from a web page entitled The article is "OPEC failure foretells decline ten years after $10 oil". That is marked MFI-24, consisting of pages 1 and 2.

  • Now, you said, Mr Sesay, the objective was to capture Kono. Why? Why did you want to capture Kono?

  • Well, one ECOMOG was in Kono, ECOMOG and the Kamajors and, two, Sam Bockarie said the Sandlines were the mercenaries who had come to help President Kabbah to fight against the RUF who were in Kono and they were doing mining, so we should capture Kono to stop their activities.

  • So you went to Kono to take the mining away from ECOMOG; is that accurate?

  • Yes, to stop them from mining.

  • Did he say ECOMOG or Sandline?

  • I thought he said Sandline was working with ECOMOG. But maybe he said come to help Kabbah.

  • Yes, but where does ECOMOG come into that? Please clarify from the witness.

  • Mr Sesay, ECOMOG was doing mining in Kono; is that right?

  • Well, I came to know that when I went to Kono but first Sam Bockarie said he was informed that the Sandlines - that Omrie Golley had informed him that Sandlines were mining in Kono and that the Sandlines were the mercenaries who were helping President Kabbah alongside the ECOMOG.

  • Where was Omrie Golley when he told Sam Bockarie that?

  • My Lord, Omrie Golley was in England.

  • Now, when you got - when you took Kono, before you took Kono, Sam Bockarie had already changed a mining commander and put Kennedy in charge of the mining in the Kono District; correct?

  • Yes.

  • But the best mining sites were still in areas not controlled by the RUF, and that's why you attacked - part of why you attack Koidu; correct?

  • No. It was to stop the Sandlines programme, the mercenaries.

  • And why, Mr Sesay, was it your goal to stop the Sandline programme?

  • Well, they were mercenaries and they were supplying arms and ammunition to the Sierra Leone government. They were issuing out arms to the Kamajors and they were fighting against us.

  • Did you capture any foreigners, other than ECOMOG nationals when you attacked Kono, Koidu Town?

  • No, we did not capture foreign nationals except ECOMOG because they flew with helicopters, they used helicopters.

  • You said you captured 12 Nigerians; is that right?

  • Did you kill any foreigners, did you have corpses of any foreigners from other countries, other than Sierra Leone or ECOMOG countries?

  • No. I said the foreigners who were there, you know, like the Sandlines, they pulled out with the helicopters when the attack took place.

  • Now, when you attacked Kono - well, let's first talk about the ammunition you say Sam Bockarie brought back when he returned from Liberia. How much ammunition did he bring back, according to you?

  • I said the ammunition were about 40 boxes.

  • Did he bring anything else, besides AK rounds?

  • Yes. He brought some boxes of G3 rounds and HMG rounds.

  • Do you recall how many boxes of HMG rounds?

  • I don't recall now but it was not as much as the AK rounds.

  • How many boxes of G3 rounds?

  • I said I don't recall the quantity but it was - the HMG and the G3 were not as much as the AK rounds.

  • Were there RPG rockets?

  • No, no. There were no RPG rockets.

  • May I inquire, these 40 boxes, was that 40 boxes in total, or just 40 boxes comprising the AK rounds?

  • My Lord, the 40 boxes were the AK rounds, and there were some G3 rounds and HMG rounds, but they were not up to the AK rounds, but I don't know the figure.

  • In fact Sam Bockarie brought back hundreds of boxes of ammunition and it came in trucks. Isn't that true?

  • No. It was not hundreds of boxes. It was not up to hundreds. One of them had the ammunition and the other - one truck had ammunition and some food and the other truck had some condiment, foodstuff and medicine and clothing and diesel and engine oil.

  • Let's just look at what you said in the RUF trial where again you didn't tell the truth about the hundreds of boxes, but let's look at what you said on 17 May 2007, page 60. If we go to the bottom of the page, about ten lines up, you were asked at line 21 by your Defence counsel:

    "Well, let's try to be as accurate as possible. What did he come back with? How much ammunition did he come back with?"

    And to just get the summary of your final answer, if we go to the next page, at the top, page 61, you said.

    "I said with - my Lords, I said 45 boxes of AK rounds, 20 boxes of HMG rounds, 20 boxes of G3 rounds and one box of RPG rockets that contains six rockets."

    So in your own trial you said he did come back with RPG rockets. Is that right?

  • Six rockets.

  • In your own trial you said it was 45 boxes of AK, and another 40 boxes split between HMG and G3; correct?

  • Yes, that's what I said.

  • So for a total of 95 boxes of ammunition. Is that right?

  • Yes. That's what I said.

  • How much ammunition was issued by Sam Bockarie to you for the Kono attack?

  • Sam Bockarie gave me 20 boxes of AK rounds and I think about 10 boxes of G3 rounds and 10 boxes of HMG rounds.

  • Mr Koumjian, I'm sorry but I don't recall how much or how many rounds are in each box. I know it has been adduced before but could you remind me, please.

  • Yes, and just for reference it was adduced in the testimony of I believe 10 or 11 March from Isaac Mongor, 2008.

  • But, Mr Sesay, each box of ammunition of AK contains - it is a wooden box and it contains two sardine tins. Is that right?

  • Inside each tin is something like 32 different packages. Is that right? 34? Something like that?

  • That is not the way it is in all the boxes, because it was not - the boxes were not having identical contents. Some of them would have 20 packets, some others would have 32 packets, but some of them would only have 20 packets, and each packet contains 20 rounds.

  • Thank you. Except for the number of packages I believe that's consistent with the previous evidence.

    Could we have the witness shown, please, P-63.

    Mr Sesay, this document shows - it is entitled "Restricted" and its subject is "Forum minute, 11 December 1998, 11 a.m. The the chairman, Colonel Issa H Sesay, the battlefield commander." You have seen this document many times before, correct?

  • I do not recall seeing this document before. I think I saw this document during this trial here.

  • Well, didn't you see this document during your own trial, or you don't recall?

  • No, I don't recall.

  • Do you recall the operation being called a do or die mission?

  • No. They did not name the operation.

  • Was the operation called Free the Leader?

  • No, before our attack the operation did not have any name. It was after the successful attack when we captured Kono and then the fighters started giving all types of names to the operation, but before the attack I did not give any name to the operation.

  • Excuse me. I think I have a little logistical problem. If I could have a moment. I will come back to this after the break because I have some - I am sure it's my mistake, I believe I have some document mislabelled. I have a different number. I think we are talking about two different documents.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, when you had the - you do acknowledge that you had a meeting before the attack with the command - other commanders who were assigned for the attack, correct?

  • No. The other commanders who were assigned on the attack were in Kono. They were not in Buedu. Those of us who took part in the attack, I was the only one present at that meeting because even Morris Kallon was not at that meeting.

  • Now you've confused me. Was there a meeting before the attack that you had with commanders who were involved in the attack on Koidu Town? I am not asking you where it happened. I am asking you did you have such a meeting?

  • Do you mean Buedu or Kono?

  • Let me try to help you. You had a meeting in Kono before the attack on Koidu Town, correct?

  • At that meeting you spoke to the other commanders. Is that right?

  • What did you tell them about the mission?

  • Well, I told them that Sam Bockarie sent me to join them in Kono for us to attack Koidu Town, and that I needed their cooperation so that we will be able to carry out the attack. And I gave standing orders to govern the attack. And I appointed the commanders who were supposed to take over various targets of the attack.

  • Did you tell them what the purpose of the attack was?

  • Well, I do not recall that. I told them what Bockarie told me about the attack. I only told them that Bockarie sent me to come and join them to attack Kono. Because before I came, Bockarie had sent a message to the brigade commander and Peter Vandi before my arrival for them to go and receive me at the Moa River.

  • Now, did you tell them anything about looting?

  • Yes. I spoke about looting. I spoke about killing of civilians. I told them they were not allowed to kill even a surrendered soldier - be it Kamajor, be it ECOMOG, they should not kill them - and that they were not supposed to burn down houses and that they shouldn't target civilians. Those were some of the standing orders that I gave to them before the attack.

  • And did you talk to them about amputations?

  • Yes. I told them that I will not be part of that and that I would not want to see amputations happen. And from Kono up until Makeni no amputations took place and no witness did not speak about amputation. All the witnesses who were brought against me during my trials did not speak to that effect.

  • Perhaps before you finish, Mr Sesay, we will show you some video of a witness who was amputated in Kono. Mr Sesay, you said you talked about amputations. Why, before a military attack, did you bring up, "I don't want to hear about amputations"? Was it because you did know that amputations had been occurring in Kono District?

  • Yes, I heard that whilst I was in Pendembu. I heard that and it was on the news. That was said over the BBC.

  • So it was even on the international news before the Kono offensive that amputations were being carried out. Is that correct?

  • Yes. In '98 it was on the news because at the time they amputated people in Kono the more was in April to May of '98.

