The transcripts of the trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia. More…

  • [On former affirmation]

  • Mr Taylor, yesterday we commenced looking at testimony given to this Court by radio operator called Perry Kamara. You recall that?

  • Yes, I do.

  • Now, I would like to complete that process today before we move on to another witness. Now, before I come to some further details of his testimony, Mr Taylor, can I ask you this: During the time that you tell us you were in contact with the RUF, how regularly would you yourself communicate with them? I am saying how regularly would you personally be on the radio speaking to Foday Sankoh, for example?

  • How would that communication operate, Mr Taylor?

  • If I had to get a message to Sankoh, I would pass it through - first it would go through my assistant, to the radio operator, who was Butterfly, and then to Foday Sankoh.

  • And tell me, was any communication ever done in written form?

  • Oh, I am not - I would suppose that they would keep some record, but I don't know how the operators did it. I would call in my special assistant at the time and give a message that I wanted to see Sankoh, I wanted to ask certain questions about progress, and he would go out and give the message, it would be relayed, and upon receiving the message - in most cases it would be in writing. They would bring it in on a piece of paper to me, and I would assume that they probably kept some record. But they would bring the report back to me on a sheet of paper.

  • What I am asking is this, Mr Taylor: Would you ever personally write a note and send it to Foday Sankoh?

  • Whatever we had to do - you know, I had to do was not - I had aides and assistants. We had a whole system set up. I just didn't write any personal notes to anybody. What I had to do, I delivered it in instructions form. The individuals took notes, but I personally didn't have to write, no.

  • Now, tell me, the modes of communication employed, you've mentioned radio?

  • What about communication by satellite phone?

  • No. At the time I was in contact with Foday Sankoh - and I am talking about August '91 through May, June '92, Foday Sankoh did not have a satellite telephone in Sierra Leone at the time.

  • Did you have one at that time?

  • Now, what about contact via landline, Mr Taylor?

  • No, no, no, no. There are no landlines in that part of the world, no.

  • And I am asking you these questions for a very good reason, which we'll come to in due course. Did you provide advice to Mr Sankoh on what tactics to employ?

  • No, I didn't.

  • Did you advise Mr Sankoh as to which targets to engage?

  • No, I knew nothing about Sierra Leone to advise on targets, no.

  • Did you advise Mr Sankoh as to appointments within the ranks of the RUF?

  • No. No. I didn't know his people. No.

  • Tell me, Mr Taylor, where is Sierra Rutile?

  • I heard in this Court that it's a place in Sierra Leone.

  • It's in Sierra Leone, from what I know.

  • Yes. Where in Sierra Leone?

  • I have no idea. I don't know the town, village area. I don't know. I just know from hearing here in court that it's a place in Sierra Leone.

  • I have a good reason to ask you, Mr Taylor, so I am going to press you on this. What is the strategic importance of Sierra Leone Rutile?

  • I really don't know. I really don't know what is the importance of Sierra Rutile. I really do not know.

  • Is it a diamond mining centre, for example?

  • I do not know what Sierra Rutile is, no.

  • One other matter before we go into further detail with this witness. How many radio operators did you have, Mr Taylor?

  • Oh, I would say about 30, 35 or more radio operators.

  • And how many were personally assigned to you?

  • My operator was Butterfly. One, only Butterfly.

  • Did you have any other operator?

  • No, I didn't have any other operator but Butterfly.

  • Did you personally have a code name?

  • In fact, I had - they called me unit 1. That was the code name that they would use. They also used 047, they used that. And they also used - I think it was Ivory or Ebony - the Vice-President - I think I was Ebony and the Vice-President was Ivory. So they used Ebony, unit 1, 047.

  • Did you Foday Sankoh have a code name?

  • To the best of my knowledge, yes, he did have a code name.

  • My remembrance is that his code name was Toyota, that I remember.

  • Now, bearing all of that in mind, let us look further at the evidence of this witness. And remember, we are dealing with the evidence of this witness, who is called Perry Kamara. Page 3049 of the transcript of 4 February 2008:

    "When Sankoh was ready to go on the peace talks in Abidjan, he left Mohamed Tarawalli in charge as acting leader. Mosquito came next to him, and Issa too went next to Mosquito, and so then he went. After he went, Mohamed Tarawalli got missing in action, then Foday Sankoh appointed Mosquito as the leader. That was how the structure changed."

    Pause. Mr Taylor, did you appoint Mosquito as leader of the RUF in the absence of Foday Sankoh?

  • No, I did not.

  • Did you appoint him a general?

  • "Q. You said Mohamed Tarawalli got missing in action.

    When was this?

    A. It was in 1996."

    Now, I want you to listen carefully to this:

    "Q. During the period up until 1994, what was the state of

    communication that you had, the RUF had with Liberia?"

    Note 1994, Mr Taylor, yes?

  • "A. If you are talking about radio communication, it was

    cordial. It was cordial.

    Q. And can you comment on the frequency of the

    communications with the NPFL?

    A. Well, we always spoke to the NPFL at any time Mr Sankoh

    want to speak to Mr Taylor; at any time Mr Taylor wanted

    to speak to Mr Sankoh. That happened every two, three,

    days, but every moment we used to send message to the NPFL

    in Liberia and they would also send message to us, because

    the Liberians knew our communication code and we also had

    their communication code, so that was how it was arranged."

    What do you say about that frequency of contact, Mr Taylor?

  • I would just - there was - even "frequency" is an exhaustive word. There was just no contact in 1994 or 1993 that came from me to the RUF. None whatsoever. That is totally false. Totally false.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, we've heard repeatedly from witnesses called by this Prosecution of supply lines being cut by ULIMO. You recall that evidence, don't you?

  • So help me. If you were not supplying anything to the RUF, why were you - why were you in such regular contact with them, according to this witness?

  • The fact is I was not. That's it. This witness - what am I going to be talking to Foday Sankoh about in 1994 that I did not talk to him about in 1992 - late 1992 and that I did not speak to him about in 1993. There was no contact.

    Now, I would not dispute if this witness said that maybe, like some of these boys that got to know each other, would call each other across radio lines, ordinary operators. We had - every major town and city that we captured in Liberia, we put a radio. Now, these boys, like Nya, who came from Nimba County, and some of these other boys that were on the other side, it would not be unusual for a Liberian who was fighting on that side, wanting to talk to somebody in the NPFL area, let's say if you have a relative somewhere in Nimba and you want to call and say, "Oh, tell my mother I am okay", something like that. Officially with this Charles Taylor or any senior general or administrator in the NPFL, there was no contact whatsoever. I certainly did not speak to Foday Sankoh or gave him a message or received a message from him at the end of the period in 1992. So that is totally out of question that there was supposed to be some contact between me and anybody. In fact, I never even spoke on the radio. Never.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, I have to put it to you because it may well be suggested to you in due course: Was it the case that despite the absence of any supplies from you to the RUF in this period, you were none nonetheless still running the RUF project? Do you follow me?

  • I follow you.

  • By remote. Were you doing that?

  • No, I was not. I would say that would be total nonsense that they would be suggesting because it's all about reasoning. If this is true in 1994 - if this is true in 1994 - where there is contact between Foday Sankoh and myself, one must assume that it would continue in 1995 and it should continue in 1996. But we know what happens in 1996, when in early 1996 Foday Sankoh goes out of Sierra Leone into an area that he can contact me and he doesn't. Then he is one ungrateful individual. There was no contact. It is a lie. There was no contact between Foday Sankoh and myself at the end of May/June 1992. None.

  • Now, the witness continues, page 3050, transcript of 4 February 2008:

    "They had code names. Even when they spoke directly. When they were speaking directly to each other they referred to themselves. Mr Taylor called Sankoh Toyota and Mr Sankoh, who was Toyota, referred to Mr Taylor as Ebony."

    Do you agree with that?

  • Well, I agree with the names. I don't agree that we talked. Foday Sankoh and I did not talk on the radio, no. Those codes are correct.

  • The codes are correct, but what do you dispute?

  • I dispute that we spoke on the radio personally, no. I would give a message and Foday Sankoh would send a message. I never spoke on the radio with Foday Sankoh, no, but messages were passed, I accept that.

  • Now, it continues:

    "But at times they used to refer to themselves as subjects, when they never wanted to use the same code at all times. But sometimes when we went on the Liberian net we referred - we called Mr Taylor's radio station Butterfly and then when they went to our radio net they would call 35, so we would know automatically that they were calling from Liberia."

    Now, was your radio station called Butterfly?

  • Not to my knowledge. My radio operator was called Butterfly. I don't know how they would communicate with each other, but Butterfly was my operator and when that operator got on the air to any NPFL area they would know that that message was coming from me. I don't know if that was the station name, but I know the operator was called Butterfly.

  • So you agree with the code names Toyota, Ebony and Butterfly?

  • What about three five, 35?

  • No, I don't know what they called themselves on the other side, their station, I don't.

  • Right. Now this, Mr Taylor: Remember I asked you about you providing military advice to Foday Sankoh?

  • The witness says this:

    "Q. Did the military situation in Sierra Leone change at

    some point?

    A. Yes, in that year 1994, the government troops attacked

    us and we were restless. We always took our ammunition and

    flee and we always took our ammunitions and carried them on

    our heads. But during this period" - 1994, note - "in my

    presence, Mr Sankoh called Mr Taylor and Mr Taylor said,

    'You should stop attacking.' He said, 'You should use your

    guerilla tactics at this point so that you will be able to

    gain from the government.' What was this guerilla tactics?

    He said, 'You should make sure you set an ambush and

    secondly you should avoid towns' and indeed that was how it

    happened. The ammunition we had we never used to attack

    again. We would set an ambush and we would prepare

    ourselves in what we referred to as the jungle. We avoided

    the towns and then we based in the bush. We would cook

    only at night."

    Did you provide such advice?

  • Never did. Never provided Foday Sankoh, you know - and if I did I would say I did. If I say I gave Foday Sankoh arms in 1991/92, what would an advice be as compared to arms? Look, I just never advised Foday Sankoh. Foday Sankoh fought his war. He was a trained man, a trained soldier. I have never done any military training in my life. I have read military documents but I have done no training. I could not and did not give Foday Sankoh any military advice in 1994 when he had been fighting a war since 1991. I am supposed to be advising him in '94 on how to fight? This is nonsense. I never gave him any military advice. None.

  • Now, you have heard evidence in this Court, have you not, of a change in the tactics of the RUF when they created their zoebushes in the jungle. You've heard that?

  • Yes, I have.

  • Now, was it you who dictated that change in strategy, Mr Taylor?

  • No, I did not. And I think if we refresh a little bit, I think in Foday Sankoh's own publication of the RUF "Footpaths to Democracy", Foday Sankoh explains what led to all of his decisions. It was not informed by what Charles Taylor said or didn't say because I was not in contact. No, did not have anything to do with that whatsoever. I think Foday Sankoh's action was informed by the situation on the ground. That's my own suggestion.

  • Well, we have looked at "Footpaths to Democracy" and I don't intend to go back to it now.

    Page 3053 of the transcript of 4 February 2008. The witness had mentioned that no supplies were coming through from Liberia and he was then asked this question:

    "Q. Do you recall what sort of subjects would be discussed

    at this time that there were no supplies coming through?

    What would be the subject of their communication?

    A. Yes, you know, as we all observed the process in Sierra

    Leone, Mr Sankoh always - was always advised by Mr Taylor.

    At any time Mr Sankoh received message from Mr Taylor, we

    will undertake a serious attack. The RUF will attack the

    government troops. On many occasions as a radio man of the

    RUF I received, I monitored, I read from the log books,

    for example, when a place like Sierra Rutile - because

    Sankoh told us that he wanted to look for a major place

    that he would attack according to Mr Taylor's advice."

    What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

  • Total, total, total fabrication. I never gave Foday Sankoh any advice in 1994. Never talked to him, needless to say give him advice. Never.

  • Now Sierra Rutile, the witness confirmed, is in the Bonthe District in the southern parts of Sierra Leone. Did you know that?

  • Page 3058:

    "Q. Now, you were talking about advice that was given to

    Mr Sankoh following the capture of Sierra Rutile and one of

    those pieces of advice was that the RUF should set up

    diplomatic relations with the outside world, as you stated

    it. Apart from that, was any other advice given on

    anything else?"

    Did you provide such advice, Mr Taylor?

  • No, I did not. But let's reflect on the evidence before this Court given by a Prosecution witness. A Prosecution witness came in this witness chair and told this Court that a group of them that were academics had advised Sankoh to pursue a diplomatic course and that I was in fact just using the RUF and it took him some time but finally he accepted it. And that witness is protected, I can't call his name, but he appeared before this Court very late during the Prosecution's presentation as one of their academics.

    So this is a blatant lie because from what he said was that there was a debate in their team as to what they should do outside to get the word of - this advice did not come from me. It came from their own academics within their organisation.

  • And you may recall that that witness also told us that they set up an external delegation based in the Cote d'Ivoire?

  • And went on to complain about the behaviour of Foday Sankoh whilst he also was in the Cote d'Ivoire with them. Do you recall that?

  • So I ask again, Mr Taylor: Who was it who decided to set up or establish diplomatic relations? Was it on your advice or was it on their own internal debates within their RUF?

  • It's on their own internal debate within the RUF. It had nothing to do with Taylor. Taylor had no contact with them.

  • Well, in answer to that question posed to the witness, the witness said this:

    "Yes, I recall some that I can say now. In fact, this was a message from Mr Taylor to Foday Sankoh saying for now those people have moved to that point, they should try and make an arrangement to choose a particular area where they should construct an airstrip for aeroplane to be alighting there. And it was a written message from Mr Taylor to Foday Sankoh. After Mr Sankoh had received the message, he sent the message to Kailahun and then he appointed somebody who was called Peter B Vandi and said to him that he should be with the civilians day and night and that they should make sure that they do the job and what was the job? For them to construct an airfield. And this airfield, it was chosen at Buedu."

    Did you do that, Mr Taylor?

  • Never did that. What was supposed to be sent to this airfield for me? There were no planes. I had no planes in Liberia. So what was I supposed to be sending to Foday Sankoh? I never, never told or advised anyone, because there was no contact with them, to construct any airfield. I would suppose, and I would just put forward a proposition, at this time because of maybe their external delegation they are making contacts outside. But within Liberia, where am I supposed to get an aircraft from that would take off from Liberia to go into RUF area when I don't have any contacts with them? This has to be an external situation, I would suppose. But not from Charles Taylor, no.

  • Well, let me put the following propositions to you then, Mr Taylor: Was it the case that because ULIMO had cut off road transport to Sierra Leone, you decided to adopt another means of supplying them? Do you follow me?

  • That was not the case because that would suppose also that first of all I would what? I would have the material and I would have the aircraft, the means, to deliver it there. There was no aircraft in NPFL area in 1994 and don't let's forget what's happening around this time in 1994. If we just reflect very briefly to the Court, in 1994 it's a very, very tough year. 1994, by mid-1994, and again we don't get time here - 1994, what happens? I go to Akosombo in Ghana for a meeting. And what happens at that time in 1994? Gbarnga, my headquarters, is overrun. Gbarnga is overrun in 1994 while I'm out.

    So while they have opened it up, but 1994 is a year of fighting on the NPFL side. We don't have any aircraft. If there were any aircraft, they would have been seized when they took over Gbarnga. So there is no such thing. I go and I come back from Akosombo and I have to fight for three months up until November 1994 before I regain control of my headquarters and other major towns. This is totally, totally untrue. Totally.

  • Well, what about this proposition then, Mr Taylor: You may not have had the aircraft, but then you may have got your good mate, Blaise Compaore, to be sending arms and ammunition by air to this airstrip constructed on your instructions in Buedu. What do you say about that?

  • I would say that is totally nonsense, because Blaise would not be sending material to me. If anybody needed material in 1994, I needed it. Because my headquarters had been overrun, all the arms and ammunition - the armoury was in Gbarnga at the time - had been captured by enemy forces. So if anybody needed help, I needed help. But the fact of the matter is there was just no contact whatsoever with Sankoh in any shape or form. None whatsoever.

  • Now, page 3073 of the transcript.

    "Q. How far beyond Sierra Leone were you able to

    communicate by radio?

    A. We communicated in Sierra Leone and apart from that, we

    had communications with Liberia with Charles Taylor, and we

    also had communication with Abidjan. Then we also had

    communication when Sankoh went for the Lome Peace Accord.

    He went with a radio. When he was patrolling for the peace

    talk, wherever he would go, like where I mentioned, would

    have a personal communication on this particular radio."

    Did you know about that, Mr Taylor?

  • About Sankoh moving --

  • Travelling with a radio operator and a radio?

  • No, I did not know. I was not in contact. No, I didn't know what he was doing, no.

  • Then this:

    "Q. Now, regarding communications with Liberia, how was

    it? How would this operate?

    A. Well, the Liberia communication was a direct contact

    from our control station to Charles Taylor's radio station.

    That was effective. I would almost say it was every day."

    What do you say about that?

  • Total nonsense. We are talking about what year? 1996 now? Am I right about that?

  • Well, he doesn't give a date.

  • Well, he talks about Abidjan communication with Charles Taylor also --

  • Well, I am not so sure that this question is tied to that answer, Mr Taylor, so let's not limit it in that way.

  • Okay. No, there was no contact. I don't know where - there was just no contact. And if there were contact with Foday Sankoh, why would I sit before the Court - this boy is lying. There was no contact with Foday Sankoh at all. I, Charles Taylor, at this period had no contact with Foday Sankoh. And if I had, I would say, "Yes, I was in contact with Foday Sankoh." That didn't mean I was doing something for him, but I was not at all.

  • Mr Taylor, who is Mr Martin?

  • Mr Martin? I don't know who Mr Martin is. Mr Martin?

  • Well, according to this witness, page 3080 of the transcript of 5 February 2008:

    "Mr Martin was a very good coordinator. He was also an agent for Mosquito, moving from Buedu to Monrovia for arms and ammunition arrangements with Mr Taylor."

    Who is this Mr Martin, Mr Taylor?

  • I don't know any Mr Martin. And what year are we into now?

  • Well, I can't help you with that.

  • Yes, for arms and ammunition arrangements with Mr Taylor. So Mr Taylor, help me, was it Mr Martin; was it Jungle; was it Varmuyan Sherif? Who was the coordinator, the liaison person? Who was it?

  • There was no liaison. I don't know Mr Martin or nobody. There was no liaison if we are talking about movement to Monrovia, so I would interject that we must be talking about - maybe I shouldn't say "we must be talking about", because I am in Monrovia. We are talking about two different times. I would say between 1995 up to my election of 1997 July, that's one period; and 1997 July up until the end, that's another period. So I don't know which period he is talking about.