  • So it happened even - it was on the international news about these amputations even before the ammunition was received from Liberia for this attack, correct?

  • I said it was on the news. Before Bockarie came and said he bought those ammunition from Lofa it was on the news in '98.

  • Mr Koumjian, the witness said at page 44, "Yes, in 1998 it was on the news because at the time they amputated people in Kono" - something - "was in April to May." What was that the interpreter said?

  • Your Honours, the interpreter does not recall.

  • Mr Sesay, what did you say?

  • My Lord, I said in April and May I heard about the people who were amputated in Kono, like at the Tombodu axis, those who were amputated there. And it was Savage and Staff Alhaji, who - they and their men who were carrying out those amputations.

  • Thank you. Hopefully when we - on the tape, they will be able to hear the words that were said at that time. I don't recall what he said was in April to May.

  • So, Mr Sesay, did you give an instruction about looting?

  • I said yes, I gave instructions, because they told me that - before the attack, the commander gave me a situation briefing, and he told me that Koidu Town, it was ECOMOG and the Kamajors who occupied there. So I gave orders that there should be no looting, no burning of house, no killing of civilians, no amputation, and that even when surrendered - soldiers surrendered, they should not be killed.

  • Mr Interpreter keeps saying there should be no burning of houses, but I keep seeing "bombing". It should be "burning".

  • Mr Sesay, you actually said no looting until the mission is accomplished; isn't that true?

  • No. I said no looting.

  • I would like to show you the testimony of 12 April 2010, it is an open witness, page 38667, one of the Defence witnesses, Charles Ngebeh. Beginning at line 3, the witness was asked:

    "Q. Now, while you had this forum for this operation, you

    were given some directives related to this operation; isn't

    that correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And one of those directives you were given was that no

    looting would take place until the mission was

    accomplished; isn't that right ?

    A. You are correct."

    Mr Sesay, that's the directive you gave, that the soldiers, your soldiers, should not start looting until they had defeated ECOMOG and controlled the town; isn't that true?

  • Well, I don't recall that I gave such directives, but looting took place because even with all the things that ECOMOG had with them, we took everything from them. So looting took place. And after the attack, looting took place. I don't deny that fact.

  • In the attack, the attack was a huge success, correct?

  • Yes. The ECOMOG ran away because we fought from morning to evening and they ran away, and those who surrendered, surrendered together with the ECOMOG, including the Kamajors.

  • Now, the document that I meant to show to the witness, I gave the wrong number, it is P-93, if that could be put on the screen.

    Going through this document, Mr Sesay, it is directed to Major General Sam Bockarie. At the very top, it is listed as restricted. It is from Brigadier Issa H Sesay, battlefield commander, and it is dated - it appears to be 26 January 1999, so this is after the Freetown invasion in late January. You have seen this document before, correct?

  • Yes. They showed this to me during my trial.

  • It says that: "On 6 December I left the defence headquarters." And it says, "The below enumerated materials and items were then handed over to me for said mission." And the document indicates you received 30 boxes of AK rounds. That's correct, isn't it, that for the mission you were given 30 boxes of AK?

  • No, no, no. I told my lawyer that this document was not prepared by me because this was not the quantity of ammunition that I was given.

  • Well, let's make one thing clear. You wouldn't prepare a comprehensive report like this, as the battlefield commander of the RUF; you would have someone like your adjutant do it for you. Isn't that the way things would work?

  • Well, if it were a report for me to prepare, as this person it alleging, it should have been the ammunition that we captured from Kono. It was not the one that the commander gave me to come with, because the commander already knew what he gave me. So it is not something I should report on again to send to the commander because he gave them to me. So, this is not a report that I prepared, nor did my adjutant prepare it, because it was the commander that gave me the ammunition. How would I, again, make a report of that and send it to him? I might make report of what we captured. And I'm fully aware that when we came to Kono, what we captured, I sent a radio message, and went we got to Masingbi, what happened there, I sent a message, up to the time we got to Makeni. All that transpired there, I also sent a message.

  • And while it was your duty to report by radio, constantly updating Sam Bockarie, the chief of defence staff, it was also a responsibility and a practice in the RUF to send written reports, particularly about ammunition capture, correct?

  • Yes, but at the time I was advancing from Kono, I was sending reports on the radio about the amount of ammunition that we had captured in Kono. And about the ECOMOG soldiers that surrendered, the Kamajors, I also sent message. But I would not send message about what had been handed to me by the commander for the operation, because he had gave it to me and he had taken details of those, so how could I have sent a report about that again? Should I send any report, it should be on the attack and the things that I captured.

  • Which this report includes. Your adjutant, in January of 1999, was Samuel Jabba, correct?

  • Yes. Jabba was my adjutant throughout.

  • And the document lists various ammunition and supplies that you were given for various targets. Then if we go to the second page, going down to the bottom, the second-to-last paragraph:

    "December 9th, 1998, we arrived safely at Guinea Highway, 2nd Brigade headquarters."

  • I am reading the next line.

  • I beg your pardon, you are right.

  • "We were 100 per cent welcomed by the commander, Colonel Boston Flomo, alias Rambo, including his adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Peter B Vandi, and others. Materials and items as mentioned above were turned over to the commander."

    By the way, it is important, in any military organisation, including the RUF, to account for materials, arms and ammunition, that are issued to various units, correct?

  • Yes, the commander who goes on the mission, the ammunition that you give to the commanders that are carrying out the operations, you should take a record of that. But about these documents, the date that it is referring to, that that was the date we came to Kono, is not correct. And Samuel Jabba was my Defence witness, and if he had this - we had this as exhibit, when we put it before him, he did not testify to it, to say that he was the one that prepared it.

  • So it was never put before your Defence witness? Your lawyers never put this document to him?

  • I told my lawyers that the document is not a true document, but you are saying - you, the Prosecutor, you are saying it is a true document, but when Samuel Jabba came, you did not put it before him as a Defence witness, and you are alleging that he prepared this.

  • It has his signature. Turn to the back page. We have had witnesses in this trial recognise his signature. This is Samuel Jabba's signature as the adjutant BFC's office, isn't it?

  • No, this is not Jabba's signature, because he had - you had the opportunity to prove that at the time Jabba came as Defence witness. You should have put it before him, that he prepared the document and that this is his signature, but you did not do that. It is simply because it is not a true document.

  • Mr Sesay, on the - several witnesses have identified this signature in this trial. On December 11, it reads, going back to the second page:

    "The commander then call a general forum at his headquarters. Battalion and unit commanders were then invited to this forum. At 11 a.m. the forum commenced and mostly centralised on the mission given to me by you, to attack and capture Koidu, including Yengema and the airfield, for quick transportation of our material by air."

    Skipping down a few - two lines - excuse me, two paragraphs:

    "December 16th, 1998, the mission was carried out as rescheduled by me. It was carried out successfully and there was understanding among the officers and other ranks. On 17 December 1998, the town was under complete control."

    Do you agree, Mr Sesay, that by 17 December 1998, all of Koidu Town was under the control of the RUF and its allies?

  • Yes. We attacked on the 16th, and on 17 December Koidu was under RUF control, but it was on the 12th that myself and those who came from Kailahun arrived at - on Superman Ground. That was on 12 December, around 12 to 13 December, because I recall that I spent about three days, three days - three to four days before the attack. So, it was not on the 7th that we arrived on Superman Ground, no.

  • I am done with this document for now.

    Mr Sesay, how many tanks were captured in that attack on Koidu Town?

  • Well, the tanks that were in operational order were two, and the one that had problem, the ECOMOG left that one at Kokuima, and the one that we met at - that we got at Nimikoro was also disturbed, and we captured one at Opera, and the other was captured at the Tankoro Junction.

  • So I am not clear if you have answered my question. Can you give me a number? How many tanks were captured on the attack on Koidu?

  • Well, those that were in working order were two and those that were not in working order were two.

  • I apologise - the court officer may need to go back to this document. The document that we just looked at, and I can show it to you, says three armoured tanks were captured. Is that true?

  • You are referring to P-99, are you?

  • P-93, I believe is the correct number, P-93. Thank you.

  • And if we can look now at page 3, at the very bottom. At the bottom there is a list from A-S, and just so we understand what it is a list of, the sentence before Koidu Town says, "The below listed items and materials were captured" and then going to the very bottom, S, "three armoured tanks." Is that correct? Is this report accurate?

  • Well, there were two functional armoured tanks and the other two were not in working order.

  • Could the transcript from the RUF trial be put on, please, for 17 May 2007, page 90.

  • Going to the very bottom of the page, the last line says:

    "We captured tanks. We captured two functional tanks and one was" - next page - "not functional."

    So in the RUF trial you gave the exact same number as this document, P-93 page 3, the last line, "Three tanks were captured." Correct?

  • My Lord, I said the two tanks that were functioning were in Koidu Town, and there was another one that we got at Kokuima and we got another one at Nimikoro. Those were not in functioning order. So there were two that were working and the other two were not in working order.

  • So now you're saying there were two none working tanks captured for a total of four, while in the RUF trial you said there was only one non-functional tank for a total of three, consistent with the document I just showed you; is that right? You have contradicted yourself again?

  • Well, I don't believe that I have contradicted myself because my lawyer asked me about the tanks that we captured in Koidu Town. But I am understanding your question to be that how many tanks we captured in Kono, and one at Nimikoro was not in working order, and the other at Kokuima was not in working order, and the two were captured in Koidu Town and everybody saw those tanks.

  • Mr Sesay, did you capture two? Did you capture three or four tanks, which is it?

  • Four, my Lord. During the whole operation in Kono we captured four tanks, my Lord.

  • And why in the RUF did you say three?

  • Well, in the RUF trial, when my lawyer asked me, he asked me about just immediately after the attack on Koidu Town, Koidu Town, and the attack on Koidu Town was three tanks; but the question here now is asking about how many tanks we captured in Kono. And the other tank was captured outside Koidu Town and that was in Nimikoro. That is my understanding. And the tank that was parked at Nimikoro, everybody saw it that it was not in working order.

  • I have another subject. Perhaps this is a good time for a break.

  • Very well we will take the midmorning break and reconvene at 11.30.

  • [Break taken at 11.02 a.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 11.35 a.m.]

  • Mr Koumjian, please continue.

  • Mr Sesay, when you made your plan for the attack in Kono District, did you plan to cut off any reinforcements that could have come to assist the defenders of Koidu Town?

  • Yes. It was Morris Kallon who went on that ambush to cut the supply line.

  • Where did he go to ambush the supply line, to cut the supply line?

  • Around Gold Town.

  • That was to cut supplies coming from where?

  • For the reinforcement that was to come from Makeni, to fight the ECOMOG and the Kamajors in Koidu.

  • So is it correct that that was a normal military strategy, that in planning an attack, you would set ambushes to cut off reinforcements from coming to assist those that you were attacking? That was a standard tactic, correct?

  • Sorry, maybe before we continue, I'm looking at my LiveNote and it would appear that the reinforcement that was being cut off was the reinforcement that was going to fight the ECOMOG and the Kamajors. I'm not sure that that's reflective of the evidence.

  • What line are you referring to?

  • Page 53, line 24 on my LiveNote.

  • I can't remember what the witness said.

  • Let me - perhaps, Madam President, I could clarify with the witness.

  • Mr Witness, I had asked you earlier "Where did Kallon go to ambush the supply lines." You said, "Around the time. Around town." And then I asked --

  • "Around Gold Town".

  • "Gold Town", correct.

  • And then I asked you: "That was to cut supplies coming from where?" You said: "For the reinforcement that was to come from Makeni to fight" - did you say "the ECOMOG and Kamajors that were to come from Makeni to help fight in Koidu"?

  • Yes, to help their brothers who were in Koidu to fight against us.

  • To fight with the ECOMOG and the Kamajors; the reinforcement was coming from Makeni to fight alongside ECOMOG and Kamajors?

  • Okay. Thank you.

  • What I'd like to do now, Mr Sesay, is to give you a map of Sierra Leone. This map is previously marked. Okay. It's not marked. It's a map of Sierra Leone. And I would like you to mark the map, take your time, in two different colours.

  • Mr Koumjian, before the map is marked. I don't recall an answer to your previous question: "Was that a standard tactic?"

  • Thank you, Justice.

  • Mr Sesay, I'm sorry, we did not get an answer to my last question. The question I asked you was: Was it a standard tactic, in planning an attack, to prepare to ambush reinforcements that could come to assist those who were attacking?

  • Yes, that is a military tactic.

  • Now, the map in front of you, for everyone's information, is from map S1 in the map book, an unmarked version is P-5, is document P-5.

    What I would like you to do, Mr Sesay, is to mark in two different colours; in one colour those positions in Sierra Leone held by the RUF and, in the other colour, those positions held by your enemies, the Kamajors, ECOMOG, and the loyal SLA.

  • In the whole country?

  • Yes, sir. Could you do that?

  • Over what time frame? What time frame are we talking about?

  • Thank you. That's very pertinent.

  • Mr Sesay, I want you to mark the positions that were held before you attacked Koidu. So before the 16th, let's say the 15th of December 1998, where was - first of all, why don't you just mark, where was ECOMOG? Mark the positions held by ECOMOG the 15th of December 1998.

  • That is in what district?

  • Well, let's start with Kono District.

  • Okay. Well, ECOMOG was in Koidu Town while the RUF was in the outskirts of the town because, like, RUF was in Kuyor and that is almost part of Koidu Town.

  • The city was Kuyor, spelt K-U-Y-O-R?

  • Yes, my Lord, and that is part of Koidu Town. RUF had their combat camp there while the ECOMOG was in Koidu. But you could be standing at Kuyor Junction and see right into Koidu Town. And, if you look at Yardu here, RUF was here before the attack on Koidu. RUF was here, Yardu. But Kuyor is not on this map. Kayima, RUF was here as well. Kurubonla, here, SAJ Musa, Brigadier Mani and others were here. And Gandorhun - RUF was here. Njaiama, ECOMOG was here. And Yengema, ECOMOG was here. Njaiama-Sewafe was ECOMOG. Tefeya, RUF was here. Tefeya, Yomandu, Kayima; that is Yomandu, Tefeya, all those were RUF. Njaiama-Sewafe, Tongo, was ECOMOG and the Kamajors.

  • And let's look, moving to the west, who held, December 15th, before you attacked Koidu Town, who held Masingbi?

  • Masingbi was the Kamajors and the ECOMOG.

  • Yes, I've marked it.

  • Thank you. And who held, and I know I don't pronounce it correctly, Magburaka - Magburaka?

  • Well, before coming to Magburaka you pass through Matotoka, it was the ECOMOG and the Kamajors that were in Matotoka; and Magburaka, it was ECOMOG and the Kamajors that were there.

  • Okay. Please mark Matotoka and Magburaka?

  • I've done that, sir.

  • Thank you. Who held Makeni?

  • Mr Sesay, are you using different colours to represent the different groups that held these positions?

  • Yes, my Lord. This one is for ECOMOG and the Kamajors and this one is for the RUF. Yes, ma'am.

  • And the witness indicated, Mr Sesay, correct me if I'm wrong, he's using green for ECOMOG and orange for RUF - is that correct?

  • Green for ECOMOG and Kamajors, and orange for RUF, is that correct?

  • Yes, my Lord, it's correct.

  • Lunsar, it was ECOMOG and the Kamajors because the AFRC attacked there, but from there they continued their movement towards Masiaka, and ECOMOG went there as well and took the place, together with the Kamajors.

  • 15 December 1998, who held Port Loko?

  • ECOMOG and the Kapras, the Gbethis; so I can say ECOMOG and the Civil Defence.

  • So please mark that in green.

  • Thank you. Who held Masiaka?

  • Before the 15th of December AFRC captured here, that is Masiaka, and they continued their movement towards Waterloo. And around the 15th ECOMOG and Kamajors re-took the place after they had pushed out the AFRC, Masiaka.

  • So you're saying that Masiaka, around the 15th of December, was going back and forth between the AFRC and ECOMOG, is that correct?

  • AFRC captured the place; what I learnt later when they were advancing towards Freetown, that is Waterloo, they captured Masiaka and ECOMOG attacked them and they withdrew and continued their movement towards Waterloo, Masiaka.

  • Okay. So you've indicated that after the 15th it was controlled by ECOMOG, is that correct?

  • Yes, it's correct.

  • Well, then, mark that with green and the record will reflect your comments.

  • The entire western peninsula at the 15th, Waterloo, Hastings, York, Wellington, Freetown, all of that was held by ECOMOG and its allies, correct?

  • Well, around this time the AFRC movement was around this Waterloo Songo area, between Masiaka and Songo. There were AFRCs there.

  • Between Masiaka and Songo?

  • Yes, which is four mile - just four miles from Waterloo.

  • Can you put, then, an orange circle in that area between Songo and Masiaka where you believe these AFRC troops were.

  • Yes, sir.

  • And is it correct then that from Songo to the west, all of that area was controlled by ECOMOG and its allies?

  • Between what time and what time?

  • 15th of December 1998, before you launched your attack on Koidu, Songo, Waterloo, York, Hastings, Wellington and Freetown were all in the control of ECOMOG and its allies, correct?

  • Can you mark all of that area green.

  • Lungi airport, who controlled Lungi at 15th of December 1998?

  • It was the ECOMOG and the Civil Defence.

  • Can you mark that, please.

  • Together with the Sandlines, because that is where their helicopters were, the helicopter gunships, around that.

  • Okay. Perhaps we could put the map in its current condition on the projector, so that we can see what it looks like.