    Assuming that he is talking about the period of my presidency, there is no coordinator between the RUF and my government. By the time in '98 that I make the contact by inviting Sam Bockarie, there is no coordinator. Sam Bockarie is the one that we are dealing with.

  • Well, try and help us, Mr Taylor. Because we have heard a lot of evidence about liaisons between you and the RUF. Now, try and help us; who was it?

  • Was it him? Was it Jungle? Was it Mr Sherif?

  • Right. Was it Senegalese?

  • No, none of them. None of them served --

  • Was it Eddie Kanneh?

  • Was it Ibrahim Bah?

  • There was no coordinator. I dealt with Sam Bockarie. There was no coordinator that I had. I mean, at my level when I wanted Sam Bockarie, he came, he left. But I did not use any coordinator between the RUF and my government, no. I dealt with them directly. There was no coordinator.

  • Now, the witness went on to say this, page 3083 of the transcript 5 February 2008:

    "Q. Now, you have mentioned Sankoh and Mosquito having

    satellite phones. Did any other person or any other leader

    of the organisation get a satellite phone at some stage?

    A. Yes. The time Sam Bockarie left and went to Liberia to

    Mr Taylor, and again when Foday Sankoh was arrested in

    Freetown during the May incident 2000, Issa took over as a

    leader - as acting leader of the RUF. During that time

    again Issa had a satellite phone through Liberia, so he

    himself was talking to Mr Taylor. So whatever they

    discussed, he would do the same thing by sending messages

    to all commanders through field radio communications. And

    even if the RUF spokesman or whomsoever was representing

    BBC Focus on Africa or the Voice of America, they would use

    the same satellite phone to talk."

    One question about that, Mr Taylor, did you provide Issa Sesay with a satellite phone?

  • No, I did not.

  • Did you provide Mosquito with a satellite phone?

  • Did you provide Foday Sankoh with a satellite phone?

  • No, I did not. But just to remind you: On the Foday Sankoh satellite phone, there is evidence led here about Foday Sankoh obtaining a satellite phone in 1996 when he went to Abidjan and when he sent one back to Zogoda along with a fax. So that is a part of the records here already.

  • Now, another aspect of this witness's evidence, page 3102 of the transcript 5 February 2008, he gave this answer in answer to this question:

    "Q. Can you describe what happened when you arrived in


    A. Immediately we got to Koidu, there was now

    communication between the authorities, Issa Sesay, Superman

    and Sam Bockarie, for them to reorganisation and base in

    Kono - for us not to loose Kono. The first message that we

    monitored - that we received in our message logbook,

    according to Sam Bockarie, he said he had consulted

    Mr Taylor in Liberia saying that in Kono - as long as we

    have Kono, we will not fail in taking over the rest of

    Sierra Leone again, because we already knew that Kono was

    one of the prominent diamond mining areas in Sierra Leone,

    therefore, all the troops should be on standby there except

    Issa Sesay, Johnny Paul Koroma and the securities who were

    going to escort them to Buedu."

    What do you say about that?

  • Never talked to Sam Bockarie about any such operations in Kono at all. Never did.

  • Well, Mr Taylor, you appreciate that the control of Kono plays a prominent role in the allegation against you, it being, as the witness indicated, a prominent diamond mining area. And you appreciate the suggestion that you were terrorising the civilian population of Sierra Leone in order to exploit their mineral wealth?

  • So did you instruct the RUF to control Kono, as this witness suggests?

  • Never did. Never instructed, never discussed it with them at all. I don't know what it would have taken, as if the RUF - and this Kono based on the testimony here, we are talking about what now, '98, '99? Based on this, that it would have taken somebody from outside to tell these people, who have been dealing with their own people in diamonds all their lives, that Charles Taylor will now say, "Guess what happened? Kono is a place you got to take to do something." This is outrageous. Never held any such discussion or gave any such instructions to Sam Bockarie. Never.

    And I guess, you know, this is a well put together situation where it is important for these little boys to come up and say, I see here where - who is involved here? Johnny Paul Koroma. Well, I get Johnny Paul Koroma released in 1999. He is incarcerated most of the time, so I don't know how he got involved in this, but it just never happened. And I am sure as we proceed, we will get to know - this Court will get to know more about it and this accusation, that this never happened. Never.

  • Let's move on. Page 3104 of the transcript 5 February 2008:

    "They always gave orders, but before the orders were given Sam Bockarie, I can recall, transmitted a message that he had finally had an arrangement with Mr Taylor, because we were now in Kono and we should be able to take care of Kono. He", that being Sam Bockarie, "said Mr Taylor had told him that they should try and reorganise and", note this, "reprepare the airfield at Buedu. So in there they would need civilians to do the work on the field. The RUF sent over 200 to 300 civilians to Kailahun to do forced labour, to work on the field day and night with security escorts. Besides that, we also got rid of some civilians for the mining purpose in Koidu Town in Kono District."

    Mr Taylor, you understand what is being said here, don't you?

  • That for a second time you were giving instructions to Sam Bockarie to reprepare the airstrip in Buedu. Did you do that?

  • No, I did not. And you know, this - I know sometimes it's just too repetitious, but we just have to state it because this is my life that these people are playing here with. Look, then we must conclude, your Honour, that Sam Bockarie's salute report is incomplete. Then he misled his leader in 1999 when he presented his salute report. It's an incomplete report. Then he was not qualified to be left. Because I don't see how all these major advices that I am giving to Sam Bockarie to take Kono and redo this and build airfield for this, and he failed to mention this in his salute report to his boss when he reports in 1999. Then, one, it's incomplete and, two, he was just not fit to be left in control. This is not true. And maybe, thirdly, then he is a very ungrateful individual.

    And I would say that none of those would be true because I would want to believe that he could not have hidden anything from Foday Sankoh and the whole purpose of the reports, all of the reports that have been made, someone would have said: Oh, well, thank you. You cannot help but to thank Mr Taylor for what he did for you and us by advising us to take Kono, by advising us to do this airfield. Remember that airfield that he told you about before, okay, we had to go back behind it.

    Your Honours, this thing is all a lie. It is a lie. It is as black of a lie as it can get. It did not happen. I gave no such advice, so help me God. I didn't. I did not.

  • Now, listen to this, page 3105 of the transcript 5 February 2008:

    "In Koidu Town, before ever we left there, we had another message from Sam Bockarie in which he said he needed money. The arrangement between himself and Taylor has been confirmed and now he needed money. But by then there was a commercial bank in Koidu Town. He passed the order to Superman and he told him that they should destroy the bank. There should be money in there. And with regards the bank, Superman also gave orders to some commanders and the bank was destroyed. There was money in there which were US dollars, Sierra Leone money, sterling pounds and diamonds in a big cup. I saw that with my eyes because where I was working was in Superman's house. Where Superman was was where I did my communications."

    Now, Mr Taylor, firstly, the obvious question: Did you have any hand in that bank robbery in Koidu Town?

  • No, I didn't. I did not. Did not have any knowledge that some bank was in Koidu. I don't know where Koidu is to have to instruct somebody or know that somebody is going to go to break a bank. But my recollection is that there is a different account of this by another witness, so I don't know. This is totally untrue.

  • Well, we know there is a different account and do you recall what that account is, Mr Taylor?

  • My recollection is that this bank was broken into by some individuals without the knowledge of the principal commanders and they were arrested, some of the money recovered. That's as far as I can recollect on this matter.

  • And do you recall what that witness said about the use to which that money was put?

  • I think he said that they used it to buy some material, I think, either from the Guineans or ULIMO, or something like that, and it helped to --

  • Hold that thought, because the witness goes on to say this:

    "Q. Do you know what happened to the money itself?"

    That's the money from the bank, page 3107.

    "A. Yes. Later Mosquito sent a message and said that he

    was going on a trip and where he was going on this trip was

    Liberia to see Mr Taylor. He said he was going to arrange

    for arms, ammunition and food. So when he left with the

    money, he returned with arms and ammunition from Mr Taylor.

    Immediately after his return, he sent a message saying that

    he has brought arms and ammunition and supply from

    Mr Taylor out of the money that was - that he received from

    the RUF in Koidu Town after the bank was destroyed."

    So help us, Mr Taylor. Was the money used to buy arms from ULIMO or did it end up in your pocket?

  • I saw no money. Sam Bockarie wouldn't be stupid enough to bring me money. Sam Bockarie and I didn't have that type of arrangement or that type of contact. That would be - I would have even considered it disrespectful to me if Sam Bockarie had even offered anything. Never. And it's just so terrible that, you know, you are answering these thing, it's almost like a broken record; it didn't happen, it didn't happen. But it really didn't happen that Sam Bockarie would rob a bank and bring me the money in Liberia. It just didn't happen, your Honours. It didn't.

    And I am not sure what year again these people are talking about. I am not sure if this is '98 or '99. I don't know if I can get some help on that.

  • Now, apart from arms and ammunition, Mr Taylor, did you ever provide the RUF with food?

  • No, I didn't give the RUF any food. No.

  • Rice is the staple in that part of the world. Now, did you provide them with rice?

  • No, I did not provide the RUF with rice. No. Foday Sankoh bought rice when he came to Liberia. Now, the time in question here - that's why I'm saying time for me is important here because I don't know what period they are talking about so it's very difficult to ascertain. When Sam Bockarie came to Liberia, he would also buy things and carry and I am sure he carried rice, but I don't know the period now that is in question here, so it's very difficult to answer specifically to what he's talking about.

  • Well, the witness was asked this:

    "Q. What sort of food did you get from Liberia?

    A. We had rice from Liberia. Rice.

    Q. How did you know that this was coming from Liberia?

    A. All the movements between Sam Bockarie and

    Charles Taylor, whatever they arranged, whatever he get

    from Taylor that man would send a message to us, the RUF

    as a whole, that he had received this and this amount of

    food. He had distributed it into jungles, so everybody

    should come for his. That was the same way he distributed

    ammunition. Whatever he would go and get from Mr Taylor he

    would inform us through the radio communication and I was a

    senior man in the radio communication business. I was

    supposed to know all about this."

    Now, Mr Taylor, bear in mind this is a radio operator and we heard from several RUF radio operators in this case.

  • Being radio operators, they are the eyes and ears of the organisation, and this man, this radio operator, is saying that through that role he learned that you were the hidden hand behind all of this. Now, what do you say to that allegation, Mr Taylor?

  • That is totally untrue. I was not the hidden hand. And that's why some of these radio operators and [indiscernible], he talked about a lot of this being in log books. From the log books presented before this Court probably it would be good to go through to see. I don't know as to whether they have all of their log books to see if some of these major allegations, he said that they were recorded, he learned some from log books. I don't know if we can probably go through those log books to see if this is true.

    But this is one of the problems that you have with some of these kinds of situations. Here is a radio operator someplace, not knowing what's going on, Sam Bockarie goes to Liberia. Now I am telling you, and everybody else, during the period that I mediated for ECOWAS in dealing with the RUF I tell this Court if I had given Sam Bockarie rice it would have been within my right to do so. In fact, I would have felt that it was a good thing to do. And there would be nothing about that to hide from this Court, that I gave Sam Bockarie rice.

    That period I did not give Sam Bockarie rice. I have even testified before this Court that during the very tough period I permitted RUF injured persons to take treatment in Liberia, okay. So what would be rice? Of course, non-lethal thing as rice if I give it to them why would I say I didn't?

    Sam Bockarie then came to Monrovia, they did a lot of shopping. They did a lot of shopping. They came to Monrovia, they were not locked up in a prison. They moved around. When they got ready to go back, sometimes they bought clothes, blankets, different things. That was a part of the pacification process that once it was a non-lethal thing - they even bought fuel in Liberia, okay, to keep hospitals going, and old people. So what would be rice that I would sit here and say I didn't give him rice, come on. If I gave him rice it would have been proper for me to give him rice. Once there was something non-lethal it was within my duty to speak to him and to do that.

    It's happening all over the world. You go between the bridge now between China and North Korea, there are trucks moving up and down. That's a part of the process. The process is to pacify as much as possible.

    I would not lie to Jesus about giving Sam Bockarie rice, you understand me. Sam Bockarie bought what he wanted to buy in Liberia that was non-lethal with the knowledge and consent of my government. Whether it was rice - I don't dispute that Sam Bockarie bought rice. I don't dispute that he bought clothes and whatever, sneakers, and bought drugs and other things. I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, did not give it to him. But we are aware that he bought rice.

    Now, here is a little operator someplace, and maybe Sam Bockarie comes back and they see the thing because he's going to Monrovia to see Mr Taylor, if he brings anything, it's coming from Taylor. He doesn't know what he's talking about. That's as plain as I can get with this.

  • But, Mr Taylor, I have to go through these details for this reason, listen to this passage from 3118 of the transcript of the 5 February:

    "It was through our communication systems because within the RUF we didn't hide any information. No information should go beyond - should go without the knowledge of the communication operators because at the time we were not using vehicles."

    So these radio operators are at the centre of things, you understand me?

  • Well, I don't believe that proposition at all. He's got to be out of his head. Because any professional or even semi-professional military organisation well know you are speaking on a two-way radio where every major power in the world got access in the area that you would be on a radio speaking your heart out. It's a blatant lie. Then he is a foolish radio operator because no one does that, okay, except where you have a radio communication system that is secured. And, of course, the little RUF, and even we, did not have secured radio. And what I mean by secured, in advanced military systems you have scrambled systems where you could be right there and as the communication is coming through it is scrambled and then anyone trying to intercept from the outside would not get it except the system on the other side.

    So for this man to say that everything on - I mean, that had to do with the RUF came on the radio? No, it cannot be true. Then I can see why they failed. Because if you are planning an attack and you call and put it on the radio, then of course you expect the enemy - and these radios are open radios that everybody can listen to. Everybody. Of course you know the government of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces and ECOMOG and all these assets in the area will not know, then they were very foolish. So he cannot be right by advancing the idea that nothing was hidden. Then I can see exactly why they messed up so badly, because no matter what happens, even the great military powers will never just get on a radio and just put everything out. And a little radio operator - and then every radio operator, not ones that have been qualified as having access to certain information - because in these organisations, you have a clearance system - at least in my organisation. In my organisation, there were people that had clearance that had access to certain information. And even though it was organisational, but other people in that organisation could not get it because of compartmentation. So he does not - because he wants to impress maybe the OTP that he knows what he is talking about, he is talking foolishness because there are able people on this OTP that know military science and know that this is not correct.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, I appreciate that much of what I am asking you about is tedious and repetitive?

  • But I don't want it to be suggested at a later stage that we didn't challenge aspects of the Prosecution case, do you understand me?

  • So please bear with me. Page 3118 of the transcript.

    "A. In the first instance, if, for example, it is

    tomorrow, the day after that ammunition will be brought,

    Sam Bockarie would say, 'Jungle would bring' - Jungle was a

    strong fighter for Mr Taylor. He would say, 'Jungle will

    bring ammunitions to Foya by helicopter' - this helicopter

    was coming from Monrovia - and offload ammunition in Foya.

    That was in Liberia. Foya is a short distance from Buedu,

    so our vehicles which we had, which Sam Bockarie had, will

    go to collect them and brought it to Buedu. That as well

    would be part of the message, that ammunitions would be

    coming today and the person who will be bringing the

    ammunition, he will call his name in the message, and where

    the ammunition was coming from, he will mention that as


    Q. Now, this person called Jungle who you just mentioned,

    did you get to meet with him at all?

    A. No. Jungle, I don't know him personally, but at any

    time we get message, his name will appear in that

    particular message. And when Jungle came to Buedu, we

    would get information that Jungle had come to Buedu and for

    such and such an arrangement, so I didn't know him


    Q. Did you know whether this person had any other name

    apart from Jungle?

    A. No."

    Now, Mr Taylor, we have had Mr Martin, and now we have Jungle. Tell me, was Jungle a strong fighter for you?

  • Jungle was a junior soldier with the RUF - I mean, with the NPFL that we lost in 1991 when ULIMO cut off Liberia from all information that I got to know. He is a Gissi boy, I understand, that was something like a brother to Sam Bockarie, because Sam Bockarie was believed to be Gissi. And our soldiers got cut off and Jungle, being from the Sierra Leonean-Liberian border, I understand at that particular time became a member of the RUF.

  • When did you come to understand this?

  • While we were - through our investigation here in this trial I got this information of who this Jungle was, and I did not know him personally. So as far as Jungle being some messenger for me, that did not happen.

    But even more important, counsel, I keep pushing this issue of time, because there is something very important about these big accusations being made here. We are talking about Sam Bockarie. This is what this is about. Okay, so we must be talking about, okay, 1998, and this period must end when? In July 1999. So in dealing with Sam Bockarie for me, I am talking about September 1998 to July 1999 --

  • Why July 1999?

  • This is when the Lome agreement is signed and Foday Sankoh is now back. Because during this time, Foday Sankoh is incarcerated. Now - and in looking at this period, in dealing with 1998, there is something important because these accusations are floating at this particular time about arms supplies going in and out of Sierra Leone from Liberia. Now, but something interesting happens that we've led before the Court, and that is, these accusations lead to a major investigation in 1998 where Colonel Dempsey, my Defence Minister, United Nations armed forces personnel, conduct an investigation about Camp Naama and all of these things and file a report. And in that report, Colonel Dempsey and the rest of them do say that there are no arms going across and if any, they are going in small quantities. And I even spoke about that in a speech that I delivered in December 1998 on a major policy thing dealing with Sierra Leone.

    So this thing this man's talking about of arms, ammunition, and breaking banks, these are some of the same lies that were going on during this period about these large shipments that lead to this investigation by the international community involving a colonel from the United States embassy in Monrovia, okay, whose report I saw.

    So it can't be both ways, that they conduct this investigation and find out that all this nonsense in 1998 is not true. But these are the people that led the Prosecution into believing that all these things were true, so we can't - that's why I keep talking about the time, because the time in question, we had an international investigation. So it's not true. It's not true. Okay? And I deal with it at length in December 1998 in a major policy speech that I made in 1998 December on the Sierra Leonean crisis revealing what this commission had come up with and everything. So this is a part of that whole construct of lies that, you know, I keep pushing for the time, because this time had been settled through this investigation by the UN, the American government, represented by Colonel Dempsey. We had my Defence Ministry, other NGOs and everything, they conducted this investigation. So it's just not true, but this is a continuation of these lies.

  • Now, the witness went on to say this, Mr Taylor, at page 3135:

    "It was a continuous message that came from Sam Bockarie almost all the time, but not every day. He said the mining in Kono was very important for the RUF and that will enable us to get arms and ammunition, food and drugs from Charles Taylor, and therefore we should make sure that we get rid of civilians and organised mining units and also hold fast to Kono District, Koidu Town as a whole. These were some of the messages that came in."

    Mr Taylor, this is a radio operator saying that continuously these messages were being sent by Sam Bockarie?