  • Yes, sir, but it would be good - because you've told me to mark Koidu, I've marked Koidu. I told you that at the outskirts of the town, and that is part of the town, RUF was there. Can I mark there with the orange? Or just locate the areas where the RUF was before the attack, sir?

  • Yes, please, make the map as complete as possible. Your knowledge of where the ECOMOG and RUF - ECOMOG and its allies were and RUF and its allies were on 15 December 1998. Take your time.

  • Yes, sir.

  • Can we please see the map on the screen.

  • It's now on the screen. Thank you. The map is now on the screen.

  • So, Mr Sesay, you have marked in orange, it appears on my screen to be pink right now to me, where the RUF and its allies were and in green where ECOMOG and its allies were, correct?

  • Yes, sir. In some towns in the Kono District and Tonkolili coming town to Bombali and the Western Area.

  • Before we mark this, can you also mark where the RUF was in Kailahun District. And, Mr Sesay, for completeness, could you mark what you know about who was in control of the southern districts of the Bo and Kenema Districts.

  • My Lord, I don't think it's necessary to mark that, because the whole of the southern province was controlled by the government, that was the ECOMOG and the Kamajors, the whole of the south.

  • Well, that's clear. Perhaps you could just mark green Kenema and Bo Towns and your remarks will be on the record, noted.

  • I said that is just for the south, because some areas in Kenema, there were RUF there.

  • I see. Okay. Can you mark those areas in Kenema that were held by RUF and those areas held by ECOMOG.

  • Well, the area where the RUF was from Nyama to almost Joru, I've not seen it on the map.

  • If you know approximately where that is you can mark the area, even if the name of the town is not marked. Mr Sesay, if I did not ask you before, can you also mark who controlled Makeni on 15 December 1998.

  • I've made some mistake here. I had the orange in my hand, that was what I first used, but I've used - I've overwritten it with the green.

  • Okay. Thank you. Was that at Makeni where you made that small mistake or where?

  • Yes.

  • Okay. But it's clear to --

  • It's clear to us now. Okay. Thank you.

  • But around the 15th of December the RUF, Superman, the AFRC, Mani, their troops had moved from Koinadugu and they were around this Bombali District, around this Binkolo axis.

  • So can you put - they had not yet taken Binkolo on the 15th of December, correct? That was attacked shortly before Makeni, correct?

  • Yes, but they were on their way but they had not taken Binkolo yet, right.

  • So can you put an arrow coming from the north pointing towards Binkolo in orange to show that they were coming towards there.

  • Around this Alikalia, Kurubonla, Bendugu, Koinadugu, STF, Brigadier Mani and Superman's troops were there throughout from August when Superman went there.

  • Okay. Can you mark that in orange then.

  • And these other towns within the Bombali District, these were towns that the AFRC had been attacking during 1998 up to this time when they came to this place like Karina, Pendembu, Mateboi, Batkanu, Gbinti, Mange.

  • Thank you, we understand that from the evidence, but right now I only want you to mark where forces were occupying on the 15th of December. If you know that they were there on the 15th of December, mark it, but if you don't, just leave it unmarked.

  • No, during December 15th they were not there. They were where I had marked, around the Songo - between Masongo and Masiaka.

  • Okay. Thank you. So, Mr Sesay, are you ready for us to look at what you've marked, or have you completed your work?

  • Yes, sir. Because the place which I said around the Kenema District that we were, I told you that I did not see the towns' names, so you told me to mark the areas that I knew. I've marked the area, yes, sir.

  • Very well. So let's take a quick look on the screen at what you've marked. And it is as you've described. And we see areas marked in orange, that RUF or AFRC held, and areas marked in green, held by ECOMOG, Kamajors or government soldiers. Mr Sesay, can you just write on the top of that, let's give it back to you for now, and write "Military position 15 December 1998".

  • I don't understand, sir. Military position, like what?

  • No. Just these words, just so when we look at this or when the judges look at this months from now they understand what you've done. So just along the top, the very top above the map, if you could write "Military positions held, 15 December 1998".

  • Should I write on top of the map?

  • Mr Sesay, where I'm showing you, just at the top above the map, if you could write along the border.

  • Yes, military what, sir?

  • "Military positions held, 15 December 1998". Thank you. And if you could just sign it at the bottom and put today's date, which is 19 August 2010.

  • Mr Koumjian, that's not enough. How will we know which colour pertains to who?

  • Certainly. Thank you.

  • So, Mr Sesay, just so we can see how much space is left, can we look quickly at the map after you've written that and I'll tell you where to write the rest. Okay. On the top you've written "Military positions", as I requested. You wrote, "16th December 1998", that's fine. And now if you could put --

  • 15th. It was 15th.

  • And now if you can put, above that, Mr Sesay, take the orange and write "ECOMOG and allies" in orange.

  • There's no need to write in orange. All you need to do, Mr Sesay, is write a little dash in orange and against it to write "RUF and allies". And you take the green marker, make a little dash, and write "ECOMOG and allies". A-L-L-I-E-S, allies.

  • No, my Lord, I just wrote "RUF/AFRC", "ECOMOG/Kamajors".

  • Thank you. That's good enough.

  • Thank you, Mr Sesay. And just so we can mark this exhibit, can you just put today's date and sign this. And today's date is 19 August 2010. Thank you.

    May this map, as marked by the witness, be marked for identification, please.

  • Would you put it back on the screen, please, for us to see? We need to see the map, not the signature. I want to see the legend as well, the words at the top. This is a map of Sierra Leone, as marked by the witness, showing military positions as of 15 December 1998. That is marked MFI-25.

  • Thank you, Madam Court Officer.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, you talked about Kallon receiving instructions to set an ambush for reinforcement. What actually occurred is that your victory over the ECOMOG was so complete, the ambush that Kallon set, he ended up catching the ECOMOG troops that were retreating. Rather than reinforcements coming to Koidu, he was able to attack ECOMOG troops retreating from Koidu, correct?

  • No. At first it was the reinforcement that was coming that fell in the ambush, so they retreated, and Kallon and others were able to capture a very good amount of RPG rockets and some ammunition that they left behind, when they ran away and left the pick-up, and they went back to Masingbi.

  • What happened to the ECOMOG, the Kamajors that were in - and the loyal SLA that were in Koidu Town when you attacked Koidu Town, 16 and 17 December '98?

  • Well, they withdrew from Koidu Town. They went to Bumpe, and the larger group of them went through Njaiama Nimikoro, and the other group retreated to Sewafe. So when they heard about the ambush at Gold Town and we had also captured Bumpe, they then left their vehicles and they crossed the Sewa River, yes, the Sewa River, through a village called Pumudu - Punduru, Punduru, and then - and then they went towards Bamakonta.

  • Can you say the name of the river that they crossed again?

  • I said Sewa River.

  • So the withdrawal of ECOMOG turned into a panic, and they abandoned their weapons and ran; is that correct?

  • Yes, because when we captured Bumpe from them, they then divided. A group went towards Nimikoro, and the other group went to Sewafe, where they crossed the Sewa River.

  • Following the capture of Koidu Town, you've previously explained in your testimony, your forces, the forces under your command, continued westward, correct?

  • And tell us where you sent forces after capturing Koidu Town.

  • Well, when we captured Koidu Town, we knew, because we saw them running away that evening, when they were pulling out with some of their vehicles, we then understood later that they were in Bumpe so we had to attack Bumpe. So when they saw us coming towards Bumpe, they started withdrawing, so our troops attacked Bumpe, and then they withdrew to Njaiama Nimikoro, one group of them, and the other group went to Sewafe. And they continued to stay in Njaiama Nimikoro until January of '89 when we were able to push them out of there and they retreated to Tongo.

  • Where did your forces go after you took Koidu Town?

  • Well, I reported to Sam Bockarie. I told him that we captured Koidu Town and the ECOMOG ran away and that they were going towards Makeni, Magburaka - I mean, they were going towards Masingbi, and the others were at Njaiama Nimikoro. He then said, "Well, Rambo" - he said, "Rambo should go and join Morris Kallon at Gold Town and they should continue to push towards Masingbi whilst Akim and others should go towards Njaiama Nimikoro to attack the ECOMOG at Nimikoro.' But the ECOMOG resisted there strongly until January '99, when we were able to push them out of there.

  • Now, you've told us that 24 December, you took Makeni, correct?

  • What happened between 17 December and 24 December? Where did your troops go?

  • Well, the troops were moving from Kono District, going towards Masingbi, and from - and at Masingbi, they captured Kamajors who surrendered with their guns, and the same thing happened at Makali, and it continued on to Magburaka before they arrived in Makeni.

  • After taking Makeni, along with Superman's forces on 24 December, where did your forces go?

  • Well, my troops that moved from Kono, when we captured Magburaka, we sent some towards the road going towards Bumbuna, and the others went towards the road to Magbas, towards Mile 91, and the others went to Makeni, and then they went and captured Makeni, after which we decided to attack Bumbuna. Superman and his troops went and attacked Kabala, but those two attacks were not successful and we were not able to attack Bumbuna. We then decided to set up a defensive at Magbontoh.

  • Mr Koumjian, there are so many names that I have not heard of. This place Magbas or something like that. Please pay attention to the place names. If this evidence is useful, please pay attention to the place names and elicit spellings.

    Mr Interpreter, Magbas, how do you spell it?

  • M-A-G-B-A-S, your Honours.

  • Magbontoh is M-A-G-B-O-N-T-O-H, your Honours.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, at some point the RUF launched an attack on Port Loko after taking Makeni, correct?

  • Yes, in January of '99.

  • Well, I think it was around - I don't recall the exact date now, but it was in January.

  • Was it before or after the January 6 invasion of Freetown?

  • Well, the January 6 attack had gone on already in Freetown. They were carrying out the attack in Freetown whilst the RUF attacked Port Loko.

  • The RUF also, you told us, went and attacked Waterloo, trying to get to Freetown. When did that happen?

  • Well, that was after the RUF had been pushed out of Port Loko because the RUF was not successful in capturing Port Loko. So it was after that that Sam Bockarie said since Rambo and others were not able to capture Port Loko, he said the troops should move towards Waterloo. That was the time they attacked Masiaka, they attacked Mile 38, and they then met the Guinean troops at Waterloo, and they fought against them for some time before they could capture Waterloo.

  • Okay. I'd like now to just show a video going over some of the terrain in the area you talked about where this December '98, January 1999 attacks took place. So if we could show video 2, please, which is December '98 attack sequence.

  • [Video played to the Court]

  • Mr Koumjian, what are we supposed to be seeing?

  • Now we are seeing - we started at Buedu and then the - we saw the terrain at Koidu and a close-up of Koidu, and then we went along the road to Makeni, we saw Makeni, and now we're travelling along the road and we see Magburaka, the road - we saw the road between Makeni and Magburaka. Again, we're looking close in at Magburaka, and now going on the road back to Makeni.

  • Is that how it happened?

  • No, no one is giving this as the sequence of the event - all the events.

  • That's why I asked you, what are we looking at, I mean other than the place names and the terrain? What is it that we're looking at?

  • Well, we are looking at the terrain, and the sequencing starts off in Buedu, goes to Koidu, goes to Makeni, Magburaka, and then we went back to Makeni. And that was the sequence that was shown in that video.

  • It's the sequence that was shown, but what does it signify, Mr Koumjian? Is this in any way related to the evidence of the witness? Are you going to put questions to him arising out of that map?

  • Sir, you started in Buedu and then you took Koidu; is that correct?

  • You took Koidu by 17 December 1998, correct?

  • Yes, you're correct.

  • You then went on and your forces, on 24 December 1998, took Makeni, correct?

  • Yes.

  • You talked about attacking Magburaka. When did that occur?

  • Well, we captured Magburaka around the 20 - I think the 22nd, something like that.

  • So just before you went to Makeni, you captured Magburaka, correct?

  • Yes. We passed through Magburaka, myself and the troops.

  • Thank you. Now, on 5 January 1998, before the attack on Freetown, where were your troops?

  • January 5, 1999, Mr Sesay, where were your troops?

  • January 1990 what? Say the question again, please.

  • Just before Gullit went into Freetown, where were your troops?

  • Well, we were in Makeni because, like I said, we attacked Binkolo and Superman went and attacked - Superman went and attacked Kabala but those two attacks failed. But those who went to Freetown, the map has not shown the route that they took and where they were at that point in time for them to enter Freetown.

  • Okay. We'll come back and we'll mark that in just a moment. We'll have you point out where they were when they entered Freetown. Let me first ask you: Where were you when you heard about the death of SAJ Musa?

  • Well, I was in Makeni. I was in Makeni when I heard in January - when I heard in January about the death of SAJ Musa, because at the initial stage I did not know.

  • Well, wasn't it, in fact, in December that you heard about the death of SAJ Musa?

  • Well, no, I did not hear it because Sam Bockarie did not tell me and I did not overhear it when Gullit told him, because Bockarie too did not believe it initially. So I don't --

  • My question was: Did you hear about it in December and your answer is no, it wasn't until January?

  • It was around the time that he died, because I don't recall now because I did not have direct communications with them except if I got it from Sam Bockarie's station. But I do not recall now the exact time that I heard about it.

  • Where were you when you heard about it? In Makeni?

  • I was in Makeni.

  • How many days approximately after you captured Makeni was it that you heard that SAJ Musa died?

  • Well, I don't recall how many days it took. But I was in Makeni when I heard that SAJ Musa had died and it was through Bockarie's station because they informed Bockarie, but Bockarie too did not believe.

  • So did you get the information the same day that Sam Bockarie got the information?

  • Well, the day we captured Makeni, I did not hear that information on that very day.

  • That's not what my question was. Mr Sesay, you were the battle group commander of the RUF - excuse me, the battlefield commander of the RUF at that time, correct?

  • Of course.

  • And you were leading the troops that were on the offensive in Makeni. You had just captured - you had captured Makeni and you had troops engaged in battle with ECOMOG, correct?

  • It was important for you to know what the situation was in the country. Isn't that true?

  • Well, it was important for me to know about the others who were taking orders from me. But if people were not taking orders from me and something happened from amongst them, it was then not important to me because they were not directly reporting to me, my Lord.

  • It was not important to you - is that your testimony - that SAJ Musa had died?

  • But the commanders who were operating with SAJ Musa were not reporting to me because they were not under my instructions.

  • So your answer is it was not important to you to hear that SAJ Musa died?

  • No. The way you asked the question, I do not want you to base your - your answers or questions on my response, my Lord, because you are asking the question as though the troops were under my command. And Gullit and SAJ Musa's troops were not reporting to me, they were not sending messages to me.

  • Mr Sesay, you can answer my question. My question was: Was it important to you to hear that SAJ Musa died? Is your answer no?

  • They were my fellow Sierra Leoneans. It was important for me to hear that he died because he is my fellow human being and he was a Sierra Leonean.

  • It had no significance to you that SAJ Musa died as far as the military situation was concerned? Are you saying it didn't affect, as far as you were concerned at all, the military situation?

  • Well, SAJ Musa and I were not on the same military operation at this time. But my concern is when he died he is my fellow Sierra Leonean, so I had sympathy for him. But we did not share any common interest to say that the operation that was going on, it was a joint operation with me. But I operated with - I stopped seeing him in February of 1998. But we used to discuss at that time. But besides that, we never had any further business.

  • Was it important to you - well, let's first set some background. SAJ Musa was not communicating with Sam Bockarie and the RUF, correct?

  • Yes, he was not communicating with the RUF. Sam Bockarie - with Sam Bockarie. He was not communicating with me and so I did not know whether he was communicating with Bockarie.

  • The day that SAJ Musa was killed, you know that Gullit began to communicate with Sam Bockarie, correct?

  • Well, on that very day I did not know, because I was also on an attack trying to capture Makeni. So it was after that, the following days that I heard from the operator that - my operator that he heard - he got a message from Buedu that the operator in Buedu was saying that Sam Bockarie said Gullit said SAJ Musa had died. But the operator said Bockarie said he did not believe what he heard. And later Bockarie also told me that he did not believe what Gullit told him.

  • Mr Sesay, ever since your trial you've tried desperately to distance yourself from your friend Gullit. Isn't that true?

  • No, that is not it. What happened and what people knew - he knew that and I also knew that. I am not trying to distance myself from him, but since then I know that he and I did not have any common purpose, so how can I just link myself with him?

  • You used the word "common purpose". Did you get - are you talking about the legal term "common purpose"?

  • Well, that is what they have in the indictment that we had a common purpose for the attack on Freetown. But as far as I know, I did not have any common purpose with them. And even at that time they brought RUF who were present with them in the attack on Freetown like King Perry as a witness, the Prosecution brought them. They brought Gibril who was sprung out of Pademba Road, they brought him as a witness.

  • Mr Sesay, we have to try to finish your testimony so you have to answer the question and the question was just: Are you talking about the legal term "common purpose"? And I think you answered yes, is that right? You understood that term from the indictment, is that correct?

  • I am talking from my own knowledge that I did not have a common plan with the man at this time.

  • He was your friend, isn't that true, Gullit?

  • Yes, I came to know him when he was PLO-2 during the days of the AFRC. That was the first time I met him in Freetown.

  • Unlike SAJ Musa, who didn't want anything to do with the RUF, Gullit was your friend, correct?

  • No, no. In that case you are talking about things that you do not know about. Even before the looting of the Iranian embassy SAJ Musa used to visit me on Sundays because we were all staying at Hill Station. Sometimes he would visit us, Mike Lamin, Kallon and I, he would invite us sometimes to go and meet him at Cape Sierra, then we'd take lunch together. So all of these men that I'm referring to, they were Mendes and SAJ Musa too was a Mende. The only person that I know that he was not pulling with was Sam Bockarie because I saw that they did not see eye to eye. But all other people that I'm talking about, I think they were all together up to the intervention.