  • I don't know what Sam Bockarie said to them, but I am not in a position to confirm or deny what Sam Bockarie said to his people. But it surely didn't come from Charles Taylor. I have no idea of what Sam Bockarie was telling his people, but it didn't come from me.

  • And the same witness goes on in the same vein a couple of pages later in the transcript, page 3142:

    "Yes, the first stage was the first time he entered Kono. We had a message from Superman - sorry, from Sam Bockarie, Buedu, to Superman concerning mining in Koidu Town. The message said we should not lose Kono at all because it had gone over to Mr Taylor. He had gone over to Mr Taylor for arms and ammunitions, and what Taylor told him is he should try and get Kono. He should not lose Kono, and from Kono we could get diamonds and we can use these diamond. Give it to Taylor and he, in return, would give us ammunition. That was the first message we got."

    I am sorry to sound like a stuck record, Mr Taylor, but the evidence of this witness is replete with these suggestions. So what are you saying about them?

  • They are all lies. Total lies, that's what they are. And I don't know who put him up to this, but they are lies.

  • And in the same vein at page 3146:

    "Mosquito sent us a message to all stations that Johnny Paul Koroma was about to escape with diamonds, but they had been taken away from him. What I understood about the diamond, it was two plastics full. Among the diamonds one of them weighed up to 40 carats. He said he was giving that diamond is Issa Sesay to take to Liberia."

    Guess to whom? "Mr Taylor." What do you say?

  • That's not true. But we heard about another 40 carat that Foday Sankoh was supposed to have given me. I am not sure if this is the same 40 carat that - maybe it got thrown around in their midst. There was no such thing, and I am sure this Court will get to know later that there was no such thing.

  • There is a similar suggestion on page 3148, but I am not going to deal with it. I am going to skip that and go to page 3159 of the transcript:

    "There came a time after this mission Bai Bureh went off, and then we had an instruction from Sam Bockarie that came to Superman that Superman should move to Buedu for a meeting. The purpose of the meeting was for a plan that he brought from Liberia from Charles Taylor so that he will be able to explain to Superman, and then Superman in return will come and explain to the other fighters and other camps on the ground. That was the time we moved to Buedu."

    Mr Taylor, did you use your position on the Committee of Six as a way of camouflaging your dealings with Sam Bockarie and the RUF? You understand me?

  • I understand you.

  • You were using it as a cover?

  • Total nonsense. I would not bring myself so low where my colleagues in West Africa would depend on me for something and I would be dealing with a Sam Bockarie to not just undermine them, but to undermine the whole peace process and Liberia. That is total, total nonsense, no.

  • Because what this suggests, Mr Taylor, is that, in effect, you were micromanaging that war in Sierra Leone; that you were summoning Bockarie to give him specific instructions on what to do on the ground. Is that the case?

  • That is never the case. Never. Never the case.

  • Who is Bai Bureh, Mr Taylor?

  • Have you ever met Superman, Mr Taylor?

  • Now, that conversation regarding the instructions was supposed to have taken place in April-May 1998. April-May 1998, Mr Taylor?

  • 1998 April, we are just - we are getting out of - that's after the intervention. March, Kabbah goes to Freetown. No, there is no such thing, no, in April of 1998 that I would be involved in, no.

  • Now, when Sam Bockarie came to Monrovia, Mr Taylor, did you monitor or have monitored what he purchased to take back to Sierra Leone?

  • It would be monitored, yes.

  • The security personnel that was assigned to observe what they did would monitor them.

  • And what was the purpose of monitoring that?

  • Well, to make sure that during this process they did not get their hands on any war-like material, that is whether it is - you know, anything that would be harmful. Like, whether it was even as simple as a machete, we would not let them buy them in Liberia. We wanted to make sure that we knew at all times what they were doing.

  • What about mining materials?

  • Shovels, shakers and the like.

  • Oh, I am not sure if they bought it, but if they bought it, yes, the security would have monitored that they picked up those things, yes.

  • What about things like radios?

  • And other communication equipment?

  • No, they would not be able to buy communication equipment.

  • Because depending on what type of communication, if these are walkie-talkies they were only sold to security agencies. If they wanted to buy long-range radio equipment that the ordinary radio equipment, unless it was for a purpose in Liberia, we would not let them carry communication because it could be used for military purposes. We would not let them do that.

  • Because the witness at page 3162 speaks of seeing in Sam Bockarie's house a carton of FM commercial radio and a satellite phone:

    "He said all these things, including the diamonds that he had been collecting from Kono, he said they are the things that have provided us with part of this ammunition. He said all the diamonds that we have been sending from Kono and monies, he said these are the things in return for them that Mr Taylor has given. He said more things were coming after."

    That's page 3162 of the transcript. What do you say about that?

  • This boy doesn't know. That's not true. This FM communication radio that he is talking about has been covered by over witnesses here too and who was helping to operate it, such as Hilton Fyle operating this FM communication and where it came from. So there is a different account. Because the FM radio station he is talking about is not like a communication radio. It's a broadcasting station he is talking about. But it's been covered here also. Hilton Fyle was supposed to be helping along with that. It had nothing to do with Charles Taylor. Absolutely nothing. And I am sure other witnesses will come that will even give more details of how they got their radio station.

    I didn't have any FM broadcast. This is not something you go in a store and buy. A broadcasting station had to be ordered, you had to get frequencies for it. It's a broadcasting radio network. This is nothing that the Government of Liberia gave. From my understanding from testimony here this was something that the RUF bought through some of their own contacts and Hilton Fyle was supposed to have been operating it, based on what I heard in this courtroom.

  • Now, Bockarie, according to the witness, showed those items in his house at a meeting that was held to plan an operation and the witness continued in this vein at page 3163 of the transcript of 5 February 2008:

    "Sam Bockarie told us that he was just coming from Mr Taylor's site with a very big plan so that we will be able to take over the country. So I saw them bring a map of Sierra Leone. He said this is how Mr Taylor has planned and he told him to come and implement it. He showed us the areas we should attack. I can still recall the towns that he made mention of on the war plan. One of the towns was Kono, Sefadu itself or you call it Koidu. The other town was Kabala. The other town was Makeni, Magburaka, Matatoka, 91, Masiaka and Waterloo, Waterloo including Port Loko, Kambia. Those were the names that I can recall and they were all on the map. He said that was what they planned before he left Mr Taylor."

    What do you say, Mr Taylor?

  • I don't know Sierra Leone or what the importance of these towns. Sam Bockarie and myself would not sit down to plan anything about what they have been doing in Sierra Leone. I never planned anything with Sam Bockarie. Never even planned it before with his boss Foday Sankoh. Never made any plans or discussions with Sam Bockarie to attack any towns or villages in Sierra Leone. Never did.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, if one looks or recalls a map of Sierra Leone, those towns, Makeni, Magburaka, Matatoka, 91, Masiaka, Waterloo, that looks like Port Loko, that looks like the Freetown invasion, late '98/'99. Did you plan it?

  • No, never planned it. Never knew of it, no.

  • And the witness goes on to say this, page 3164:

    "Q. Did he indicate how you were going to take control of

    these towns?

    A. Yes. In fact, when we came to Buedu, Mr Taylor sent a

    herbalist for these missions. The presence of the

    herbalist will help us to get rid of the town. He said the

    people who are in Kono - I'm sorry, when Superman returns

    back, what he should do, the ammunition that he will carry,

    he should carry them directly to SAJ Musa's place after he

    runs the mission that I am going to refer to again

    Fitti-Fatta mission. But I have to explain how he would

    plan to attack the towns as it was discussed in the

    meeting. He said SAJ Musa and Superman were going to be

    responsible for Kabala and Makeni. The group that was

    going to join Gullit at Rosos, they were going to be

    responsible for Port Loko and Kambia. Those in Kono, after

    Superman had left, they were responsible for Kono, Sewafe,

    Makali, Magburaka, Mile 91. And the meeting point was to

    be Masiaka because Masiaka was a main junction in Sierra

    Leone. After we get to Waterloo then we make a fresh plan,

    a new one. That is what he said Taylor told him.

    Q. Mr Witness, now what was the overall focus of this

    plan? What was the overall focus ultimately?

    A. Well, the main focus was to get Freetown."

    That's page 3164. You planned it, the Freetown invasion, according to this man. You gave the plan to Sam Bockarie. That's what this man is saying?

  • That shows you just how credible he is because all of the other accounts that we have heard here, and this Court is very well aware, from what I listened to in this courtroom of what happened between the RUF and the SLA regarding this gentleman called SAJ Musa. There was no contact. And that SAJ Musa and the SLA were involved in this attack on Freetown and that the RUF was not involved. So this other man comes with his own story. And that's what it is, a real fairytale. I know nothing about any invasion of Freetown. Never planned it, never knew of it at all.

    And his account, his account as he describes it here, goes very much away from other accounts that have been led before this Court. So there are several now before this Court. Different accounts as to how the Freetown invasion occurred. Who were involved, the conflict between the SLA and the RUF, the death of SAJ Musa, that I heard in this Court, how he died, there maybe at least a half dozen different accounts. This is totally, totally untrue. I knew nothing about any attack on Freetown which occurs in January 1999. Nothing whatsoever.

  • Now, the questioning continued in this vein, page 3165:

    "Q. You mentioned the herbalist was sent by Mr Taylor. Is

    that correct?

    A. Yes. One herbalist came. This herbalist - sorry, Sam

    Bockarie gave Superman in Buedu, we all travelled and came

    to Koidu Town. It was this herbalist that was going to

    inspire us so that we will have no fear of attacking Kono

    and the various areas I have named. This herbalist was -

    we were going to use this herbalist to go on a mission that

    we called Fitti-Fatta, Fitti-Fatta mission. This herbalist

    after we had come to Kono before the Fitti-Fatta mission.

    Q. Now, before you get on to going back to Kono, how did

    you know this herbalist came from Mr Mr Taylor?

    A. Well, the herbalist himself was introduced to us

    during the meeting. It was from there that I was able to

    know that he came from Mr Taylor and he said with all

    these plans these were the herbalists who were helping him

    in Liberia. Therefore he sent him to us also so that he

    will come and work for us."

    Mr Taylor, do you believe in juju?

  • No, I don't. No, I don't believe in juju.

  • Well, did you send this herbalist to inspire the RUF?

  • No, I did not. But, you know, I think they were using herbalists in the Kamajors too. These herbalists - how am I going to take somebody that I don't believe in juju and send a herbalist? Maybe a herbalist - that Lofa region, they have a lot of herbalists in that region. Maybe somebody went there and brought somebody from Liberia because the whole Gissi - Sam Bockarie [indiscernible] that's a Gissi place. The Gissi, the Gbandi - these are all spelt in the records here. Gissi, Gbandi, Loma, Mende, that whole area, that's the area where you find herbalists. So when you hear about the Kamajors who were the bush fighters, these are herbalists and different things.

    I did not send any herbalist to Sierra Leone and I did not even use herbalists with the NPFL. So I don't believe that - we saw people walking around claiming different things, but, no, we never. I knew better than trying to depend on some herbalist that would come and do - maybe depending on fetish or whatever, no. I am not of that - I am not in that area, no.

  • Well, Mr Taylor, the cynic might say, "Well, you might not believe in it, but dealing with superstitious people by any means necessary." Do you follow me?

  • Yes, but then if that would be true then I would use it for my own people. I would use it - and I didn't use it in the NPFL, so I wouldn't use it on that side.

  • Now, at that same meeting, the witness claimed:

    "Once again Sam Bockarie told us that the airstrip for which he had received orders from Mr Taylor to construct, work had started constructively on it because we got ammunition through helicopter from Monrovia to Foya and that was a delay, therefore the airfield was also part of the meeting."

    Mr Taylor, again, we're looking at some time in 1998 here, obviously, in light of this is the meeting where the Freetown invasion is being planned. Were you also instructing Bockarie once again to construct this airfield?

  • Never gave him any such instruction, no.

  • The witness goes on to say this, and this is a specific allegation which I want you to address, Mr Taylor, page 3169:

    "Q. What was the ammunition and arms intended for?

    A. These particular arms that were given to us were for

    that Fitti-Fatta mission and also ammunition that Superman

    was supposed to carry to SAJ Musa.

    Q. Did SAJ Musa - did Mosquito say anything about how arms

    and ammunition would be provided for the big plan which he

    had discussed, which was a long-term plan?

    A. Yes. He told us that the ones that he had showed to us

    were not for this, just this first mission plan. He said

    there are more ammunition - of ammunitions coming for that

    big mission. He said that was what Charles Taylor said."

    The implication being you provided the arms for that Fitti-Fatta mission. Did you?

  • No, I did not.

  • And that you promised arms for the bigger plan, the invasion of Freetown. Did you?

  • No, I did not. But again, I just want to leave on the record there are other accounts of how arms were obtained for Fitti-Fatta that we heard in this Court. I am sure we will get into that, maybe with another witness. There is another account of how Fitti-Fatta, or whatever they call it, was put together.

  • Because the witness makes quite clear that this was a very important meeting, a meeting held in Buedu, the witness says. And he continued about that meeting in this vein, page 3179:

    "Q. Did Sam Bockarie get instructions from anyone about

    the plan that was discussed in Buedu, the plan which he

    discussed with Superman in Buedu?

    A. Yes. What he told us, he said he had instructions from

    Taylor. Both of them discussed before he left Liberia -

    before he left Liberia for Buedu. Yes, he had an order

    from somebody, and that person is Mr Taylor.

    Q. How do you know this?

    A. He himself explained it to us during the meeting at

    Buedu. He said this time around when he went to Taylor,

    Taylor called him and gave him instructions how he should

    begin to run operations in Sierra Leone. He told him

    everywhere. He told him the places where to attack, and so

    when he returned he called all the prominent commanders and

    explained to them so that they could take action with

    regard to the instructions. That is what he told us. That

    was one of the agenda items during the meeting which was

    discussed in Buedu."

    So you see the order of things, Mr Taylor: Bockarie goes to Liberia; you summon him; you put to him a plan; he returns to Sierra Leone; armed with your instructions, he organises this important meeting in Buedu where not only is the short-term Fitti-Fatta mission discussed and organised, but also a long-term plan to capture Freetown. And you - according to this man, you are the brains behind it all. Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

  • That is totally incorrect. And if we were to even assume that it was correct, that means that Sam Bockarie failed to follow instructions because from all of the records that I have seen, which is factual, is that Sam Bockarie and the RUF were not involved in this Freetown invasion. So I don't know how I could have sat with him to plan and organise. Then he was just a terrible person, he just didn't - he failed to follow what he was told then. There was no such discussion with this man, and this King Perry, he's - I must admit, he is pretty good at this. He is pretty good at this.

  • Now, in relation to the first part of the plan you are alleged to have provided to Sam Bockarie, he goes on to say this, page 3181:

    "Q. Yesterday we discussed the Fitti-Fatta mission and you

    said that your side took many casualties from that mission,

    and some of the casualties were sent to Liberia for medical

    care. Is that correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Where in Liberia were they taken to?

    A. It was in Monrovia.

    Q. Do you know who facilitated the arrangement?

    A. It was Sam Bockarie and Mr Taylor.

    Q. How do you know this?

    A. Like, for example, when those people were wounded, his

    response to Superman was he had made arrangements with

    Mr Taylor. Whenever we had serious wounded fighters, let

    them be taken to Buedu so that he will send helicopters to

    take them from Foya.

    Q. In your experience, was this the first time that

    fighters of the RUF or wounded fighters of the RUF had been

    evacuated to Liberia for medical care?

    A. No. At any time we had serious wounded fighters, they

    would take them to Liberia for treatment. Those who had

    problems would be taken to Monrovia, Liberia. The

    helicopter would take them to Monrovia."

    Is that true?

  • Well, he's got the - part of the information true, but he's got it all mixed up. We don't get a helicopter until about 1999, and so in 1999, just before we finally organise this final beginning of April meeting in Lome, as a part of that pacification we do let some wounded RUF individuals and some other Sierra Leoneans civilians that were injured to be treated in hospitals in Liberia. So if he is talking about a helicopter, he is talking about 1999, so - and this happened, I would say - I would put it to about February/March 1999, and all of these little pacifications helped to get that April process going where we begin to move people to Lome to start something. So this is 1999. This is what they do. He has some information, that he ties it up to a different story to make people know that he is a little radio operator someplace that knows everything is in senior staff meetings. I don't know, but there are RUF people that are brought to Liberia in 1999, yes.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, if that is right, then there seems to be a certain congruence between what you are saying and what this witness is saying. Because what the witness is saying - remember the sequence - Bockarie goes to Monrovia. He is given a plan. He returns and organises a meeting. Part one of the plan is Fitti-Fatta, you provide a herbalist. Part two is Freetown invasion. But also part of the arrangement is any serious wounded will be taken to Monrovia. Now, you are telling us that in February/March 1999, i.e. just after the Freetown invasion, wounded soldiers were being taken to Monrovia. Do you see?

  • Well, no, I don't see. I don't see the congruence that you describe, no. By February/March 1999, in fact, the individuals - there are civilians, I say, and RUF people that are being treated in hospitals, okay, that we, for humanitarian purposes, bring them over. It's got nothing to do - I am not sure if the RUF - from all information that I have, the RUF was not involved in the Freetown invasion. I am explaining that here is a situation where you have two sets of facts: You have one fact that yes, during the period of my mediating, we let some wounded individuals come to hospitals in Liberia. That's a fact.

    There is another fact, that there is an invasion in January. So somebody takes that information. It's like saying Charles Taylor, as President of Liberia on a date, got in a black jeep and he drove to a football stadium, and while at the football stadium he saw the game, but while watching the game, he saw X number of persons. Now, there are several facts in there, but not all of them are true. Yes, Charles Taylor went to the football game, but Charles Taylor didn't see those people that the person described.

    So what I am saying about this witness here - and this is why I am here to tell the Court exactly what happened and I am not here to - I am already in jail. I am not here to hide information. I am saying here that when you look at the fact of a helicopter, the Liberian government does not have a helicopter, okay, before 1999. So if he says that a helicopter is evacuating wounded, this has been to be in 1999. So 1999 at this particular period, February/March, we are busy now trying to tie some final pieces in getting Lome together. So for me, whether they are civilians, bringing some cases to Liberia for humanitarian purposes that we needed to do to pacify the RUF, I say we did. I didn't ask whether - because I know the RUF was not involved in Freetown. I didn't ask how they got hurt or where they got hurt. If you were a civilian individual and you had a case where we felt that could be done in a hospital, we assisted.

    So we don't have any problems with that. We provided fuel for hospitals to keep light going for injured civilians and other people. So he has got some information, but he's got it mixed up. This is not because of some arrangement that Sam Bockarie comes and gets instructions and he carries it out. I was not involved in any planning of any invasion in Freetown. And I tell you, you know, one would have to know maybe the mindset of individuals in dealing with some of these matters with some of these simple, simple lies.

    Look, in 1996 if Charles Taylor had planned with any human for an invasion of Freetown, there are several questions, to even believe this story, that would have to be asked. Number one, what would Taylor do? I would want to make sure that the mission would be successful. You understand me? Because we are talking about a time in 1999, I am already President for almost two years. I would definitely make sure that there are - that they have the capabilities of carrying out such a mission. That would that would be the first thing that any sensible person would want to do. I have heard stories here --

  • Are you talking about 1996, Mr Taylor?

  • No, 1999. Okay? 1999. So any sensible person would be, yeah, I have it here, Charles Taylor makes a plan to invade Freetown and another witness, in testifying about this whole Freetown thing, says I sent reinforcement of, I think he said 30 men. Look, anything can be said about Charles Taylor, but not being stupid. You understand me. A nation, first of all, wants to invade another nation and we send 30 men?

    Look, your Honours, this is beyond what one can keep saying: I had nothing whatsoever to do with the January invasion of Freetown. I had nothing to do with planning no Fitti-Fatta or planning no Kono attack. Nothing to do with it, because I am not stupid. And if there was such bad blood between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Government of Liberia and there was an opportunity that I saw to attack a country, I had sufficient ex-combatants, I would have sent thousands, thousands, and by that I can put a number. Maybe 5,000, maybe 10,000. Minimum I would have sent would be 5,000 men to make sure - because, who is in Sierra Leone? ECOMOG is on the ground. I am supposed to send 40 men to go and fight ECOMOG?

    Why people think this way? It just didn't happen. It just didn't happen. And the RUF, to the best of my knowledge, after all of the evidence that has been presented throughout all these trials, was not involved in any Sierra Leone attack. This was the SAJ Musa and the SLA because of their, you know, whatever reason. I had nothing to do with it.

  • Let us deal with another specific allegation, Mr Taylor, and in order to put you in the picture I need to deal with a fairly lengthy passage of this witness's account so that we get the full picture. Page 3262 of the transcript, please:

    "Q. Now, Sam Bockarie when he was the leader of the RUF

    was based in Buedu, is that correct?

    A. Yes, he was based in Buedu.

    Q. Now what was the position in your areas of deployment

    at this time just after the Freetown invasion? You had

    deployments in other parts of the country up until the

    time you attacked Freetown and this attack, after two

    weeks or so, you came back, you retreated, some of you

    were based in Makeni. What about the other areas that were

    under your occupation before you moved to Freetown?

    A. Well, all the areas that were under our control, they

    were still under our control. Even after we retreated from

    Freetown, they were still under our control.

    Q. Now, can we focus on one of those areas is Kono, Koidu,

    is that correct?

    A. Yes, Kono was under our control.

    Q. Now, can we focus on Koidu after the Freetown invasion?

    What was happening in Koidu after the invasion?

    A. Just after the Freetown invasion, when the majority had

    retreated to Makeni, some were based in Kono. What we were

    doing mostly, because at that time we were not engaged in

    fighting, was diamond mining. We were mining diamonds.

    Q. And what was the - what was it all focused on, the

    proceeds of the diamonds that you were mining, what was the

    whole purpose for which you were mining these diamonds?

    What was the focus of mining during this period?

    A. Well, from the beginning up to this time, when we were

    mining the main reason why we were mining was for us to

    have more defensive arms and ammunition from Mr Taylor

    because the moment our leader went for peace, it was at

    that time that he told us that in times of peace we should

    prepare for war. So when you go for peace talks, you

    should always be prepared for war. So as a result he

    organised the miners to mine for diamonds, but before

    mining for diamonds we would have to arrange the

    conditions, so they started calling the civilians to mine

    the diamonds.

    Q. Now, who arranged the mining. As you said the mining

    was arranged, who arranged the conditions?

    A. From the beginning when Mosquito had not gone yet, he

    sent an instruction to Issa Sesay. Issa Sesay returned and

    based in Kono. So Issa Sesay arranged - rearranged for the

    mining to be more effective. But before that we had a

    message. RUF heard a message from Sam Bockarie saying that

    Charles Taylor was going to send white people to come and

    inspect Kono and the airfield so that they could support

    the mining and we would do effective mining. Supporting,

    they said they would send machines like Caterpillar and any

    other machine that we would use for the mining. And it got

    to a point when two white men came from Buedu. They were

    escorted by RUF security forces. They just came and took

    snapshots at the mining field and took snapshots of the old

    mining machines. According to them, according to the

    message we received, Charles Taylor had sent them from

    Liberia. They just came and took snapshots and wrote all

    the things that we would need, machines for the mining, and

    they returned the following day.

    Q. Now, during this period that we are talking about, did

    you continue to get any supplies from the proceeds of the


    A. Yes. We used to have ammunition, but it was not

    frequent. But our ammo dump was only in Buedu because

    there was no fighting around there. So when ammunition

    would come, Mosquito would keep it at Buedu, but again the

    mining, we initially did it with our hands. We didn't use

    machines. But at this point in time we started using


    Q. The two white men who came from Liberia to Buedu and

    then to Koidu, did you know their names?

    A. No, I can't recall their names."

    Mr Taylor, do you see what that's saying?

  • That after the Freetown invasion you effectively tried to organise the mining in Kono on a more commercial basis by sending two white men to inspect to see what machines would be required. Did you?

  • I did not. Never knew that white people went there or didn't go there. Did not, no, no.

  • The allegation is quite plain, Mr Taylor. The allegation is that after the Freetown invasion, in a sense you had achieved your purpose. The RUF were in control of Kono and so, therefore, your design to exploit the mineral resources of Sierra Leone had now come to fruition so you were sending the experts in, white people, to organise it more effectively. Did you?

  • I did not. And, you know, to see how this witness puts it, as though he has never seen white people before, that was his first time seeing white people. All the Lebanese and the people they have had in their mining places buying diamonds, that's now the first time he has seen a white man. Like I say, this boy is very good at putting these lies together. Look, I do not send anybody into Sierra Leone to go to look for nothing. I have diamonds in Liberia. We are not even mining in Liberia. What about Liberian diamonds? No such thing happened, counsel. There is no such thing.

    But I would add for the record that a lot of this information also is different, but I am sure during this defence there will be more that will deal with this particular matter. No, I wouldn't send two white men into Sierra Leone to go and look at diamonds.

  • But interestingly, Mr Taylor, the witness's account about this continues in this way, page 3267. He was asked by Mr Bangura:

    "Q. Mr Witness, what happened to the diamonds that were

    produced at this time?

    A. Well, at this time that I am talking about, the

    diamonds that Issa Sesay gathered from the beginning of

    Issa Sesay's administration" - August 2000, note - "Gibril

    Massaquoi used to go and collect it and bring it to

    Freetown at this stage until the UN problem happened. That

    was the time the RUF arrested the UN personnel. From

    the time Mosquito left the RUF until the time RUF arrested

    the UN, Issa was sending diamonds to Mr Sankoh in Freetown.

    But when Mr Sankoh was arrested, in the May 6th" - it

    should be May 8th - "incident in Freetown, all the diamonds

    we used to get from that May 6th up until the time of the

    final disarmament in Sierra Leone, all the diamonds were

    going to Mr Taylor."

    You see that?

  • So let's put the picture together then. After Freetown you send two white men to organise this commercially, but the diamonds, according to this, after Issa takes over, so that's August 2000, until the UN personnel are --

  • Yes, until the UN personal are arrested.

  • Yes. They go to Sankoh. But after Sankoh's arrest, they start coming to you. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

  • Well, they are terrible people because if I have to go through all this work, sending experts and everything and I am still there and Sankoh comes and they forget about me and start sending all the diamonds to him, then he gets arrested, then, you know, if you have ignored me for all this time, why are you sending me diamonds after Sankoh is arrested?

    It just shows you how these boys work. There is no such thing about me arranging experts to go to Sierra Leone and all of this. I have no idea whether they sent diamonds to Sankoh or not. The only idea I would have about diamonds going to Sankoh during that period is contained in documents that have been presented by the OTP that I have read about Sankoh's own dealing with people in Belgium. That's all I know. So one can assume that if those documents from the OTP are correct, then Sankoh did receive some diamonds during that period. Other than that, I did not receive any diamonds from Issa Sesay and I am sure there will be adequate proof to that effect.

  • Well, talking about proof, let's continue with what the witness said, page 3267:

    "Q. Now, you said from May 6th through to disarmament the

    proceeds of diamonds were - the diamonds were taken by Issa

    Sesay to Mr Taylor in Liberia. How frequent were these

    trips to Liberia?

    A. This was happening every two weeks because the diamonds

    we were mining, we used to have it now more than before

    because at this point we had machines and Issa started

    going to Liberia and he was even bringing vehicles for

    Mr Taylor. Anytime he would bring these vehicles, he will

    call us and say, 'I have brought one or two vehicles from

    Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor donated this.' And at the same time

    he would keep the diamonds. He said Mr Taylor was storing

    the diamonds for any time Sankoh would be released. So

    that would be the time when he would report the diamonds to

    Sankoh. He said that was what Mr Taylor said. He would

    bring documents to the effect that they would read that to

    us. We would see the number of diamonds, the date and time

    that he left it there. Sometimes he would bring diesel,

    petrol, engine oil for the machines that were working in

    the fields and even food."

    Now, taking matters in stages, did you give vehicles to Issa Sesay?

  • No, I did not. I did not give vehicles to Issa Sesay.

  • Were you holding diamonds in safekeeping for Mr Sankoh?

  • No, I was not. He says for the return of Mr Sankoh. Mr Sankoh does not return, so that means I must have those diamonds.

  • Yes, so where are they, Mr Taylor?

  • Nobody ever gave me diamonds because after Sankoh is arrested in 2000 he doesn't return, so where are the diamonds? Then that means that Issa Sesay and the RUF should be able to have me account for those diamonds. It just never happened that way. Never. Never happened that Issa Sesay brought me diamonds to keep or to show or nothing. Issa Sesay never did that.

  • What about this documentary proof of the number of diamonds, the date and time when they were left. Where is it?

  • I don't know. I am sure with this OTP witness having this kind of information, the OTP would have gone after this because this would be documentary evidence. He speaks about it because he knows it doesn't exist, documents that I was supposed to be keeping diamonds. There is no such thing.

  • But what about the suggestion, "Sometimes he would bring diesel, petrol, engine oil for the machines." You accept that, don't you?

  • No, I accept that there were times that diesel, a drum or two - by drum - what we call a drum in Liberia is 55 gallons. For hospital operation, maybe one or two drums would go to Sierra Leone, but not even --

  • How do you know it would be limited for use in hospitals?

  • Well, the quantity. The quantity. We would not - because we knew that fuel could be used for military operations, so we were very, very strict. 55 gallon fits in a drum. We would make sure the maximum that could leave Liberia were two drums because we did not want it used for military purposes.

  • Mr Griffiths, what time frame is this?

  • We are talking about still - I am talking about the period in early 1999 between February and March of 1999 that this is going on. Not even during Issa Sesay's time, but during Sam Bockarie's time.

  • You would send fuel for hospitals in Sierra Leone?

  • They would buy fuel in Liberia, okay, and they would carry it across to be used for hospitals and clinics, yes.

  • So it was not donated?

  • No, no, no. They would buy it. They would buy it, but we permitted the purchase.

  • Would that be a convenient point, Mr President?

  • Yes, we will take the morning break now and reconvene at 12.

  • [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 12.01 p.m.]

  • Right, Mr Taylor. We're continuing with the same witness and hopefully we can finish him before lunch. The witness went on to say this, page 3269:

    "Q. Do you recall the year 2000, May 2000?

    A. Yes, May 2000, yes.

    Q. Where were you at this time?

    A. May 2000 I was in Makeni. At times I would travel to


    Q. Now you've mentioned that Sankoh was arrested and that

    was in May 2000. Is that correct?

    A. Yes, I've just forgot the date. It was May 8, 2000.

    The date I recalled, it was a mistake. The date should be

    May 8th, 2000.

    Q. Just before the arrest of Mr Sankoh, did anything

    happen in Makeni around May 2000?

    A. Before Sankoh was arrested a big thing happened in

    Makeni. That was the arrest of the UN in Makeni Town

    ordered by Issa Sesay, because Sankoh was arrested in

    Freetown and at that time I was in Makeni when this


    Q. Now after the arrest of the UN peacekeepers as you have

    mentioned were they eventually released?

    A. Yes, they released them but they were not released in

    Sierra Leone. After we had arrested UN and all the arms

    and ammunition, communication, vehicles from them, Issa had

    to inform Mr Taylor through a satellite phone that the UN

    personnel were under detention. Immediately after

    Mr Taylor got the story, he ordered Issa saying, 'Bring

    those people here to me in Liberia.' That was the message

    Mr Taylor sent and Issa Sesay in Makeni, he called

    everybody and told the authorities and fighters on the

    ground and they loaded these people from Makeni. In fact,

    they were stripped naked. They travelled from Makeni to

    Yengema. Yengema was one RUF strong training base.

    Yengema is a very short distance from Koidu Town which is

    in Kono. From Yengema he crossed with them to Liberia. He

    transferred all of them to Foya. It was a helicopter that

    came from Monrovia sent by Mr Taylor and when this

    helicopter came, it brought a lot of ammunition from

    Liberia and dropped them in Foya. In return, it took the

    peacekeeping forces, loaded them into the helicopter, and

    took them to Liberia to Mr Taylor. That was how we

    released those people."

    Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, Issa had to inform you. How did you come to learn about the detention of the UN peacekeepers?

  • That was communicated to me through the news media I got from my national security adviser, but also from the UN special representative in Monrovia that they had this terrible situation, that several UN personnel had been arrested.

  • So the implication of "Issa had to inform you" was that you were controlling Issa Sesay at the time. Was that the case Mr Taylor?

  • That was not the case. You know, in fact, when those peacekeepers are taken, the first person that I get in contact with is Foday Sankoh himself. I sent a mission to see President Kabbah and Sankoh. Messrs Cooper and Joe Tuah went down. This little boy, he doesn't know. No. No. It doesn't - it doesn't - you know, when you don't know the story and you make up these things, it doesn't happen this way. Issa Sesay got to inform me that - so where is - these peacekeepers, the situation starts, we get on Foday Sankoh, he's communicating. It takes us a period of time. This is no - I got the peacekeepers, send them to me, we take some time. There are so many countries involved.

    Remember, I talk about assistance coming from different countries, Libya. It took a process. Issa Sesay came to Monrovia, okay? This is after Sankoh because this was going on - when Sankoh gets arrested, Issa Sesay comes to Monrovia and he is delivered a direct strong statement from me that these peacekeepers have to be released; that the international community will not accept it; and that they must be leased; and that there will be no attachment - the argument was, they wanted Foday Sankoh released. I said there will be no quid pro quo. Foday Sankoh's release would not be tied to the UN peacekeepers. So he don't know what he is talking about, counsel.

  • Now, let's just deal with the detail, in case it's important, was that contact made by satellite phone?

  • No, the first call was made by radio. There was a radio call to Issa asking him to account for what had happened over there. Not by me. I think it was my national security adviser or one of the officials of the government. Subsequently, I spoke to him on the telephone and told him to come to Monrovia.

  • This witness goes on to say "he", that being you, ordered Issa, "Bring those people here to me in Liberia." Did you?

  • I did not. I did not order Issa Sesay to bring those people here to Liberia. Issa Sesay came to Liberia. I told him what the international community wanted. He returned. The United Nations was involved in every step of the way. Every step of the way. Even the helicopters that went to Foya to evacuate the people from Foya were UN helicopters. So, in other words, he is saying that the UN carried arms for these people. These boys - this is the danger in this kind of situation, that they do not know and they add. Well, then, I mean, the UN was involved in taking ammunition to pick up the soldiers.

  • Because he says "it brought a lot of ammunition from Liberia and dropped them at Foya."

  • So the UN did then. So the UN did, because those helicopters were UN helicopters that evacuated - there were several hundred. We have a list in here. There were - in fact, the total number of hostages that were taken was close to 500, okay? And the first set that came - I forgot the number - 200 and some. You can't have 200 people getting in one helicopter. There were several trips made up and down straight from Foya to Spriggs Payne airport where the UN were waiting with - the whole international press were at Foya. The international press were at Spriggs Payne airport. So if any ammunition had been offloaded off any helicopter, it would have been reported. It would have been reported.

    So, I mean, this step of fabrication continues and it makes you - you know, you sit here and it makes you look so - well, you know, you keep - it's almost like denying, denying, denying, but the lies are just so many you just have to sit there - they are not true.

    I don't know if you go further on this, but there was a question that was posed by the honourable justice just before we broke and I think it was a very important situation by Justice Sebutinde on - and I think some basis ought to be explained to the justice of what is going on when she asks about the field situation, and I think that we need to - I think we need to understand the period. So when you're through, maybe I can explain to the justice because --

  • Well, explain now.

  • Well, she asked about fuel. I just want to give a little brief background. Most of what mediations involve involve a little give and take here and there. In October 1998, the borders - my government closed the border with Sierra Leone. That is reflected in - and it is at this time that President Kabbah alleges that Liberia is about to attack Sierra Leone with 5,000 troops and then the UN goes and investigates and Kabbah and myself speak. But that is contained in, I think it's the second report of the Secretary-General in October 1998, and the closure of the border is confirmed.

    Now, we are now at that particular time putting pressure on the RUF to come to the peace talks. Now, we are all shocked by the 6 January invasion, and I did explain here and its contained in the reports here about the ceasefire that we tried to get leading on to Kabbah's return in March and so on. Now, there's an important little point here that I want to get across with that prefix. That is, the opening and closing of the border at that particular time with the purchase of fuel or rice or chicken soup, salt, tobacco, whatever, is a part of a process that we used this extensively to open and tighten situations to bring people to the table, okay, and making sure that it is non-lethal.

    So in order to get what we got accomplished by April 1999, with that border closure, what used to happen was that you had merchants coming, little business people coming from Sierra Leone buying. Now, if and when you cut it off, it forces them to come forward. As you cut off this movement across the border, then you force them to the table. So we had to use a little arm twisting to get a lot of these peace things, so there was trade going on across that border with non-lethal things and I didn't want it just to be looked at as just fuel, but there is many other things going on. And when we close it when we want to force - when we close it, after a week or two, we can extract also - by "we" I'm speaking about the Committee of Six, ECOWAS - we can extract some concessions. As we gave, we extract some concessions.

    So this happens with mediations, and we did have a trained mediator dealing with this. Mediations go - there's a little give and a little take here. I didn't want to leave the justice believing, oh, there's just fuel going across because of some special thing. No, they bought what they had, but we could also use that to twist their arms when we cut off that flow.