  • And Gullit was your friend, correct?

  • I said I met him in Freetown when they invited us, he became my friend but I cannot say that he was a close friend of mine that, like, for instance, he used to come to my house, no. SAJ Musa visited me in my house frequently than Gullit at Hill Station.

  • Gullit visited your house, didn't he?

  • Well, I recall that Gullit visited my house once. By then he and Jeff, because at that time his CSO Jeff was my wife's cousin, so they visited my house one particular day. But like for SAJ Musa, at the time he came, on most Sundays he used to visit my house.

  • I asked you about Gullit and now you're going on to SAJ Musa. So I'm going to stop you because we'll go on forever if you don't just answer the questions. Gullit also gave you a pick-up truck, correct?

  • Yes, he gave me a pick-up when I went to Freetown. I did not have a vehicle. Sam Bockarie told him, he gave me a pick-up.

  • Gullit also was a friend of Sam Bockarie. When he retreated from Kono he went to Kailahun and he stayed with Bockarie, correct?

  • Yes, he was with Bockarie and Bockarie was friendly to him because they were - they became friends from the time they overthrew because Gullit was the number three man or the number fourth man in the AFRC.

  • And Gullit was a friend of Alfred Brown, the radio operator that had been sent to SAJ Musa, correct?

  • Well, Gullit was a friend of Honourable Sullay. Honourable Sullay was Alfred Brown's best friend in Freetown, not Gullit. But because Gullit and Sullay were friendly to one another, so Alfred Brown became friends with him also. But I know about his friendship with Sullay.

  • So the answer to my question is, yes, Gullit and Alfred Brown were friends; correct?

  • Yes, they then became friends through Sullay before the withdrawal from Freetown.

  • Now, you were in detention with Gullit, Alex Tamba Brima; correct?

  • And you've told us that you would talk about what Alex Tamba Brima was going to testify about in his case. Isn't that true?

  • Yes, I said he suggested it to me and I said no. I said he should say what happened, but he should not link the RUF to what RUF did not do or what RUF was not involved in.

  • You and Alex Tamba Brima and others, you got together and decided the best story would be "we had nothing to do with each other". Isn't that true?

  • No, no, no. We did not have that common understanding. Not at all.

  • And you agreed, for example, to lie for Gullit when you testified in your RUF case. Isn't that true?

  • No, no, no. We did not have that agreement. What happened in Freetown was what I spoke about. And even the Prosecution witnesses, what they said was what happened in Freetown about the Freetown attack, that it was done by the AFRC. Some of the AFRC like Junior Lion and others, what they said, and even what the RUF insiders spoke.

  • Now we know that you've denied any link to the mining in Kono and we've seen the documents and the testimony that says that the diamonds that you took to Monrovia, and didn't come back with, were from the mining unit and you say that's not true. Just like you, Gullit tried to deny any link with the mining in Kono. And you helped him by lying and saying in your trial that you took no diamonds from Gullit. Isn't that true?

  • Well, Gullit was not in Kono. When we greeted RUF/AFRC when we went there, we did not meet Gullit there. And Gullit came to Kono from Kailahun in mid-98 and he directly moved to join SAJ Musa. So how would I have said that he was involved in the mining?

  • Well, because you told us here in court that you took diamonds from him. Isn't that true? Johnny Paul Koroma sent you to get diamonds from Gullit, and you've told us that you took diamonds from him, correct?

  • Yes. Mike Lamin and I went there.

  • You've repeated that three or four times in your testimony, that you took diamonds from Gullit, right?

  • But you lied in the RUF case and you said you didn't take any diamonds from him. If we could have your testimony shown to you, 10 May 2007, page 41.

  • Your Honour, this is a closed session transcript.

  • I'm reading from line 14 - well, for context I'll have to read a little earlier. Starting at line 2, the sentence ends:

    "A. Then I killed Gullit" - excuse me, "Then I called

    Gullit. We moved out from the crowd. He was with about -

    about five or six bodyguards were with him. I told him,

    'Fellow, I have come to arrest you because I've been given

    instructions and if you don't comply with the instructions,

    I have been given orders to execute you.' He asked me,

    'Who gave the orders?' I said, 'JPK, Mike Lamin and

    Bockarie.' I told him - I told him to hand over his

    pistol. He took his pistol from the side and handed it

    over to me. Then I told him that the three people - 'JPK

    gave orders to me that the diamonds you have in possession,

    you should hand over to me. So if you fail to hand over

    the diamonds to me, I should kill you.' He said, 'No,

    Issa, I have no diamonds. You can check me and my boys.'

    And indeed, I checked him and his boys, the five or six

    boys, one after the other, and I did not see any diamond.

    But he told me that he came with diamonds but the diamonds

    he came with, he had handed over to Bockarie before JPK

    arrived in Kailahun."

    So, Mr Sesay, in your own trial, you lied and told the judges that you didn't take any diamonds from Gullit. Why did you lie in your own trial?

  • I cannot recall everything that I said during my trial, but the diamonds that we took from Mike Lamin, that is Mike Lamin - or from Gullit, that is Mike Lamin and I, they were small pieces of diamonds. But all the things that I said were events that occurred, but I cannot recall everything now.

  • Well, this is what you said in 2007. You said, "He said, 'No, Issa, I have no diamonds. You can check me and my boys.' And, indeed, I checked him and his boys, the five or six boys, one after the other, and I did not see any diamond."

    Those are details, Mr Sesay. You made those details up in 2007 to protect Gullit, just as he was protecting you by saying RUF didn't have anything to do and didn't assist in the invasion of Freetown; isn't that true?

  • No. The two of us did not have any arrangement to protect each other. If the RUF had anything pertaining to the invasion of Freetown when Gibril came, he should have said so. He should have said so. And like even people like Junior Lion, because he testified in open session when he did, he told the Trial Chamber that he was the task force commander for the attack on Freetown. He spoke about how they carried out the attack.

  • Now, Mr Sesay, a few moments ago you said that you first learnt about the death of SAJ Musa in January. If we could have the transcript of 18 May, page 77, please, put on the screen, in the RUF trial. 18 May 2007, page 77.

  • Your Honour, this is a closed session transcript.

  • Actually, just for logistics, I'd just ask if it's permissible that my colleague could read it, Mr Bangura, because I can't read that far. He has it on his screen.

  • Yes, Mr Bangura, please read the text, slowly.

  • I'm reading from page 77, line 4:

    "Q. So what was the next news you heard concerning the

    whereabouts of this group?

    A. Well, later I came to know, when we came to Makeni, my

    operator told me that he received an information from Buedu

    that SAJ Musa had died, that he died at Benguema.

    Q. When was that? When was the news?

    A. May, around the 26th or the 27th. That was the time my

    operator told me in Makeni." Then the judge intervenes: "What month? What's the month? May, you say, 26th or 27th of?"

    Then the witness answers: "No, my Lord. I said December. December 26th, 27th, sir."

    Then the judge says: "Thank you."

    And the witness says: "Yes, sir."

    And this is at page 77.

  • Mr Sesay, the death of SAJ Musa and communication from Gullit to Sam Bockarie, that was big news in the RUF. As number two in the RUF, you would have heard about that the same day. You did hear about it the same day, didn't you?

  • No, I did not hear it on the same day. I did not hear about it on the same day. And I said even when Gullit told Sam Bockarie, Sam Bockarie said he did not believe that. He said maybe it was just a trick.

  • Sam Bockarie believed it enough to immediately send a mission to go reinforce Gullit, didn't he?

  • No. Because Sam Bockarie told Gullit to wait, that he would send reinforcements to him, and Gullit did not wait and he went ahead with the attack on Freetown.

  • Sam Bockarie ordered Superman to go and attack Port Loko, to move with these troops going to Freetown; isn't that true?

  • I don't understand the questions, sir.

  • In order to - you've told us before that in planning an attack, it's important to cut off the supplies, the reinforcements, that would be coming to the defenders. Do you remember telling us about that tactic?

  • Well, I said it's a military tactic, but it was not compulsory for a commander to carry out that kind of thing. It's up to the commander to know how to carry out or plan his attack.

  • In order to attack Freetown, it was critical to try to take Port Loko, to cut off any reinforcements; isn't that true?

  • Well, no, because they had attacked Freetown before we carried out the attack on Port Loko.

  • Port Loko was controlled, the supply routes, from either Lungi airport or from Guinea; isn't that true? You could cut off supplies coming from Guinea or from Lungi by holding Port Loko; isn't that correct?

  • Well, there's a road leading from Port Loko to Lungi, and there's a road leading by the Guinean border.

  • The road from Conakry to Freetown would pass through Port Loko, correct?

  • Yes, my Lord. Yes, sir.

  • If we could look at the map at tab H - excuse me, 16, I believe. Yes, 16H. We see from this map that in order to go from Lungi by road, by major road, through Freetown - to Freetown, the road goes through Port Loko, correct?

  • Yes.

  • And we see, if you look at the very top left, Conakry, the road from Conakry to Freetown passes through Port Loko, correct?

  • Yes, it passes through Port Loko.

  • And, Mr Sesay, in an attack on Freetown, the only quick way for ECOMOG to reinforce its forces would either be by air, landing at Lungi, or by road from Guinea, forces that were also in Guinea; isn't that true?

  • But the ECOMOG had a field where they landed in Hastings.

  • And that was being attacked by the RUF in January 1999; isn't that correct?

  • No. It was the AFRC, it was not the RUF fire.

  • Well, that's true. Before the AFRC entered Freetown, they attacked that airport and they burned it, didn't they? Airfield. They burned planes and structures, correct?

  • That is what I saw later when I came to Freetown because I wasn't there. But the men came to Hastings, and from Hastings they moved and they met an ECOMOG base at Jui and that was cleared, and they crossed over to Orugu Bridge. That is what they explained to us when we met up. That is what I used to hear from them. Even the Prosecution witnesses, like Junior Lion and others, that is what they explained. They used the main road from Hastings, marched using the main road across the Orugu Bridge, and they came to town. They moved up to Wellington, and they used the old road and the new road. That is Junior Lion's testimony.

  • Orugu Bridge, your Honours, is previously on the record. I believe it's O-R-O-G-U [sic].

  • Mr Sesay, that's also known as Jui Bridge, correct?

  • It is Orugu Bridge that I know.

  • Mr Sesay, let's go back for a moment to - thank you, Madam Court Officer, for the map - to talk about the death of SAJ Musa and look at testimony from 6 October 2008, page 17976. At the beginning of the page it says:

    "Q. Was your brother E-boy killed? Was he killed in

    battle or was he killed in another way?

    A. During battle. They said when Koidu was attacked, that

    was when he was killed."

    But I'm more interested in going down the page where the witness says at line 18:

    "Well, at the time we were there we heard communication.

    At the time we went to Brigadier Mani, I and Wallace went

    there and we were there when a call was made that they

    wanted reinforcements. They were there together with

    Superman. They said they wanted reinforcement and that SAJ

    Musa had been shot in Freetown.

    Q. Okay. Where were you when you heard this


    A. At Superman's house. That's where we were sitting


    Q. Was Superman present?

    A. Yes, they were all sitting there outside.

    Q. Now, you said that 'we were there when a call was made

    that they wanted reinforcements'. Who made the call to

    your group?

    A. Well, it was Five-Five who called that they had shot

    SAJ Musa and that they wanted reinforcements."

    Mr Sesay, after SAJ Musa was killed, Gullit and Five-Five, they called and they asked Bockarie to send reinforcements. Isn't that true?

  • According to my operator, it was Gullit's name that was mentioned to Bockarie's operator, that Gullit told Sam Bockarie that Sam Bockarie had died.

  • Your Honours, can the witness kindly repeat this part of his answer and slowly.

  • Sir, Mr Sesay, the interpreter lost you. You have to speak a little slower and clearer. What we got is you said, "According to my operator, it was Gullit's name that was mentioned to Bockarie's operator". Continue.

  • Yes. According to Bockarie's operator, what he told my operator, he said Gullit told Sam Bockarie that SAJ Musa was dead. So Gullit - sorry, Sam Bockarie told Gullit that if what he was saying was true, then Gullit should wait where they were around Benguema and he should send reinforcement. Sam Bockarie said they should wait for reinforcement to come so they would go and attack Freetown, but Gullit did not wait and Sam Bockarie did not send instructions to me and I did not send any reinforcements to Freetown.

  • Well, you sent Rambo to Waterloo, didn't you?

  • Rambo came to Waterloo where they fought for about two weeks before they could get ECOMOG. That was late February in 1999. Those men were then on the withdrawal before they could occupy Waterloo.

  • Mr Sesay, excuse me. Mr Sesay, the question asked you about half a page ago by counsel was: After SAJ Musa was killed Gullit and Five-Five, they called and asked Bockarie to send reinforcement, that's true? In other words, it was Gullit and Five-Five's group that called and asked for reinforcement from Bockarie. From your answer, the answer would seem to be yes. Yes?

  • I said, my Lord, I heard Gullit's name. I did not hear about Five-Five. I never heard that Five-Five called Bockarie for reinforcement.

  • Yes. But the subject of the call was that they were asking for reinforcement, weren't they? They were asking Sam Bockarie for reinforcement, were they not?

  • No. The subject - what I understood is that Gullit told Bockarie that SAJ Musa had died. He did not ask for reinforcement at this stage. He only passed on the information to Sam Bockarie that SAJ Musa had died and Bockarie said if SAJ Musa has died, let Gullit wait so they would send him information to Makeni so all of us would go and join them to attack Freetown. That is what I heard, my Lord.

  • Are you saying that Bockarie offered reinforcement which was never asked for? He asked them to stay in Benguema and wait for reinforcement when they never asked him for reinforcement? Is this your evidence?

  • I am only saying what I heard, my Lord.

  • Answer my question. Are you saying that Bockarie volunteered reinforcement when he was never asked for reinforcement?

  • Yes, ma'am, that is what my operator told me. That is what my operator told me.

  • Did Bockarie offer to send reinforcements?

  • Yes, based on the instructions that he gave to Gullit that Gullit should wait so he could coordinate with us in Makeni to go and attack Freetown. But Gullit did not wait and they went ahead with the plan to go and attack Freetown.

  • So Bockarie was willing and working to coordinate his attack with Gullit, correct?

  • Yes, when Gullit told him, he was willing. But because Gullit did not go by Bockarie's instructions - you know, Bockarie told Gullit to wait and Gullit did not wait, so he did not go ahead with what he was told.

  • I need an explanation from you, Mr Sesay. Earlier on today, this morning, you said to us that when SAJ Musa's group left the RUF and went off on their own towards Freetown, they did this on their own; it had nothing to do with the RUF. Isn't that what you told us this morning?

  • Now, explain this to me. I need to understand why, all of a sudden, Bockarie is volunteering to send reinforcement at Benguema. Why was he volunteering to send reinforcement to this renegade group at Benguema? Why?

  • Yes, my Lord. My Lord, this group was controlled by SAJ Musa. He was the commander. And he and Bockarie had no business. So when Gullit has now told Bockarie that SAJ Musa is dead, so Bockarie now saw that, because Gullit was his friend, he was ready to work with him. And he said, "If SAJ Musa is dead, so wait there, let me tell my men in Makeni so all of you could meet up together to go and attack Freetown." But Gullit did not wait and he went ahead to go and attack Freetown, my Lord.

  • Okay. Thank you.

  • I would like at this time to ask the witness some questions. Did you hear about a radio broadcast and I'm just --

  • Mr Koumjian, just before you do.

    Mr Sesay, counsel asked you a question, I'm referring here to page 88, line 8. "You sent Rambo to Waterloo." And your answer is, "Rambo came to Waterloo." Did you send him or did he go on his own, a frolic of his own?

  • My Lord, after the failed attack on Port Loko, at that time the AFRC were in Freetown. It was Bockarie who gave the instructions that Rambo and others should go towards Waterloo. And when Rambo and others went to Waterloo, they met the ECOMOG there, the Guineans, and they fought for two weeks before they could get Waterloo. And when they got Waterloo, it was in February and when the AFRC was retreating from central Freetown.

  • Mr Sesay, I'm asking about the order. Are you saying now that you didn't order Rambo, but Sam Bockarie ordered Rambo?

  • My Lord, the instructions came to me from Sam Bockarie for Rambo to go to Waterloo.

  • And you, in turn, ordered Rambo to go, yes?

  • Yes, my Lord, yes.

  • And the instruction, Mr Sesay, was, "Go to Freetown. Take Waterloo and go to Freetown." Correct?

  • Well, the instruction was, you know, if you could get Waterloo then you could go to Freetown. But if you could not get Waterloo you could not go to Freetown. And even when we got Waterloo we could not go because ECOMOG was in Hastings and in Jui, so they could not go further than that.

  • The purpose of attacking Waterloo was to get to Freetown, to seize the capital, the seat of power, correct?

  • And that was the order you gave to Rambo that came from Sam Bockarie, correct?

  • Yes.

  • Could we please play a radio clip, P-279, the transcript is - that's 279A is the radio clip and B is the transcript.

    And while that's being done, we played a video, December '98, and I'd ask that video be marked for identification. Also we had a satellite photograph 16H, in tab 16H, where Port Loko and surroundings areas, Lungi and Conakry, are depicted --

  • Mr Koumjian, first of all, in relation to that video clip, we are not agreed as to what that video clip depicts. I asked you and you still wouldn't tell me. So unless and until I understand what it is we are admitting in evidence, I can't admit it in evidence. What does that video clip depict? Other than somebody moving with their camera, probably a satellite camera, from location to location and back and forth? What is it an evidence of?