  • Very well. Now, on the same topic of the detention of the UN peacekeepers, the witness went on to say this - no, let me start with the question:

    "Q. Mr Witness, you said that the helicopter which took

    the peacekeepers across to Liberia from Foya had brought

    with it weapons, arms and ammunition which were given to

    you, to Issa Sesay and he brought them to the RUF. Do you

    know what those arms and ammunition were used for later?

    A. Yes. According to Issa Sesay, he said Mr Taylor had

    said since we had arrested and molested the United Nations,

    let us expect fighting. So the light weapons that we had

    taken from the United Nations, we should keep them and even

    the ammunition that he was sending, we should reserve them,

    in case they attempted to attack our positions we should

    use those against the United Nations. That was why he sent

    the ammunition."

    What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

  • A lie. But let's go into the record. What did they take from the UN peacekeepers? According to the records presented to this Court, there were some 500 people. They took, what? APCs. These people were equipped. So what kind of ammunition I would be sending? In fact, we were forcing them to return the material to the UN peacekeepers. It was a part of the pressure we put on them. These people invaded the UN facilities and took some 500 hostages along with all of the arms and ammunition that they had. So what do I have to send to them? What do I have to send to them when I don't have it for myself, when, in fact, they had everything? They took all of the equipment from the people.

    So this boy is just making up a lie. He is just making up a lie. If this boy can say that the helicopters that went to Foya carried arms and ammunition, then I don't know what else to say about this man. Then he - the records are there. The UN was involved. This was not a Charles Taylor operation. Everybody connected with UN from Sierra Leone side to the Liberian side to international journalists who were at Foya, they were at Spriggs Payne airport, I don't know where this man got this thing from. I don't know your Honours. I don't know. It is a lie. These were UN choppers that picked up these people and brought them to Spriggs Payne airport. So if they had ammunition, then there was complicity on the part of the United Nations, and that is not true.

  • Now, let's deal with another topic raised during the course of the testimony of this witness. He was asked this, page 3272 of the transcript of 6 February 2008:

    "Q. Were RUF forces involved in any fighting in Liberia at

    any period after 1992?

    A. Yes, 1993 a group went there and even up to the time

    when we had disarmed, Taylor sent instructions for the RUF

    to go there as a standby force in case UNAMSIL would

    attempt to attack our positions. In 1993 when our supply

    route was blocked by ULIMO, Mr Kallon had to send - I'm

    sorry, Mr Kallon had to lead a group to go and fight in

    Liberia. It was a request from Mr Taylor to Sankoh at that

    time. That was the first group I can remember went to

    Liberia. They were the ones who went and formed - I mean

    they attacked ULIMO positions so that we could get supply

    routes to Mr Taylor's headquarters.

    Q. This I understand, Mr Witness, was 1993. Correct?

    A. Yes, it was 1993 that this happened."

    Any truth in that, Mr Taylor?

  • None whatsoever.

  • You see what is he is suggesting, in 1993 the RUF sent a force into Liberia to fight ULIMO led by Morris Kallon. Did that happen?

  • That did not happen. That did not happen.

  • "Q. After that do you recall any other time that the RUF

    had been involved in fighting inside Liberia?

    A. Yes. I can recall after these UN problems occurred,

    ULIMO started attacking Mr Taylor's position from the

    Guinea border and he requested from Sam Bockarie and

    Sam Bockarie used to send troops there to fight. Even up

    to the time when Issa was in command of the RUF, he used to

    send troops there to go and fight.

    And apart from that, Mr Taylor also sent an order that

    Superman should go and block between Guinea and Liberia to

    fight there. This latter part that Superman went, this

    information that we got was that one of Mr Taylor's

    fighters had killed Superman. That was the last time the

    RUF sent troops, apart from Sam Bockarie who was there on

    his own accord."

    What about that, Mr Taylor?

  • I don't know what part to - I don't know. I don't know. Because here he got so many years tied up, none of it is true, but he jumps from - because if he is talking Sam Bockarie, he is talking about the end of 1999, not beyond that. If he is talking Issa Sesay, he is talking about - from about August 2000. And so he has bunched up a whole lot of falsehood and it doesn't make any sense to me. But there is no way that I asked Issa Sesay or Sam Bockarie to send troops to fight in Liberia. No.

    What are we fighting - in 1999, what are we fighting? Who are we fighting in 1999? There's a brief incursion from Mosquito Spray earlier. We take care of it. There's nothing that Sam Bockarie at this particular time, in 1999 - about who is there now in 1999 that we have to go to Sam Bockarie? Isn't Sankoh by this time, if he is talking any time from July on, isn't Sankoh there that I would have to overlook Sankoh if I need something and go to Sam Bockarie? It didn't happen this way.

  • Now, it continues on the same topic:

    "Q. Now you said that the request for the RUF to send

    troops to inside Liberia first came to Sam Bockarie from

    Mr Taylor and this was after the Freetown invasion period -

    sorry, after the abduction of the UN peacekeepers. Now

    where in Liberia were the RUF forces asked to participate

    in fighting?

    A. Okay, sorry. Let me make that clear to you. After

    the UN invasion Bockarie was not in Sierra Leone. It was

    during Issa's command. Issa used to send manpower. And

    about before Bockarie left Bockarie used to send manpower

    to go and fight in Lofa. Lofa is an area that joins Sierra

    Leone. That was an instruction from Prosecutor Taylor."

    So he is clarifying the situation there, Mr Taylor. He is saying, during Bockarie's time, he sent troops. During Issa times, he sent troops, all at our - all on your instruction. What do you say?

  • Both cases are lies. Never sent any - never asked Sam Bockarie to send troops to fight in Liberia at all. Never asked Issa Sesay to send troops to fight in Liberia.

  • And it goes on:

    "And even when we attacked the UN, ULIMO was also attacking

    Taylor from the border, the Guinea border. So he requested

    for Mr Sesay who would come and contribute manpower, they

    would go and fight along the Guinea and Liberia borders.

    This used to happen all the time. And later again

    Mr Taylor called for RUF senior officers' meeting in

    Monrovia. He requested for a mission that was to go and

    attack Guinea by Sierra Leone and also attack Guinea's

    position by Liberia, Lofa County.

    Q. Just briefly, when was the - when did Mr Taylor ask

    Sam Bockarie to send forces to go and fight inside Liberia?

    A. It was in 1999. It was in 1999. That was when we had

    returned from Freetown. Our fighting had quelled down a

    little. That was the time. Because immediately after our

    men had withdrawn from Freetown we were not fighting any

    more. So our troops were going to fight in Liberia. That

    was under Sam Bockarie's administration.

    Q. And when was it that Issa Sesay was asked to raise

    manpower to help fighting inside Libera again - Guinea, I'm


    A. That was the time when Issa Sesay was now the RUF

    commander and this was the time we had arrested and taken

    away the UNAMSIL or United Nations weapons and ULIMO

    started attacking Taylor from the border, so he requested

    for Mr Sesay so that Issa Sesay would send troops there

    because of the route Issa Sesay would use to Liberia so

    that the route should not be blocked. That went on until

    the time he called again for a meeting to organise and

    attack the Guinea position. Mr Taylor called this


    So there you are, Mr Taylor. Summoning senior RUF officers to Monrovia in order to plan for the use of RUF combatants in Liberia. True?

  • Not true. He doesn't even say who comes. That - senior officers could be anybody. He doesn't even say who comes. A witness like this should be able to say, if there was any such thing, who came. It never - how would I summons RUF people to Monrovia to come to talk about fighting when I'm busy trying to get the RUF to disarm and demobilise to get the peace process going.

  • The witness later in his testimony, Mr Taylor, page 3294, returned to the issue of General Devon and he said this:

    "A. Well, General Devon, I understand in 1992 at the time

    we got to Kakata, I had information from the fighters that

    General Devon was killed by Charles Taylor."

    Now, you agree with that, don't you?

  • Oh, Degbon. Well, you know, that's how they put you, was killed by Charles Taylor, I'm the leader, yes, Degbon was executed.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, the final matter I want to deal with with this witness is this: He was asked this question:

    "Q. The messages they were recorded. The radio messages

    between Sankoh and Taylor, they were recorded and they were

    recorded in a special logbook. Correct?

    A. Yes."

    Have you seen any such logbook?

  • Have I seen any such logbook?

  • Yes, that's what I asked.

  • Now, that's all I want to ask you about that witness, Mr Taylor. I now want to move on and deal with another witness. That witness is {redacted}. Now, again we need to be very careful in dealing with the evidence given by this witness, okay?

  • I think we have something of a problem here in that I believe that with this witness it was actually closed session testimony. Now, earlier I know when that sort of very sensitive information was to be used there was a different procedure and not even the witness's TF number was mentioned. So I would ask that if this procedure is to be used that we would redact the TF number and there simply be a reference that a witness has said X or Y so that it is not linked even to a TF number. So that the TF number would be redacted and anyone in the audience would be instructed to disregard that number.

  • Thank you, Ms Hollis. Any problem with that, Mr Griffiths?

  • Well, Mr President, I fail to see how, given that this evidence was given in closed session, a mention of that TF1 number is going to alert anyone to the identity of that individual. I fail to see that.

  • I don't have any recollection of the beginning of this witness's testimony but apparently this Court did order that the TF1 number be suppressed. Is that right? Is that what you're saying, Ms Hollis?

  • What I'm saying, your Honour, is that the fact we do not go into closed session to deal with closed session testimony is an exception because typically you would go into closed session to deal with closed session testimony. So the procedure that was agreed upon in order to have some degree of openness and has been used before is that the TF number itself would not even be mentioned, but rather reference would be made that a witness said X and then a page number would be given.

    So I see it as two options to protect the witness: One would be closed session; the other would be the prior procedure which would then have the TF number itself redacted and simply a reference that a witness has said X and a page number. That would be the Prosecution's submissions, Mr President.

  • [Trial Chamber conferred]

  • Mr Griffiths, we're going to order that the TF1 number be redacted. But the rest can be given in open Court, can it not? You'll be able to tailor your questions so that no identity is revealed.

  • I certainly can do that.

  • Thank you. We'll order that the TF1 number that was mentioned by Mr Griffiths be redacted for those people in the public gallery we would order that you not mention that TF1 number outside of the Court. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

  • If you could care to give us the page numbers to guide us to where you are at.

  • I'm beginning at page 4803, 27 February 2008:

  • Now, Mr Taylor, this witness claimed to have obtained information that Foday Sankoh's wife had indicated in 1990 that he and you were friends and that he would help you fight your war and after that war - and then you would assist him fight his war, which suggests an agreement between you and Sankoh prior to the invasion of Sierra Leone. Do you follow that?

  • Yes, I do.

  • What do you say to that suggestion?

  • I don't know, first of all, what - no, that suggestion is totally wrong. I'll answer directly. I'm not even going to comment further. It's just totally, totally erroneous.

  • Now, that information is alleged to have come from someone very close to Foday Sankoh?

  • Well, I don't know. When I met Foday Sankoh in 1991, I didn't even know who his wife was. I've never seen her, met her. I don't know who he is referring to here. There is only - the only wife that I know or woman that is connected with Sankoh is somebody in later years that - in 1999 that I get to know is his wife, but I don't know any woman of Sankoh that is connected with Sankoh at the period that - I don't know Sankoh or the woman that is connected with him. I don't know.

  • On those occasions when Sankoh was visiting Gbarnga, Mr Taylor, did he have a wife?

  • I am not sure. I know he had somebody. He had to have one. But he never - speaking factually he never brought a woman to me. He never introduced me to a woman as his wife. When Sankoh came to meet me, he came alone. He met me alone. I really didn't know but I would assume he had a wife, or a woman at least.

  • Now, the witness claims to have been trained in Camp Naama, Mr Taylor?

  • Now, the witness said that Camp Naama was also called Sokoto for security reasons. This is page 4805. Do you know that name?

  • No, I heard that name here. All I know is that camp was called Camp Naama and if they are using another name maybe there's a secret operation they were carrying on, but I never heard of that Sokoto until I heard it in this Court.

  • From your point of view as leader of the NPFL, Mr Taylor, was there any reason to refer to Camp Naama by any other name than Camp Naama?

  • No. No, we had no reason to do that. Naama was - I say it's the largest military base in Liberia. Nobody would change the name. Naama is Naama. Except there is something secretive or clandestine somebody would, but that's not a NPFL something, no. I mean, Naama is Naama. Schefflein is Schefflein. We've called all of those names here. No, except it's clandestine, but there's no reason for the NPFL to have changed the name.

  • Now, the witness named some of the people met at Camp Naama. Were you aware that Issa Sesay was at Camp Naama?

  • Sam Bockarie?

  • You said were you aware? I mean awareness as to hearing it here?

  • No, no, no, no, no. Back then?

  • No, I was not aware, no, of the personnel at the base, no. I was not aware.

  • Now, the witness claimed that at Camp Naama the witness was told by Foday Sankoh that he, that's Foday Sankoh, and his brother were going - that is Charles Taylor - "That this is the RUF, Revolutionary United Front, of Sierra Leone. My brother and myself, that is Charles Taylor, we are bound together to fight. We are fighting for Liberia and afterwards we'll fight for Sierra Leone. We are fighting for the same goals. We are one."

    Did none of that come to your ears, Mr Taylor?

  • None of that.

  • That was page 4806 of the transcript.

  • None of that. And it could not have come to my ears, because I didn't know the man. So maybe even this wife that we're talking about, I don't know whether they mentioned the wife's name earlier. There's no name for this wife, the earlier part, because that's how the story starts; with a wife and all of these different things. Because maybe if some of these names were given we would be able to find some of these people. I don't know if he mentions the wife's name.

  • Does the name Fatou Brown mean anything to you?

  • No. Well, yes, in a way. I heard that name here, yes.

  • But back in Liberia in 1990, '91 --

  • -- did you hear the name Fatou Brown?

  • Now, the witness went on to say that there were two groups training at Camp Naama, the NPFL and the RUF, and that the witness trained with the RUF undergoing infantry training, training in guerilla tactics and training in ideology and that the trainers were Liberians and Sierra Leoneans and that one of the Liberians involved in the training was one Isaac Mongor. Isaac Mongor, do you know him?

  • Well, know him. I saw him here. I didn't know him until I saw him here, Isaac Mongor.

  • Another trainer was Patrick Dripo Gonkanu. Does that name mean anything to you?

  • No, it doesn't mean anything to me.

  • Now, the witness also mentioned travelling to Gbarnga with Foday Sankoh in a vehicle which was then loaded with arms from your address, your house that is, Charles Taylor's house, and then the ammunition was taken to the front line. That is in Pendembu. Do you recall that?

  • No, I don't. I don't recall that now. Again, this is a difficult one to deal with, because I don't know what time this is, but it is possible that this witness - if this witness could have been on a vehicle at the period - and this is why time is important - at the time that I'm dealing with Foday Sankoh, it's possible because I never met who travelled in Liberia and out with Sankoh. So if this witness was on a vehicle - and what this person is saying "vehicle" - between '91 and '92, it's possible that this person could have been on a vehicle. So I cannot dispute that. Because apparently they are already in Sierra Leone, so I don't know as to whether this person would have been - would have come with Sankoh or not. It's possible.

  • Does the name Charles Timba mean anything to you, Mr Taylor?

  • Charles Timba, yes. I know of Charles Timba, yes.

  • Charles Timba was one of the commanders that were with our special operations people in Sierra Leone.

  • Do you have a spelling of the surname?

  • Page 4818 of the transcript, spelled Charles as in Charles Taylor, Timba, T-I-M-B-A. It's line 14 on page 4818.

  • So who do you say he was, Mr Taylor, remind me?

  • Charles Timba was one of the commanders that worked along with Sam Tuah, and that name has come up. The group that - our special operations people that were operating now. As soon as I hear Charles Timba I can zero in on a year because now we're talking about - I will put it to about August of '91 going into '92. By the end of that. So that's the period that Charles Timba is involved in that special operations here with Sam Tuah. Yes, I know Timba.

  • Now the witness described Timba as a Mano fellow, one of the strong NPFL commanders. Would you agree with that description?

  • Yes, yes. So then I know exactly where this witness - then we know the time period. That's August 1991 to May/June 1992. That's Timba and that's the operation.

  • Now, the witness went on to say that in 1998 the witness was summoned to Sam Bockarie in Buedu and he gave an instruction that Charles Taylor said we should open a base at Bunumbu and so the witness went and set up that base, a training base?

  • Yes, Ms Hollis?

  • We're certainly getting into identifying data about this person and I would ask that such detail, if it is required for questioning the accused, be done in a private session.

  • I think we're okay so far, aren't we? As long as Mr Griffiths doesn't get further into it.

  • Well, I would ask that he not get further into it, but we're already talking about somebody being summoned, being sent to a specific location to specifically set up a training base. So in our view we're already getting into information that should not be part of the public record.

  • Mr President, I totally disagree with that. This man is on trial for very serious charges. This is a specific allegation being made by the witness that this man ordered the setting up of that specific training base. How is he supposed to deal with the allegation if he doesn't have an opportunity of hearing the detail and how does that detail identify the witness, given that we know there were thousands of people in the RUF? How does that disclose the identity of the witness?

  • [Trial Chamber conferred]

  • Yes, we'll overrule the objection. You can go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

  • Mr Taylor did you order the setting up of a training base at Bunumbu?

  • I don't know. I think it's in Sierra Leone. I wouldn't know the area of Sierra Leone. I've heard Bunumbu being talked about here, but I don't know where Bunumbu is.

  • Mr Taylor, you appreciate this is an indication that you were micromanaging what was going on in Sierra Leone to this extent: Actually ordering the specific setting up of training bases. You understand that?

  • I understand that.

  • So what do you say about that allegation?

  • It is so erroneous. The RUF starts operating way back in 1991, 1990 or whatever time they start. Your Honours, in 1998 Charles Taylor would have to ask somebody or tell somebody to set up a base and even be specific as to where it should be set up. Then I - I don't have a chance of doing - of being acquitted in this case with this type of thing here. That what? '91, '92, '93, '94, '95, '96, '97, '98, eight years after these people have been fighting and fighting and doing all the things it would take me eight years to say, "Guess what happened? Go into this place and set up a base."

    Your Honours, I did not ask anybody to set up any base anywhere in Sierra Leone eight years almost after they have been fighting and setting up their bases across the country from evidence before this Court. They have bases across the country. So I ordered them to go to Zogoda in the bush in 1996 or 1995? So I did that then? I led them to Zogoda or I told them, "Oh, guess what happened, you better go to a place called Zogoda"? How trivial can we get with this thing? I didn't do it, your Honours. I never talked to anybody and said, "Go into this place and set up a base here." I mean I don't know where they get this kind of idea from, but it is totally, totally erroneous. Totally false.

  • Mr Taylor, did you give an order to Issa Sesay that he should train some 62 SLA men at Bunumbu?

  • SLA? What have I got to do with it? No, I didn't.

  • This is page 4895 of the transcript. Did you?

  • No, I didn't. SLA men? I thought they were supposed to already be trained. SLA are supposed to be Sierra Leone army. I thought they were supposed to be trained.

  • Well, I'm just giving you an opportunity to deal with what's been said against you.

  • Did you send members of the ATU to be trained at Bunumbu? Page 4896.

  • No, no. I employed a retired South African general in a unit to train the ATU at Gbatala in Liberia and after the training - after their training they never went within sight of that. And this training occurred after 1999. So there was no unit even in Liberia at the time this witness is talking about called ATU.

  • Well, the witness claims that general --

  • Defence counsel has misstated the reference to ATU. There is no reference that the ATU were trained at this base.

  • All right, let me put it differently. Mr Taylor, did you send any ATUs with Issa Sesay to the training base that you asked to be set up at Bunumbu?

  • No. In fact, the ATUs as they were trained never went within 100 miles of the Sierra Leonean border. No, never, never did.

  • Did they, for example, go to Bunumbu to attend a graduation ceremony?

  • No. To the best of my knowledge, no ATU personnel went there and the ATU personnel that testified in this Court that is not protected, Jabaty Jaward, I'm sure the OTP would have led that question for Jabaty Jaward to state that they went or didn't go into Sierra Leone. There's no way the experienced lawyers would have forgotten to say, "Well, what happened at the time that the ATU went to" - never happened, because the question that was led to Jabaty was about the proximity of Sierra Leone and he mentioned that they did not even go within a certain distance of Sierra Leone.

    So there was no such thing. It never happened and if it had happened, the OTP would have brought it up in their examination of Jabaty Jaward. It did not ever happen that an ATU personnel left Liberia and crossed into Sierra Leone for any reason. None. None.

  • Let me give you a time frame for when this happened. Because the witness was asked to tell the Court when this happened, when you trained the 62 SLAs and General Issa and the ATU came to collect them. This is page 4897:

    "A. It is at the time we retreated from Freetown when we

    opened the base. It was during that time when we retreated

    from Freetown.

    Q. Can you give a year?

    A. I can remember. 1998.

    Q. When General Issa and the Liberian ATUs came to your

    base did they bring anything with them?

    A. Yes, they brought some things. They brought Liberian

    mats. They brought some rice from Liberia. We call it

    pusawai. They brought some pots."

    Now, did you send your ATU to take rice and mats and pots all the way to Bunumbu in Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor?

  • No, I did not. And this witness says they retreat from Sierra Leone - from Freetown from 1998.

  • But what - I mean, just to tell the - I will call the foolishness in this whole thing that this witness is talking about - but, you know, I mean, I'm not sure, your Honour. Because the way I really want to deal with this witness here, okay, I don't know what to say or how to describe it, so I'm not sure if counsel - if we may want to - I don't know, because I don't want to make any mistake because I have to deal with this witness for what this witness is and maybe the Prosecution could complain about that.

    Because the level of this witness - as I'm thinking in my head it has to be dealt in a way that maybe I may say something I've got no business saying and it would expose this witness in the setting that we have. But this Bench must know, because it is so foolish but I think I can deal with it in a different way.

  • Well, Mr Taylor, you're on trial here and if you feel you can only do justice to the topic then it may be that we have to go into a private session so you can provide the answer which you want to?

  • Okay. I really wouldn't mind, because I'm so restricted here and I want to deal with this particular witness because the level of this witness and some other things that, you know, short of making a mistake and being interrupted all the time about it, I really don't mind because the judges will have to decide anyway that - for this particular witness, I really don't mind if the Prosecution insists to go into closed session because there are some things that maybe we need to say even more detailed about this witness, okay, and what - and I don't want to make a mistake.

  • Well, can I therefore make a request then, Mr President, that we go into private session to allow Mr Taylor to deal with this witness?

  • Yes. Ms Hollis, the original testimony was in closed session but the witness concerned is not here now, so I take it you would have no objection to a private session?

  • No, we would not.

  • All right, thank you.

    Well, for members of the public, we're going into private session for some portion of Mr Taylor's evidence. The reason being that the evidence of a witness already given in this court needs to be discussed and it might tend to reveal that witness's identity and the witness is subject to protection orders from this Court.

    So, Madam Court Manager, could you please put the Court in private session?

  • [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of the transcript, pages 29069 to 29078, was extracted and sealed under separate cover, as the proceeding was heard in private session.]

  • [Open session]

  • Your Honour, we're in open session.

  • Yes, go ahead, please, Mr Griffiths.

  • Thank you, Mr President. Just one moment:

  • Now, Mr Taylor, I want to move on to deal with another witness.

  • Could I just check something through Mr Anyah for a moment, please:

  • Yes, I want to move on to another witness, Mr Taylor, a witness who gave evidence in open session in September 2008 called Mohamed Kabbah, yes? Do you recall him?

  • Yes, I recall the name now, not the - yes. Mohamed Kabbah.

  • Now, the first matter I want to ask you about in relation to him is this, page 16132 of the transcript of 12 September 2008, he was asked this question:

    "Q. Now you said also at this time while you were based in

    Buedu that communication was going on with Liberia and

    you've mentioned some particular stations and individuals

    related to that communication. First of all, as a general

    matter, describe what was going on in terms of the

    communications between Buedu and Liberia.

    A. A communication was a daily free flow activity that

    took place between the RUF and the NPFL, so at the time we

    were in Buedu if for any reason Sam Bockarie wanted to

    talk to Charles Taylor and at that time Sam Bockarie had

    visited Monrovia and he had a satellite phone - because by

    then his own dialogues was not conducted through the VHF.

    He used this satellite phone. He would tell us to tell

    Sunlight to tell Charles Taylor that he should put on his

    Two-One so that he would talk to him, and equally so when

    Charles Taylor wanted to talk with Mosquito, Sunlight will

    call us and tell us that, 'The Pa wants to talk to your own

    Pa'. So that was the kind of communication that took place

    between us and, if there was any threat of enemy attack, he

    would send the same message to us at Buedu."

    What do you say about that?

  • These little boys put themselves way beyond [indiscernible]. Sam Bockarie would not be brave enough to call me on the telephone. It's a total lie. Sam Bockarie never called me on the telephone. I have spoken to Sam Bockarie on the telephone. Any time that - and every time that I spoke to Sam Bockarie on the telephone, I would initiate the call if there was a need to. And I do admit that I talked to him several times. Sam Bockarie never ever called to Liberia and said please - never. That's totally untrue. Totally untrue.

  • Now, when you spoke to Sam Bockarie on those occasions you've just described, Mr Taylor, was it on a radio or was it on a satellite phone?

  • It was on a satellite phone. I would - times. Here we can use times. But the number of times that I would have talked to Sam Bockarie in total on the telephone would not surpass probably two times, and it had to be very, very, very urgent. One of the times - and I can almost be specific with this - that I talked to Sam Bockarie on the telephone where I would tell somebody, "Get Sam Bockarie. After you get him on the line, let me know," it would be in December - early December 1999 when I initiated the negotiations between he and Sankoh. The next time that I spoke to Sam Bockarie was - I will put it to around April, May 1999. It was not my - it was not in my habit to be calling Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie and I were not friend. We were not friends, neither were we colleagues. Sam Bockarie was a little boy that was doing his work - when I needed Sam Bockarie, I would instruct that, "Call Sam Bockarie. Tell him I want to see him for this reason or that reason or another." If it was very urgent, I would say, "Get him on the phone." If there was some delay on him doing something like this Foday Sankoh issue in December of 1999 that he didn't want to disarm, I would say, "Well, get Sam Bockarie on the phone. I want to talk to him." This is when I told him that I wanted him to come Liberia. But he never initiated a call to me.

  • Could you clarify, when you say "I spoke to Bockarie on the phone or on the satellite phone," was that you speaking on the satellite phone or Bockarie speaking on the satellite phone?

  • Bockarie speaking on the satellite phone. We could get Sam Bockarie from even a landline, you could call.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, you will note that the witness suggests that there was free flow activity between the RUF and the NPFL. Was the NPFL still in existence when you were in contact with Sam Bockarie?

  • Because let me just remind you the answer:

    "A. A communication was a daily free flow activity that

    took place between the RUF and the NPFL, so at the time we

    were in Buedu if for any reason Sam Bockarie wanted to talk

    to Charles Taylor," et cetera, et cetera.

    So would the NPFL be in contact with the RUF at the time when Bockarie is in charge?

  • Now, who is Sunlight?

  • I don't know who Sunlight is.

  • I'm not sure what Sunlight is. If you say Sunlight in referring to - this could be the code of a radio operator, if he is referring to radio here.

  • Did you have an operator called Sunlight?

  • No, no, no, I didn't have an operator called Sunlight. And let me just clarify one thing quickly. When I become President of Liberia, this matter of radio operators being assigned to me, there's no such thing as a radio operator being assigned to the President. So if we're talking about radio operator and assignment, we're talking about NPFL days. At the Presidency of the Republic of Liberia, at the time that I was President, like most Presidencies, there is a communication setup controlled by the Secret Service that contained a whole lot of things. There's several operators, telephone operators, radio operators, and different things that the Secret Service operates. The President does not have access - I mean, well, he can enter if he wants to, but there's nobody in particular. People are on shifts. They are on assignments. Even if the President has to make a telephone call, I don't even know which operator places the call. I don't know. All I do is state that I want to place a call to X, Y, Z place. I don't even know who is in the operating room doing it. So no.

    So when we're dealing with my election as of 1997 and talking about radio operators, I don't know who they are, where they are, or what they are doing, depending on the shift that they are working on. I don't know. Because there is a whole communication setup at the Executive Mansion where the Secret Service operates for many purposes. Interceptions. All kinds of things are done.

  • Now, on that question of Sunlight, Mr Taylor, the witness went on to say this:

    "Q. Where was Sunlight?

    A. Sunlight was at the Mansion Ground in Monrovia.

    Q. How do you know that?

    A. The operators who moved with Sam Bockarie and Issa at

    the times they visited Monrovia, they were located at that

    particular area - they located that particular area. They

    said that was where it was based, because I never went to


    A radio operator at the mansion ground in Monrovia called Sunlight, what do you say about that?

  • It's possible. It's possible that there's a radio operator at the mansion. It's possible. I wouldn't say it's not possible. He is probably one of many, because there's 24 hours - there's not a second that there are not operators - at least two or three operators on a shift. So it's possible. I don't deny - he says he don't go to Monrovia. I don't deny that there is a radio operator there, one, but I don't know him.

  • That might be a good place to pause, Mr Griffiths.

  • We'll take the lunch break now and reconvene at 2.30.

  • [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

  • [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

  • May it please your Honours:

  • Mr Taylor, what I'm going to do is this: I am going to go through a lengthy passage of the evidence of this witness and then seek your comment at the end of it. Do you follow me?

  • Remember before the luncheon adjournment we were talking about a radio operator called Sunlight?

  • Well, the witness continues in this vein, page 16133:

    "A. The operators who moved with Sam Bockarie and Issa at

    the times they visited Monrovia, they were located at that

    particular area - they located that particular area. They

    said that was where it was based, because I never went to


    Q. All right. When I asked you how you knew Sunlight was

    at Mansion Ground in Monrovia you said that, 'The operators

    who moved with Sam Bockarie and Issa at the time they

    visited Monrovia, they were located at that particular

    area.' I'm just going to ask you to explain slowly how you

    know that Sunlight was at the Mansion Ground in Monrovia.

    A. I said the operators who were assigned with Sam

    Bockarie, like for example Pascal who used to go to

    Monrovia and Elevation stations in Buedu" -

    Sorry, I am misleading you, Mr Taylor. My fault. My fault. I meant to start at a different point. I'm sorry. My fault. Page 13166:

    "Q. Approximately how frequently were you in

    communication with Sunlight?

    A. I had said that this process was a continuous flow. By

    that I mean it was a daily activity. It was not a hidden

    programme. It was quite clear that every day we

    communicated with Sunlight."

    Now, remember, Sunlight is based in Monrovia, Mr Taylor, yes?

  • So you understand what's being described now:

    "Q. What were the content - what were some of the things

    you remember about the content of these communications?

    A. The communications that we used to have with Sunlight

    were, one, in the morning after receiving reports from our

    various front lines and at times when he called he would

    ask us about news on the ground and then we would tell him

    that things are good, but at any time we got attacks we

    would also tell him that we had an attack. That besides,

    if at any time Charles Taylor needed to talk to Sam

    Bockarie then Sunlight would tell us that his Pa,

    Charles Taylor, said Sam Bockarie should go. That happened

    at all times that he needed him and, if at all from within

    the RUF Sam Bockarie wanted to move to go to Monrovia, he

    would tell us that and we would tell Sunlight that Sam

    Bockarie wanted to go and meet the Pa, Charles Taylor, and

    they would give the go ahead and Sam Bockarie's movement

    was a free movement. At any time he wanted to go to

    Monrovia he was welcome.

    Q. How do you know that?

    A. I was in that same town with that man. I was not in a

    different town and at any time he wanted to go to Monrovia

    he would tell us that he was going to Monrovia. It was not

    something that he hid away from us. We were there with

    him. We operated with him directly. We would go to his

    house, most times, yes.

    Q. Explain what you mean.

    A. The war that we fought in Sierra Leone, the RUF and the

    Government of Liberia were like brothers and sisters and

    whatsoever thing that went on within the RUF, be it good or

    bad, we would have to inform Sunlight because we

    communicated every day for him to have knowledge of it so

    that Charles Taylor would know because whatever information

    our station, that is the headquarters station, that

    Sunlight received from us, Charles Taylor would be able to


    Q. Why did you say we would have to inform Sunlight?

    A. I have said this. I said the operation that went on in

    Sierra Leone, let me say materials in terms of ammunition,

    we got it from that country through Charles Taylor, so

    whatever operation that took place within the RUF was not

    anything hidden from them. We had communication with them

    every day.

    Q. Now you said that, 'In Sierra Leone, let me say

    materials in terms of ammunitions, we got it from that

    country through Charles Taylor.' Explain what you know

    about this.

    A. When we needed - that is when the RUF needed -

    ammunition, Sam Bockarie would give us a message, or he

    would tell Sunlight - we would communicate directly with

    Sunlight for him to inform Charles Taylor that we needed

    ammunition. So the response that came, it would be based

    on that that Sam Bockarie would go to Monrovia to bring

    ammunition, food, used clothing and some other things.

    Q. Now in terms of this that you've just described, what

    time period are you referring to?

    A. That is the time we were in Buedu that I'm speaking


    Q. Now can you estimate about how often this would occur;

    this being what you've just described in terms of the

    message to Sunlight requesting ammunition?

    A. I said at any time we were short of ammunition - I

    cannot estimate whether it was one time or two times, but

    at any time we were short of arms that was the area from

    which we got our supplies. We would always ask.

    Q. Could you estimate in terms of - if I asked you if it

    occurred - actually, no, I'm going to withdraw the

    question. Now you said that this message would go through

    with regards to ammunition and then you said, 'so the

    response that came, it would be based on that that Sam

    Bockarie would go to Monrovia to bring ammunition, food,

    used clothing and some other things.' Describe exactly,

    from your observation, what you saw in terms of ammunition

    coming to Buedu. How would this work?

    A. Sam Bockarie used to go to Monrovia and bring

    ammunition. Jungle too used to bring ammunition.

    Sometimes when the request went Sam Bockarie would not go,

    it was Jungle who would come, but sometimes the ammunition

    that came wouldn't be enough and so at a certain point in

    time whilst we were in Buedu in terms of ammunition we

    planned an attack on Kono and so all the senior officers -

    most of them - met and they decided on the plan. But at

    first when Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia he did not bring

    enough ammunition and the next time he went, he came, they

    tried to get some diamonds and he gave them to Issa to go

    to Monrovia to Charles Taylor to bring ammunition and on

    Issa's return he said he'd lost the diamonds. So that was

    a very big blow. And later the still tried, because by

    then mining was going on around Kono, that is the front

    lines, so they managed to get some quantity of diamonds and

    Sam Bockarie himself took these to Monrovia and on his

    return he came with a big ten-tyred truck that had enough

    ammunition on board and when they arrived they packed

    everything in Sam Bockarie's veranda on the Dawa Highway

    and it had over 50 boxes of AK rounds, the RPG too were

    there in rubbers, he brought wines with him, rice, Maggi,

    salt and some other condiments, and so far whilst we were

    in Buedu that was the largest quantity of ammunition that

    we received from Monrovia and those were the ammunition

    that we used to attack Kono up to Freetown.

    Q. I'm going to ask you more about that later. First of

    all, though, how do you know that Sam Bockarie was going to


    A. One thing I want to tell this Court is that Sam

    Bockarie was a bragard. He did not hide anything away from

    people, especially when it came to operations. In terms of

    operation he would say that aloud, and those of us that

    were with him he did not hide anything away from us because

    we always sat with him at the office and anything that he

    had in his mind he spoke it out. And there was no other

    areas from where we got them. We never used to go to

    Guinea and the vehicles that came they came from Liberia

    from the Foya area by the Dawa Highway. So that was how I

    was able to know that he went to Monrovia and got the

    ammunitions from there."

    Now, Mr Taylor, I've read that whole passage in the hope that we can speed up a little bit. Now, first of all, you note the suggestion of a radio operator based at the Mansion Ground in Monrovia called Sunlight. Secondly, the suggestion that communications with you was on a daily basis, yes?

  • Also that you provided with Sam Bockarie with a large consignment of ammunition, 50 boxes of AK rounds which was used to attack Freetown. Now, I want you - Kono through to Freetown.

    "It was Monrovia, and those were the ammunition that we used to attack Kono up to Freetown."

    Now, Mr Taylor, what do you say about all of those allegations?

  • That's the charge right there, and it's well put together. That's the whole charge about Freetown attack and Charles Taylor. That just did not happen. I had nothing to do with the Freetown attack. I never gave Sam Bockarie any ammunition. Here is a man who says that he never comes to Monrovia, but he knows what's going on in Monrovia. I will tell you - and to understand this Sunlight and all these operators, at the mansion there are operators. I don't deny that there may be a Sunlight. I really do not know.