  • That's fine, your Honour. I'd ask then to mark the photograph, the satellite photograph, 16H, for identification.

  • Even the satellite photograph, what does it depict, other than location names? What is it supposed to depict?

  • What it depicts of significance, is the significance of Port Loko, that the roads from Lungi and from Conakry to Freetown would pass through Port Loko. So it demonstrates the significance of Port Loko to cutting off reinforcements that could come to Freetown.

  • I don't see the roads there. I don't see the roads on this particular map leading from Conakry to Freetown. I don't.

  • The road is marked in yellow. The testimony is in, your Honour. I mean, the witness confirmed what I'm saying so if your Honours do not want --

  • You see, Mr Koumjian, there is no legend on these Google maps that you keep giving us, unlike ordinary topographical maps that have legends to explain what is what. I know you asked the witness and he could have told us that testimony even without a map. So unless a map has value added to the evidence, we are not just going to collect exhibits for the sake of collecting exhibits. If you insist, I will take it, but, frankly speaking, it adds no value to the witness's testimony.

  • I do not insist. I was saying that the witness, in fact, verbally reaffirmed everything I think I just said. So I don't need the map marked.

  • Right. Let's proceed to the next exhibit that you were drawing our attention to. I think it's already exhibited, P something.

  • P-279 is a video BBC broadcast and the transcript is currently displayed, but I'd ask if that could be played by the video booth. I think the Court Officer is checking.

  • [Video played to the Court]

  • Now, Mr Sesay, you recognise the voice of the person who called Focus on Africa as being FAT Sesay, one of the SLAs, correct?

  • Yes, Colonel FAT Sesay.

  • And Gullit, his family was from Yaryah in Kono District, isn't that true?

  • And he was the PLO-2 in the AFRC, correct?

  • Yes.

  • When the State House was taken, did Gullit call you?

  • No. Gullit never called my station, nor did he call my radio.

  • Did your operators tell you that Gullit informed Sam Bockarie about taking - entering Freetown and taking State House?

  • Yes, I heard that from my operator.

  • So when Gullit captured State House, he called Sam Bockarie, correct?

  • Well, when they captured State House and the pressure was mounting on them by then, he called Sam Bockarie and told them that they were getting immense pressure from ECOMOG so he said Sam Bockarie should help with reinforcement but Sam Bockarie too did not cooperate at that time to do it. He said, "I had been telling you that you should wait. You did not accept". So he said they should try there on their own. That was what my operator told me, that that was Bockarie's response to them.

  • Bockarie ordered the attack on Port Loko immediately after receiving that news, isn't that true?

  • Well, they had already attacked Freetown at the time Bockarie ordered the attack on Port Loko.

  • Let's read a little bit from testimony, 22 April 2008, page 8287. And this is from AB Sesay, at about line 17, approximately. Thank you. So line 18, the Prosecutor asked the witness, she said:

    "A. Just to go back a little bit, witness, you said that

    after State House was captured the first thing that Gullit

    did was to call Mosquito and other commanders. You've told

    us about Mosquito. Who were the other commanders that

    Gullit called and informed that he had already entered

    Freetown and captured State House?

    A. He called Issa Sesay and also Superman.

    Q. Witness, on that date what are - witness, on what date

    are these communications taking place?

    A. This was the very day, 6 January, the early hours of

    6 January, we had captured State House. That was the time.

    Q. How do you know that Gullit called Issa Sesay?

    A. As soon as the brigade arrived at State House, it was

    in my presence that the set was mounted and he called and

    he said he had now captured State House and he was awaiting

    the reinforcement so that we would be able to capture the

    other barracks.

    Q. How do you know about the communication between Gullit

    and Superman?

    A. Well, like I said, after he had spoken to Mosquito he

    also spoke with Issa and, in my presence also, he talked to

    Superman and he informed them.

    Q. Witness, you've told us about the radio announcement at

    the State House that you heard by Mosquito. Did you hear

    any other radio announcements?

    A. Yes, my Lord.

    Q. When?

    A. That same day, Five-Five also went over the national

    radio and he said the troop led by Gullit had overthrown

    the SLPP and he said the troop is now in full control of

    the city and that they were advising all citizens to comply

    with the rules and regulations of whatever they will hear

    from them later.

    Q. Did you hear any other radio announcements on that day?

    A. Well, that particular day we also heard FAT Sesay. He

    went over the international media and confirmed that, yes,

    he is now based in State House and he is speaking from

    State House. He said that the commander that led the troop

    to Freetown was Tamba Alex Brima and that State House was

    under their full control and he was asking that all

    military personnel should surrender."

    What AB Sesay told this Court in April 2008 was correct, wasn't it? It was FAT Sesay who went over the radio, international radio, spoke to the BBC and told them that Gullit was in charge, correct?

  • Well, those who were in Freetown confirmed it, because even those who were there for the invasion said it; that it was FAT Sesay who spoke about the radio. But what this witness said about me, he was lying. Because even when Gullit called Sam Bockarie from the State House, it was King Perry who was the RUF operator that did the communication and they brought King Perry as a Prosecution witness against me. But King Perry never said that Gullit called me whilst they were in Freetown or that Gullit spoke to me. He never said so, because that did not happen.

  • Mr Sesay, SAJ Musa died in late December. We saw that you testified previously that you learned of his death, you said, the 26th or 27th of December. But he died in late December and now January 6th, more than a week later, during that time had you communicated with your friend Gullit?

  • No, I did not communicate with him.

  • Well, we were not on the same operation. He did not call me and I did not call him. And even the operator who was there with him served as a witness against me. You brought him to court against me. That I never called Gullit and Gullit never called me.

  • Mr Sesay, when you heard that the - this radio announcement, where it was announced by FAT Sesay that the combined forces of the RUF and the AFRC had taken control of Freetown, were you happy?

  • I knew that he was lying because by then the RUF was in Makeni. The RUF was not part of the attack in Freetown. So they were just like trying to create fear amongst the ECOMOG troops and the Kamajors who were in Freetown to show off that their strength was a larger strength, but I knew that he was lying. And even people who were in Makeni knew that the RUF were in Makeni.

  • So hearing that your enemies ECOMOG had been defeated in Freetown, that a forces that included Alfred Brown and King Perry had taken control of State House and had announced to the world that the new regime was the combined forces of the RUF and the AFRC, that didn't please you in any way?

  • Well, I was not part of that operation, so that could not have pleased me because I was not part of the planning, nor was I part of the execution of the attack on Freetown. And I did not contribute anything to the attack on Freetown. And those who went to Freetown, when they got to Freetown they promoted themselves to brigadiers, so I was not part of that.

  • Mr Sesay, what was the reaction in Makeni among the RUF to this radio announcement?

  • Well, we heard it over the BBC that they had entered Freetown but that was an AFRC operation. It was an independent operation that they carried out, so I did not get any different reaction towards that.

  • The RUF was jubilating at this news all over the country. Isn't that true?

  • Well, I did not see the RUF jubilate for that because I did not jubilate for that.

  • Let's look at the testimony of some other Defence witnesses. If we could have the transcript of 11 March 2010, page 37144. Actually, 37145, I'll begin reading there. This is line 4. The witness says:

    "A. BBC.

    Q. Do you remember the name of the programme?

    A. Focus. Focus was one of the most informative at that

    time. Anything that happens in Africa, they relay those

    informations to --

    Q. And what was the reaction where you were among the RUF

    to the invasion? How did the soldiers react when they


    A. There was jubilation."

    And I'll read from another Defence witness. 26 March 2010.

  • Sorry. Before you continue, does that reference place the witness concerned in Makeni?

  • I don't have that off the top of my head. I don't believe that witness was in Makeni, but we can look it up, as can the Defence. But I will be coming to someone who was in Makeni. DCT-215, 26 March 2010, page 31314.

  • So starting at line 4 with the answer:

    "Some of the RUF authorities, because even me, I was in Jojoima, all I thought - I thought it was a joint operation that the RUF, SAJ Musa and others had captured Freetown. But it was only later that I got to know that RUF did not enter Freetown. So we were all jubilating when that particular invasion took place."

    And then if we could have the testimony from 27 January 2009. I don't know if I have time, your Honour, to read one more. I think it's probably better to do it after the break.

  • Very well. We'll continue after the luncheon break at 2.30. Court adjourns.

  • [Lunch break taken at 1.31 p.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 2.34 p.m.]

  • Good afternoon.

    Mr Koumjian, please continue.

  • Thank you. Could the witness please be shown the transcript from 8 September 2008, page 15719.

  • Good afternoon, Mr Sesay.

  • Yes, sir, good afternoon, sir.