    My job as - the way how the presidency operated in Monrovia, a radio operator in the Executive Mansion would not be able to get to me. Even if there was a radio call from Sierra Leone, okay? And at this particular time if a radio call came from Sierra Leone, it would pass through a minimum of four hands before it would ever get to me, and during the period that Sam Bockarie is there it's very possible - I would not ever deny that Sam Bockarie could not have called a radio at the mansion during the time he's dealing with us to say that please ask the President if I can come to speak to him about X, Y and Z. But there is no Sunlight that would get to me. A radio operator - the radio operators work under maybe some - maybe I would say the assistant director of communications of the mansion. It would have to go from that operator to the assistant director, to the deputy director, the director of SSS, to the Minister of State before it gets - there is somebody sitting now in Sierra Leone saying that Sunlight would get to me. It's the way how the language is spoken as I'm seeing in this trial. These questions are asked and there are responses, and knowing the way how our people talk in that part of the world, yeah, he's talking like he knows it. He is convinced. This man is convinced that what he is saying is factual and this is that, because he wants to show that he knows something.

    The fact of the matter is this: Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia. Between September 1998 all the way until December of 1999 he is coming to Liberia. The last trip with Sankoh, that was in December of 1999 before he finally moves. The fact of the matter is during this particular time there were radio calls that would come in either from an instruction from me to get to Sam Bockarie for a particular subject matter relating to this peace. In fact, even the whole idea of putting the delegation - when they put a delegation, the UN moving people up and down. I don't get to see these operators. The fact of the matter is I don't know how many operators are at the mansion. There could be Sunlight. I don't deny this. There could be many. The communication department down there is huge, and the President would not have any responsibility of even wanting to know who is in the communication department.

    Having put that together, if someone wants to size this up that when Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia, that he's coming and he's getting material from me, it's totally, totally false. But in 1998-1999, thinking about it from an intelligence standpoint, we know that arms are being sold out of Lofa. Now, whether Sam Bockarie is buying a little ammunition and somebody is sitting over there talking about - once they see some come in that has got to be - because he went to Liberia to Charles Taylor, it's coming from there. That's the only guess I can give. But there is no way I am supplying Sam Bockarie with ammunition in this period of time and at no other time, because not - I don't have the ammunition, and that's where a lot of these people, based on this whole theory - in fact, I will call it maybe just a hypothesis. This whole thing is that Taylor has got arms in Liberia. I have no arms in this period that we're talking about to be giving these huge quantities of arms that the people are talking about.

    All I can say in final is that it is not true. The way it is constructed, there are some half truths, whole truths about the operators and all of that. But the mansion doesn't operate this way that I would be, as President of Liberia, on the radio. God knows, I never got on the radio with anybody. I gave instructions; they were followed. If somebody says that I instructed somebody and they called, yes. But to say I was on the radio, never. It's a lie.

  • Mr Taylor, there's one other aspect of this passage that I want to deal with - I want you to deal with it, and it's this: The witness comments that the RUF and the Government of Liberia were like brothers and sisters, a close relationship, and he goes on to say this communication was on a daily basis, and when speaking of trips by Bockarie to Monrovia, it seems that Bockarie was a regular visitor to Monrovia. What do you say about that relationship?

  • No, there is no - I have heard this brother and sister business. Look, a lot of people came up with brother and sister. There was not this kind of relationship between the RUF and the NPFL. I have explained here, and I don't think it's necessary to go through. My strategic involvement with the RUF at the time following that --

  • Mr Taylor, we're not talking about that period --

  • -- because this witness is talking about Sam Bockarie.

  • Exactly. But that's the period that all of their minds - you see, this case is built on this type of thinking to these witnesses and talking to them for - because this brother and sister business, he's not the first witness using this expression. There are several witnesses that have come: Oh, they were like brother and sister. Like brother and sister. So it is being built on the pretext of the beginning, where's the plan, and then I train and different things and take it. That's why I'm trying to structure it. It is this mindset that got these boys carrying on this lie. This brother and sister relationship goes all the way back to what? The training and the sending men in, and this is the way that this lie is constructed, and it's got nothing to do with that. There is no such brother and no sister relationship between the RUF and my government. None whatsoever.

  • But, Mr Taylor, what about the regularity of the contact as suggested by this witness --

  • -- in terms of a communication on a daily basis, in terms of, it would appear, Bockarie being a regular visitor to Monrovia?

  • No, Bockarie is not a regular visitor to Monrovia. No, he's not a regular visitor. He visits; it's not regular. There is no everyday communication with the RUF. The frequency of communication with the RUF would depend on the problem at hand, okay? If there is a critical issue - for example, I would say in April/May of 1999 there is a lot of communication going - I wouldn't say on a daily basis - putting that whole delegation together to go to Lome. But there is, to answer your question short, finish, there's no frequency. There is communication, but it is very infrequent and there is no regular visits, because between August, when I get this information about Sam Bockarie, to December of 1998, Sam Bockarie makes three visits into Liberia. We're talking about a total of about four months; one in September, one in October and the end of November/December he passes through. So I would not call that frequent visits. In 1999 when do I - Sam Bockarie does not come to Liberia in 1999, to the best of my recollection, until the Lome situation is going through. He does come - he doesn't go to Lome, but he does come to Monrovia first, and he returns after Sankoh gets back from Lome. So I would not call that frequency of visits.

  • Well, let's try and tie down and identify the visits again, Mr Taylor.

  • And let's break this up into time periods, shall we?

  • Let's start off with September to December 1998. You say three visits?

  • September?

  • End of November into December when he passes through to Burkina Faso, comes back --

  • Right. Now, another detail about that period: During that period, September, October, November, December, four months, what's the regularity of communication by other means?

  • No, no, no. There is no regularity, because this is the first contact. There's no real - no, no, no. I would say hardly any communication.

  • Hardly any communication?

  • Right. Let's go to 1999 now.

  • You say there's a period of quite a bit of activity leading up to Lome?

  • Try and time that for us, please?

  • I would put that to April - mostly in the month of April of 1999.

  • And does Bockarie come to Liberia in that period?

  • Bockarie does come to Liberia in that particular period, yes, he does.

  • Once. He comes to Liberia once while the delegates are being put together. Once.

  • Right. So that's the fourth trip?

  • Just to be clear, had he been to Liberia earlier in the year of 1999?

  • No, not to my recollection, no. Between January and April, no. Not to my recollection, no.

  • Right. Before I move on we're up to the fourth trip now?

  • I just want to pause briefly and deal with radio communications. In the aftermath of the Freetown invasion - because you remember that's the beginning of 1999, the year we're talking about?

  • Was there a great deal of radio traffic between you and Bockarie and the RUF in that period?

  • By "you" - not personally, but there was communication. Not by me now.

  • Not by you, I understand that. Was there communication between the Government of Liberia and Bockarie in that period?

  • Yes. In January of 1999 there was communication I would say immediately after the Freetown invasion and into the negotiation for the ceasefire which occurred, I would say, around the middle of January. Yes, there were communications.

  • So during that period there's communication going on?

  • No visits, no. Strictly communication.

  • So then we come down to April, and there's a lot of activity and a visit by Bockarie?

  • Then we have June, July: Lome?

  • August, Johnny Paul Koroma comes to Monrovia?

  • Then we know Sankoh comes to Monrovia in September?

  • That is correct.

  • Bockarie comes then, you tell us?

  • That's number five?

  • Okay. After that, when is the next time Bockarie is in Liberia?

  • The next time Bockarie comes is around November. He and Sankoh come.

  • With a view to patching up their differences?

  • Wait a minute now. Not come together, because Sankoh came from Freetown, but he came through - he was in the bush. He came through the other side, okay.

  • So that's visit number six?

  • And then when again?

  • He comes back around the - close to the end of December where he meets me, Obasanjo and Sankoh.

  • Yes, the last visit he doesn't return.

  • So he then comes on the eighth occasion and doesn't return?

  • Exactly. And doesn't return. That is correct.

  • So, Mr Taylor, when they're talking about Sankoh - I mean, Mosquito being a regular visitor to Monrovia, those, to the best of your recollection, are the eight visits he made to Monrovia?

  • That is correct, between September of 1998 to December of 1999.

  • Next passage I want to deal with is this, page 16148 of the transcript for 12 September 2008. There's a meeting:

    "A. Sam Bockarie who called the meeting, chaired it.

    Q. Now you've mentioned that the topic of an airfield was

    discussed. Actually I should say you mentioned that a

    topic of an airstrip was discussed. Describe exactly what

    was - to your recollection, what specifically was discussed

    in terms of an airstrip?

    A. The airstrip was to be constructed so that we can

    receive our own ammunition. That is we were to be getting

    ammunition from Libya. That is when it arrives it won't

    come through Monrovia, it would come straight to us. When

    Sam Bockarie came that was the message he brought. He said

    we were to try and get the war strip. The work commenced

    to construct the war - the airstrip but we did not see the

    plane that came.

    Q. I'm just going to ask you to clarify the last portion

    of your answer, Mr Witness ...

    A. We constructed the airfield for a plane but we never

    saw a plane land there.

    Q. Who did the construction?

    A. The construction was done by civilians, soldiers

    because when they were going to do that work Sam Bockarie

    will - we would take the radio along, we would be there for

    the entire day and in the evening we would return. Because

    there was a Caterpillar there that was abandoned, that was

    repaired and that was - it was working together there with

    the civilians."

    Now, what do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

  • Nothing. I know nothing about it.

  • Now, remember, we looked at another witness this morning who spoke of you instructing Bockarie that such an airstrip should be built.

  • Had you also made arrangements with Libya for the import of arms for the RUF into this airstrip?

  • Because you note that the witness claims that they were to be getting their own ammunition through from Libya?

  • Because they didn't want it coming through Monrovia.

  • Yes. What do you know about that?

  • Now the witness continued on this topic, the diamonds lost by Issa:

    "A. That diamond was the diamond that was Issa - that Issa

    was to take to Charles Taylor to buy ammunition. Because

    when we returned that was the first diamond that we were to

    use to get ammunition and continue carrying on with the

    operation. They took those diamonds from Johnny Paul and

    others and handed them over to him. When he went he came

    back and told us the diamonds were lost. That was why Sam

    Bockarie himself went back to Monrovia."

    Now, what do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

  • I know nothing about it. I heard it - well, no. I heard about this whole diamond thing in this courtroom.

  • But there's evidence to suggest that there was a radio broadcast in Monrovia which led an initially disbelieving Sam Bockarie to accept the account given by Issa Sesay. Do you recall any such radio --

  • -- report in Monrovia of diamonds being lost?

  • Now, it goes on. At the same meeting there was a discussion about an attack on Kono, and the witness says this, page 16149:

    "A. So the struggle had reached a point where these bits

    and pieces of ammunition that we were getting from Liberia

    was dwindling because the area of the struggle had become

    large and, you know, it is ammunition that fights wars. So

    when Sam Bockarie returned it was at that time that he

    spoke about that, that he had discussed that with

    Charles Taylor, that we should try and get Kono and when we

    would have taken Kono we would get ammunition because when

    we get Kono we will get diamonds and he will help us to get

    ammunition. That was the discussion; the retaking of Kono

    so that we can mine and get enough ammunition, because the

    bits and pieces he'd been giving us used to help us. But

    what we wanted did not happen. That was a clear example,

    when he took that diamond the type of ammunition that he


    Now, what do you understand from that, Mr Taylor, bits and pieces of ammunition?

  • Well, my own interpretation of this bits and pieces of information, he's probably saying that they were small quantities of ammunition that I had been giving them. But if we listen to this witness, he has talked about large amounts in other places. So he's only talking about, in my interpretation, of small quantities.

  • Now, in speaking about bits and pieces of ammunition, Mr Taylor, does anything in particular come to mind?

  • The purchase of arms and of these little amounts from ULIMO in Lofa. That's the only thing that comes to my mind in that period of time that OTP witnesses have talked about.

  • And you note, Mr Taylor, the hint that for the attack on Kono, you provided a large quantity of ammunition. Any truth in that?

  • There is no truth to that because that's the same ammunition that he is also saying - what he said, according to the reading he said what? To attack Kono through to, am I quoting it correctly, through to Freetown. So he's talking about the Freetown invasion when he talks about this, which is not true.

  • Yes. Let's move on to something else. Now, Mr Taylor, remind us, how and when did you find out about the Freetown invasion?

  • I was informed of the Freetown invasion on the morning of - the morning after the invasion by my national security adviser.

  • Now, your national security adviser was who?

  • At that particular time it was Brown, Lewis Brown.

  • Now, Benjamin Yeaten was the director of the SSS, yes?

  • That is correct, yes.

  • Did you receive any information from him about the Freetown invasion?

  • No, no. I received it from my national security adviser.

  • As far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, was Benjamin Yeaten in contact with Sam Bockarie during the Freetown invasion?

  • I really don't know. I really don't. I really don't know.

  • If he was, would you expect him to tell you?

  • Well, if I asked him, yes, he would tell me. I would expect - well, I would say I would expect that he would tell me if I asked him, yes.

  • The reason I ask is this, listen to this passage, page 16173:

    "Q. ... You were speaking of a conversation between Sam

    Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten during the time of the

    Freetown invasion. First of all, can you just describe

    generally who, if anyone, was Sam Bockarie in communication

    with during the time of the Freetown invasion?

    A. Sam Bockarie communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and he

    used to communicate as well with Charles Taylor, but for

    the communication with Charles Taylor that one he used the

    satellite phone. And the capture of Freetown, that was not

    even a hidden thing that he would go to a corner and

    discuss like he used to do, that one he did in an open

    place when he was trying to inform Charles Taylor that our

    men were in Freetown. He did that in the open because the

    RUF was happy, there was joy to the RUF that they had

    entered Freetown.

    Q. Let's start, first of all, what did you observe in

    terms of communications between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin

    Yeaten during the time of the Freetown invasion?

    A. There had been communication between them for a long

    time. It was - let me say it was a sisterly or brotherly

    operation" - that phrase again - "that we had. So whatever

    good or bad information that we had from any of the ends we

    would share that with each other.

    Q. ... I'm specifically asking you in terms of at the time

    of the Freetown invasion what was the state of

    communication - what did you observe in terms of

    communication between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten?

    A. What I observed, it's just like for example when you

    and your subordinates would be doing something you would be

    giving him instructions or orders and that was the way I

    observed. Like the time Sam Bockarie told him about this

    operation that we had in Freetown and he, Benjamin Yeaten,

    told him to send manpower or reinforcement to the city.

    Q. When was that?

    A. That occurred when he spoke with Gullit when he was

    told that they were having suppression.

    Q. When I asked you about the communication between Sam

    Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten you said that it's just like,

    for example, when you and your subordinates, we would be

    doing something while you were giving him instructions.

    What were you referring to when you said 'just like, for

    example, when you and your subordinates'?

    A. In that area - let me clarify it. Benjamin Yeaten was

    senior to Sam Bockarie. That is what I meant directly.

    Q. But when you said you and your subordinates in giving

    an example - I'm sorry, when you said you and your

    subordinates who were you referring to when you said 'you'?

    A. Benjamin Yeaten was the 'you' and the subordinate was

    Sam Bockarie.

    Q. Mr Witness, when I asked you if Sam Bockarie was in

    communication with anyone outside of Sierra Leone you've

    discussed some conversations with Benjamin Yeaten and you

    also said that Sam Bockarie was in communication on a

    satellite phone with Charles Taylor. How do you know that?

    A. That was not any hidden thing, particularly with

    regards to communication, that was not hidden to me

    particularly because I was in charge. Once when Sam

    Bockarie went to Liberia he brought a satellite phone, just

    like a handset that people use, that security guards use.

    That was what he communicated with always whenever he

    wanted to talk to Charles Taylor. When he would want to

    talk to Charles Taylor he would tell like me or the

    operator who would be on duty to tell Sunlight because

    Sunlight was the one who worked at Charles Taylor's radio

    station, the Mansion Ground."

    Now, that clearly suggests, Mr Taylor, that if not you, then at least your director of the SSS, Benjamin Yeaten, had a controlling influence over the Freetown invasion. Is that true?

  • That is not true. That is not true at all. No official in my government had anything to do with any invasion in Freetown. No, that's not true.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on and he's quite specific that Yeaten told Bockarie to send reinforcements to Freetown when Gullit was coming under suppression. What do you know about that?

  • Nothing. I doubt if Benjamin Yeaten would have had to tell an experienced person like - if the RUF was involved in an invasion of Freetown, it would take somebody from Liberia to call Sam Bockarie to say send reinforcement? Sam Bockarie as a general would know what he's supposed to do if he's involved. He would know.

  • Now, it goes on on this same topic, page 16176 - no, I should pick it up at the bottom of page 16175:

    "He would say, 'Tell Sunlight that I want to talk to

    Father', because we used to call him Father or Pa. So he

    would say, 'I want to talk to Pa or Father.' So Sunlight

    would tell Charles Taylor that Sam wants to talk to you,

    and he would switch on the phone and call. At that time

    Sam Bockarie would be on the stand-by. It was not any

    secret. It was not hidden or that the satellite phone was

    not there. No, he had it. He used to hang it on his pants

    walking around with it. It was not hidden. And for

    communications it was - I would either be present or not,

    but I will know?

    Q. At the time of the Freetown invasion, how do you know

    he was - Sam Bockarie was in communication with a satellite

    phone with Charles Taylor?

    A. All along communication on the VHF went all other

    commanders, but the satellite phone communication went on

    directly to Charles Taylor. The night that the dialogue

    took place - that was at the MP headquarters in Buedu - the

    operator who was on duty, Tiger, Sam Bockarie told him to

    tell Sunlight to tell his Pa that he wanted to talk to him,

    and that is Charles Taylor, and that very night Tiger

    passed a message to Sunlight. And where the satellite

    would receive call radios up at the MP and Sam Bockarie

    went into the vehicle and they went. Sam Bockarie, I said

    he went into his vehicle that was having the mobile radio.

    We referred to the radio at Planet 1. The base vehicle,

    that was Marvel too was in a vehicle, and we went into that

    vehicle. We and the - myself and the other operators and

    some bodyguards, we went to the MP. That was where we were

    the night when he called and this discussion took place."

    And then he goes on:

    "Q. Were you present when Sam Bockarie made this call?

    A. I was present. I said I was up at the MP station,

    because that is where there was the hill and that is where

    the satellite got coverage.

    Q. Now, who else was present in this particular instance

    when Sam Bockarie made this satellite call, if you recall?

    A. I was present, Tiger, who was on duty, was present,

    Pascal who was with Planet 1, that is Sam Bockarie's

    station, was there. His bodyguard Commander Foday too was


    Now, nothing could be clearer, Mr Taylor. It's the clearest suggestion that on the night of the Freetown invasion, you were in contact with Sam Bockarie on a satellite phone. What do you say about that?

  • That's a total lie. A total, total falsehood. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am busy. In 1998 December - I have been fighting all 1998. We were just about to put into place the 1996 agreement that was signed in Abidjan. All of us are surprised by this situation in January of 1999. There are calls all over the place, scrambling, trying to bring this here. This boy's got me on the phone with Sam Bockarie carrying on something that, it is very clear before this Court, that the RUF was not involved with. So I don't know. Maybe this is how the - these are some of the difficulties with this situation here. I am not on the phone with Sam Bockarie talking about nothing, about invasion, or anything at that time. No. It didn't happen.

  • But the witness goes on, Mr Taylor, and he specifically says - he refers to the content of the conversation. 16178:

    "The day that the communication occurred between Buedu

    station and King Perry in Freetown, it was that very night

    that the communication took place.

    Q. Do you know what was discussed in this communication?

    A. The one that I heard Sam Bockarie tell Charles Taylor

    was that our men had entered Freetown. They were advancing

    and they'd even captured State House.

    Q. Did you learn anything else about what was discussed?

    A. He was just laughing while we were talking. He will

    say, 'Yes, sir. Yes, sir.'

    Q. Who was laughing?

    A. Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie."

    Mr Taylor, was that you?

  • No, it was not me, but let's remind the Court about something now. There are other - you know, this is the funny thing about this whole thing. Remember now - and I'm sure we can find it - there are other witnesses that describe Sam Bockarie dealing with satellite telephones and what he did when he was about to talk, that Sam Bockarie always moved away from everybody and spoke, now but he is there listening to everything. So there's a difference now in how Sam Bockarie conducted himself in dealing with satellite telephone, and that is part of the records of this Court, that Sam Bockarie would move away from everybody and you could hardly hear what he was saying. Now, here is a man who was a little radio operator who was standing there and he's listening to everything. I don't know what to - how to put this, but it is blatantly, blatantly a fabrication and really a consistent fabrication, as I have seen throughout this thing. It's a lie. That's all it is.

  • Now let's go on to another topic mentioned by this witness:

    "Q. Do you know what would happen to the diamonds?"

    Having described the mining operation in Kono.

    "A. Yes, sometimes he used to travel to Liberia with those


    That's Issa. Issa Sesay would travel.

    "... and at one time on his return he, Eddie Kanneh, Zigzag

    Marzah, Sheku, Sidibay and some other Liberian guys, they

    came along with two white men. Those two white men had the

    semblance of Lebanese. When they came on that day they

    entered and brought out the diamonds, and he put everything

    on the table and they sorted them out. They put all the

    bigger ones one side and they arranged that parcel, and

    those diamonds were given to Eddie, and he asked Eddie to

    take them to Charles Taylor. He said after he would have

    sold them, he would send FOC to go and collect the money.

    But at that particular time when they came, it was only

    Eddie and the white men who returned. And when they

    returned, Sidibay and others stayed for the Guinea mission.

    They did not go with the others. So whilst we were on the

    ground, FOC later went. When he went he was there, and he

    later told us that he did not receive the money and that he

    has not been able to see even Eddie.

    Q. When you refer to 'he', who do you mean?

    A. Issa.

    Q. Now, how do you know he used to travel to Liberia?

    A. Before Issa would go - in fact, we were all in the same

    office and any time he would be going, he would take along

    with him an operator. That was Elevator. He used to go

    with him as far as Monrovia up to the Mansion Ground, and

    at any time the operator returned, he would give me his


    Q. Do you have any information as to what Issa would do

    with the diamonds in Liberia?

    A. Yes, he said he used to take them to Charles Taylor,

    and I will give you an example. At one time there was a

    boy, a commander. Because he was a commander at Tongo, we

    used to him Verbatim. He got one 36-carat diamond, an

    operator at Tongo, and that commander called the station at

    Small Lebanon in Kono. They asked for Issa. We told him

    Issa was not around and we asked what the matter was. They

    said they had got a diamond which was about 36 carats. So

    that particular morning we called Sunlight in Monrovia, and

    at that time Issa was in Monrovia. We wanted to know if

    Issa had moved and whether he was still there. So Sunlight

    told us that Issa had already left. And we called Mortiga

    at Foya for us to find out whether Issa had arrived there.

    He said Sunlight had told him that they had already left,

    but they had not yet arrived there. So we passed the

    message on to Mortiga that when Issa arrives there, he

    should report to him that 36-carat diamond had been

    collected in Tongo. But we did not know that Benjamin

    Yeaten was present in the office when the message went, so

    he transmitted the message to Charles Taylor. So before

    Issa could arrive at Foya, the message had already reached

    there that on his arrival he should take the diamond to

    Charles Taylor, and that was the message that Benjamin

    Yeaten told him. When Issa went and collected the diamond

    at Small Lebanon in Kono, he was very angry. He asked why

    we went the message there. Why didn't we wait for him to

    come? He said even a 52-carat diamond he had taken to

    Charles Taylor, he had not paid at all. He had not

    received all the money. He said now we have sent an

    information that has warranted him knowing about this

    particular one again, and that very night he collected the

    diamond and moved it, and that was the reason why I said

    the diamonds that Issa used to collect, he took them there.

    Q. Okay, Mr Witness, before you - I asked you some

    questions earlier. You were discussing an epode involving

    Eddie Kanneh, Zigzag Marzah, Sheku, Sidibay, and some

    Liberian guys, along with these two white men. The

    incident you were describing with these two white men, do

    you know approximately when this was?

    A. That incident took place before the attack, the first

    attack in Guinea. Because at that time some men came that

    was the mission that they came with, Sidibay, Zigzag

    Marzah, Sheku. They came for that Guinea mission that they

    went on. So when they came, they stayed on the ground.

    They stayed to do the arrangement with regards the attack

    on Guinea and Eddie Kanneh, and the two white men returned.

    Q. You said in your answer when you were discussing this

    incident with these two white men - you said that when they

    came on that day, he entered and brought out the diamonds

    and he put everything on the table, and they sorted them

    out, and they put all the bigger ones to one side, and they

    arranged the parcel and those diamonds were given to Eddie,

    and he asked Eddie to take them to Charles Taylor.

    Mr Witness, earlier I asked you to try to call out names

    when you're giving your answer. When they came on that

    day, they - when you're referring to 'they' who are you

    referring to?

    A. Eddie Kanneh, the white men and Sidibay and others.

    When they came, Issa went to his room and brought out the


    And then he goes on to deal with how they were sorting them out. Now, there's a lot there, Mr Taylor. Do you know someone called Sheku?

  • No, I don't know Sheku.

  • Do you know of a visit to Sierra Leone involving Eddie Kanneh, Zigzag Marzah, Sheku, Sidibay and two white men, probably Lebanese?

  • No, I don't. I don't know about it. Nothing. I don't know anything about it.

  • Now, we had mention of two white men visiting Kono earlier today?

  • Yes, that is correct.

  • Looking at the equipment with a view to making the mining there more efficient, yes?

  • Now, although this account is different, it's the reference to the two white men. Mr Taylor, did you send them?

  • I did not send any white men to Sierra Leone. None. None whatsoever.

  • And Eddie Kanneh. Did you ever have any dealings with Eddie Kanneh over diamonds?

  • Now, that long account which the witness gave about that 36-carat diamond and Issa Sesay's reaction when Issa, in particular, said:

    "Even a 52-carat diamond he had taken to Charles Taylor, he had not paid for all. He had not received all the money."

    Which appears to suggest that effectively you swindled Issa Sesay out of the money for a 52-carat diamond?

  • Yes, that's what he's suggesting. That's what he's suggesting.

  • And that as soon as - and I use this word quite deliberately - your henchman Benjamin Yeaten heard about this 36-carat diamond, you wanted to get your mitts on it. You wanted to get hold of it. Mr Taylor, what do you say about these allegations?

  • I mean, they are just - what word can I use? They are just beyond my thinking of description. These are blatant, blatant, blatant, orchestrated fabrications. You know, although you say it's different, but we're talking about accounting for two white men. One witness comes before this Court and he says that I'm supposed to send two white men, they go, and the only thing they do, they take pictures and they leave. Another witness comes, and they have constructed the white men thing. Now this witness talks about two white men. If we're assuming that we're talking about the same two white men, now they're involved in more than taking pictures. They are involved in sorting diamonds and different things. If two witnesses saw these men, observed them and their actions, how can one describe one - these white men, one say they only took pictures and left and said that we'll hear from them later, but the other witness, who saw the identical thing, can describe a situation where these men are involved in diamonds spreading out of the table. How come this first witness did not see this if he was supposed to be there to see these people taking pictures taking pictures and leaving? So, you know, I don't know how these people do this - I don't know how they get it together this way. But I'm sure by the grace of God before this defence is over there will be a lot that this Bench will get to see and know about witnesses that will appear before - these things are - this is a well, well constructed set of lies. And because they are lies, everybody cannot hold fast to his end of the lie. Two people go, see one man. One said the other man only took pictures and the other man said no, he had diamonds spread out and different things. Then he goes into 36 carat and 52 carats. I never received any carats of diamond from no Issa Sesay, never. Or Eddie Kanneh.

  • But, Mr Taylor, in this particular instance look at the detail which the witness gives about the trip, calling Sunlight, first of all, then Mortiga to so if Issa had reached there, Benjamin Yeaten intercepting the call, all of this. What are you suggesting, that all of that is a fabrication?

  • But he is in Sierra Leone, and the first thing here - you hear about it, he's talking about Sun - this man assumes that Sunlight, there's one human being at the presidency of Liberia receiving calls 24 hours a day that the radio is going on. Everything is Sunlight, Sunlight, Sunlight. Surely he must not know what he's talking about. There are many operators at the place. So is he calling everybody Sunlight? So I mean really - I mean, they had better construct their lies than this. Lies are constructed, so details of lies, once it's untangled, somebody else will come and give a totally different - and there are so many people mentioned here. He's talking about people that he has involved in this lie, I mean, which are not true that Sunlight called and what - yes, he knows people. But, look, the fact of the matter is I don't care how many tales you put to this, the most important part of this, from what I see, are about three or four details: One, that two white men were supposed to go, sent by me. That never happened. Now, all the time Lebanese - they said they looked like Lebanese - he doesn't know Lebanese. All the Lebanese that have been in Sierra Leone over the years, they have been in Kono. They have been living there. Now he says they looked like Lebanese. He doesn't know Lebanese? He knows that Lebanese practically live upcountry, not just in Freetown. He knows that from evidence before this Court. He knows that. So these other names, Mortiga and different things, doesn't mean anything to me. That's the first instance. The second important thing that I see in this thing here, the two accusations, he talks about a 36-carat and a 52-carat diamond that was supposed to be given me by Issa Sesay, and Issa Sesay gets upset and he talks about it, which is a lie. And we will find out that it's a lie.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, on the topic of these two white men, the witness did indeed go on to say this, page 16190:

    "Q. Do you have any information as to why these two white

    men were present at this time?

    A. I do not actually know, because we were surprised. I

    in particular. Because during those times it was difficult

    to see a white man amongst us, because the Lebanese and all

    other whites had run away from us. They had escaped. So I

    was very much surprised to see white men in our midst at

    that particular time. So I did not actually know what

    their mission was, what they came for.

    Q. Do you know the names of any these white men?

    A. What? Those who were in Kenema with Sam Bockarie, what

    they said? Because at that time one of the boys who was

    with him in Kenema was present, he called Mohamed. He told

    me one of them was called Michel."

    What is that? Why the groan?

  • I see where this lie is coming from.

  • Why the groan, Mr Taylor?

  • I see where the lie is coming from by the use of "Michel".

  • Why?

  • I can construct - I see where the lie is coming from now.

  • Where is it coming from?

  • Well, we do have a document that was presented by the OTP of a business partner of Foday Sankoh called Michel in those documents we have from the OTP. I see how the construct is coming about, which blatantly is a lie. This is a Michel that writes Foday Sankoh a note talking about diamonds and their dealings with diamonds in Belgium and so forth. Now, this little boy here now is pumped up now with this lie that I'm sure we will confront. This Michel that he mentions, no relationship to me. This is Foday Sankoh's what do you call it that we have documents from the OTP, and this lie spread across the world, and we will get to it.

  • Now, Mr Taylor, I want us to make a mental note, okay?

  • Page 16190 in the evidence of Mohamed Kabbah, yes?

  • We have this mention of somebody involved in diamond dealing called Michel?

  • Please remember that.

  • "He said he was Sam Bockarie's friend at the time they were in Freetown." Now we're going to leave that point for now, but we will come back to it, won't we, Mr Taylor?

  • Let's go on and deal with another topic. Page 16264 of the transcript for 15 September 2008:

    "Q. So you're in a position to help me with what was going

    in that movement from early 1992 until 2002, aren't you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Now, I want to ask you about one or two events during

    that decade long period and see if you can help me. Do you

    recall in May 1992 a message from Charles Taylor addressed

    to one Anthony Mekunagbe to evacuate all NPL troops from

    Sierra Leone?

    A. Yes, yes.

    Q. Now taking things slowly, Anthony Mekunagbe is who - or

    was who at that time?

    A. Anthony Mekunagbe was one of the generals that was in

    charge of the troops in Sierra Leone, the NPFL.

    Q. And you recall, don't you, that Charles Taylor's code

    name Ebony was, through that message, ordering all Liberian

    troops out of Sierra Leone?

    A. To say that I monitored a message, at that time I was

    not on the set so I cannot say that I monitored it. But I

    came to Pendembu, and there I was when a truck came and

    said that President Taylor said that all his men should go

    because of the problems they had started causing. I heard

    about that. But to say that I was on the set when the

    message came, I did not hear about that. I saw the message

    that came - the truck that came for these people.

    Q. But in any event, and I appreciate what you're telling

    me, Mr Kabbah, and I'm not suggesting that you personally

    received that message. That's not my case at all. But you

    certainly heard about that message, didn't you?

    A. I heard about it. I heard about and I saw that truck

    that came for them."

    Is that true, Mr Taylor?

  • What part of it? Well, there's just so many - it's a mixed bag here. There's some truth, there's some half truths. So if I want to put this in a short focus, I ordered all of my people out of Sierra Leone in May. Now, I did not get on any radio and announce any order, so he's telling the truth when he says he didn't hear it. Yes, that's good of him, because I didn't get on the radio, so he could not have heard me, so that part is true. As to whether that order was to Mekunagbe, that order was not to Mekunagbe. That order - the general that went to withdraw the men was General Dopoe Menkarzon that went to withdraw the men, so that's wrong. So it's a mixed bag of some truth and some not whatyamacallit, but we did withdraw our people with General Menkarzon, and that order came from me.

  • This was May of which year?

  • That was May of 1992, your Honour. This is after the famous Top 20, Top 40, Top Final. That's when the withdrawal occurs.

  • Page 16385, 16 September 2008:

    "Q. Sometimes during the war in Sierra Leone when there

    were media reports on the radio and in the newspaper that

    Charles Taylor had sent soldiers into Liberia, soldiers

    into Sierra Leone, often times that was because there were

    some Liberians who had chosen to fight with the RUF, would

    you agree?

    A. Yes, Liberians were there and so if they said Liberians

    were amongst us they were not lying, they were amongst us.

    Q. But it didn't mean that Charles Taylor had sent them,

    did it?

    A. He sent them. It is just like when you have a child, a

    child that is not guided well, if you send that child on a

    mission sometimes they will go and do something that you

    did not actually send them to do. Those are the type of

    children. They were wayward soldiers."

    Now, yes or no, Mr Taylor, did you send Liberian fighters into Sierra Leone?

  • It's very difficult to say yes or no because it is yes and no. Yes in dealing with the period between 1991 August to 1992 May, and it is no at any other time. So it is both yes and no. But that's why time - being time specific that he's not talking about that. If he's talking about this period of the withdrawal, then it is yes. But it is yes and no.

  • Right. That's all I want to ask you about that witness, Mr Taylor. So let's move on. Now, Mr Taylor, we are now going to move on to deal with another witness. But, again, we need to proceed with care. Do you follow me?

  • Yes, I do.

  • Now, this witness, TF1-274, gave evidence in December 2008, okay? Now, General D-E-G-B-O-N, who is that?

  • General Degbon was a Special Force.

  • Is that the same - this is page 21318 of the transcript, by the way. Now, is that the same individual as the person referred to as General Devon, D-E-V-O-N, by another witness we looked at?

  • I would say that he's talking about the - not speaking for that witness. He could be talking about the same person. Actually, the man's name is General Yegbeh Degbon, okay. He called it Devon. He could be talking about the same person.

  • Help me. How many generals were there in the NPFL with a similar name?

  • None. None. This is Degbon. Yegbeh Degbon, one of the Special Forces.

  • So is he one and the same person, is that your evidence?

  • Now, this witness accepted that General Degbon was a member of the Special Forces and then he speaks of someone called One Man One. Who's that?

  • I didn't know him.

  • Did General Degbon have a nickname?

  • Well, a nickname? No, I don't know of his nickname.

  • Or did he have a code name?

  • He did have a code name, but forgive me, I can't help. I don't remember. I don't remember it. He did have a code name.

  • Well, listen to what the witness had to said:

    "Q. Okay, I'm asking you just about General Degbon.

    A. Yes, that is what I am describing. He had a code name

    Energy. He was code named Energy."

    Ring any bells, Mr Taylor?

  • Yes, I think that was Degbon. Yeah, that's Degbon's code name, Energy, yeah, but he was Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy. Yes, I have no reason to doubt that that is it.

  • When was he Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy?

  • That is during the wartime, our government behind the line, not when I was elected. That was around - we're talking about - this is around 1991.

  • Now, the witness goes on to deal with Black Kadaffa, Mr Taylor.

  • And this is at page 21324 of the transcript for 1 December 2008:

    "Q. You said that the Black Kadaffa unit was 90 per cent

    Sierra Leonean. Approximately 90 per cent Sierra Leonean.

    Is that correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Now, the Special Force unit, do you know the

    composition of this unit in terms of its nationality?

    A. They were purely Liberians.

    Q. You also referred to the Zimbabwe unit. Can you

    explain anything you know about this unit?

    A. Yes, they were combatants. And that was one of the

    groups from which reinforcements used to come from to go

    and fight in Sierra Leone, to reinforce the RUF to fight in

    Sierra Leone.

    Q. Do you know who was in charge of this unit?

    A. I do not know the commanders exactly who were in charge

    of those units.

    Q. And you also referred to a Scorpion unit?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Again, can you explain what you know about this unit?

    A. The Scorpion unit also was one of the fighting units

    that used to go and reinforce us in Sierra Leone, as a

    reinforcement to fight against the Sierra Leone Army, and

    most of them were Liberians.

    Q. Were some others non-Liberians?

    A. I wouldn't recall that, whether there were others who

    were not Liberians, because I did not actually come across

    them directly face-to-face. But with my interaction with

    them I can say most of them were Liberian.

    Q. You mentioned three units, the Zimbabwe unit, the

    Scorpion unit and the Special Task Force unit. Do you know

    where these units were based?